


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
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
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Vice-Chairman of the Council

Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley, K.C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., has been elected Vice-Chairman of the Council for 1955.

Vice-President

Field-Marshal The Viscount Alanbrooke, K.G., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., has been re-elected a Vice-President of the Institution.

Elected Members

Lieut.-Colonel J. A. T. Barstow, D.S.O., has been elected a Territorial Army Member vice Brigadier A. D. McKechnie, D.S.O., O.B.E., T.D., A.D.C.

Other elections are recorded in the Proceedings of the 124th Anniversary Meeting published in this issue of the JOURNAL.

Ex Officio Member

Major-General M. M. A. R. West, C.B., D.S.O., has accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Director, Territorial Army and Cadets.

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The following officers joined the Institution between 19th January and 18th April, 1955 :—

NAVY

Lieutenant H. W. Plunkett-Erle-Drax, R.N.
Lieut.-Colonel R. H. W. Kirby, R.M.
Midshipman (S) J. B. Claro, R.N.
Lieutenant P. D. Minchin, R.N.
Commander G. V. Gladstone, D.S.C., R.A.N.
Commander J. A. Garland, R.N. (retd.).
Major V. St. G. T. Connolly, R.M.
Colonel J. R. C. Browne, R.M. (retd.).
Captain (E) C. J. B. Colthurst, R.N. (retd.).
Major M. A. Wilberforce, R.M.
Commander P. L. Langly-Smith, R.N.
Lieutenant (Sp) P. M. I. W. Hey, R.N.V.S.R.
Cadet M. H. Atkins.
Lieutenant F. C. Darwall, R.M.
Commander (E) I. J. Lees-Spalding, R.N.
Major D. J. Flunder, M.C., R.M.F.V.R.

ARMY

Major C. P. de B. Jenkins, M.C., Royal Engineers.
2nd Lieutenant J. R. Hounsfield, Royal Military Police.
Captain M. A. Glover, The London Rifle Brigade Rangers, T.A.
Colonel J. C. Barrett, V.C., T.D., D.L., Hon. Colonel, The Royal Leicestershire Regiment, T.A.
2nd Lieutenant G. J. Shipman, The Royal Berkshire Regiment.

Major J. R. G. Stanton, M.B.E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
 Major J. H. St. G. Hamersley, Royal Signals.
 Major M. E. Stone, R.A.O.C.
 Major J. S. S. Gratton, The Royal Hampshire Regiment.
 Lieutenant H. A. J. Stacpoole, M.C., The Duke of Wellington's Regiment.
 Captain B. T. Lancaster, Royal Artillery.
 Brigadier V. W. Street, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.
 Lieut.-Colonel W. C. G. Ruddock, late Australian Army.
 Lieutenant P. F. Musselbrook, Royal Signals.
 Lieut.-Colonel A. G. Peart, O.B.E., Royal Engineers.
 Captain R. N. P. Reynolds, 6th Gurkha Rifles.
 Captain W. P. V. Wakley, Royal Engineers.
 Captain E. M. P. Hardy, The Duke of Wellington's Regiment.
 Captain D. W. D. Steward, Royal Artillery.
 Lieutenant K. M. Brecknell, late The King's Regiment.
 Captain P. G. Rowley, Royal Artillery.
 Captain Sir Forster G. Goring, Bart., late The Royal Sussex Regiment.
 Major R. L. Phillips, late Indian Army.
 Major C. S. Fitzpatrick, The East Surrey Regiment.
 Captain R. J. T. Irwin, M.C., The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
 Lieut.-Colonel J. B. P. Phillips, The Queen's Royal Regiment.
 Major-General G. L. Verney, D.S.O., M.V.O.
 Captain A. G. Braithwaite, Royal Engineers.
 2nd Lieutenant L. J. Sabatini, late Royal Tank Regiment.
 Colonel J. N. Mackay, D.S.O., late 4th P.W.O. Gurkha Rifles.
 Captain W. F. P. Currie, 4th Queen's Own Hussars.
 Major J. P. Kaestlin, M.B.E., Royal Artillery.
 Captain J. H. G. Crompton, The Worcestershire Regiment.
 Major A. I. D. Fletcher, Scots Guards.
 Lieutenant C. J. N. Longmore, The Hertfordshire Regiment, T.A.
 Major A. L. Murray, 3rd Carabiniers.
 Lieutenant M. C. Timbs, late Royal Australian Artillery.
 Major A. G. C. Waters, T.D., Royal Artillery.
 Brigadier H. E. Gilbert, D.S.O., O.B.E., New Zealand Army.
 Major L. F. Baker, The Middlesex Regiment.
 Lieutenant C. D. Miller, The Duke of Wellington's Regiment.
 Major R. M. Barnes, late The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
 Captain C. L. B. Gillespie, Royal Engineers.
 Brigadier, D. S. S. O'Connor, C.B.E.
 Brigadier J. O. E. Vandeleur, D.S.O.
 Captain M. Wimbury, W.R.A.C.
 Captain G. E. Symes, R.A.S.C.
 Major D. S. Glover, Sussex Home Guard.
 Lieutenant S. A. Berry, The Duke of Wellington's Regiment.
 Captain P. C. McE. Brooks, Royal Artillery.
 Major A. S. J. de S. Clayton, The Middlesex Regiment.
 Lieutenant N. T. P. Murphy, The Green Howards, T.A.
 Captain J. S. Weeks, The North Staffordshire Regiment.
 Captain P. Platts-Martin, Royal Tank Regiment.

AIR FORCE

Squadron Leader C. J. Woodward, D.F.C., R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader D. E. Adamson, R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader T. A. Evershed, R.A.F.
 Wing Commander D. H. M. Graham, O.B.E., R.A.F.

Squadron Leader D. A. Watson, D.F.C., R.A.F.R.O.
 Flight Lieutenant W. G. Didcote, R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader W. E. Thomas, A.F.C., R.A.F.
 Wing Commander D. W. Edmonds, D.F.C., A.F.C., R.A.F.
 Air Marshal Sir Hugh S. P. Walmsley, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., C.B.E., M.C., D.F.C.
 Flying Officer R. St. J. Milroy Hayes, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant J. Windle, R.A.F.V.R.(T).
 Wing Commander A. W. C. Tustin, R.C.A.F.
 Wing Commander V. C. Woodward, D.F.C., R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant C. R. G. Neville, R.A.F.
 Group Officer J. L. A. Conan Doyle, O.B.E., W.R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant R. M. Jenkins, A.F.C., R.A.F.
 Group Captain E. A. Whiteley, C.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant D. H. M. Chandler, R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant G. M. Hermitage, R.A.F.

PRIZE MEMBERSHIP

Acting Sub-Lieutenant I. D. C. Pearson, R.N., 2nd Lieutenant C. D. B. Butler, The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, and Pilot Officer C. A. Herbert, R.A.F., have been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution.

COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Council hope that many more members will support the scheme for covenanted subscriptions, details of which have been circulated.

This materially assists the Institution as it enables income tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription and goes a long way towards meeting the increased essential costs of administration. The Council wish to thank the many members who have re-covenanted since the beginning of the year.

To date, there are 1,284 annual and 248 life covenanted members.

Any member who has not received his copy of the scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

LIAISON OFFICERS

The following alterations to the list of Liaison Officers, as published in February, have taken place:—

<i>Establishment or Command</i>	<i>Name</i>
ROYAL NAVY	
H.M.S. <i>Dryad</i>	Lieut.-Commander A. E. Fanning, D.S.C., R.N.
R.N. Barracks, Devonport ...	Commander L. E. S. H. Le Bailly, R.N.
ROYAL AIR FORCE	
Transport Command	Wing Commander A. Reece, D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.

MUSEUM

ADDITIONS

A full-dress uniform, 1860, which belonged to Lieutenant Ord-Brown, Royal Horse Artillery (9669) ; a full-dress uniform, 1836, which belonged to Lieut.-Colonel B. C. Brown, Unattached List (9670) ; and a car pennant, damaged by bomb splinters, used by Lieut.-General Sir William Dobbie, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.S.O., when Governor of Malta, 1940-42 (9671). Given by Lieut.-General Sir William Dobbie, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.S.O.

A reproduction of the original woodcut commemorating the liberation of Urbino, 28th August, 1944 (9672). Given by Captain E. G. Perry.

Service dress jacket worn by Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck together with the formation signs introduced by him during the 1939-45 War (9673). Given by Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E., LL.D.

JOURNAL

Offers of suitable contributions to the JOURNAL are invited. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of the recent war; also contributions of a general Service character, such as strategic principles, command and leadership, morale, staff work, and naval, military, and air force history, customs, and traditions.

The Editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers, and, if found suitable, to seek permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's commanding officer.

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Members are particularly requested to notify any permanent change of address.


Naval officers are strongly advised to keep the Institution informed of their address, as JOURNALS sent to them via C.W. Branch of the Admiralty are invariably greatly delayed.

As a serving officer is liable to frequent changes of station, it is better for such members to register either a permanent home or a bank address.

REPRINT OF LECTURE

To meet the demand for copies of the lecture *A Look Through a Window at World War III* given by Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein in October, 1954, a reprint has been made. These are available at 3s. a copy, post paid.





A CORNER OF THE CRYPT
IN THE MUSEUM OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

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ALLIED NAVAL AND AIR COMMANDS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN¹

By ADMIRAL THE EARL MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA, K.G., P.C.,
G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O.

On Wednesday, 30th March, 1955, at 3 p.m.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR RHODERICK R. McGRIGOR, G.C.B., D.S.O.,
in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: There is no need for me to introduce Lord Mountbatten who is so well known to you all. It is sufficient if I say that he was relieved as Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, shortly before Christmas after two and a half years in that appointment. During his last two years he was also Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean, an organization in which he was the first Commander-in-Chief and which he had to set up.

To-day he will be speaking to us in his capacity as the late Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean, and he will tell us something of the problems he encountered and how they were solved. There is much else he might have said about Allied planning and co-operation, but you will all realize that he is limited in what he can say in his lecture or in the subsequent discussion, for obvious security reasons.

My lords, ladies, and gentlemen—Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma.

LECTURE

I FEEL very honoured to have been invited to lecture at the Royal United Service Institution, and particularly under the Chairmanship of the First Sea Lord, on the Command of the Allied Naval and Maritime Air Forces in the Mediterranean.

I want to stress that I am about to describe only the organization with which I was connected in my last appointment and that I shall not be saying anything at all about the many problems with which I shall have to concern myself shortly in the Admiralty.

Before speaking about the actual structure of the Mediterranean Command, I would like to remind you of the steps which led up to its formation.

Sir Winston Churchill's great speech at Fulton on 5th March, 1946, first directed attention to the desirability of mutual aid between the United States and the Commonwealth.

The first concerted political and military measure to be taken by the western nations, however, was the Dunkirk Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, which

¹ A map of the Mediterranean faces page 186.

Britain and France signed in March, 1947; and this was followed in June, 1947, by the introduction of the Marshall Plan for the post-war recovery and reconstruction of Europe. The importance of this plan lay not only in its tremendous generosity, but in the fact that it was aimed at reviving economic collaboration among the European nations themselves, for their own mutual advantage.

The next stage was the signing, by the American States, of the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of Mutual Self-Defence in September of the same year. This treaty had no direct effect, of course, on political or military organization this side of the Atlantic; but its importance to us lay in the fact that it was the first regional grouping of States since the setting up of the United Nations, and that it provided the germ of the idea which was to lead to the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Brussels Treaty—a treaty of economic, social, and cultural collaboration and mutual defence—followed in fact shortly afterwards, in March, 1948, and was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

Up to this the United States, although they had signed the Rio de Janeiro Treaty, had not yet taken part in any military pact in Europe. But three months after the signing of the Brussels Treaty, the United States Senate, by 64 votes to 4, passed the so-called 'Vandenberg Resolution', which recommended the association of the United States "with such other regional and collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid". This statement of United States policy directly paved the way for the North Atlantic Treaty, and for the organization (N.A.T.O.) which it set up. The treaty was signed in Washington, on 4th April, 1949, by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries were subsequently joined by Greece and Turkey.

It is about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Allied Command set up in the Mediterranean, under N.A.T.O., that I wish to speak to-day. When the task for drawing up defence plans for the North Atlantic area was first considered in 1949, no military command structure was envisaged. There was to be a Military Committee of all member nations, under which a Standing Group of permanent representatives from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States would exercise control over five Regional Planning Groups and deal with the area covered by the treaty. It was soon apparent, however, that an Allied military command structure would be necessary; and in December, 1950, General Eisenhower was nominated to the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe: a military command coming directly under the Standing Group. (Later, two other Supreme Commands, the Atlantic Command and the Channel Command, were set up.)

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) set up three major subordinate commands: the Northern Command at Oslo, the Central Command at Fontainebleau, and the Southern Command at Naples. The Southern Command was given to Admiral Carney, U.S.N., and he organized three subordinate commands: Land Forces, Southern Europe; Air Forces, Southern Europe; and Naval Forces, Southern Europe. Admiral Carney himself took command of his own subordinate naval command, and as he was then also the Commander-in-Chief of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), he may be said to have set the fashion for senior N.A.T.O. Commanders to wear more than one hat.

The Southern Europe Naval Command, known as NAVSOUTH, included forces from the French, Italian, and United States Navies (including the U.S. Sixth Fleet). But it did not include the British Mediterranean Fleet; and the reason for this was both strategic and political. To NAVSOUTH, which was concerned with the maritime supply of France and Italy, and the naval air support of these areas by aircraft from the Sixth Fleet, the Mediterranean provided a convenient sea route to the coasts of southern Europe; but for the British, on the contrary, the Mediterranean, besides being a probable battleground in war, was the vital highway to the Middle East. The very considerable army and air forces which the British kept in the Middle East were not included in N.A.T.O., for the area itself lay outside the orbit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—and indeed remains outside it to this day. Therefore, since the protection of sea communications to the Middle East was of primary importance to the British, the British Mediterranean Fleet remained outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

A certain amount of liaison and combined planning took place between COMNAVSOUTH and the British naval authorities; but the situation remained rather untidy until February, 1952, when Greece and Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This brought matters to a head: for C.-in-C. South's planning responsibilities covered the land and air forces of these two countries, but not their navies. It was clear that the whole question of the naval command of the Mediterranean must be resolved; but this in fact took nearly a year to accomplish. In December, 1952, however, the creation of an Allied Mediterranean Command, under the C.-in-C. of the British Mediterranean Fleet, was finally approved. This not only brought the British, Greeks, and Turks under one Allied naval command with the remainder, but it ensured that the considerable British forces in the Mediterranean would be available to play their part in the overall Allied tasks, in addition to securing the sea communications of the Suez Canal.

On the foundation of Allied Forces, Mediterranean Command (AFMED), on 15th March, 1953, the Command of COMNAVSOUTH was abolished: being succeeded by the Allied Command of the Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH), under C.-in-C. South. STRIKFORSOUTH has up to the present time consisted solely of ships of the United States Sixth Fleet, and is charged only with the task of supporting the land/air battle in southern Europe. It has two main components: the Amphibious Force, capable of landing United States Marines against opposition to support a land battle; and the Carrier Task Force, capable of delivering atomic bombs in support of the air offensive. The carrier task force, used in this mobile and flexible way, is an extension of the land-based strategic air force—it will be able to outflank the enemy's front and get closer to him. It is no part of the duties of the Striking Force to support the war at sea; and that is why it does not come under the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief—although the latter is charged with the responsibility for co-ordinating the movements of the Striking Force with those of his own forces.

AFMED, the main Allied Command in the Mediterranean, was then set up at Malta, with myself as Commander-in-Chief. It consisted of forces from six nations: France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and it constituted a major subordinate Command of the Supreme Allied Command in Europe—by virtue of which it ranked as an equal partner with the Southern, Central, and Northern European Commands. My principal tasks were the security of sea communications in the Command, and the support of adjacent Commands.

It might have been supposed that the Allied Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean would have under him all the naval and maritime air forces of the Allies concerned throughout the Mediterranean. On going into the matter, however, I found that this was far from being the case.

Under the N.A.T.O. military organization, it seemed that I was restricted not only as to the actual forces which were to come under my command, but also as to the areas in which I could command them. In point of fact, only those ships and air forces specifically assigned to N.A.T.O. by the respective nations would come under my command in war, or for large-scale, peace-time exercises: and then only on the high seas. The remaining forces were to remain under their national commanders; and coastal waters would also remain under national control—but not necessarily always under those same commanders who commanded the sea-going national forces.

The climax was reached when I discovered that even the extent of the coastal waters themselves had been left undefined; and that some countries wished to include all areas covered by coastal radar sets—which in some cases meant that claims were made for as much as 30 miles from the shore. A glance at the chart of the Mediterranean will show that, if such interpretations were to be seriously accepted, the area of sea which would be left to the Allied Command would make adequate Allied control, or even planning, impossible.

I therefore firmly stated, from the outset, that I would not accept a limit greater than the internationally accepted three-mile territorial limit—though even this would leave all the vital approaches to harbours, and the mine-clearance of swept channels, as purely national responsibilities.

It is true that the un-assigned forces which countries retained under national command were theoretically intended for coastal operations; but in the case of the smaller navies, this meant in effect that the greater part of their fleet was retained, whether actually operating inside territorial waters or not. Unless I could find some way round these crippling restrictions, I could see little prospect of ensuring the security of sea communications throughout the Mediterranean—which is as far across as the Atlantic between Canada and England.

As if these headaches were not enough, I found I had inherited a further complication from Admiral Carney's naval organization: namely, two large national areas, known respectively as the French Zone and the Italian Zone, whose boundaries were still under dispute—and I was directed to leave these under their national Commanders. I was authorized to divide my Command into further areas; but was alarmed at the prospect of a Mediterranean chopped up into a number of comparatively small zones.

Suddenly a solution presented itself. I decided to divide the Mediterranean into areas; and each of these areas would be under an admiral of that nation which had the greatest length of coast-line within the area. But none of these would be national areas: they should be Allied areas, and be christened with geographical names. Thus, the French Zone became the Western Mediterranean area; and as French is the alternative official N.A.T.O. language this became known as *Méditerranée Occidentale*, and the short title of the Allied Commander COMEDOC. Fortunately, the existing Commander of this zone, Admiral Sala, whose headquarters are at Algiers, had already under his command all French naval and

maritime air forces, and all bases and coastal waters in the south of France, Corsica, and French North Africa.

All that was now needed was for me to offer him the Allied Command under me of the Western Mediterranean area—on condition that he was allowed by his Government to retain command of the French forces and coastal waters which were not under me. This was agreed to; and Admiral Sala now had complete control of all Allied and national naval and air forces, on the high seas and in coastal waters, within the Western Mediterranean area. There was still one difficulty in the way of my making overall plans, which was that in theory he only owed allegiance to me for assigned forces on the high seas: I will explain in a moment how this particular snag was overcome.

The Italian Zone was also re-christened: it became the Central Mediterranean area, and included all the waters round Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily. Here the difficulty was to find an Italian admiral who had all the un-assigned Italian ships, and coastal waters, and naval bases under his command. Such a comprehensive command did not exist; but at my request Admiral Girosi was given the necessary powers, and became National and Allied Commander of the Central Mediterranean area at Naples under the title COMEDCENT. His period of command has just finished, and he has been succeeded by Admiral Lubrano.

The Aegean and Eastern Ionian Seas were formed into the Eastern Mediterranean area. Here again, there was difficulty in finding an appropriate Greek admiral, for the Commander of the sea-going fleet had no shore headquarters, and no responsibility for naval bases. Finally, I invited the Chief of the Greek Naval Staff himself, Admiral Lappas, to become my Allied Area Commander; and he kindly consented, with the concurrence of his Government, operating under the title COMEDEAST, from the Ministry of Marine in Athens.

The Black Sea, the Sea of Marmora, and the Eastern Aegean were formed into another area, under a Turkish admiral. Admiral Altincan, Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Navy and Chief of their Naval Staff, at once offered to become the Allied Area Commander—which he did under the title COMEDNOREAST, with his headquarters in the Ministry of Marine at Ankara. The Supreme Allied Commander, General Ridgway, laid down that this area should not be called the "Black Sea Area", as he considered that this would be an uncalled-for provocation to the Russians: so we called it the North-Eastern Mediterranean Area—which no doubt confused the Russians as much as it did us!

This left the South-Eastern Mediterranean, from Malta to Cyprus (including the Libyan and Egyptian coasts, and the Levant) unallocated. Since this constituted the main highway to the British Middle East Command, I placed it under the Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean Fleet. But I realized that I could not very well represent the interests of one particular area or nation, and at the same time take the chair at meetings with all the area commanders; so I turned over responsibility for COMEDSOU EAST to the Second-in-Command of the British Fleet (now Vice-Admiral Reid). This step made it advisable for his staff and mine to be integrated; and our officers were in the same building, at Lascaris, about a quarter of a mile from the Allied Headquarters at Floriana. In the course of this integration several staff posts became redundant, and this enabled me to take outstandingly efficient and experienced staff officers with me when I set up the Headquarters of the Allied Forces, Mediterranean (HAFMED).

There was now only one small part of the Mediterranean still to be dealt with: the small area to the east of Gibraltar. The British Naval Commander at Gibraltar (now Rear-Admiral Currey) was already responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for the sub-area extending from Gibraltar into the Atlantic; he was now given a similar responsibility for the sub-area between Gibraltar and the Western Mediterranean area. As a result of which COMGIB now uses the title COMGIBMED when dealing with the Mediterranean sub-area of Gibraltar.

Since the United States have no territorial possessions in the Mediterranean, no area was put under an American Commander. Although, as I have already said, the Striking Force formed by the U.S. Sixth Fleet was not under CINCAFMED, adequate American naval forces were assigned to the Command to help in the war at sea, including maritime air patrol squadrons, submarines, hunter-killer groups, and minesweepers. American national interests are taken care of by the C-in-C. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), who is now Admiral Cassady. His representative at HAFMED is Vice-Admiral Fife, who is also Deputy CINCAFMED.


When this stage had been reached, the whole of the Mediterranean had been zoned under area Commanders who commanded all naval and maritime air forces, whether assigned to N.A.T.O. or retained under national commands, and whether on the high seas or in coastal waters.

Each area Commander would have in his own headquarters a small inter-Allied staff, in addition to his own national staff. Each of these would comprise one American officer, and at least one officer from each of the adjacent areas; the latter would in every case be of the same nationality as the area Commander he represents. (In Malta, of course, this was painlessly achieved by COMEDSOUEAST borrowing officers of the appropriate nationality from HAFMED, which is just down the road.) This injection of the Allied element into the respective area Commanders' national headquarters would have the double advantage of enabling the hitherto purely national Commander to exercise his Allied functions, while co-ordinating his Allied and national interests.

All that now remained was to devise a structure for the Allied Headquarters which would take account of the national aspects of overall planning. For whereas in the areas the headquarters were essentially national, with the Allied interests injected, at HAFMED, which was by definition the overall Allied Headquarters, it was the national interests which had to be worked in. Fortunately, I was able to draw on experience gained in South-East Asia during the war, when it had been necessary to set up rather similar planning machinery. I invited all the area Commanders to consider themselves members of my Allied Headquarters in Malta—at all events in theory. In practice, since they could not leave their own headquarters, I asked each of them to nominate a rear-admiral to represent them permanently at HAFMED; and each of these representatives was allocated a big room with a conference table in the Allied Headquarters building.

This was readily agreed to; and each nation and area now had its own high-level permanent representative at Malta, with a small staff drawn from his own nationals: some half-dozen officers in the case of the smaller navies, and a dozen or more from the larger ones. It was therefore only necessary for the area Commanders themselves to attend meetings in Malta three or four times a year.

HEADQUARTERS ORGANISATION ALLIED FORCES MEDITERRANEAN



◆ Indicates Chief of Division. ● Indicates One Officer. ○ Indicates One Naval Air Officer. ◎ Indicates Air Force Officer. () Indicates Officer shared by Two Divisions.

The inter-Allied staff has been organized in six divisions, each division being put under a rear-admiral (or appropriate senior officer) of one of the six nations represented. PLANS are under a French officer; OPERATIONS under an Italian; ORGANIZATION, Turkish; LOGISTICS, Greek; INTELLIGENCE, American; and COMMUNICATIONS, British. The staff of each division includes at least one officer of each nation—or perhaps I should say half an officer, since the smaller navies provide few officers, and in some cases one has to divide his time between two divisions. The main point, however, is that no division is without a representative from every nation; so that it would be impossible for even the simplest plan to be started without each nation being fully aware, from its very inception, of what is under consideration.

In HAFMED, officers of any nation are encouraged to meet openly in the room of their national admiral, and to discuss freely in their own language the interests of their own nation and area; so that purely national responsibilities can be taken care of within the Allied Headquarters. I obtained special permission from the Supreme Allied Commander to incorporate this unorthodox feature in the setting up of my headquarters. As a result of this, young officers from each division are able, at their national meetings, to keep their senior national representative informed of what is in the wind; and this ensures that national points of view can be ventilated in the earliest stages.

Two psychological advantages accrue from this arrangement. Firstly, it is far healthier that information affecting national interests should be acquired in the normal course of business than by devious means which would have to be used by liaison officers or military representatives. Secondly, it makes for goodwill as well as for efficiency that the same officer, whose duty it was to report the difficulty to his senior national representative, should be in a position to induce the other members of his own division to amend the paper in question—rather than that the matter should have to go forward as a complaint to a higher level. The practical advantages are also plain: the redundancy of military representatives and liaison officers allows of smaller staffs; while continuous reference back to higher national authorities for agreement is obviated. So the production of acceptable plans is speeded up in every way.

Having catered for possible divergencies among national interests, it now only remained to see to it that land-based as well as carrier-borne aviators also should be able to take care of the air point of view in a predominantly naval headquarters. In HAFMED there is at least one 'light blue' air force officer from each of the six nations concerned, as well as 'dark blue' aviators from the U.S., French, and Royal Navies; and there is at least one of these officers in every staff division—so that the air point of view is fully integrated. The A.O.C. Malta, Air Marshal Reynolds, is Deputy CINCAFMED (Air), and holds his own air meetings, attended by airmen from every division, to ensure that air interests are adequately taken care of.

The organization of the maritime air forces in the Command has proved to be rather uphill work. To begin with, the Greeks and the Turks have no maritime air forces, but are examining the question of naval/air co-operation by any of their air force squadrons which might be available. Next, the Italians have been given "Harpoons" by the U.S. Navy, who have also trained Italian naval officers to pilot them; but the question whether they shall come under the Italian Air Force or Navy is still, so far as I know, under discussion. The United States and French Navies own their own maritime air squadrons, which remain under purely naval command. Finally,

British aircraft not embarked in aircraft-carriers belong to the Royal Air Force, and command of ships and aircraft is exercised jointly by the flag and air officers concerned from a maritime headquarters. In Malta, Air Marshal Reynolds acts jointly with Vice-Admiral Reid in the Command of the South-Eastern Mediterranean area; while Air Commodore Barrett acts with Rear-Admiral Currey in the Gibraltar sub-area.

In comparison with some of the difficulties I have just mentioned, through naval and maritime air forces not being under unified command, it might seem that the American and French system, of the navies owning their own shore-based maritime air forces, would provide an island of simplicity in a sea of complications. But their refusal (which in the American case was particularly emphatic) to place their aircraft under any but a purely naval command has in fact made the situation more difficult.

A solution acceptable to all is not easy to work out; but when I left Malta in December we were thinking along the following lines: the French and Italian maritime air forces would work under their own area Commanders, though the exact command relationship would ultimately depend on the final decision as to whether the Italians would belong to their Navy or to their Air Force. The British would continue to work under their own A.O.C.s at Malta and Gibraltar. The Americans would come under a functional Naval Air Commander, known as COMUSPATMED, directly subordinate to CINAFMED. They would operate, as required, to support any area; and would be prepared to send a liaison officer or delegated Commander to the relevant area headquarters while operating there.

The submarine organization has presented no difficulties, for of course only naval authorities are involved. The Commander of Submarines in the British Mediterranean Fleet would command all Allied submarine operations in war, from Malta, under the title of COMSUBMED, with a small Allied staff. Allied submarines operating in the North-Eastern Mediterranean area would come under a separate Allied Submarine Commander directly under COMEDNOREAST.

I have dealt in some detail on the organization of the Allied Command in the Mediterranean, since its structure is such an unusual one. I now want to talk about the relationship of AFMED to its neighbouring commands.

To begin with, it is clear that such a command can only work efficiently if it has the closest links with the Allied land/air Command of Southern Europe. Admiral Fechteler (the late Chief of U.S. Naval Operations), who exchanged jobs with Admiral Carney in the Summer of 1953, is now C-in-C. South (CINCSOUTH), with his headquarters at Naples. He has two of his subordinate headquarters at Naples: STRIKFORSOUTH (the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet), and AIRSOUTH (his functional Air Subordinate Commander), who is responsible for air operations in Southern Europe. In addition to this, he has two subordinate army commands: LANDSOUTH, at Verona; and LANDSOUTHEAST at Smyrna (or Izmir, as it has been renamed).

Fortunately, Naples and Malta are connected by a fast and frequent air service, as well as by a specially installed telephone link; so staff co-ordination at all levels is easy. To ensure that there shall be continuous liaison between the two commands, CINAFMED keeps a liaison officer (a captain, Royal Navy) based on Naples, but spending a few days every fortnight in Malta. Relations between the two headquarters could not be happier.

In my dual role, as British C.-in-C. Mediterranean and C.-in-C. the Allied Forces Mediterranean, I took care to keep my two jobs physically separate: dealing, in fact, with my British duties when in the British Headquarters at Lascaris, and with my Allied duties when in the Allied Headquarters at Floriana. I found that, apart from being theoretically subordinate to my Allied self, my British responsibilities were unchanged. In peace-time, our British problems in the Mediterranean, such as the Canal Zone, are not affected by our Allied commitments; in making war plans also, the problems have not basically changed. The management of ports, operations in coastal waters, and the logistic support of British forces operating in the Mediterranean remain national responsibilities; but the creation of HAFMED has enabled our planners to know the capabilities, and the intentions, of their Allies, and to fit in their plans with Allied requirements.

So far as British plans are concerned, support of the Middle East Command still looms large; for this is an entirely national commitment. Until my appointment as CINAFMED, the Middle East was a three-Service command, managed by the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, of which, as C.-in-C. Mediterranean, I was the naval member. But when I assumed Allied status and responsibilities, it was undesirable that I should remain as a third partner in a non-N.A.T.O. command; since it might have been an embarrassment to my Middle East colleagues that I should also be a N.A.T.O. Commander—and my N.A.T.O. colleagues might equally have feared that I was in some way involving them in matters in which they did not wish to be concerned.

Consequently, the composition and limits of the B.D.C.C. were revised. Its area of responsibility was reduced and the strategic responsibility for Malta was turned over to me in my British hat when I relinquished my membership. The naval point of view is now represented in this land/air Command by the Flag Officer, Middle East, who acts as a link between this Command and the neighbouring naval Commanders-in-Chief.

I would like to give you some account of how we have been raising the standard of preparedness in the Command: which is achieved, principally, by combined training of all the Allied forces in large-scale and small-scale exercises. The differing initial standards and methods in use in the various national forces presented a difficulty which it is still taking time to overcome. If unlimited funds were available, so that ships could be sent to sea, and aircraft sent into the air, whenever, and for as long, as one wished to do so, the standard of efficiency would improve at an even greater rate. But we are unfortunately in the financial position of having to cut our exercises below what we would all like. Consequently, the comparatively small number of 'live' Allied exercises that we are able to lay on have to be most carefully planned so that they may yield the maximum value.

We have learned to avoid the pitfall of laying on large 'shop window' exercises, that look splendid when reported in the world Press, but do little to advance training. In such exercises there is a tendency to produce voluminous detailed orders in which every situation is pre-planned: so that the captains and senior officers do not have to make any difficult decisions. The result is that, although no mistakes may be made, no lessons are learned.

We started like this. Our first two exercises, "Weldfast" (in conjunction with C. in C. South, in the Autumn of 1953) and "Medflexable" (in the Spring of 1954) were largely of this type. But we soon progressed: and our next exercise was run

without actual ships or aircraft: a 'paper' exercise, "Medshipable", to test our shore headquarters and their communications, as well as our naval control of shipping organization. In this exercise, the Commanders were made to think for themselves and act accordingly, by means of incidents being injected on the sealed envelope system.

This led on to our next exercise, "Medflexbaker", in which actual ships and aircraft took part, but with no situations pre-planned. Two of our area Commanders were invited to fight a third, and both sides started a five days' mock war with no knowledge of the opposing dispositions. Mistakes were made, but also some good decisions.

Immediately after this exercise, the first N.A.T.O. Naval Review was held; 52 ships, and 52 aircraft, drawn from the six nations of the Command, steamed and flew past the North Atlantic Council who were embarked on board H.M.S. *Surprise*. The ships then entered Malta harbour, and a post-mortem conference was held the following morning, attended by officers from all the ships that had taken part—so that the lessons learned could be thrashed out while the events were still fresh in their minds.

These major exercises are mainly of a strategical nature; but it is, of course, essential to carry out tactical training also. This can be dealt with at sea, in bilateral exercises arranged between any two nations, to afford them training in specific functions, such as minesweeping or anti-submarine tactics. It is not possible, however, for lack of money and opportunity, to have as many of these small exercises as one could wish for. I was fortunate in obtaining Admiralty approval for the erection in Malta, as part of the British Joint Tactical School, of a remarkable training device, known as the 'Action Speed Tactical Teacher'. This has provided the means of developing a common tactical doctrine in the Command; and has enabled this doctrine to be taught rapidly and inexpensively to officers of each nation, who come to Malta to do short courses. There are earlier models of this excellent Teacher at Portsmouth and Portland; but the one in Malta is the most highly developed and proving extremely popular with our Allies.

Tactics are also investigated by study groups, containing officers from each Allied navy. These groups meet regularly at different area headquarters and as a result a fund of agreed and up-to-date tactical doctrine is being created. When I left Malta we had groups studying anti-submarine warfare, mine-warfare, submarine warfare, and naval control of shipping.

I hope that my recital of all that has been going on in the Mediterranean will not have led you to suppose that there is a vast staff at HAFMED. Although I say it 'as shouldn't', we have gone in for quality and not quantity; and it is by far the smallest of any comparable N.A.T.O. headquarters. I think, also, that we can truly claim that our Tower of Babel functions both efficiently and happily under the Chief of the Allied Staff, Vice-Admiral Cazalet.

I seem to have left till the end the strategic considerations and war plans for the Mediterranean, which everything I have been describing so far has really been designed to deal with. As I mentioned at the beginning, though I am sure I hardly need to tell you, the principal task of AFMED will be to keep open the sea lines of communication throughout the Mediterranean.

So far as attacks by submarines or surface forces are concerned, the best way of dealing with this is obviously to prevent them from even reaching the convoy routes.

In the Mediterranean we are fortunate in having only two narrow entrances through which submarines or surface forces must come: the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in the east and the Straits of Gibraltar in the west. No enemy can come in by the eastern entrance so long as Allied forces hold both sides of the Straits; and entrance at Gibraltar can be denied to surface ships, though it would be more difficult to exclude submarines. However, it is a long haul that way round, and we do not expect submarines to come this way in great numbers; in any case, plans have been made to deal with any that did make the attempt, and I hope their passage could be made so hazardous as to become unprofitable.

Therefore, since only a trickle would be able to get past Gibraltar, the key to the maritime control of the Mediterranean must be the control of the Turkish Straits. This key is in the safe keeping of C.-in-C. South and the Turkish national forces, supported by Greek national forces on the European side of the Straits. The U.S. Marines, and aircraft of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, in their capacity of C.-in-C. South's Strike Forces, would also be available.

These forces are very considerable; but of course Turkey and Greece have few land communications and their armies and air forces must be largely supplied by sea. The safe arrival of supplies to this vital combat area is a responsibility of CINAFMED, though in many cases a redistribution of these supplies by sea to the troops in the front line is undertaken by the national naval Commanders of Greece and Turkey in their coastal waters. This is an excellent example of the advantages of having Allied and national responsibilities shouldered by the same area Commanders.

If the Turkish Straits were to fall into enemy hands, there would be little to prevent an entire enemy fleet from debouching into the Mediterranean: in the very serious situation that this would create, I have no doubt that CINAFMED would turn to C.-in-C. South for help from his powerful Striking Force. Yet even while the Turkish Straits are held, sea communications in the Mediterranean are wide open to air attack. Enemy aircraft operating from Black Sea bases could carry out fighter-escorted strikes over the whole Aegean, light bomber strikes over most of the eastern Mediterranean basin, and heavy bomber attacks over the whole Mediterranean Sea.

They could attack our ships with rockets, bombs, and torpedoes; they could mine our ports and shallow channels. The mining threat is a formidable one, although local air force all-weather fighters could afford some protection against this, as well as against air attack on ships in harbour.

There are difficulties in providing for the protection of convoys from air attack in the Mediterranean by shore-based fighters, so this will be provided by aircraft-carriers.

However, I have no doubt that the Allied strategic air offensive against enemy airfields and bases, which would be largely carried out by the carriers of C.-in-C. South's Striking Force, will whittle down very considerably the scale of air attack which we could otherwise expect. In fact, you must not think that, because I have dwelt on the defensive aspects of a possible war in the Mediterranean, the offensive aspects have been overlooked. But you will appreciate that for security reasons I cannot give you any details. I am sure that, under my successor, Admiral Grantham, the Command will go from strength to strength.

When I finally left the Command the six admirals from the six navies serving in HAFMED proved that they were practical seamen by kindly manning a six-oared

galley and pulling me off to my despatch vessel. I could not help feeling that this was symbolic of the spirit of HAFMED, where six navies pull together in perfect stroke; and I wondered if it could by any chance be symbolic also of my past two years that I should be sitting back, steering, while others did all the hard work!

I cannot end without expressing my appreciation to the First Sea Lord for having taken the Chair this afternoon. In my recent British hat he was my immediate boss, and in my Allied hat he was part of the galaxy of brass to whom I owed allegiance through General Gruenther. Admiral McGrigor was an ideal chief to serve, clear-cut in his orders, sympathetic to my difficulties, and unswerving in his support; so may I end, Mr. Chairman, by saying "Thank you very much"?

DISCUSSION

MR. J. M. MACKAY: Would the Admiral be good enough to tell us a little more about the Action Speed Tactical Teacher, particularly with regard to the training of Allied forces under CINCAFMED?

THE LECTURER: The Action Speed Tactical Teacher is a very useful device indeed; and when you are teaching Allied navies I should say that it was absolutely invaluable.

We took over a large building in Malta—a gymnasium in fact—and put in it fourteen separate cubicles or cabins, each of which was fitted up in the same way as the plotting room in a ship. Each had an automatic plotting table on which imaginary ships were tracked, and each had a helm with a quartermaster on duty together with the captain, and the latter could give the quartermaster actual speed and helm orders. According to the speed set on the telegraph and the course steered, so the track of the ship was kept on the automatic plotter. So ingenious is this device that if you increase speed from, say, 10 to 25 knots, it takes time for the speed to come up. At the same time, if you put the wheel over it takes time for the imaginary ship to come round to the new course. As you know, an automatic plotter keeps its position by a spot of light which travels along the chart; in parallel with that spot of light is a big one which shines on to a huge screen at the far end of the room; thus complete tracks of the movement of all ships can be kept by plotters behind the big screen.

Eight cubicles are fitted for surface ships and five of these can also be used as submarines. There are cubicles representing an aircraft carrier and also aircraft from both shore bases and the carrier. So the directing staff can set out the positions of the force at the beginning of the engagement lasting perhaps half an hour or an hour, and at the word "Go" all units start off at the speed they have on. There is no time to stop and think. Communications are represented by telephone lines instead of radio, but the important point is that people can walk from one cubicle to another. In CINCAFMED each of the six nations provides a team who understand the Teacher, who can lecture on it, and who know what is going on, so that when you get some ignorant officer who has gone hard-a-starboard when he should have gone hard-a-port or, perhaps, has done nothing at all, you can go into the cubicle and ask him what he is doing or why he is not doing anything, and you can argue it out at the time. If necessary you can stop the game if the argument gets hot, and then go on again.

In my opinion it is better to start Allies on the Action Speed Tactical Teacher in harbour than to start them at sea, because they learn more quickly. At the end of a week you can let them loose at sea. The Turks are ordering one and I think that the French are ordering one, so we are doing a roaring trade for British industry as well!

REAR-ADMIRAL L. W. MURRAY: With regard to the submarine situation, if the rumours which we have heard during the last two or three weeks are true, the Russians are setting up submarine bases in Albania. I hear that two or three floating docks have been seen passing through the Dardanelles.

THE LECTURER : We have always kept an eye on Albania as being the only bit of Iron Curtain territory which actually has direct access to the Mediterranean, and there is no doubt that what you say is physically possible. They could have bases there, but their use depends on what sort of war it is. With a thermo-nuclear war the situation could be settled in one minute! Even if it is not, the position can be taken care of. It is unlikely that submarines would get in without our knowing in advance.

CAPTAIN C. COKE, R.N. : When the lecturer was discussing the exercises in the Mediterranean he did not mention the exercise "Rendezvous". Could he say something about that? It was the first one, which took place a fortnight after the Command was set up, and therefore it must have been planned very quickly. I do not think that it can be secret because it is mentioned in an article in *Everybody's* which is attributed to the lecturer.

THE LECTURER : I did not mention the exercise "Rendezvous" because I did not wish to take credit for what was Admiral Carney's exercise which I inherited with the Command. General Ridgway told me that I must take over before the exercise started and I did—about six hours before it commenced. It was a shop window exercise. Our staff literally joined the Command on Saturday and on Sunday morning the exercise started.

So far as the article in *Everybody's* is concerned, I have seen it because the Chief of Naval Information brought it to me. It is headed "An Exclusive Article by Earl Mountbatten" and it is interesting to see how in so few words a false impression can be created. First of all the article is not by me. I have never seen it before. It is certainly not exclusive, because after I left the Mediterranean the staff wishing, I suppose, to be kind to me, or perhaps to cash in on the fact that I had gone, produced the ordinary standard hand-out dealing with what had happened during the two years I was in command. Well over 1,000 copies were produced, of which I believe some 600 were distributed to the Press before Christmas. This magazine has taken the hand-out and where it reads "The Command was set up under Earl Mountbatten", has made it read "I set up the Command"! It is a very good article I might add, of course!²

MAJOR J. NORTH : I hope that the question is not obtuse, but if air force action is necessary to protect Mediterranean convoys, to whom does CINAFMED turn for it and would he be able directly to control it?

THE LECTURER : It is rather difficult on account of security reasons to answer that question. The air protection of convoys is at present being taken care of by aircraft carriers. I will not deny that the Mediterranean being a narrow sea, if we have aircraft which are based on shore it is an ideal place to use them; but it is difficult to know where to put the actual airfields, because they have to be in N.A.T.O. territory to begin with, and with the limited amount of money available to spend on construction it is necessary to give very careful consideration to where it shall be spent. While this can be done cheaply with aircraft carriers, it costs a great deal to lay on the same thing in peace-time on shore. Although ideally the aircraft should operate from shore bases, the various difficulties which I have mentioned have made us rely for the moment on aircraft carriers.

² Admiral Mountbatten subsequently informed us that further investigation showed the article to be one of several produced by the various Allied Commanders-in-Chief, in accordance with S.H.A.P.E.'s policy, to publicize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was, in fact, produced by his Allied staff in Malta on identical lines to the subsequent standard hand-out and sent to the British Society at the latter's request for syndication in the important daily and Sunday newspapers of the world. The British Society supplied it to a literary agency in Paris, who sold it to *Everybody's*. He therefore felt he had mistakenly accused *Everybody's* of having tampered with the hand-out; whereas they had, in fact, obtained an article issued by him shortly before leaving the Allied Mediterranean Command in December, 1954, and he had not recognized it as such.

CAPTAIN R. B. N. HICKS, R.N.: Would the lecturer care to say something more about COMGIBMED? Can he take Mediterranean ships into the Atlantic and, conversely, can Atlantic ships be taken into the Mediterranean?

THE LECTURER: That is under discussion at the present moment. It is clear, as I have already said, that it is an absolutely vital point to prevent enemy submarines getting through, and clearly one of the two Commanders-in-Chief should be responsible for producing the force. He should have the right to operate on either side of the Straits, because, clearly, if you cut the control at Gibraltar itself, it would mean that transit offensive would be completely ruined. The question, which was left undecided when I left, was who should do it. If CINCEASTLANT does it, then we wonder whether he would be rather half-hearted because it must suit his book that as many submarines as possible should go into the Mediterranean! We would be prepared for him to do it if we thought his heart was in it. We do think that a commonsense arrangement will be made and one of the two Commanders-in-Chief will be given final responsibility for this.

ADMIRAL SIR HAROLD BURROUGH: I think that during the last war the Mediterranean Command was extended to the westward of Gibraltar in order to deal with U-boats attempting to pass through the Straits.

THE LECTURER: I should not think it was necessary to have more than the right for CINAFMED to extend the transit offensive into the Atlantic.

CAPTAIN S. H. PATON, R.N.: Were any difficulties experienced by all these nations in providing a sufficient number of English-speaking officers who understood naval terms, so that the set-up would work smoothly without much interpreting?

THE LECTURER: It is astonishing the amount of English known by the various navies. It is not the case in the other Services. Sailors learn English very well and the young bachelors pick it up surprisingly quickly at Malta!

I do not know whether you realize it, but of course any language other than English, or in special cases French, is taboo in N.A.T.O. headquarters because it is not a recognized language, and nationals at other N.A.T.O. headquarters are not supposed to get together and talk nationally. Of S.H.A.P.E., General Eisenhower said: "When you enter these portals you leave behind all national or Service allegiance." This idea of allowing our nationals to get together and talk their own language is quite novel. We encourage nationals to talk their own language quite openly because it is human nature. You cannot really prevent men talking about their own nation in their own language. We have not had the slightest difficulty since our Headquarters were started two years ago.

LIEUTENANT R. B. SUMMERFIELD, R.N.V.R.: How do communications work out among the various ships in the Allied Fleet? Have you had the same success in communications or have there been difficulties?

THE LECTURER: It is all right as long as they stick to the Fleet Code. If the proper words are used they understand each other, but what often happens is that a Scotsman gets on to a Turk who appears to have fluent English, and sometimes departs from the Fleet Code, then trouble results. But it is quite astonishing how clear they are and how well they understand ordinary routine signals if you do not go outside them. Handling communications in Malta are telegraphists from every nation, and the whole Allied organization is under an Italian C.P.O., and I might say that he is absolutely first-class.

I would say that communications are really going ahead extraordinarily well. Morse is being read without any difficulty, and provided you do not break off into colloquial language, you get received very well.

CAPTAIN M. B. PAGE: Has the signing of the Bled Treaty caused any change in the responsibility of CINAFMED? I have in mind those aspects delegated to MEDCENT.

THE LECTURER: Not so far as CINAFMED is concerned. The Treaty concerns Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, and not Italy who are not in it yet. I have talked twice

with Marshal Tito and there is no question that although he is completely outside the Iron Curtain and we shall help him with training, he has no desire to come into N.A.T.O. as an organization, nor do I think at the moment he is particularly wanted. Therefore any naval training done is a sideline between Britain, Yugoslavia, and possibly other nations.

WING COMMANDER E. E. M. ANGELL : The lecturer said that one of the difficulties which he experienced was the reluctance of the Americans to allow their maritime aircraft to operate in British areas where under a joint command. Is it a fair question to ask the reason for that ?

THE LECTURER : I did not say that there was a reluctance on the part of the Americans. I said there was an absolute refusal ! It is not for me to speculate on this question, but the fact is that as a matter of American policy they would only take orders from the Navy. They are very friendly, but it is a matter of American naval policy. We have not solved this yet, but the solution appears to me to be to have an air commander for United States naval aircraft in Malta who will nominally give the orders. They will not allow any air force commanders to give the orders to their naval aircraft.

REAR-ADMIRAL L. W. MURRAY : Might it be possible that their difficulty is connected with the fact that the American dark blue airmen have custody of the bomb, and that that must be controlled by United States Command ?

THE LECTURER : I agree. That is the right answer and please consider it substituted for my previous answer.

THE CHAIRMAN : If there are no further questions it remains for me to thank Admiral Mountbatten for his interesting lecture. You have seen something of the very great difficulties which he had at the start with six nations and all their national, political, and other problems in these very narrow waters of the Mediterranean. You have heard how he set up his own very original and unorthodox method of solving these problems. There are still one or two things to be solved, but what he has done is wonderful, and it works. I went out there a year ago to see what was happening and I went out again early this month to have another look, and all I can say is that you have there a very happy and efficient set-up with officers of all these six nations working together in very close harmony. That is what one might expect because they all know that they are doing a worth-while job and that they are trusted. There is no looking over the shoulder as might happen elsewhere.

There is also this point that it is a very welcome economical set-up from the point of view of manpower.

Admiral Mountbatten is relieving me very shortly as First Sea Lord, which was the appointment held by his father some 40 years ago. I am sure that at the same time as we thank Admiral Mountbatten for his lecture we shall all wish to join in wishing him every continued success in the future. (*Applause.*)

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY : Before we break up I should like in your name to thank Admiral of the Fleet Sir Rhoderick McGrigor for having taken the Chair this afternoon. As you know he has been three years as Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord—three years which must have been fraught with more changes than any other three years in the history of the Navy. He has dealt with them and you can see how well he looks on it. We wish him a long rest, we thank him for having taken the Chair this afternoon, and express the hope that we shall see him again at this Institution many times after he has had his holiday. (*Applause.*)

THE CHAIRMAN : Thank you very much.

Infant

ALLIED FORCES MEDITERRANEAN



Drawn by NTD/WCO, 29/53.

NEAN — SUBORDINATE AREAS.



THE INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL SERVICE WITH THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC FUTURE

By MAJOR-GENERAL C. LLOYD, C.B., C.B.E., T.D.

On Wednesday, 1st December, 1954, at 3 p.m.

GENERAL SIR CAMERON NICHOLSON, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.,
in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: We welcome to-day General Lloyd who is going to address us on the Integration of National Service with the Country's Economic Future.

General Lloyd at the moment is the Chairman of the British Association for Commercial and Industrial Education. That is rather a mouthful but its more familiar title is B.A.C.I.E. He is in addition a member of the Boy Scouts Association and a former member of the Advisory Councils on Education for England and for the Colonies. It is, however, as a soldier that this audience know him best. You will remember that he was first D.A.G. for Home Forces and 21 Army Group during the war, and immediately afterwards became Director of Army Education, a post which he held for five years.

LECTURE

I HAD better begin by explaining the limitations of my interpretation of the subject, because I have a most uneasy feeling that many will have read into it much more than I had intended or anticipated. The subject had its origin in a conference on industry and National Service which the British Association for Commercial and Industrial Education, B.A.C.I.E., held in March of this year. I was then the Vice-Chairman of B.A.C.I.E. (I am now the Chairman) and had the task of summing-up the conference. It was as a result of this summing-up that the idea of this lecture arose. The title was suggested to me and I agreed to it, but while preparing it I have realized that the use of the word 'economic' may have misled you.

The conference to which I have referred dealt mainly with the personnel and personal sides of National Service—which indeed are by far the most important from any point of view—but not with the purely economic or financial aspect of the subject. I propose to deal with my subject from the former point of view, that is, to discuss the implications of National Service for the personnel of industry and therefore on the economic future of the Country. This latter phrase would perhaps have been a better title for the lecture, since I am by no means qualified to deal with the purely economic aspects, if indeed National Service can usefully be discussed in this way in isolation from foreign policy.

I am not, of course, going to enter into any discussion of the pros and cons of National Service—I am going to take its existence for granted and regard it as an accepted feature of our national life. Indeed, with our new commitments in Europe, I cannot see how it can be otherwise, whatever political party is in power, for the foreseeable future.

One of the aspects of the National Service scene which is most to be deprecated is the somewhat parochial way in which those concerned with it are apt to regard it. Parents, teachers, and youth workers are inclined, in the main, to regard it almost as a social evil or, at best, a nuisance which interrupts a boy's early career. Industry often sees it as a period of vacuum for its technical and other skilled people in training. The Services—preoccupied with their difficult problems (unique for them in time of

peace)—are apt to ignore, or to be resentful of, the civilian aspects of the problem and with civilian concern with it. The boy, himself, naturally looks at it from a purely personal viewpoint and is often completely bewildered.

Now the devil of it—to one like me who has been on both sides of the fence—is that all these people have some element of truth and reason in their views, but there is no one single authority which is, at present, charged with the responsibility of looking at National Service in all its aspects and of co-ordinating the views, requirements, and actions of the various agencies concerned with it. One of the most interesting results of the conference, which I mentioned earlier, was the understanding which it brought about on the part of industry and the Services towards each other's problems.

My only reason for undertaking the not inconsiderable task of preparing this lecture was that I might perhaps be able to indicate a line of thought which could do something to reconcile the present divergences of view and to point a way in which all these interests can work together towards a common end, which must surely be the ultimate good of our young men and therefore the ultimate good of the Country as a whole. If I can even start a rational and reasonable discussion—free from sectional interest—of the problems which National Service creates for all of us, I shall be quite satisfied.

The basic factors of the situation are simple enough. Economically we produce or we perish, and we must be able to produce goods of high quality, thoroughly up-to-date in accordance with the latest advances in technology, and at prices which allow us to meet increasing competition in world markets. We cannot produce unless our defences keep us free to do so, but we can only have the defences which we can afford. Both industry and the Services therefore are mutually interdependent, and it is essential—probably never more so than now—for both sides to get together to ensure the efficient working of National Service.

The fundamental point for our purpose today is that our wealth lies in the skill, knowledge, and personal qualities of our people.

It is very easy in considering this problem to get all airy-fairy and to speak purely in generalities. This I am very anxious to avoid, since I am sure that this is at the root of a good many of our problems in connection with National Service. I have therefore prepared, and am going to show you, some diagrams of the structure of industry and the Services, and the personnel within them, in order to provide a factual background for discussion.

A word of warning about these diagrams. They are not exhaustive although I believe that, so far as they go, they are accurate. I have had to prepare them myself, and I must confess that as I got well into the business of preparing them I thought up in each case a better way of doing the job. I would like here to pay a tribute to Major Cope of my staff, who has prepared the blackboard version of them. However, my main object this afternoon is to begin an analysis of National Service from an overall point of view in the earnest hope that a Government Department, or some other agency with greater resources than I can command, will complete the picture.

But let us first look at the standard analysis of industry as adopted by the Ministry of Labour for its statistical purposes.¹ As a whole, it is divided into main groupings, as follows :—(A) agriculture, forestry, fishing ; (B) mining and quarrying ;

¹ Shown as Diagram 1 at the lecture, but now set out below in the text.

(C) non-metalliferous mining products ; (D) chemicals and allied trades ; (E) metal manufacture ; (F) engineering, shipbuilding, and electrical goods ; (G) vehicles ; (H) metal goods not elsewhere specified ; (I) precision instruments, jewellery, etc. ; (J) textiles ; (K) leather, leather goods, and fur ; (L) clothing ; (M) food, drink, and tobacco ; (N) manufacture of wood and cork ; (O) paper and printing ; (P) other manufacturing industries ; (Q) building and contracting ; (R) gas, electricity, and water supply ; (S) transport and communication ; (T) distributive trades ; (U) insurance, banking, and finance ; (V) public administration and defence ; (W) professional services ; (X) miscellaneous services.

Of these, the main groupings from our point of view today are probably : (A) agriculture, etc. ; (F) engineering, etc. ; (G) vehicles ; (Q) building, etc. ; (S) transport, etc. ; and the other diagrams have been prepared in relation to this classification, as you will see, using the alphabetical indicator letters to save repetition and for clarity.

This standard classification is itself extremely interesting, as it gives an overall picture of industry and enables us to focus on the major groupings. Broadly speaking, the major divisions of industry are :—

- (1) *Productive*.—Agriculture, mining, chemicals, metals, engineering, vehicles, textiles, leather, clothing, food and drink, wood, paper, building.
- (2) *Services*.—Gas, electricity, water, transport.
- (3) *Distribution*.—The distributive trades.
- (4) *Professional*.—Banking, finance, public administration, etc.




Diagram 2 is designed to show the distribution of males of all ages in the various industrial groupings with the proportion (shown in black) of those under 20 years of age. You will see that the proportion is significant in agriculture (11 per cent.), engineering (8 per cent.), vehicles (8 per cent.), building (10 per cent.), transport (5 per cent.), although there are certain small groups, such as precision instruments, etc. (10 per cent.) which are extremely important and disproportionately to their size. This diagram gives a perspective view of the distribution of personnel in industry, with the important exception that women are omitted.

DIAGRAM 3

**DISTRIBUTION OF MALES AGED 15-17
ENTERING EMPLOYMENT ANNUALLY**





Diagram 3 gives an analysis by industrial groups of young men 15-17 years of age entering employment in Great Britain in one year (1952). From this diagram—which follows diagram 1 very closely—you will see the significant numbers which enter the productive groups which we have already mentioned.

I ought at this point to make a general observation about industry which I believe to be of fundamental importance. Recently, I have listened at conferences on industry and National Service at which speaker after speaker has spoken of industry in the same sense as we speak of the Royal Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force—that is, as if it were a single entity under unified administrative control, as, for example, the Army is under the administrative control of the War Office. This, of course, is by no means the case—in fact, almost the opposite is true—each unit of industry is autonomous and the only ultimate sanction is that of Parliament, although I suppose that it is true to say that certain Government Departments, such as the Ministry of Labour, the Board of Trade, and the Ministry of Supply exercise some sort of control directly or indirectly in certain aspects of the administration of industry.

**ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRY BY
SIZE OF ESTABLISHMENT**

DIAGRAM 4



The fourth diagram is intended to emphasize the point which I have just made and to go a little further in analysing the structure of industry. I am afraid that the diagram is somewhat complicated and in order to make it reasonable, I have restricted it to certain industrial groups as you will see. To explain the way in which it is constructed, I will select the engineering group, which is by far the largest. You will see that for each group there are two columns—the one on the left shows the distribution of establishments by size—the lower part of the column indicates establishments with less than 100 employees; the middle part shows those with more than 100 but less than 1,000; and the upper part shows those with over 1,000 employees. From this, you will see that by far the largest group is that with less than 100 employees and the overwhelming majority have less than 1,000. Incidentally, I have not shown agriculture on this diagram but if I had, you would have seen that practically the whole column is less than 100 employees with just a very small section between 100 and 1,000.

The right-hand column shows the number of employees actually employed within the establishments shown on the left, and you will see that on the whole, the greatest number of employees is contained within the establishments employing less than 1,000 employees. The importance of this analysis for our purposes today can hardly be overestimated, as the size of the establishment naturally determines to a very great extent the type of administration and the extent of the facilities which can be offered to the employees. For example, an enormous establishment such as I.C.I. has a splendid range of welfare and training facilities which a small firm cannot hope to afford, even if it wished to do so. It would be comparatively easy in I.C.I. to put across some ideas about National Service to the young employees, but to do the same thing for the youngsters in the smaller industrial units is relatively much more difficult. I will return to this point later, but I ought to say here that a similar analysis of units in the three Services would be extremely interesting also. I was unable to do this as the information is not readily available and it has a security aspect. I am fairly certain, however, that such an analysis would reveal a situation not very different from that in industry.

ANALYSIS OF MALES AGED 15-17 ENTERING EMPLOYMENT ANNUALLY

DIAGRAM 5

APPRENTICESHIPS(OR) LEARNERSHIPS TO SKILLED CRAFTS

EMPLOYMENT LEADING TO RECOGNISED PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS

CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT

OTHER EMPLOYMENT

The next diagram (number 5) shows an analysis of young people entering industry in one year (1952) by types of employment—that is the proportion in apprenticeships (or learnerships) to skilled crafts in employment leading to recognized professional qualifications and in clerical employment as compared with what the Ministry of Labour calls “other employment”—in other words what we would call unskilled or general duty work. The interesting thing to me about this diagram is that it shows that the number of boys in skilled or professional employment is very nearly one half of the total and approximately equal to the number of boys going into general employment. The proportion now is much greater than it was before the war—surely an exceedingly good thing.




Diagram 6 shows the distribution to the three Services of the whole of the National Service intake in the year 1953 and the distribution of those entering the Army as between the various arms of the Service. This distribution is probably well known to you—it is remarkably even and rather fewer boys go into the Infantry than one would have thought. I would just like to mention here in passing that this distribution is quite different from a similar analysis for an army in the field in time of war. The technical arms and supply services then take a far greater proportion of the total, as I well remember from my experience with 21 Army Group. The great majority of those who enter the Army enter arms having a specialist function and,

of course, all of those who go into the Royal Air Force are earmarked for specialist work, as are the relatively few who enter the Royal Navy.

Diagram 7 (which it is unnecessary to reproduce here), was a very simple one which I thought it worthwhile to display simply to show the overall picture at any one time of the distribution of young men of National Service age. It illustrated the situation of the men in the 1929 age class as at September, 1949—that is when they were 20 years of age. It showed that 65.9 per cent. were in the Services, 11.1 per cent. were medically unfit, 9.5 per cent. were in agriculture, coal, and the Merchant Service, 13.5 per cent. were deferred apprentices or students.

Diagram 8 is designed to show the extent to which, on the one hand, the demands of the Army for the tradesmen which it requires can be met from among the civilian trades of the incoming National Service man, and on the other, by implication, the proportion of National Service men with civilian trades who cannot be absorbed into a trade in the Army. I must point out that this diagram, although the most interesting from many points of view since so much has been said about the bad placing of tradesmen in the Army, has been an extremely difficult one to prepare in spite of the greatest assistance from the War Office and the Ministry of Labour. I am not entirely happy about it, as the terms used for the various trades inside and outside the Army are so different and I would most certainly like to see an official version. It is, however, sufficiently accurate for our purposes today and to me it shows a very surprising thing. It must be emphasized that the trades in industry are, on the whole, 'productive' trades while those in the Forces are mainly 'maintenance' trades. If we assume, as we must—but it is an important assumption—that the placing of individuals is accurate, then there is a greater demand for tradesmen in the Army than can be supplied. We must not forget of course that the R.A.F. and the R.N. take a very large number of tradesmen before the Army gets a chance. This must mean that there should be no great difficulty in keeping an intelligent boy fully employed during his National Service in a job requiring technical knowledge and skill, and therefore making demands on his powers.

I have shown these diagrams—as I have already said—in order to provide a concrete background—even if it be somewhat incomplete—against which we can isolate certain important factors for discussion. This I would now like to do.

At this point, I must attempt what the B.B.C. calls a recap. We have reviewed the structure of industry and the distribution of personnel within it. We have seen that industry is not a single entity under unified control but is largely made up of smallish units. We have looked at the equivalence of civilian and Service trades and the extent to which they match in numbers and nomenclature. I must now turn from the particular to the general, since by no means all the important features of National Service are brought out by the diagrams.

The first is the skilled person. It is important to realize that there is no hidden reserve of such people. You will have noticed the very considerable proportion of skilled persons in the intake and the difference between the crafts and technologies in which they are engaged in industry and those, as nearly equivalent to these as possible, into which they can be absorbed into the Army. Now this group is of very considerable—indeed critical—importance to industry as well as to the Services, and I would first of all like to discuss the problem which they create for us very thoroughly. We may take it as axiomatic that it is very largely on these people that the economic future of the Country depends as well as the technical efficiency of the Services.

Apart from National Service, a proper proportion of them must somehow or other be encouraged to become Regulars.

The group includes the apprentices, most of whom are deferred and take their National Service when they have completed their apprenticeship. The absolutely minimum requirement for these people is that their period of service does not result in a serious deterioration of skill and efficiency. I am of the opinion that, in many cases, it is not necessary for them actually to be filling equivalent jobs in the Services, provided that they are kept usefully employed and, above all, have their potentialities for leadership properly developed. One of the greatest requirements of industry today is for leaders (or managers and foremen) at all levels, and if the Services can send their young men back into industry having given them confidence and skill in the handling of men and in what we call 'man-management,' then they will have performed a great service to the Nation. If a qualified man is employed in a job different from that which he occupies in civil life, then he must be provided with the opportunities, at least in his own time, to keep abreast of developments in his own field and to keep his hand in at his manual or bench trade.

In this respect, the Services must remember that they are serving their own long-term interests. If war should come at some time in the future, these men which we are discussing now will, in all probability, be in reserved occupations occupying key positions in productive industry. Now it is on the efficiency of this side of industry that the Services will have to rely for the supply of weapons and materials of war, and by-and-large they will determine the extent and degree of the war effort. Morale will also be important and will, to some extent, be determined by the attitude of these men to the Services—this in turn will depend on their treatment during National Service. Even those who are recalled from the Reserve for service in war will more often than not have to change their cap badge from a fighting arm to a supply or technical arm.

I would like here, if you will allow me, to indulge in an aside which is not part of my main theme and only marginally connected with my subject. It is that I do hope that we are this time looking very closely at the employment of technically qualified personnel in military employment in the Territorial Army. At the outbreak of war, I had the honour to command a battery of field artillery in the Territorial Army, and the regiment of which it was part had twice won the King's Cup. We felt and were told that with a very little shaking down we were ready to go overseas and fight, but we had no sooner mobilized than we were subjected to what was then called 'the comb out,' and we lost—almost overnight—all our men who were in this category that we have been discussing. Among these were most of the very men who were also key men from the military point of view—among them the battery sergeant-major and three of the number ones. We were thrown right back to the beginning and it was another year before we were really ready to go overseas, although before then—as is the way with the British Army at the beginning of wars—we were in the thick of it in France. You are all aware of this problem and have no doubt had first-hand experience of it. I mention it here to underline the need for overall planning with regard to personnel—particularly those with important skills—and I shall return to the point later on.

So much for the actual apprentices. In these days industry is giving more and more technical training to personnel who before the war would have been called 'general duty' personnel. This reaching down of technology and specialization into

the field of the general duty men is also a characteristic of the Services, and in both the Services and industry practically everyone now is a specialist of some sort or the other. In industry this category has no agreed title but, for the purposes of this lecture, we will call them operatives, which is a term often used for them although it has a specific meaning in certain industries. For operatives and other personnel not fully trained when they leave industry for National Service, two things are supremely important. One is that their standard of what we call general education should be maintained, and the other is that their technical skills shall be maintained and, if possible, extended. Industry today is quite unanimous as to the importance of general education, as may readily be seen by its sustained criticism of the standard of education of the products of the educational system which come to it at 15. It is not my job today to say anything about education as such, except to point out to you that industry finds it essential to make provision for continued education of its personnel. The present attitude may be illustrated by the remarkable growth of day-release, by the establishment, by practically every firm which can afford it, of an education staff and facilities, by the considerable contribution to educational thought and literature by the foremost industrialists of today—and so on. The operative will not, I think, usually be among those selected for specific training in leadership, but he will be all the better for the opportunity to participate under good leadership in joint activities of a team nature. It is very significant to me that in my visits to industrial units which I am constantly making, as well as my visits to Service units, the happiest and most efficient are those in which the leadership is good and where the operations are carried out in teams.

The second point I should like to lead up to is this. Let us for a moment discuss the environment of the boy all through this process of going into the Services. In school he has what one might call a stable environment. He gets into industry and again finds a stable environment, although industry of course is very rapidly evolving at the present time. What of the Services? Hitherto, the environment has been somewhat unstable, but because of circumstances very largely outside their control and which arise from national policy. I think that those members of the audience who are in the Services ought to make a special point of putting this point of view across to the civilians. I will illustrate what I mean by two examples.

I hear the Services criticized very often about their treatment of National Service men. This is largely due, or has been due up to now, to lack of Regulars or experienced people to do the training. Why is that? The answer is, of course, quite simple. The rapid run down of the Services after the war caused unbalance of personnel, and I think that this was particularly true of the Royal Air Force. Then there was an equally rapid expansion, still further unbalance of personnel, and therefore great difficulties over training. That, of course, has nothing to do with the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force—it is the direct result of national policy for which everybody is responsible, and that ought to be put across.

The second example, which is a totally different one, is the 'civilianization' of routine employment so as to release National Service men from 'spud bashing' and so on! The nation has a policy of full employment. The Army alone, I have discovered, employs 187,000 civilians at a cost of £67,000,000 annually. The Nation can have this civilianization if it is prepared to do two things: first, if it is prepared to divert more civilians for permanent service in the Army and, second, if it is prepared to pay for them. There is something which can be done, but it can only be done as a result of national policy. I think that that point should be in the fore-

front of any discussion on National Service as between the Services and the civilian side. There is the equally important point that things in the Services can in fact rarely be stable, and we must make everybody realize that stability is really the fundamental requirement for good education and training.

When I was Director of Army Education after the war and I used to get criticisms from educational administrators of what we used to do, I would say to them, "Would you like to do some of the things we attempt to do with the unstable conditions that we have to put up with?" and of course the answer was "no". Civilian educationalists would never put up with unstable conditions in the schools.

I should like to balance the last point about instability by a very brief survey of the enormous assets of Service life. There is community life with all classes living and working together, comradeship, the feeling of mutual interdependence, and so on. There is opportunity for travel, there is good, regular food, etc., exercise in the open air, and then there is what I personally regard as the most important, the opportunity for exercising leadership and working together as a member of a team. That is an absolute fundamental requirement, both in industry as well as in the Services. Of course, when boys are in the Services they have opportunities for spiritual care and development, and then there is education, and that which is provided now I am satisfied is at least equal to what is provided on the average to any boy before he enters the Service.

We also must not forget that before a boy is 20 he goes through at least two changes which I would call—from his personal point of view—cataclysmic changes. The first is when he has to go from school to industry, and the second when he has to go from industry to National Service. The boy at 18 is not an adult and it is no good saying he is. For most of them Service life is rather a closed book. The effect of the imminence of National Service on a boy's attitude to his career can be very great, as we all know, and one of the most serious points about National Service is that the very imminence of Service does cause very many boys to defer the adoption of a useful career. It is here that we see the great importance of pre-Service courses.

I suppose you know that a number of the large and enlightened firms already hold these pre-National Service courses and the results—unfortunately I have not the time to go into them—are most interesting and stimulating, and the boys who have this opportunity do much better than the boys who do not. But it is easy for the large firms to do it and difficult or impossible for the small firms.

This work, which is very worth while, has to be done and I should like to ask who is to do it? There are several possibilities. The Ministry of Labour is starting some through the Youth Employment Service, and there are the voluntary agencies; but I think it is one of the aspects of this problem that we should all look at to try to find some agreed overall solution. My main plea on this point is that this transition from school to industry, from industry to National Service and, indeed, from National Service back to industry, must be made as continuous a process as possible.

My fifth point concerns the content of National Service training in the broadest sense. The plans of the Services for National Service men are excellent. There is no question about that. The weakness, I think, with great respect, lies in implementation at the unit level. I feel that we must pay attention to this, and the National Service man must above all be kept fully and usefully employed. It must be plain to him that his training has been very carefully thought out. I say that because after one of these conferences I was prevailed upon to give a ten-minute broadcast

about National Service in the "Topic of the Week" on Thursday night, and I was inundated by letters after that broadcast, half of which were on this point—that it was not clear to the National Service man that his training had been thought out. Another group of letters came from the parents dealing with the general moral tone of some Service units, the attitude to 'scrounging', and so on, and I do think that perhaps we ought to look at this aspect of Service life. That is why I say a boy of 18 is not an adult. I think that the attitude which we people who are now getting on can put up with quite robustly and laugh off is not so easily laughed off perhaps when a boy is 18, and we might perhaps have a close look at the attitude inside the Service unit to moral questions of that sort.

I think that we must have, as I believe we actually have at the present time, educational facilities which are at least equal to what the boy would get in civilian life. Of course, above all he must be encouraged to make use of these facilities and to retain mental and manual skills.

I have asked myself through all these conferences which B.A.C.I.E. has been holding, "What is the supreme point about National Service, if there is one?" I think there is such a point, and that quite simply it is that everyone concerned with the young man, whether he be parent, employer, teacher, youth leader, Service officer, or non-commissioned officer, must have constantly in the forefront of their minds, the thought that for every young man National Service must be a positive experience and not a negative one. Those concerned with him before he goes in must send him in feeling that he is going into a phase of life to which he can look forward and in which he is determined to do his best and from which he is determined to get the maximum. On the civilian side I am afraid that this is all too seldom done, in spite of recent developments. Instead there is the passive or negative attitude towards National Service which does, of course, very greatly prejudice what can be done with him when he is in. On the other hand, those who are concerned with him in the Services must see that if he comes in with this attitude he is not disappointed, and that to the best of their ability they provide him with a positive experience. I think that what he actually does—and I am measuring my words in saying this—is relatively unimportant so long as he is kept flat out mentally and physically. If we can achieve this we shall not go far wrong.

To come back to my subject, we have here an opportunity actually to improve all these young men and hence to put more back into industry than we have taken from it. If we do that of course we can positively improve the economic future of the Country.

DISCUSSION

LIEUT.-COLONEL S. TERRELL: The lecturer did not mention anything about the Cadet Force, and I do not understand this industrial pre-Service force unrelated to the perfectly good organization we have already under the Territorial Associations.

THE LECTURER: I think that if you add together all the youngsters who are in pre-Service forces—cadet forces, Boy Scouts, and youth clubs—you will find that they only total about 15 per cent. of all the boys available. There are 85 per cent. not in anything at all. Therefore, the great majority go into the Services without having any training in youth organizations whatever.

These courses to which I referred are quite short courses. They were started, I believe, by the firm of Newton & Chambers, of Sheffield, and they are two-day courses in their case. They arrange a visit to a military unit so that the boys can actually see what they are in for in a year's time or whenever it may be, and they actually get a talk,

not from a senior Service officer, but from someone like the Regimental Sergeant-Major. The boy has probably been told by his father about the Regimental Sergeant-Major, and I think we are stupid about this. I came across a boy who was petrified about what he would go through, and it was all due to the build-up which his father had given to his old Regimental Sergeant-Major in the 1914-18 War. It gave the boy a perfectly shocking impression. If they see that the Regimental Sergeant-Major is a nice chap who can talk to them quite nicely, the effect on the youngsters is remarkable. The firms of Stewart & Lloyds, Newton & Chambers, and Tube Investments have carried out experiments as to what happens to those boys who go into the Services after such courses and the results are most encouraging.

BRIGADIER B. B. RACKHAM: I am the Secretary of the Middlesex Territorial Association and my Association are very interested in these pre-Service courses; but as is clearly shown by the lecturer's diagrams, we can only touch the fringe of it by getting at the big firms. The real problem seems to be how to get at the majority. Is it not possible to do much more from the point of view of the educational authorities and to get school leavers doing these courses?

It is a great problem, but we feel in the Association that if we were brought into this we might be able to help considerably.

Another point is that part-time service is only just touched on, if at all. We feel that should be much more emphasized. The part-time service we know will not come until the completion of the full-time service, nevertheless the original allotment to an arm of the Service goes a long way to determine where the youth will do his part-time service. The interviewing officer is instructed to enquire where the youth would like to do his part-time service and where it would be best to do it. We should like that stressed more in these courses.

With regard to the diagram showing the distribution of males aged 20, might I enquire whether the large scale or segment includes men who have gone in for three years?

THE LECTURER: Yes, it does. It shows the actual number at that particular time who are in the Services, and it includes the three-year service people.

I cannot say anything about the first point. I do not know who should carry out these courses for boys in the small firms. I was merely, in the lecture, posing it as a problem which has to be solved. I think that it is a very difficult problem indeed.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. BEDDALL: This point came up at one of our conferences and it was suggested that the Chambers of Commerce throughout the Country might be able to assist in getting courses together for smaller firms who could not organize them themselves.

With regard to schools, I am doubtful indeed whether we should get further than that. I should like to see cadet courses extended more than they are now, and I think that we might get somewhere, but I do not put any trust in the schools at all.

THE LECTURER: I agree with General Beddall for the reason that when a boy leaves school, as I said in my lecture, there is a cataclysmic change. He casts away childish things, and I have found in my own field that we cannot get a boy interested in technical training if we use the same methods after school that he has been used to in school. We have to change the methods. If my advice were asked, I would say that I would not do this under the aegis of the schools if I could do it in any other way, because I feel that it would arouse a feeling of resentment among the boys.

THE CHAIRMAN: I should like to assure you that we fully appreciate the point made by the previous speaker that some reference should be made to part-time service before, if possible, the boy comes into the Services, and certainly during his whole-time service.

SQUADRON LEADER S. CURSETJEE: I agree with National Service and think that it is an excellent thing for a youth when he leaves school, but I think that the age limit

is very low. It hardly gives him time to get into any industry before he is taken away and sent for National Service. It is an awkward break. Is not it possible to make the age limit, say, 20, and thereby give the youth three years in industry?

THE LECTURER: If you will forgive me, I think that I ought to say bluntly that that sort of problem is outside my terms of reference, because I have lectured to you on the assumption of the fact that National Service is as it is. If you start talking about whether the age of entry ought to be 18 or 20 and so on, you throw open such a completely new set of factors that you ought to have another lecture, which God forbid!

The age for National Service is determined mainly on military grounds and we all know that certain assets would flow directly from a raising of the National Service age, but it would also bring in its train a number of additional problems of a military character. The whole subject is much too large to be dealt with in question and answer and should be the subject of a full-dress debate.

COLONEL G. S. FILLINGHAM: It is with great diffidence that I speak to-day because I am not a serving officer. I think that the lecturer avoided the difference between the two columns of his diagram rather nicely. Surely it is those people who are difficult to fit in who are the ones who are bitter and who go back to civilian life and provide excitement for a certain daily newspaper! That is where I feel we want guidance, encouragement, and a good deal of drive. Looking around at this very distinguished audience one sees that there are a large number of empty chairs, yet within short range of this building there are the three Defence Departments, the Home Office, and others—but I am getting away from the subject.

I came across a case recently of a plumber who had been through his National Service selling postage stamps. It is true he was in the Royal Engineers, who are responsible for the post office in the Army, but his feeling when he went home after selling postage stamps instead of plumbing I leave to your imagination.

THE LECTURER: I agree. I did say that I think that the essential for those people is this. First of all I think they must understand that they cannot be fitted because of a perfectly logical reason. Secondly, they must be provided while serving with the opportunity, at least in their own time, for keeping up their own particular skills. If they do not take advantage of those facilities it will be very largely their own fault.

It is rather difficult, but in the case of people such as, for instance, skilled textile workers, for whom there is no counterpart in the Army or in Service life generally, it is most important that their other personal qualities should be developed, particularly their qualities of leadership. I do not think that as a Nation we could possibly conceive a situation in which the Army established a Corps of Textile Workers simply to absorb the textile tradesmen. That is quite outside the bounds of possibility. But if it were thought so, then it is a matter of national policy and the Nation would have to provide the money and would have to enlarge the intake to allow it to be done. If it cannot be done, which is more likely, then what we must do is to provide these people with facilities in their own time for keeping up their own standards and, at the same time, developing to the full their other personal qualities. If you can send a textile worker back into his industry a better leader of men than when he entered the Services, you have rendered that industry a service, because you have assisted it in its search for foremen, charge hands, machine minders, and so forth.

BRIGADIER B. B. RACKHAM: I am in some little doubt as to whether it is really fair to ask the Services to keep a man up in his skill whatever that may be in civil life. Is it really a practical proposition? In the case of an infantry battalion serving in Malaya or Kenya, is the battalion commander to keep all those men up to scratch in their civilian skills? If it is not a practical proposition, are not we being a little dangerous in offering a false promise?

I have attended pre-Service conferences and the general information was excellent, but all the questions were along the line, "What will happen to me?" and answers, of course, could not be given. However, certain hopes were thrown out, and they must not be false hopes.

THE CHAIRMAN : I do not think that we should forget what National Service is for. It is imposed upon the Nation to meet the Nation's commitments, and that decides all priorities of training. I quite agree that it would be wrong to give a priority to the training of the individual against that policy, but having said that and recognized it, I am in full support of developing the National Service life in its three phases—the pre-call-up, call-up, and post-call-up which the lecturer has described.

THE LECTURER : I think that the speaker has probably read more into my lecture than I intended. Supposing the National Service man is serving at home in this Country, there is no reason at all why the youth should not take courses in his own time, by correspondence if necessary. What we have to do is to create a situation in which he is determined to make use of those facilities. Nobody in his senses would advocate the provision of similar facilities for people fighting in Malaya and so on, but even there facilities could be available for correspondence courses, so that the boy who is determined does not feel that he is completely left out.

I think if you ask General Beddall he will say, rightly, that in his opinion the scope of the facilities which are provided under his direction is greater than the youngsters are willing to take advantage of. I have had dozens of boys say to me, "Well, of course, I shall not do anything about this industrial radiography", or something of that sort, "while I am in the Services." In other words, they are taking the easy course. He has tried to escape getting on with his studies, but there is no reason why he should not if he has the will to do so.

LIEUT.-COLONEL S. TERRELL : I commanded a Territorial battalion for five years after the war, and in a number of cases had youngsters joining the Territorial Army before going into the Regular Army for National Service. When they went into the Army they adapted themselves very well and stood up to a good deal of mis-employment at the other end. It has struck me that if this three-and-a-half-year period in the Territorial Army were altered so that a year was cut off (the Territorial Army has a great problem with respect to handling those men in those three and a half years) and the youngsters had a year less at that end but a year before they went in, a great deal of the problem would be very much ameliorated. It seems to me that it would suit industry as well, and this burden placed on the large patriotic firms of carrying out indoctrination of their own would be eased and the smaller firms would find it done for them. At the same time our commitments from the point of view of N.A.T.O. would be met.

THE CHAIRMAN : I take your point. I am not free to make a statement on the age of call-up or on the length of part-time training, but I can say that both your opinions have been voiced recently and are now under investigation.

MR. H. E. TRAVES : The lecturer referred to the question of man-management in the Army and in industry. In industry at the present time, so far as the question of man-management is concerned, the important factor is that of human relations, and I wonder whether the lecturer has studied human relations from the point of view of industry.

THE LECTURER : I personally think that the pride of the British Army before the 1914-18 War lay in its man-management. The study of leadership in industry, as a study, is as you know a comparatively recent growth. For example, the British Institute of Management was not established until after the last war. Again, when you look at the first group of textbooks on leadership and management in industry and compare them with the equivalent books available in the Services before the 1939-45 War you will find that there is an unparalleled accuracy of wording between the two. In other words, it

is inescapable to me that the early textbooks on management in industry were taken from the handbooks on man-management and leadership in the Services.

I do not know what was behind the question, but I rather imagine that there was the implication that man-management in the Services is not good. If I am right in that assumption, I think I can say quite honestly that in the best units, man-management as it is found in the Services is probably as good as could be found anywhere. Where it is deficient there are a number of quite different reasons for it, some of which are outside Service control.

Out of all this, what I am satisfied about is that fundamentally the problem is the same in industry as it is in the Services, and where you get the same sort of relationship between the foreman and his team as you get between the good non-commissioned officer and his section, you get the best results. I believe the only difference between the two is the formal one of discipline, which is an external matter.

THE CHAIRMAN : I should like to sum up briefly with two points. The first is one that I made earlier, namely, that we must not forget what National Service is for, and therefore military requirements must have a priority. However, we fully realize in the Services that National Service is with us and we must plan and develop it as much as we can in the future. The main thing at the moment is not only to get the machine organized but to keep it working. I think that the machine is now organized—and by the machine I mean that link-up between the Ministry of Labour, educational authorities, and the Services in order to see that the points which General Lloyd has emphasized are properly handled.

Having organized that machine, we have to keep it working and that is our job in the War Office. I can assure you that we are fully appreciative of it.

The second point is this. Our lecturer did say he thought that the moral side of the units in the Army might require some examination. I would say that of course you can never be satisfied with the moral side of any unit or establishment, but we find in the Services that occasionally we are acting as corrective establishments to some of those who serve with us.

I am sure you would like to join me in thanking General Lloyd most sincerely not only for his lecture, but also for his most useful analysis. (*Applause.*)

COMMODORE R. HARRISON : Ladies and gentlemen, before we disperse I am sure it would be your wish that we should express our appreciation to the Adjutant-General for so kindly coming and presiding here this afternoon. (*Applause.*)

THE DUTIES AND ORGANIZATION OF THE POLICE FORCES OF ENGLAND AND WALES (INCLUDING RELATIONS WITH THE ARMED SERVICES)

By SIR JOHN NOTT-BOWER, K.C.V.O.

On Wednesday, 19th January, 1955, at 3 p.m.

GENERAL SIR OUVRY L. ROBERTS, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: I should like to welcome a number of guests here to-day. I hope it will be the first of many visits. We have the representatives from all the neighbouring police forces, including chief constables, and we do welcome them most sincerely.

I do not think that I need say very much in the way of introducing Sir John Nott-Bower. It is my privilege to introduce him to you, but I think the fact that he is the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police is sufficient introduction. You may like to know that he served in India for 22 years when he obtained the Police Medal. As far as I can gather he got it shooting another fellow who was fatter than he was! The fellow was not so good at shooting back! He then came to the Metropolitan Police Force and, except for a very short time when he was in Austria with the Allied Command in 1945-46, he has been in the Metropolitan Police Force ever since and was made Commissioner in 1953.

I shall not say any more, but I do introduce him with very great pleasure.

LECTURE

I THINK it is essential for a proper understanding of our present police system to trace briefly its development from the early part of the last century.

In greater London at the beginning of the XIXth Century, the police arrangements were on a parochial basis with, in addition, constables attached to the offices of and working under the control of the magistrates, and the Bow Street patrols, mounted and on foot, under the general control of the Home Office. Crime went almost unchecked and there was no means of dealing with constant outbreaks of serious public disorder and rioting except by the employment of the troops. A number of committees of enquiry examined the situation in the late XVIIIth and early XIXth Centuries, but the main obstacle to the formation of a properly organized and paid police force was the fear that it would interfere with the liberty of the law-abiding as well as the lawless.

However, at last in 1829, when Sir Robert Peel was Home Secretary, this opposition was overcome and the Metropolitan Police Act was passed, establishing the Metropolitan Police Force. The area of the new force, which roughly corresponded with the present County of London, did not include the City of London, and the magistrates' constables and the Bow Street patrols remained outside the control of the Metropolitan Police. The City of London Police were established in 1839 as an independent force, as of course they have remained. In 1836, the Bow Street mounted patrol was taken over by the Metropolitan Police, and in 1839 the other police agencies in London were absorbed into the force, whose area was increased in 1840 to almost its present size of just over 700 square miles within a radius of 15 miles from Charing Cross.

Two Irishmen, Colonel Charles Rowan who had fought at Waterloo, and Richard Mayne, were given the task of organizing the new Metropolitan Force. Their office was at 4, Whitehall Place, the back of which opened on to a courtyard which had been

the site of a former London residence of the Kings of Scotland and had become known as Scotland Yard. There was a police station behind 4, Whitehall Place, with its entrance in the courtyard; thus it was that the headquarters of the Metropolitan Police became known as Scotland Yard. The present headquarters, New Scotland Yard, were taken over in 1890.

The new Police met with a great deal of opposition from almost all sections of society at first, some of it violent, but the two Commissioners were careful to instil into their officers and men an attitude of helpfulness, courtesy, and service; they also set a high standard of conduct and efficiency and were ruthless in getting rid of those members of the force who did not measure up to this standard. The result was that in a remarkably short space of time the new force began to be accepted by Londoners.

The police arrangements in provincial towns were just as unsatisfactory as those in London before the Act of 1829. Too many public bodies were concerned and the badly paid part-time officers of the peace were quite incapable of preventing and detecting crime or keeping public order. It was not until 1835, however, that the Municipal Corporations Act was passed, which required boroughs to appoint Watch Committees who were to appoint "a sufficient number of fit men . . . to act as constables."

No measures were taken to introduce permanent paid police in the rural or county areas until 1839, although again the parish constable system was hopelessly inadequate to cope with the changing conditions. Then the County Police Act was passed which enabled the justices at their discretion to maintain a paid police force either for the whole county or part of it.

Development in the provinces of the new police system on the Metropolitan pattern was, however, slow, particularly in the smaller towns and in the rural areas, and this led to the passing in 1856 of the County and Borough Police Act, which required the justices to set up a paid police force for the whole of each county and provided for the appointment of Inspectors of Constabulary to report to the Home Secretary on the efficiency of all county and borough forces. The necessity for this reform can be seen from the fact that in 1857 over 100 forces were reported by the inspectors to be inefficient.

The outcome of the early police legislation was that very small boroughs ran their own separate forces quite independently of surrounding county forces, and as time went on it became clear that, for the sake of efficiency, there must be some limitation of these very small forces. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1877 and the Local Government Act of 1888 provided that only boroughs over certain population limits could have separate forces and every effort was made to persuade the other smaller forces to merge with the counties. Very few did so, however, and as late as 1939 there were still 183 forces, 121 of them being borough forces. Apart from the amalgamation under the Defence Regulations during the last war of a number of smaller forces in areas of military importance, the problem was not tackled again until the Police Act of 1946 and the present position is that there are 126 forces in England and Wales, comprising the Metropolitan Police, the City of London Police, 52 county forces and 72 borough forces. The authorized establishments vary from about 20,000 in the Metropolitan Police to under 100 in five provincial forces.

The Home Secretary is the Police Authority for the Metropolitan Police; in other words, the Commissioner controls the force, subject to the Home Secretary's

general directions. In the counties, since the Local Government Act of 1888, the Police Authority has been a committee made up of representatives of the County Council and the county justices and known as the Standing Joint Committee; in the boroughs it is a special committee of the local authority known as the Watch Committee.

Besides being the Police Authority for the Police of the Metropolis, the Home Secretary has a general responsibility for all the forces in England and Wales, since the Exchequer makes a grant of 50 per cent. of their expenditure—the other 50 per cent. being met from local rates. He makes regulations regarding pay and conditions of service—discipline, promotion, etc.—which were standardized after the Report of the Desborough Committee in 1919, and gives advice and guidance on policy matters.

ORGANIZATION

The main ranks used in the police forces in England and Wales are Chief Superintendent, Superintendent (Class I and II), Chief Inspector, Inspector, Sergeant, and Constable. The chief officer of a force is called the Chief Constable, except in the Metropolitan and City of London Forces, which have a Commissioner in charge.

The larger forces are split up into divisions and sub-divisions. In the Metropolitan Police there are 23 divisions (including the Thames River Police) and each division has three or four sub-divisions; the divisions are grouped into four districts. The Metropolitan Commissioner is assisted by a Deputy Commissioner, four Assistant Commissioners in charge of departments at headquarters, and a Secretary in charge of the secretariat. The districts are under commanders, the divisions (650 to 1,000 officers) under chief superintendents, and the sub-divisions (150 to 500 officers) under superintendents.

In provincial forces, a division may be commanded by a chief superintendent, a superintendent, or an officer of the inspector grade according to its size; sub-divisions are under the command of chief inspectors or inspectors.

The basic operational unit of all our forces is the beat. Beats, which vary in size according to local conditions and the value of property to be protected, are worked by individual constables in uniform. In rural areas a constable is usually resident on his beat and has a 24-hour responsibility, whereas in built-up areas a beat is worked on a three-shift system of eight hours each. In the Metropolitan Police, all beats, even in the outer and more sparsely populated areas, are worked on the shift system. Normally the constable patrols on foot or pedal cycle, but in the outer areas motor cycles are now used. Beat patrols are superimposed upon beats to give extra protection to the more vulnerable parts at selected times. In addition, there are patrols covering much wider areas by car or motor cycle. The beats forming a section are under the general supervision of patrolling sergeants and inspectors.

A number of forces have mounted branches, the largest being that maintained by the Metropolitan Police, with an establishment of 209 officers (all ranks) and 201 horses. In the Metropolitan Police the normal daily patrol is three hours, and during the remainder of the tour of duty horses are groomed, kit cleaned, and stable work done, although of course the men on duty are available to turn out, if required, at short notice. The mounted men have the same responsibilities as the foot police, assisting with traffic control and dealing with crime, rowdiness, and traffic and other offences. The main value of the mounted officer, however, is in his moral effect on large gatherings of people. There is no doubt that a handful of mounted men are

worth several times their number of foot officers on these occasions. They can see over the crowds and spot where trouble has started or is likely to start, and they have a tremendous advantage over the foot officer in getting to the seat of trouble.

If officers employed on beats and patrols are to be fully effective, it is essential that they should have means of quick communication to obtain assistance or pass on information to other areas. For this purpose we have the police telephone box system, with a telephone box or post on or near each beat, connected by direct line with the local police station. The boxes and posts may also be used by members of the public who require help from the Police, and they are in fact encouraged to use them, in addition to the emergency (999) telephone call system.

The past 20 years have seen a steady and continuous development in the use of wireless for police purposes. In the Metropolitan Police, there is now two-way wireless communication between headquarters and cars on area patrols and special traffic and accident patrols, Flying Squad cars, beat and traffic patrol motor cycles, and Thames Police launches. Police can thus be concentrated quickly at any point where extra assistance is required to deal with crime, serious accident, threatened breach of the peace, etc. Walkie-talkie apparatus is also used, particularly in connection with ceremonial events.

All forces have now recognized the value of women police officers and have a complement of women in their establishments. The women have the same training as the men and are employed on all types of police duty, although they specialize in duties in connection with women and children and young persons, such as escorting women prisoners, taking statements from women and girls who are victims of sexual assaults, and dealing with children and young persons who are neglected or in need of care or protection.

All forces, of course, have an establishment of detective officers. It is difficult to generalize on the organization of criminal investigation departments because they vary according to the size and character of the force, but I will outline the organization in the Metropolitan Police when I come to talk about criminal investigation.

DUTIES

Sir Richard Mayne, one of the first two Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police, defined the duties of the Police as follows:—

“The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime: the next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. To these ends all the efforts of police must be directed. The protection of life and property, the preservation of public tranquility, and absence of crime, will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful, and whether the objects for which the police were appointed have been attained.”

I propose to deal with police duties under the headings of preventive duties, criminal investigation, national services performed by the Metropolitan Police, traffic duties, and public order.

PREVENTIVE DUTIES

Duties designed to prevent crime are in the main carried out by the uniform officers on beat and patrol. Constables are encouraged to acquire an intimate knowledge of their beats and station areas. Much of their time is spent in examining and testing the security of houses, shops, and other premises which are vulnerable

to thieves and burglars. They are expected to have a good knowledge of local criminals and also to study and memorize the descriptions of persons circulated as wanted.

There is no doubt that the efficiency of a force largely turns on the manner in which the constables on beat and patrol duty carry out their work, but its routine nature can and does tend to make it tedious. Another drawback is that the relative lack of mobility on foot or cycle beats limits the amount of protection which can be given. In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, experiments have been carried out in recent years with a team system of policing which we call the section patrol system. The constables available for ordinary street duty in a sergeant's section work as a team under the direct supervision and control of the sergeant, covering the section as a whole. The sergeant has a wireless car in which he conveys the constables from one part of the section to another as required, where they patrol on foot. Ground which cannot be covered at any given time by the constables on foot is covered by the sergeant in the car. Experience so far gained of this system is encouraging; it undoubtedly adds variety to ordinary beat work, keeps the officers on their toes, and has the added advantage that criminals cannot tell when and where an officer is likely to be patrolling at any given time.

In my view it is most important that the work of officers on the beat should be made as varied and interesting as possible. They are very often responsible for the arrest of a criminal, but it has been the practice in the Metropolitan Police for the C.I.D. to take over at this stage and complete the enquiries. I felt that many uniformed officers would welcome the opportunity of seeing through their own cases, or at any rate taking on some of the further enquiries and attending the hearing in Court, and I have arranged for them to do so, wherever practicable, with the advice and assistance of officers of the C.I.D. Officers of the Uniform Branch investigate and take to Court complicated and hotly contested traffic cases, and I see no reason why they should not deal just as successfully with cases of crime.

In addition to the beat constables, the mobile patrols who cover wide areas also have their preventive value, besides providing a reserve of officers who can quickly reach any point where their help is needed.

The Metropolitan Police and other forces have been experimenting in recent years with the use of trained dogs with officers on beat and patrol duties and they have proved outstandingly successful. We now have 140 dogs in the Metropolitan Police, mostly Alsations and Labradors. Besides the preventive value of their presence, particularly in areas where there had been rowdiness and hooliganism, they have been most useful in searching premises to locate thieves, tracking after house-breakings, chasing fleeing criminals, and searching for missing persons. During 1953, 217 arrests were made with the help of our dogs, and in 1954 the figure rose to 514.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

As I have already mentioned, all forces have C.I.D. establishments, but since their organization varies too widely for easy generalization, I will describe the C.I.D. organization in the Metropolitan Police, which is, of course, on a much larger scale than in any other force.

The Metropolitan Criminal Investigation Department is controlled by an assistant commissioner, who has two commanders under him, one in charge of Special Branch dealing with security matters, and the other in charge of the remaining branches of the Department. The latter include a Central Office, which is mainly

concerned with the investigation of certain serious crimes, the Flying Squad, and the specialist branches—Fingerprints, Criminal Records, Fraud Squad, Home Counties Crime Branch, and the Detective Training School. Each of these branches has a detective chief superintendent in charge. In addition, there is a complement of detectives in each division under the command of a detective superintendent. The total strength of the C.I.D. is just over 1,400 officers.

Practically all local crimes are investigated by the detectives in divisions, who may, of course, call for general advice and assistance as necessary from headquarters, as well as technical assistance from the specialist branches. But there are many crimes committed by criminals, sometimes in gangs, who do not confine their activities to any particular locality and it is with these that officers of the Flying Squad are chiefly concerned. The Squad is equipped with a fleet of fast cars and has a roving commission throughout the Metropolitan Police District. Its officers also have the job of keeping their ears to the ground to pick up information from the criminal fraternity—the informant is indispensable to the work of detective officers—and the Flying Squad is particularly valuable for this purpose.

The system of numerous local independent police forces has certain disadvantages, and one of these is in the provision of the scientific staff and equipment which is of such vital importance in dealing with modern criminals. It would clearly be a most uneconomic proposition for each force, large or small, to have its own laboratory, and to meet this situation the Home Office have established laboratories on a regional or district basis to serve the needs of all forces in those areas. The Home Office appoint the staffs of scientists and administer the service, subject to a certain amount of control by representatives of the Police Authorities. Although the Metropolitan Police Scientific Laboratory at Scotland Yard, which was established some 20 years ago, is run on a rather different basis, being part of the Metropolitan Police establishment, its services are in fact available to all the forces in south-eastern England.

The chemist, the biologist, and the physicist are now constantly called upon by the detective to help in forging the chain of evidence necessary to prove his case in Court. The presence of dust of a particular composition in trouser turn-ups or flakes of paint on a vehicle which has been in collision with another vehicle may well prove significant evidence after examination by the scientist.

NATIONAL SERVICES OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE

Because of its position in the capital and its size, the Metropolitan Police Force finds that certain duties fall naturally upon it. These include the protection of Royalty, of Ministers, and of Parliament, and a special subvention is received from the Treasury for this work. H.M. The Queen and H.R.H. The Duke of Edinburgh and certain other members of the Royal Family have officers attached for their personal protection. In addition, there are officers on permanent duty at Buckingham Palace and Windsor Castle, and a staff of Metropolitan Police officers accompany Her Majesty when resident outside London. Special protection is given to the Prime Minister and certain other Ministers, and Metropolitan Police officers are on permanent duty at the Houses of Parliament for the protection of the premises, preservation of order, and generally to facilitate the business of Parliament, and at a number of other important public buildings.

Two of the specialist branches I referred to when describing the organization of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Metropolitan Police, the Criminal Record Office and the Fingerprint Branch, both provide services which are available

to all forces. The former was established under the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871, to maintain a record of convicted criminals. The work has now grown much more elaborate in character. Besides the nominal index of criminals, there is a 'wanted' index of persons wanted for or suspected of crime, a 'method' index of methods used in perpetrating crimes, a deformities and characteristics index, and a stolen property index, to mention only a few. Some half a million searches are made annually by the officers of the Branch. The Criminal Record Office also edits and publishes daily (except Sundays) the *Police Gazette* which gives information of wanted criminals, etc., persons apprehended, property stolen, and the like, and is sent to all forces in the United Kingdom.

The Fingerprint Branch deals with the classification and identification of fingerprints, the examination of articles found at scenes of crime, and the preparation of fingerprint exhibits for production in Court; its officers are constantly called upon to give expert evidence. Over a million and a quarter forms are filed in the main fingerprint collection. The branch has a photographic section, the members of which visit scenes of crime in the Metropolitan Police District when necessary to make a photographic record. Full use is made of scientific methods of photography, such as the employment of infra red and ultra violet rays in the examination of suspect documents, etc. Both the Fingerprint Branch and the Criminal Record Office provide facilities for the instruction of officers from other forces in this Country and overseas.

Under arrangements made in 1906, the Metropolitan Police provide assistance to other home forces in the investigation of difficult cases of murder or other serious crime upon request by the local chief constable. The reason is that the senior C.I.D. officers of the Metropolitan Force have a much wider experience in these cases than it is possible to obtain in the other forces. The officers sent on these enquiries are usually from the Central Office of the Criminal Investigation Department at New Scotland Yard.

Another branch with duties which are not confined to the Metropolis is the Special Branch, which is mainly concerned with the observation of subversive movements, enquiries into offences against the security of the State, and special protection duties in connection with Royalty, Ministers of the Crown, and foreign V.I.P.s.

Close co-operation between the forces has had to be developed to cope with present day needs and the modern criminal. A striking example of this is in the formation of composite departments staffed by officers from more than one force.

After the 1939-45 War, there were a large number of fraudulent schemes afoot, particularly in company promoting, and in many cases the victims were ex-Service men who had been induced to part with their war gratuities. Investigation of this type of crime demands specialized knowledge of company law and accountancy, which does not come the way of the average C.I.D. officer; but we had at Scotland Yard a small group of officers who had considerable experience of these cases. As in many of the cases enquiries led to the City of London, it was decided to set up a joint branch of the Metropolitan and City of London officers called the Metropolitan and City Police Company Fraud Department. The department was put under the charge of a detective chief superintendent and its functions were to investigate difficult cases of fraud in connection with company promotion, company investments and the creation of or dealing with debentures or shares in any company, and cases involving expert investigation of company accounts.

In its first year of operation the department dealt with 290 cases, some of which involved large sums of money. The number of cases has increased year by year and in 1954 was over 1,000. From the beginning, members of the department have been available to assist provincial forces faced with these intricate and difficult enquiries, and in addition a number of detective officers from the large provincial cities have attended courses of training at Scotland Yard in the methods followed by the department.

The Metropolitan and City Police Company Fraud Department, or the Fraud Squad as they have come to be known, has been a marked success, not only in bringing to Court the perpetrators of some very substantial frauds, but also in taking action which has prevented many fraudulent schemes from being brought to fruition. We have also been able to meet requests from the Colonies to send members of the department to instruct local officers and to help in the formation of local fraud squads.

HOME COUNTIES CRIME BRANCH

At a meeting in 1952 of the County Chief Constables Section of the Association of Chief Police Officers, concern was expressed at the small number of cases of house-breaking and burglary at large country houses which were cleared up. It was thought that many of these crimes were committed by criminals who came from London, and that the chances of catching them were remote unless some special measures for co-ordination and co-operation between the forces were taken. A meeting was arranged at the Home Office between the chief constables chiefly concerned, who brought with them representatives from their detective branches, and the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner C.I.D., and other officers of my force.

The result was the setting up in February, 1954, of a new branch at Scotland Yard, which was named the Home Counties Crime Branch. The branch is under the command of one of my detective superintendents working directly under the Assistant Commissioner, C.I.D., and is staffed by detective officers of the Metropolitan Police and of the Home Counties forces. Its function is to make a special study of serious crimes, particularly breaking offences, committed in the Home Counties, and to undertake enquiries at the request of the chief constable concerned. It has already achieved considerable success.

TRAFFIC DUTIES

Nowadays, the dictum of Sir Richard Mayne which I quoted earlier applies with equal force to the functions of the Police regarding traffic. In fact, the threat to life and limb from traffic is very much greater than from crime. Officers on ordinary beat and patrol duty have to deal with traffic matters as with other incidents with which they may be confronted and must, of course, take prompt action in the case of accident. They, as well as the officers posted specifically to traffic duty, are required to take all possible steps to prevent danger to pedestrians or vehicles.

The rapid increase in the number of motor vehicles in the 1920's and the legislative measures taken to control traffic in 1930 led to the introduction in 1930 of motor patrols.

At the present time in London we have over 700 men in the traffic patrols with 100 cars and 145 motor cycles. The primary aim of the patrols is the prevention of accidents. Few accidents are unavoidable; they usually arise from lack of skill, error of judgment, or inattention, and often, I am afraid, from insobriety. I am convinced that if all drivers took pride in perfecting their skill and showed care,

patience, and, if necessary, restraint in face of provocation, this would do more than anything else to reduce the appalling toll of death and injury on our roads. As evidence of the extent to which a high standard of driving affects the rate of accidents, the experience at our driving school at Hendon is significant. In 1934, before the school started, accidents, no matter how trivial, involving police vehicles in which police drivers were considered to be to some degree to blame, were at the rate of one per 8,000 miles run; in 1953, the corresponding figure was one per 75,000 miles.

The traffic patrols and indeed all police on traffic duties endeavour to work by persuasion and warning. Even so, enforcement of the traffic laws has in my view put a great strain on the relationship between the police and the public. Our police system depends for its existence on public co-operation and support. In carrying out their traffic duties the police are constantly coming up against members of the public who would not in other times have expected to find themselves the objects of police action. This is especially so with regard to obstruction and parking offences. The difficulty is that there are obviously not enough police to ensure a constant watch at all places and at all times, and motorists are quick to feel victimized if they are suddenly stopped from parking in a place where they have been previously immune from interference and to attribute officiousness to the constables concerned. If, on the other hand, the Police were to take no action, not only would they be failing in their duty to enforce the law but traffic would soon be at a standstill.

From time to time suggestions have been made in the Press and elsewhere that a special body of men should be recruited to take over from the Police the duty of traffic regulation and control, apparently on the grounds that traffic duty demands less skill and involves less physical strain than other police duties and could be performed by a cheaper agency. This is a misconception; the physical strain is certainly no less than that involved in performing beat duty and there is of course the ever present risk of injury or even death. Moreover, many aspects of traffic duty cannot be divorced from police work in its more generally understood sense. Traffic officers have to know and be able to apply the law, take statements, collect evidence, and present a case in the witness box in the same way as other officers, and they are readily available to help and advise members of the public on any matter of police duty. But the fundamental objection to a change in the present system is that without the authority which the Police command there cannot be effective control of traffic. The public support the Police because they know that police officers receive careful training in their powers and duties and are subject to a strict code of discipline. The same qualities would be required of the members of a traffic corps as are required of the Police, and men of equal physical and educational standards would have to be recruited. They would thus expect the same pay and conditions and therefore there would be no consequent financial saving.

PUBLIC ORDER AND RELATIONS WITH THE ARMED SERVICES

The paramount duty of the Police is, of course, the preservation of the peace, and I am dealing with the duties of the Police in connection with public order after their other duties only because this subject leads naturally into discussing relations with the armed Services.

There is no doubt that the most exacting test of a police officer's capabilities is the carrying out of his duties at public meetings, gatherings, or processions where there is disorderly behaviour or imminent danger of it. He must know exactly what he is empowered to do, have complete confidence in his ability to do it, and be able to control himself in face often of intense provocation.

The Police have powers under various statutes to prevent or, failing this, deal with obstruction of the highway occasioned by meetings or processions and to take action against persons guilty of disorderly behaviour. In addition, the Public Order Act of 1936 makes it an offence to wear in any public place or at any public meeting a uniform signifying association with any political organization; gives the chief officer of police power to prescribe the route for, and impose other conditions on, public processions if he has reasonable ground for apprehending public disorder; and if this is not sufficient, enables public processions to be prohibited for periods of three months at a time, with the consent of the Home Secretary.

With regard to meetings in the streets and public places, there is no right in law to hold such meetings as the highway exists for free passage only, but the Police do not interfere unless obstruction is caused, or a breach of the peace can reasonably be apprehended, or there is some statutory provision, regulation, or by-law affecting the holding of a meeting at any particular place.

Generally speaking, in London, in recent years at least, the Police have not been faced with any undue difficulties in carrying out their duties in preserving public order; meetings and processions have, with few exceptions, been conducted in a reasonably orderly manner. The exceptions have been in the East End of London, where political gatherings have at times caused trouble, and it has been necessary to ban processions for short periods. But at all times the situation has been well within control by the Police.

Before the formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829, the Military were frequently called upon to assist the Civil Power to maintain order and not infrequently to do other jobs now regarded as essentially police duties, such as escorting prisoners, patrolling to prevent crime, etc. The first instance after 1829, however, of troops being called upon in the Metropolitan area was to help in quelling a public disturbance in Hyde Park in 1886.

Another frequently quoted example was the employment of the Military in connection with the colliery strike in South Wales in 1910. I doubt if it will ever be possible to dispel the oft repeated accusation that the then Home Secretary, Mr. Winston Churchill, was responsible for the use of troops to quell the disturbances. In point of fact, however, exactly the opposite was the case. When pressed to send military forces, Mr. Winston Churchill decided to send instead a force of mounted and foot police from the Metropolitan Police. One hundred mounted men and 300 foot police were sent in the first instance and eventually over 800 Metropolitan policemen went to South Wales. The Military were held in reserve, and their Commanding Officer, General Macready, was personally instructed by Mr. Churchill to proceed to Tonypany and to co-operate with the Chief Constable with complete cordiality, and not to use his troops unless called upon to do so by the police and civil authorities: he stressed that vigorous action by the Police was likely to be the best means of preventing recourse to fire-arms.

Equally characteristic was his reply to a protest from the Monmouthshire and South Wales Coal Owners' Association about the Chief Constable's decision to withdraw his men from a certain district: one of their members claimed that he had requisitioned their services and they were employees of his for as long as he wished. Mr. Churchill "found it surprising that the owners should have placed before him a document containing such a proposition. They must be well aware that the Police occupy an absolutely impartial position and are no more employees of the mine

owners than they are of the strikers. They are there solely for the purpose of maintaining order and to protect each party in the dispute from violence or illegality on the part of the other."

As you doubtless know, there is now a well defined procedure governing requisitions for military aid in times of civil disturbance threatening riot. Although a requisition must be signed by a magistrate, the local chief constable—in London, of course, the Commissioner—has the responsibility of considering and co-ordinating any such requests for military aid, and before a request is passed on he must first be satisfied that no police arrangements which can be made, either by augmentation within his own force or by assistance obtained from other police forces, will render it possible to dispense with military assistance.

I think the whole temper of our times and the improved standards of living and education make it less and less likely that under normal conditions the Police would again be faced with the disorderly mobs of earlier years of our history.

Turning now to other aspects of the relations between the Police and the armed Services, I cannot do better than quote to you an Order issued to the Metropolitan Police in 1837: it reads:—

"The Commissioners take this opportunity of again pointing out to the Police the great advantage to the Public Service of a good feeling being kept up between the Military and Police Service, and repeat their desire that, when it can be done without mischief or offence to the public, the Police will avoid any interference with soldiers for drunkenness or irregularities that may concern themselves only, and that when they may be required to act they will do so with the utmost discretion and good temper."

I am sure you will all readily concur with these sentiments.

So far as drunkenness is concerned, it is still the practice not to charge a soldier or airman who is drunk and disorderly and incapable of taking care of himself. His commanding officer is asked to send an escort for him and only if this does not materialize, is he taken before the Court. I am afraid sailors and marines do not come off so well as they have to be charged, unless the offence is also one against naval discipline with which the naval authorities have power to deal.

Police action in the case of criminal offences committed by members of the Services is dependent on the nature of the offence. Generally speaking, any case affecting the person or property of a civilian is dealt with by a Civil Court, but there may be other factors, such as a man being under orders to be sent overseas, which may justify his being handed over to the Services, if the offence is not too serious. Commanding officers are consulted, but the final decision rests with the Police.

Most police enquiries relating to members of the armed Services are nowadays in connection with absentees and deserters. The police of the area of a man's home address are notified by his unit within a few days of his absence without leave so that enquiries can be made to trace him. After three weeks' absence he is classified as a deserter and particulars are published in the *Police Gazette*. A register of local deserters is maintained at each police station. Subsequent action depends on whether he surrenders or is arrested. If the former, he can be returned to his unit without being brought before a Court, but any absentee or deserter arrested by the Police must be brought before a Court.

The Police also have a fair amount to do in connection with men who fail to report for National Service, or medical examination before call-up, or part-time service after completing their National Service. The procedure varies considerably according to the branch of the Services concerned; on reading the instructions to the Police I found them so complicated that I decided not to attempt to elucidate them in this company!

As you know, a good deal of work falls on the Metropolitan Police in connection with ceremonial occasions. Some of them are annual events, such as the State Opening of Parliament and Trooping the Colour; others occur less frequently. They all have one thing in common, in that they require the most careful and detailed preparation. Large numbers of police have to be brought in from outer areas and so disposed that the onlookers may enjoy themselves without interfering with the procession or function and with the minimum of discomfort, while those members of the public who have to continue about their business can do so with as little inconvenience as possible. These events demand the closest co-operation with the Military who participate, and I should like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the great help we receive from them. The cordial relations which exist make planning so much easier and I have every confidence in the continuance of this relationship in the future.

DISCUSSION

MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. KIRKMAN: I should like to ask whether the lecturer would care to comment on a statement made in one newspaper to-day to the effect that, like many other organizations, the Police were unable to recruit up to their establishment, and that this shortage of manpower was tending to have a serious effect on keeping up to date with petty crime.

THE LECTURER: I am very glad that question has been asked because the newspaper in question came out with headlines about the alarming state of crime in London last year, and the article went on to say that crime had been going up a great deal and that owing to our depleted numbers we were unable to prevent crime or to clear it up. I think that somebody must have been pulling the reporter's leg, because exactly the opposite is the case. In point of fact, crime has gone down very considerably, and it is for the first time below the figures for crime in 1938. The proportion of crime cleared up is in fact higher than it was last year.

It is, of course, quite true that we have had great recruiting difficulties, and I suppose my most serious anxiety at the moment is due to the fact that in the Metropolitan Police we are nearly 4,000 men under strength; but it has not produced the results suggested in that article.

SQUADRON LEADER S. CURSETJEE: I should like to pay a very high tribute to the Metropolitan Police Force and to the other police forces in this Country. From my experience of the ordinary police that we see on the street, they are highly commendable. I should, however, like to ask the lecturer one question. Have you any system of providing armed escorts for the General Post Office people when they transport large sums of gold from one place to another? In my opinion, if that had been provided in the past the mishaps which we have had would have been avoided.

THE LECTURER: The answer is in the negative.

SQUADRON LEADER A. D. RUTHERFORD-JONES: The lecturer mentioned that in dealing with traffic problems persuasion was important. Before the war I seem to remember that quite a number of police forces throughout the U.K. used what were known as 'courtesy cops'. The system was that the Police used the loud hailer for drawing the attention of the public to bad behaviour on the roads. I have not noticed the use of those cars since the war and I wondered what the reason for that was.

THE LECTURER : I am surprised to hear that there has been any change, because we still use the same method as we did before the war. We deal with as many of these cases as we can by persuasion and many of our cars have loud speaker apparatus which can be used to draw the attention of people to carelessness on the road. In any case, it is normal practice to have a few kindly words with the driver if it is some minor breach of the traffic regulations, as an alternative to taking any proceedings against him.

CAPTAIN A. R. FARQUHAR : As the question of loud speakers has been raised, what are the views of the Police about the use of loud speakers during election times ?

THE LECTURER : I agree that they do become a nuisance in election times, but then many things become a nuisance in election time.

CAPTAIN A. R. FARQUHAR : Are these things legal, or only legal at election times ?

THE LECTURER : I do not think there is anything illegal about them. Perhaps one of my colleagues could tell us more about the law on the subject ?

CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT J. R. LUCAS (City Police) : I am quite certain that there is no law to stop loud speakers as used at present.

CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT F. DORMER : Will you compare and contrast the duties of the Special Branch with those of M.I.5, because I think there is confusion in some people's minds and they think that M.I.5 is part of the police service.

THE LECTURER : Beyond saying that they are not part of the police service and beyond saying there is close co-operation between the two, I think I had better not go into detail.

CAPTAIN P. BETHELL, R.N. : Two things struck me about the lecture. The first was the statement that there are more than a hundred separate police forces in the United Kingdom. That is staggering and I should have said that it might lead to inefficiency, because I cannot imagine what would be the effect of having a hundred separate armies each under different commanders, or if every ship in the Navy took its orders from a different source. I should have said also that this separation must make some things, especially training, most uneconomic and difficult. It would be interesting to have the lecturer's comments on the question of training.

The second point which occurred to me concerns this question which has been discussed at some length of recruiting a separate corps for traffic duties. As would be expected you were opposed to that. Every force opposes having its duties given to someone else, but I think that your objections might look rather peculiar when it is considered that all over the country traffic control is carried out by the scouts of the Automobile Association and the Royal Automobile Club and has been for many years. I believe there is a feeling among some sections of the public that there are not enough police on the beat and too many on traffic duties. To put it the other way round, if there were a separate force for traffic duties there might not be so many incidents of 'Teddy boys' stabbing each other on Wimbledon Common and beating up cinema commissionaires in Brixton. Is it the Commissioner's considered opinion that there is nothing to be gained by having a subsidiary corps of traffic police ?

THE LECTURER : Dealing with the first point concerning the number of police forces which are maintained in this Country, that of course is a very wide question which I should find very difficult to discuss in detail in the very short time at my disposal ; but it has always been the tradition in this Country that police forces are, so to speak, nothing more than a part of the general community. In other words, the Police are the public and the public are the Police. I think that a great deal of the esteem and confidence with which the Police are regarded in this Country is because of the local nature of the force ; they are locally enlisted, locally controlled, and under the general control of the local authorities. I think that if the system were changed and put on a single national basis, although it might facilitate co-operation and make a number of problems easier to solve, and possibly contribute towards efficiency from our point of view, the objections to it

from the national point of view would be very much greater. I think that we should lose a great deal of the support which we get from the public at present. I think that everybody would feel there was a danger that the Police in this Country might develop into something like the police in some of the totalitarian States which are under direct government control. The Police in this Country are not under direct government control at all. They are independent of government. They are the servants not of the Government but of the law.

As regards training, very briefly the system is that now the training of the Police is carried out on a regional basis. We do our own training in the Metropolitan Police at our two training schools, and there are training schools set up in a number of areas up and down the Country to which all the police in those areas send their recruits. The whole system of training is co-ordinated and put on general lines which are applicable throughout the Country.

With regard to the separate force for traffic, I tried to explain that my view is that you do not require any lower standard for traffic duties than you do for other duties. In a sense of course I should only be too delighted to see another force raised and maintained to deal with traffic so that I could have more men free to deal with crime, but I do not see where we shall get those men. If I am right in saying that we need the same standards and same pay and conditions of service, I do not know where we shall get those men. Taken by and large, the traffic side of the policeman's duty is the least popular side, and if you cannot get men to do general police duties I do not see how you can expect to raise a large number of men to form a separate corps on the same scale and conditions of service to do the least interesting and popular side of police duty. The present system does mean that no man is solely engaged on traffic duty. He is thoroughly trained in all forms of police duty and is available to tackle any other type of work which happens to crop up.

WING COMMANDER J. B. TAYLOR: Apropos the point made earlier with regard to the establishment in the Metropolitan Police Force, I should like to know whether any attempt is made to recruit members of the Provost Branch of the Services who are largely short time people. They go into the Provost Branch by their own election and because they like the work. It appears to me that a certain amount of advertising among the Provost Service would lend itself to an increased recruitment into the police force after National Service.

THE LECTURER: I think that all of us in the Police would welcome it if we were given facilities to do some propaganda among the Military Police and National Service men, but it is the military authorities who frown on anything of that sort and we are not permitted to carry out any recruiting campaign among members of the Services.

AIR COMMODORE H. J. PROUD: The lecturer touched broadly on the relations of the Police with the armed forces. He did not go into more detail with regard to the relations between the Civil Police and the Service Police due, possibly, to modesty on his part. Speaking for the Royal Air Force Police I can say that we receive tremendous help in a great number of ways which I shall not specify from the Metropolitan and other police forces in the Country. We are always very conscious of this and very grateful for it. One does not often get the opportunity of expressing that appreciation in a wider forum, and I should like to take this one and say how greatly we are indebted for the help given by the Civil Police on work and also in the training of our own people.

With regard to the point which has just been made concerning ex-Service men going into the Civil Police, I must say that every police airman I have spoken to who is due to go out of the Service has replied, when asked what he is going to do when he gets out, that he is going to try for the Civil Police. Therefore, propaganda or no propaganda, they all seem to know about it. Without exception the men to whom I have spoken in the last three months have said this, so there does not seem to be any lack of information on the subject.

THE LECTURER : I am very glad to hear those remarks and I appreciate the tribute you have paid to the co-operation you receive from the Civil Police. I should like to say how much we on our part value the cordial co-operation which we receive from the police forces of all three Services. If it is true that members of the various Service police forces are desirous of joining the Civil Police when they leave, I am delighted to hear it.

COMMANDER G. C. H. CLAYTON, R.N. : May I second the remarks of the last speaker. We of the Admiralty Constabulary have always had the greatest help and encouragement from all the police forces in the Country.

COMMANDER M. G. SAUNDERS : Could the lecturer tell us something about contacts with foreign Powers, methods of training, and methods generally in the police forces, say, of western European countries since the war, and in the United States ?

THE LECTURER : I do not think we have any contacts with other forces in regard to training. Perhaps I ought not to say it, but I do not think that we have much to learn from them in this Country. Police forces in all countries are organized on a different basis, and I do not think that we should be able to get much assistance in regard to training by co-operation with other countries.

COMMANDER M. G. SAUNDERS : I was looking at it from the point of view of what we could teach people—for instance, Western Germany.

THE LECTURER : In the case of Western Germany we have done a great amount to teach them, because for many years there has been a Public Safety Branch in Germany which was advised by British officers and is still advised by them. We have done a great deal to inculcate our methods in the Western German police with a certain amount of success.

BRIGADIER R. H. MAXWELL : May I endorse on behalf of the Royal Military Police all that has been said about co-operation with the Civil Police. I should also like to endorse that which has been said about propaganda. Quite a number of military policemen go into the Civil Police.

DR. J. K. DUNLOP (Hamburg) : May I be allowed to endorse that which the lecturer has said about the magnificent work done by the officers of the Public Safety Branch in Western Germany. I can speak with special knowledge, and the work that has been done by these officers who have left England, Wales, Scotland, and North Ireland to serve with the Control Commission in Germany is beyond all praise. I hope that the result of their work will remain as a benefit to Europe for many years to come.

THE CHAIRMAN : I am sure you will all join with me in saying how much we have appreciated the very interesting lecture which we have had from Sir John Nott-Bower, the Commissioner. We are also grateful to him not only for the comprehensive manner in which he managed to cover such a vast subject in a short time, but for the way in which he has answered all the questions put to him. I have found it intensely interesting and I do thank him for his appreciation of the help which he has received from the Services. I shall not labour this because it has been said already, but I should like to endorse very strongly my own personal appreciation, in all the places in which I have served, for the help which I have received.

I think that we often fail to have sufficient knowledge of what other people are doing. Sir John mentioned this in his introduction and it is clear to me that we do not know enough about the Police. We ought to know much more and this lecture is of particular value to us. It is not, however, only the audience in this room who should know about the Police, but the public at large, and how that is done I do not know. The gentlemen of the Press are here and I think that it is their job to teach the public so far as that is concerned.

Some criticism was made of the fact that there were a hundred different police forces in this Country. I think that this audience would be the first to say thank God for the British Police. There is no police force which does its job as well in any other country in the world, and that is admitted all over the world. The great thing about our police force is, I think, that it does deal in a human way with all the problems that come before it. You have only to go to other countries to see some of the inhuman ways in which persons are dealt with if they quite unwittingly commit some offence. It might be thought that they were serious criminals. That sort of thing does not happen in this Country, I am glad to say.

On the traffic problem I shall not express any opinion as to what is right or wrong, but I do know that it is one of the most unpopular jobs that the police constable has to do, particularly in London where the traffic problem is acute. I know that constables hate it. To appoint special people to spend their time running people in for car parking offences would be very unsatisfactory. The fact that the police constable is not on this job all the time is certainly something to be said for keeping it a responsibility of the police force.

I should like once again to thank Sir John most heartily on behalf of everyone present for an extremely absorbing and interesting lecture, and for the able way in which he has responded to the many questions put to him. I hope that it will help us to learn more about our really wonderful police force.

(Applause.)

WORLD WAR III. SOME PROS AND CONS

By ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD A. R. P. ERNLE-ERLE-DRAX, K.C.B., D.S.O.

THERE are probably to-day many thousands who think, or assume without thinking, that World War III is a contingency so remote that no one need worry about it. The League of Nations, they say, may have failed to prevent World War II, but the United Nations, with their greater strength and greater experience should certainly be able to stop the next one. No one wants a war, so 'they' must see to it that we don't have one, 'they' being the politicians and statesmen who are supposed to control our destinies. A much larger number of people are completely uncertain and are just fatalistically hoping for the best. But some have formed very decided opinions. One well-known publicist (he may prefer to remain anonymous) wrote in 1945, after the dropping of two atomic bombs, "Total war—large-scale national war—is at an end. It has vanished from the sphere of practical politics. . . ." An eminent Marshal of the R.A.F. stated somewhat similar views in 1954.

It therefore seems useful to examine the chances for and against such a war. We had better start with 'against,' because the list of these items is, unfortunately, somewhat shorter than the other.

First, hopes can no doubt be built on the fact that Communism has certain fundamental defects which are bound to produce, in time, stresses, friction, and inefficiency. In Russia it has already begun to do so, but it has not led to any diminution in her vast production programme of tanks, bombers, and warships.

Great hopes were built on the possibility of some internal upheaval on the death of Stalin but, apart from the short conflict between Malenkov and Beria, this did not materialize. There is in Russia some shortage of food and consumer goods, which however is being tackled energetically. There is fear or hatred of the secret police and there is believed to be a considerable resistance movement, but this no doubt is violently kept in check by informers and *agents provocateur*.

Next, there is similar discontent in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and others of the satellite states. These certainly tend to weaken Russia, but they can never make it sure that she will not, in one way or another, blunder into war.

Next, there is the ancient hope that there will be no major war (a) because it is quite obvious that war does not pay, even (some would say especially!) if one is victorious; or (b) because nobody wants war, the people hate it, and public opinion in every land should be able to impress this fact on their leaders. Common sense fully supports these views, but unfortunately, even after the tragic experience of 1914-18, history shows that they do not operate in practice. Since 1930, we have had a second world war, Japan was at war with China for eight years (from 1937-45), and shortly after it ended China was quite ready, with Russian help, to force a war on the United Nations in Korea. When that war ended, she supported the Viet-Minh revolution and kept France fighting in Indo-China for eight years. From the point of view of world strategy and Russian imperialism, these moves were very effective, but they do not look like pointers to permanent peace.

Next, there is the Kellogg idea, of which it was said in 1927 that, "A general treaty renouncing war as a means of settling international disputes would crystallize in legal form the moral will of the civilized peoples of the world." This is exactly

what was done in the Kellogg-Briand Treaty of 1928, an ill-starred treaty which merely proved a few years later that good resolutions are no deterrent to evil men.

Next, there is the fond hope that the frightfulness of the hydrogen bomb has rendered war unthinkable and no longer possible. Alas, it is not so, for the fundamental causes that give rise to wars are, for the most part, in no way affected by the particular weapons that are going to be used when the war starts.

Similar hopes that war was at an end were heard with the introduction of gun-powder and again with the invention of dynamite, though these of course were trivial by comparison. The horror with which we now regard World War III was almost exactly equalled by the horror which experts, as well as the public, expected to result from the bombers built or building in 1939. Yet the very potency of this factor was, quite probably, one of the things that determined Goering and Hitler to launch their war. Certainly the new conditions of utter devastation on both sides will deter any sane man from deliberately planning to start a war, but they are no protection against the possible 'war by miscalculation', of which Lord Montgomery warned us so plainly in October, 1954. (After all, was Hitler sane?)

Lastly, there is the hope that the United Nations may prove more fortunate than the defunct League. Actually, it has suffered so many set-backs that some observers expected Russia to leave it, some say that the U.S.A. should leave it, and Communist China has not yet been allowed to join it. Certainly, it demonstrated that the United Nations (or rather a limited number of them, committed to it by the sudden action of President Truman) were prepared to take up arms against aggression. But it also demonstrated that their 'First XI' was deplorably weak and could only just stand up to the combined forces of North Korea and China's so-called volunteer army. This, incidentally, was an army that was very short of aircraft and was facing for the first time the full blast of the western war-machine. On the whole, therefore, it seems that our hopes of permanent peace are not yet secure.

SOME OF THE PROS

Our first 'pro' is the regrettable fact that, for 3,000 years or more, wars have flourished on this earth with such regularity that the only cause for uncertainty was whether the intervals between them would be long or short.

If, now, we are suddenly entering a period of permanent peace, there ought to be signs of some spectacular change, not merely in the weapons that we fight with but in the major causes that drive us to war.

The history of the XXth Century shows no indication whatever of such a change; for the XXth Century wars, even the minor ones like Indo-China, Malaya, and Kenya, are, though more unpleasant, no less frequent than those of earlier times.

Much has been written about the fundamental causes of war, and though experts differ somewhat there is a large measure of agreement. There is little sign that those causes are being eliminated from human affairs, in fact one may say that they are as widespread on the face of the earth to-day, and as virulent, as at any time for 100 years. While those conditions exist there is always a danger that the situation may get out of hand and events begin to take charge of the men who think they are controlling them. Thus, two nations sometimes reach a position like that of two great ships converging in a fog. Each thinks it is on a safe course, till suddenly, through the whirling mist, it is seen at the last moment that collision is inevitable. With nations, however, the process is partly psychological and therefore less rapid.

It is always difficult to differentiate between the apparent causes of war and those that are really fundamental. For example, in 1739, exactly 200 years before Hitler's war, we had a war with Spain which is known to historians and schoolboys as the War of Jenkins's ear. Needless to say, the Spaniards' ill-treatment of Captain Jenkins and the loss of his ear were, like the murder of the Austrian archduke at Sarajevo, no more than the last straw which tipped the balance in favour of war. Before the final event there of course existed, in each case, a state of tension or unstable equilibrium where war had become obviously possible, if not probable. People are constantly saying that if this or that had been done by some person in authority, the two world wars might have been avoided. In the light of world history, it would probably be more accurate to say that they had become inevitable at least a year before they actually started. Of course the word inevitable is one that, quite rightly, we all avoid like the plague, but it is a grim thought that, without any of us knowing it, our next major war may have become inevitable some months before it actually begins. In this connection, many statesmen and others have already pointed out that unless certain things are done, by peoples as well as by Governments, the prospects of maintaining permanent peace are not good.

Another significant pointer is the fact that it is contrary to all the experience of history for great fighting forces to be built up, kept for years all ready for action, and then never used. Especially is this the case when they are built up by an autocrat or dictator, whose foreign policy shows clear indications of a passion for imperialism if not for world conquest. As, therefore, "the means to do ill deeds makes ill deeds done", we should not forget that Russia is still producing tanks and long-range aircraft in enormous numbers, while the Admiralty have informed us (in August, 1954) that since 1945 she has spent on building up her Navy the fantastic sum of £12,000,000,000. She plans to have, in two or three years' time, 30 cruisers, 150 destroyers, 500 submarines, 1,000 minesweepers, hundreds of other small craft, and 4,000 naval aircraft. In these days the menace of a new war is apt to wax and wane almost from week to week, but the general view does not seem to be that it is getting permanently more distant.

For example Mr. Casey, Australian Minister, said in September, 1954 (B.B.C., 28th September), that the only hope of avoiding war was to persuade the Communist countries that they could quite well co-exist in peace with the democratic nations of the West. But that is exactly what we have been trying to persuade them to believe for nearly 10 years. And since the Soviet Government's distrust and dislike of us shows no sign of abatement, we can only suppose that our efforts have totally failed. Dr. Billy Graham, speaking at Baton Rouge, U.S.A., in October, 1954, is reported in the Press to have referred to conversations with President Eisenhower and Sir Winston Churchill. Their views, he said, could be summed up in the single phrase, "We don't have long to wait", while one of them told him, "The storm clouds are gathering in all their maddening fury." If this report is correct one might hazard a guess that the first phrase was coined in America and the second in England.

Mr. J. R. H. Hutchinson, Under-Secretary of State for War, speaking in Glasgow on 2nd September, 1954, said that Britain must arm—and arm quickly—if she is to avoid a third world war.

Our chief danger was well described by Lord Montgomery when he told us, in his lecture at the R.U.S.I. on 21st October, 1954, that "war by miscalculation" might come at any time. Thus, he said, the danger of war is always with us, and now, as never before, preparedness is vital.

After all, it was miscalculation that started World Wars I and II. In the first, the Kaiser was convinced that we would not fight, partly because we were gravely preoccupied with trouble in Ireland. In the second, Hitler was equally convinced that we would not fight, largely because we stood aside when Mussolini attacked Abyssinia, and later had capitulated at Munich.

In the old days, if one nation mobilized, others felt compelled to do so within 48 hours. But to-day a large part of the Russian army is already mobilized, and there is the further danger that no nation is willing to risk being the victim of a surprise attack with nuclear bombs. Thus, a false report that one of us was planning or preparing such an attack might decide an enemy that he must at once adopt what may seem to him the only remedy at his disposal, viz., a 'Pearl Harbour' assault, on a vastly greater scale, with fleets of heavy bombers. The deplorably small response in Britain to all appeals for Civil Defence volunteers makes it clear that our people are, in the matter of peace and war, still living in a fool's paradise.

If we look for a moment behind the scenes, we can well imagine a memorandum such as the following being issued by the high authorities in Moscow, or in the Pentagon at Washington—or in both.

Secret.

To the Heads of the Armed Forces and all others concerned.

In regard to preparation for war, or for defence against aggression, it must be realized that any attacker with nuclear bombs who gets a start of 24 hours will have obtained a decided, and perhaps a decisive, advantage. If we do not attack first [which it is generally assumed the U.S.A. would never do] we lose the chance of gaining that advantage.

In any case, this means that when the relations between the Great Powers become strained, it is necessary for us to be ready for war at *very* short notice. From the moment that the enemy's bombers take off, if he is making a surprise attack,¹ we shall have only a few hours in which to man and get into action our radar detection service, Civil Defence Corps, high-angle guns round our major cities, guided rocket batteries, home defence fighters, etc. If these fail, or are not ready in time, we are lost. But defence alone is of no avail. We must therefore with equal speed get into action every possible form of counter-attack. These include naval operations to assist the delivery of nuclear bombs; air and naval operations to protect the ocean highways from minelaying; military operations to hold up advancing armies; a strategic bomber attack to cripple in every way possible the offensive moves of the enemy; &c.

It is thus obvious that speed and complete readiness are vital, for time lost may never be regained. It is equally obvious that much depends on a highly efficient intelligence service, for one or two false reports, or a warning report that failed to arrive, might have shocking results . . . and so on.

One does not wish to make people's flesh creep, but it seems fairly clear from the above that the fighting Services, both in the east and in the west, have now the unpleasant duty of making everything ready for a war of horrifying dimensions, with

¹ General Gruenther has stated that, for the N.A.T.O. forces of Western Europe, it is possible the period of warning in such a case would not exceed 13 minutes!

At Pearl Harbour, certain warning indications of enemy approach were received, but they did not reach the Command H.Q. in time to be acted on.

a hair-trigger to release it. These are hardly the conditions to ensure permanent peace!

OPINIONS FROM THE CHURCH AND THE BIBLE

Continuing our enquiry into the fundamental causes of war, which obviously is a complex and difficult subject, it would hardly be wise to omit considering the views of the Church, or the endless references to war and tribulation contained in the Bible.

The Church tells us that many prophecies in the Old Testament have been literally fulfilled, as recorded in the New Testament. The latter, and parts of the Old Testament too, contain numerous references to some future time, described as "the latter days", or "the time of troubles", or "the times of the end", culminating in famine, fire, earthquake, and war, brought by the four horsemen of the Apocalypse. These prophecies are mostly to be found in *Daniel*, Chapters 11 and 12, *Ezekiel*, Chapters 38 and 39, *Matthew* 24, *Mark* 13, and *Revelation*, Chapters 6 to 20.

Any study of these chapters brings us at once to two major problems. First, it is extremely difficult to put a date to any of the future events foretold in the Bible. Second, it is impossible to say what parts of them could or should be interpreted literally, and what parts can be regarded only as parable, metaphor, or allegory. Many passages in 11, 12, 13, and other chapters of *Revelation*, for example, could not well be taken literally. On this subject it may be noted that a Doctrinal Commission was appointed by two archbishops in 1922 to consider the nature and grounds of Christian doctrine. Some 20 bishops and eminent theologians studied the subject for 15 years and then reported that certain passages in the Bible could not and should not be taken literally.

The main point of interest, however, is that no past war, from the days of Attila, 1,500 years ago, to the present time, could be said to conform at all accurately with the Bible prophecies describing the happenings of the latter days.

But since the invention of the atom and hydrogen bombs there has been a very marked change. As regards time, there seems no particular reason why the campaign of Armageddon might not occur at some period in the XXth Century. A number of people, erroneously, thought that the time had come when Allenby, in September, 1918, was fighting his way across the plain of Megiddo, and the Arabs, deeply impressed, were saying that "Allenby", in their tongue, could be interpreted as "the Prophet of God."

It may be noted that the prophecies of the latter days are in many places directly connected with the Second Advent, to be followed by the Millennium. This event was expected by many in the year 1000 A.D. and has been expected by hosts of others both before and since. But quite evidently that is a subject on which no human being can venture to express an opinion (*vide Mark* 13, v. 32). All we can do is to make a few general deductions as to the incidence and the course of World War III if (note if) certain of the Bible prophecies are to be interpreted more or less literally.

The following deductions seem then to emerge:—

1. That according to Scripture, World War III is almost inevitable. And anyway, that the war to end war has not yet been fought.
2. That a war with nuclear weapons would tally closely (as no previous war could) with conditions described in parts of the New Testament.
3. That the losses and the devastation will be ghastly, and that in the end the power of the aggressor will be utterly broken.

Thereafter it might be that "they shall beat their swords into plough-shares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." But any event subsequent to the great war of the latter days is outside the scope of this enquiry.

The following quotations, which, of course, differ somewhat in importance, might be used to illustrate the three deductions stated above.

For No. 1: (the probability of a major war).

"And at the time of the end . . . the king of the north shall come against him like a whirlwind, with chariots, and with horsemen, and with many ships . . . and there shall be a time of trouble, such as never was since there was a nation even to that same time." *Daniel*, Chapter 11, v. 40 to Chapter 12, v. 1.

"And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars: . . . for all these things must come to pass, but the end is not yet. For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom: and there shall be famines, and pestilences, and earthquakes, in divers places." *Matthew*, Chapter 24, v. 6 and 7.

"For they are the spirits of devils, working miracles, which go forth unto the kings of the earth and of the whole world, to gather them to the battle of that great day of God Almighty." *Revelation*, Chapter 16, v. 14.

For Nos. 2 and 3 (indicating the potency and unprecedented devastation of atomic war?) there are some appropriate passages in the *Book of Revelation*. It is not suggested that this book should in any way take precedence of the four gospels or the major prophets, but it happens to define in greater detail some of the events described in general terms in *Mark*, Chapter 13 (and in *Matthew*, Chapter 24).

"The first angel sounded, and there followed hail and fire mingled with blood, . . . and the third part of trees was burnt up, and all green grass was burnt up." [An atomic bomb in a large forest at the right time of year might easily start a fire that would destroy a third of the trees.]

"And the second angel sounded, and as it were a great mountain burning with fire was cast into the sea:² . . . and the third part of the creatures that were in the sea, and had life, died; and the third part of the ships were destroyed. And the third angel sounded, and there fell a great star from heaven [nuclear bomb?], burning as it were a lamp, and it fell upon the third part of the rivers, and upon the fountains of waters; . . . and the third part of the waters became wormwood; and many men died of the waters, because they were made bitter. . . ." *Revelation*, Chapter 8, v. 7-13.

"And the four angels were loosed, which were prepared . . . for to slay the third part of men." *Revelation*, Chapter 9, v. 15.

(It may be remarked that when the Black Death swept through Europe in the Middle Ages it slew nearly half the population, so if an atomic war killed only a third, the survivors might think themselves relatively fortunate?)

Two references to The Isles are of some interest:

"The king of the north shall come, and cast up a mount, and take the most fenced cities; . . . after this he shall turn his face unto the isles, and shall take many." *Daniel*, Chapter 11, v. 15-18.

² It may be noted that, on exploding the American H-bomb in the Pacific in 1954, a whole island was cast into the sea.

"And I will send a fire on Magog, and among them that dwell carelessly in the isles : and they shall know that I am the Lord." *Ezekiel*, Chapter 39, v. 6.

Finally :

"For in those days shall be affliction such as was not from the beginning of creation which God created unto this time, neither shall be. And except that the Lord had shortened those days, no flesh should be saved : but for the elect's sake, whom he hath chosen, he hath shortened the days." *Mark*, Chapter 13, v. 19, 20.

It must be said again, that there is no wish to suggest that all these quotations should be taken literally. On that point, every individual must decide for himself. But there is one striking point about all forecasts of "the times of the end." In every case there is a categorical statement that these things will be. Whereas all the prophets of Israel for a thousand years or more, when speaking of their own times, prefaced with an *if* their warnings of approaching disaster. "*If ye harken unto the Lord your God ; if ye cease to worship Baal and the golden calf ;*" then all will be well and the impending doom will be averted. Always there was a choice between good and evil, and every nation was free to determine its own future. But for the latter days there is no *if* !

THE ULTIMATE FACTOR

In conclusion, there is one other factor which we can interpret either as a 'pro' or a 'con', according to our opinion of the conditions that exist to-day. That is, the extent to which the nations concerned are entirely deserving of peace.

It has often been said that "every nation gets the government it deserves", and many examples from history could be quoted to support that contention. But, if true, it would be equally reasonable to suppose that, in the long run, every nation gets the wars and the disasters that it deserves. This theory is old-fashioned, as old indeed as the Old Testament, but if it be accepted that, in general, nations as well as individuals can be expected to reap what they have sown, it may be of interest to consider briefly what measure of good or ill fortune Destiny has handed out to them during the present century. The three ancient scourges, war, pestilence, and famine, have, we find, been somewhat unequally divided. Intermittent war, civil war or revolution, though not on the grand scale, has recurred most frequently in South America, the Balkans, and parts of Asia. Disease flourishes perennially in many parts of Africa and large areas of Asia. The famine areas are mostly to be found in the east, India and China being among the worst.

Turning to Europe, we find that the worst famine of the XXth Century occurred in Russia, and the only catastrophic pestilence was the influenza epidemic of 1918-19, said to have killed more people than the first World War !

The number of wars since 1900 has been so great that we cannot attempt to analyse them here.

The classic example, perhaps, of long-continued suffering is the tragic history of the Jews. The Old Testament describes their chequered history for some thousands of years, and they seem to have fared no better in modern times. Whether, as some have said, they were too fond of the Golden Calf, or perhaps were guilty of some other faults, it is not for us to enquire. Suffice it that the last war was their worst, for it is estimated that some 5,000,000 Jews were massacred by Hitler.

Turning to a wider field, the more one looks into history the clearer seems the truth of that old maxim, that every great civilization has crumbled from within before it was smitten from without. Similarly, in kingdoms and empires that are gone, one finds that there were visible seeds of decadence which foreshadowed the approaching end. And, sadly enough, the people most closely affected were usually the last to recognize the writing on the wall.

Arnold Toynbee has pointed out that, after the disappearance of some 20 great civilizations, what we now know as 'western civilization' is almost the sole survivor of them all. It cannot be denied that seeds of decadence have been clearly visible in certain parts of it: we can only hope that Britain, if not immune, is at least less tainted than some of the other areas. This, however, is a difficult matter to assess. Some foreigners express the opinion that the British Empire reached its zenith and began to decline at the end of the XIXth Century. Others say that the terrible loss of life (and mainly of our most valuable lives) in the 1914-18 War left us in a position where decline was inevitable. (The British Empire lost more than a million dead in the first and more than half a million in the second World War.) Against this, many will assert that a great renaissance began with the new reign under the inspired leadership of Queen Elizabeth II. Who can tell us which is right? But if it were to be proved that our western civilization is going downhill (or uphill), we should know more about a factor which, judging from history, may have a decisive influence on the coming or not coming of World War III.

Let us end with a few quotations from men whose opinions are worthy of respect, to show how far we seem to have got with the job of converting our present uneasy peace into a peace that is secure and permanent.

"Every one of the Ten Commandments is being violated from one end of the earth to the other, and from that springs all the badness of the present time."

"The wells of truth are poisoned by racial hatreds, poisoned by false and lying propaganda, poisoned by the fanaticisms which inspire them." Dr. Fisher, Archbishop of Canterbury. As reported in the Press, October, 1947.

"It is my confident belief that until those who are responsible for the governments of the chief nations of this world are Christian in faith and Christian in practice, there can be no guarantee for the continuance of peace. At the same time I am equally confident that they will not become established in Christian faith and in Christian practice without something in the nature of a great revival of religion throughout the world." The Moderator of the Church of Scotland. As reported in the Press, October, 1947.

"To-day we find that men still have greed and ambition, hatred and lust, pride and lying, and cheating. In spite of all our progress, we find more hatred, more war, more wickedness, more killing in the world to-day than at any time in its history."

"This has been an age of frustration, nervous tension, selfishness, fear, lawlessness, immorality, insecurity, chaotic international relationships. The age of progress which was boasted about a few years ago, seems to have failed somewhere, and it has suffered a death-blow." Dr. Billy Graham: from a Press Report in July, 1954, quoting some of his addresses.

"I want to interpret the crisis of our time as the breakdown of a civilization. . . . If we go on thinking and acting as if this civilization of ours is assured of its survival, or as if its strains could be cured by better political systems or economic

methods or even more heroic morals, then—I contend—the breakdown will deepen into complete dissolution. On the other hand, if we frankly recognize that our western civilization is showing, on the largest scale ever known, all the signs which have marked the disintegration of cultures in the past, we may be able to plant the seeds of a renewal which will not have to wait until after a long period of utter decay." Canon V. A. Demant. In *What is Happening to Us?* (Dacre Press.)

So much for a small selection from the spokesmen of the Churches. It would be rash to disregard them, though some may say they would naturally be biased in favour of a religious or spiritual outlook.

The quotations that follow, however, are essentially similar and are collected from a wide variety of laymen. Again there is room only for a very small selection. If space permitted they could be multiplied indefinitely.

Alexis de Toqueville, in his book *Democracy in America* (written many years before 1914), said :

"The Christian Nations of our age seem to me to present a most alarming spectacle ; the impulse which is bearing them along is so strong that it cannot be stopped, but it is not yet so rapid that it cannot be guided ; their fate is in their hands ; yet a little while and it may be so no longer. . . ."

Herbert Agar (U.S.A.) in his book *A Time for Greatness*, 1943, says :

"We are at war primarily because of a sickness in our civilization that made all these events necessary."

"The war must begin again—must always begin again until our world is dead—unless we define the causes of our failure and insist that the causes be abolished."

"How did it happen that we have come so close to such a final disaster ? . . . Even to-day it is impossible to persuade many people. They cling to the myth that there is nothing wrong with our world except a 'war' that was 'started' by Germany or by Japan—the implication being that if we win the war, or even negotiate a not-too-onerous peace, we have solved our problems."

"If we take the attitude that we took after the last war, we shall merely insure that the war must begin again. And so far as civilization is concerned, the third time will be out."

"Man has only a few frail institutions with which to ward off darkness. If he fails to preserve them there will soon be no civilization beneath the indifferent stars."

Lord Elton writes (in *St. George or The Dragon*, 1942) :

"Who can contemplate this war without recognizing that it is the supreme arbitrament of our fitness for survival, and that we have no right to hope to survive unless we are worthy to survive—and to shape the new world ? And who, recognizing this, can help anxiously reflecting upon our qualities, and their defects, in the light of this final and most searching test ?"

Arnold Toynbee, broadcasting in 1951, said :

"What are the prospects ? The next stage in mankind's earthly pilgrimage will certainly not be easy going. The re-awakening peasantry, being human, may carry their unreasonableness to perilous lengths. . . . They do not realize

that, if they are eventually to get material benefit out of technology, they must first put spiritual treasures into it—such rare treasures as self discipline and patience and vision."

Cyril Falls, sometime Professor of the History of War at Oxford, ends his recent book, *A Hundred Years of War*, thus:—

"So at the end of a century of warfare, our world depends for the maintenance of peace, not on a system, but on the inspiration and efforts of individual statesmen, and on the improvisations of states eager to avoid a world conflict but wasting their substance upon armaments. It would be foolish as well as dishonest to prophesy success in this effort to ward off a terrible disaster for mankind. It would be cowardly to abandon hope that the effort will prove successful."

Nikolai Berdiaeff in a lecture at Chatham House, printed in *International Affairs*, in June, 1948, said:

"We live in a world which is destroying itself; we are taking part in the ruin of a whole civilization. . . . I myself believe that the most deplorable fact about our epoch is that it has broken with Christian values. . . .

"Man in our day gives the impression of being in his death-agony, or very close to it; the foundations of his existence are disappearing; he is experiencing a process of disintegration from within, rather than from without."

Let us end on a more cheerful note, for the authors of our last two quotations have made a brave effort to be optimistic.

David Gammons, M.P., broadcasting in January, 1950, said:

"An England with its gaols full, its courts cluttered up with juvenile delinquents, its homes broken, its thieving. . . . That sort of England can never win the battle against the devaluation of the British character. . . . I am absolutely convinced that the great qualities of the British people are still there. They have been overlaid for the moment by a false philosophy. . . . In all our long history no one has ever been able to equal the British at their best. The trouble is that so many of us to-day are not even at our second best. . . .

"Lastly, I do not believe we can win the battle against the devaluation of our national character without acknowledging that it was a religious belief which was the true inspiration of that character and the source of all our power."

Arthur Stanley wrote thus in his *Seven Stars of Peace* (1940):

"Let us be quite frank about it. The road is not an easy one. . . . If we are, as Pitt said, to save others by our example, we must first save ourselves by our exertions. Already it may be too late. The situation which led to the present conflict was in itself an indication of some decay in our western civilization. . . .

"But we need not abandon hope. Our present age may not, after all, be the twilight of the West, in which our civilization is fading towards its final extinction. We may yet, if we prove ourselves as wise in peace as we are now proving ourselves strong in war, pass through this present darkness to a brighter and happier day."

CONCLUSION

The above opinions do not definitely suggest that the war of Armageddon, or any kind of major war, is shortly to be expected. But they do suggest that, just as the Jews have completely failed to end their long centuries of tribulation, so we in the West have no good reason to think that permanent peace has been made secure, or probable, or even adequately merited. It could be done, it is perhaps the most urgent problem of our day, but the time now available for such a tremendous task is very short.

There is, of course, no space here to suggest how the task might be accomplished. But since this paper ranges, in part, over unconventional ground, it may be useful to set down a few of the deductions that can be drawn from it, viz. :—

1. It would be most unwise to suppose that a major war in the future will be prevented solely by the Great Deterrent, i.e. by the threat of complete destruction on both sides with H-Bombs.

There has been too little examination of the fundamental causes of wars. Such study would indicate that they have little or no connection with the particular weapons that will be used in waging them.

2. It is arguable that the wars and other disasters experienced by any nation are largely dependent on the extent to which their people are deserving of permanent peace. It would be rash to assume without ample proof that this is not so, for it may prove to be a dominant factor.

3. We have at our disposal the history of many nations and some 20 civilizations (c.f. Arnold Toynbee), and of the latter nearly all have perished. In every case they decayed from within before they were smitten from without.

If then we take history as a guide, it would seem that the preservation of permanent peace is, whether we like it or not, a spiritual as well as a military or political problem. "*Si vis pacem para bellum*" is a good rule for the present day, but it does not cover all the ground, and never can. If, without undue delay, we, or better still the nations of the West, can demonstrate that we have overcome our present failings and achieved a way of life that is admired and envied by all the world, we shall have made our future more secure and taken a long step towards conquering Communism.

FIGHTING FORMATIONS OF THE FUTURE

By MAJOR A. F. J. G. JACKSON, E.R.D., M.A., THE WORCESTERSHIRE REGIMENT

THE arrival of tactical atomic weapons is going to cause some radical changes in the organization of fighting formations. Exercise "Battle Royal" held last Summer in B.A.O.R. under the direction of General Sir Richard N. Gale started considerable discussion on the subject. Prior to that, two bold officers, Major W. N. R. Scotter in the JOURNAL of November, 1953, and Major N. C. Baird in the issue of August, 1954, ventured to put forward their ideas on the reorganization of the infantry division.

Both articles contained much that was interesting and provoking as well as a great deal of good sense, but both had the weakness that they were inspired rather by organizational than by functional aims. For instance, Major Scotter talks of a division with a four battalion 'front,' with three or four battalions in reserve. This at once argues a conception of linear defence, with divisions neatly drawn up, side by side. Such conceptions are dead. Even if the forces were available, atomic weapons forbid such concentrations of men and vehicles. The tactical use of atomic weapons must lead to greater mobility and, therefore, flexibility in units and formations. Any argument about 'threes,' 'fours,' or 'fives' in formations inevitably leads to 'sixes and sevens' and is sterile. There is only one way to design a tool and that is to decide what it will be asked to do. In designing the fighting formations of the future one must consider the tactics and strategy which the characteristics of the new weapons will force on commanders. Atomic explosive can be delivered in bombs from aircraft, in the warheads of pilotless aircraft or rockets, and in shells from cannon.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

The general characteristics of atomic explosive are too horribly familiar to need restating in detail, but it is worthwhile dwelling on certain advantages and disadvantages which are common to all forms of atomic weapon. There is little to be gained from expressing the effect of atomic bombs in terms of tons of TNT when used in shells. To do so misses the point of the greatest advantage of an atomic explosion which is its speed and thoroughness. Used on a battlefield one can say that in a second of time at 4,000 yards from the point of impact no men or unarmoured vehicles will be left capable of fighting as an organized force unless they have had the opportunity of fortifying their position very strongly. Even troops in slit trenches can expect casualties up to 1,500 yards. The equivalent amount of TNT would take many hours to deliver by any means and its effect would be unevenly spread over the target.

There seem to be three outstanding disadvantages possessed by all atomic weapons. The greatest is the expense of production in terms of industrial effort and money. It is difficult to give any figures, but the amount spent annually by the United States and ourselves on research and production puts these weapons in a class by themselves. Therefore it follows that they will not lightly be used on the battlefield. Further restraint on their use will be the fear that the damage they do may impede our own forces and the desire not to waste them on uneconomic targets resulting from poor information.

THE EFFECT ON THE THEATRE OF WAR

Any one can see that atomic weapons mean more dispersion, but to arrive at our future organization we must find out what that really means. The best way is to strike out various forms of high concentrations of men and vehicles now known to us.

Beginning in the rear areas, one sees straight away that the day of the large single base such as Antwerp in 1945, or Tel-el-Kebir, is over. Corps maintenance areas and divisional administrative areas offer far too valuable targets. Nearer the front, large columns of vehicles and too much reliance on roads are dangerous. Divisions concentrating to cross rivers or start lines will do so at their peril. Never again will three armoured divisions concentrate for so long as they did for Operation "Goodwood" in Normandy on 18th July, 1944. The artillery will never again form up as they did before El Alamein, nor can one visualize the concentration of aircraft and gliders which were collected to carry Major-General Wingate's second Chindit expedition into North Burma in 1944 happening again. Aircraft and landing craft carrying troops to battle will only be able to concentrate for short periods at the point of delivery.

This rapid review shows quite clearly how the whole organization of an army from front to rear will be affected. Large concentrations of men or material must be broken up into packets small enough not to offer worthwhile atomic targets. At the same time it will be as necessary as ever before to concentrate when strategy or tactics demand it. These apparently contradictory requirements can only be reconciled by producing fighting formations which can move rapidly at short notice. To do this they must be shorn of every vehicle or item of equipment which is not essential to their functions. A reduction of vehicles and stores will not only increase mobility, it will also lessen the problems of hiding units from the air and reduce the material to be hidden in the depots and parks to the rear. If the remaining vehicles are designed with a good cross-country performance, mobility will be increased still further, thus making unlikely those heavily congested roads which every ground attack pilot hopes to find.

It is obviously impracticable here to go into detail when talking of reducing equipment, but to show that it has not been considered lightly it may perhaps be worth giving some examples showing what could be reduced in an infantry battalion. These thoughts are based on the conception of a far greater austerity than was acceptable in the last war. There will only be space on transport for reserve ammunition, petrol, and food. Even these must be reduced from the present scale. The soldier's daily ration must be produced so that he can easily carry and cook it himself. Self-heating tinned foods made their appearance during the last war. Individual cooking will do away with the cooks and Officers' Mess trucks straight away. Evacuation of wounded by helicopter from forward areas could eliminate the doctor and two vehicles. There will be no room for blankets or officers' bedding rolls. In their place there is a need for a groundsheet lined with glass fibre or similar light but warm material, easily converted to a sleeping bag.

To some these ideas may appear ruthless and dangerous for morale, until the awful alternative is considered.

The increase in mobility will be of no value unless accompanied by a remarkable advance in communications. The Royal Corps of Signals must search for reliable wireless sets capable of long distance operation, but not bulky; sturdy and easy to

operate and not subject to enemy interference. This is a difficult demand to meet but it must be realized that the telephone makes headquarters immobile because they become unwilling to move and lose their secure and certain line communications.

DEFENSIVE BATTLE

Having considered the effect of atomic weapons in general one can now approach one's conception of the way future battles will be fought. The aim of all commanders will be to force their enemies to concentrate sufficient forces to constitute an atomic target, while at the same time not offering one themselves. Here one must issue a word of warning. There will be many occasions when some other means has to be used to destroy the enemy. For political, economic, and strategic reasons atomic weapons may be unsuitable.

Before one can go any further one must try to establish what constitutes a worthwhile atomic target. Remembering the area of destruction against dug in troops, a circle of 1,500 yards radius, and the thoroughness of its destructive powers, one must conclude that a brigade locality defended by present day small arms weapons (which with ground control its size) could be effectively neutralized by one atomic missile. But if that brigade is defending an important bridge or communication centre, its destruction will deprive the enemy of the fruits of victory as well as impeding their advance still further. Nor will it generally be possible for the enemy to locate and delineate precisely the brigade position and, therefore, the chances are that part of the missile's effect will be wasted and, as indicated already, no one can afford to use atomic explosives on anything except major targets because of their great cost. A divisional locality defended by present day small arms, however, is much harder to miss and a hit anywhere is likely either to destroy its headquarters and reserves or to tear a great hole in its defence. One can, therefore, assume that a brigade will very seldom provide a sufficiently tempting target, but a division will. It will, however, still need at least a division to reduce a brigade with conventional weapons if the brigade is properly dug in.

Having decided that a brigade, particularly if it is defending an area of value to the enemy, is not an atomic target but that a division is, it follows that there must be a minimum distance that one brigade can be placed from another, assuming that it will be desirable to use atomic weapons against large bodies of enemy trying to infiltrate between defended localities.

Though it should be possible for troops to dig in under most circumstances, it is seldom feasible for tanks or vehicles to be given similar protection. In the open, tanks need to be 2,000 yards from ground zero and battened down to escape damage. Trucks require at least 2,500 yards. Therefore, the minimum distance between brigade localities must be 5,000 yards. It is essential here to say that this figure is only introduced to show the nature of the problem. The tactical nature of the ground to be defended will decide the size of the gap, but the defence will be handicapped in its use of atomic weapons and liable to heavier casualties if a smaller gap is accepted.

The pattern of the defensive battle now begins to emerge. The ground will be held by infantry brigade groups holding important communication centres, defiles, and main river crossings, or any area possession of which by the enemy will considerably help his advance. The greater the depth of this belt of fortresses the better, and the more natural obstacle lines, rivers, mountain ranges, or forests that run at right angles to the enemy's thrust the more economical use may be made of the troops available.

The advancing enemy risks destruction by atomic attack if he is foolish enough to concentrate a division or more to remove the brigade in his path, provided this concentration takes place more than a mile and a half from our own troops. If he succeeds in launching an attack within this safety limit then he must himself be attacked by our armoured forces which have lain in wait to a flank. Since they form the mobile element essential to his destruction, the enemy will spend a great deal of time and effort locating and then atom bombing these armoured forces. Therefore, they must carefully choose their hiding places and must be ready to use deception at every stage. A move every night may become a 'drill' for armoured units. Here again a brigade is probably the biggest acceptable concentration until the moment comes for attack. The concentration for attack is not difficult. It requires the evolution of a staff technique similar to that used by Bomber Command in 1,000 aircraft 'saturation' raids over Berlin in the 1939-45 War, in order to co-ordinate the arrival of the formations involved.

Even when it has been possible to use an atomic weapon on the attacking enemy, our armoured forces will have to follow up, in case the bomb has not been fully successful, to destroy survivors.

THE OFFENSIVE BATTLE

The offensive battle is conceived as being the final effort that wins the war. The industrial and economic cost will prohibit such an effort being repeated. Before it is launched the air battle must have been won and the enemy's material support weakened by atomic destruction of his key industries. It will be a pity if the strategic background to this great climax should be anything but the 'oblique' strategy which has stood the British in good stead so often in the past. Provided that sufficient atomic missiles are available and the whole army can go forward on cross-country vehicles, it will, of course, be possible to bulldoze a path through the enemy's defensive belt of fortresses, but at a terrible political as well as material cost. A head-on attack must be avoided unless accompanied by a diversion which will effectively make the enemy look over his shoulder and divide his forces. Such a diversion might be provided by the use of airborne and air transported forces to establish 'airheads' behind the enemy fortress belt. Following the principles so far established these will each require a number of landing and dropping zones. Their aim will be to control a large piece of territory across the enemy's communications. If an 'airhead' can be set up within reach of a sea flank attainable by the Navy, reinforcements and supplies can come by sea provided a stretch of coast has been won which is long enough to enable deliveries to be made at several points. The enemy air force will never be so defeated as to be incapable of attacking highly vulnerable and worthwhile targets, such as a mass of shipping provides.

These 'airheads' must be supplied in the early stages by air, and if no sea communications are available, must continue to be so supplied until a land line of communication is opened up.

While they are being created an attempt to destroy completely the enemy's armour and atomic artillery by air and tank attack will be in progress. Once this is achieved the only obstacles to linking up with the 'airheads' are the enemy fortresses guarding his main routes. These can either be by-passed or attacked with comparative impunity by infantry supported by armour. By-passing is preferable since the 'airheads' must be reached quickly, but it requires infantry to be carried in cross-country vehicles and the provision of prefabricated bridging materials which can quickly and easily be brought forward and placed in position. One sees helicopters

providing much assistance in the rapid construction of these bridges, by dragging one end across the gap.

However, there are bound to be fortresses which cannot be by-passed and preparations must be made for their reduction. If the diversion has been well planned and launched, the morale of the troops holding these fortresses will probably be poor, particularly if our light armoured vehicles ranging deep into enemy territory have prevented supplies reaching them. On the other hand, they may realize that on their staunch defence rests the result of the war. Therefore, there must always be available highly mobile 'siege trains' of specialized armoured vehicles to breach minefields and wire obstacles, and to destroy defence works. These 'siege trains' will be in great demand, and on their availability and speed of movement will depend the continuing momentum of the advance. As one fortress after another is reduced or by-passed, so will the enemy's resistance crumble. As our surface thrusts continue, the transport aircraft will be carrying supplies and reinforcements to the 'airheads.' Thus the enemy will be made to face both ways and divide his forces. In such a manner can one see the old arts of strategy being applied in new ways.

ORGANIZATION

The Infantry Battalion. This new type of warfare is going to have certain very clear effects on the infantry battalion and its establishment, and, though it is not strictly a formation, these effects must be touched on because the organization of formations will depend so much on the assistance the Infantry will require. In defence, it must expect to hold bigger areas and be capable of rapid movement, deployment, and occupation of defensive positions. In the attack, it must be capable of rapid movement in armoured personnel carriers (A.P.C.s). Controlled by radioed orders, it must deploy and move into attack while in motion. It must be able at all times to move complete by air—a cold as well as a hot war requirement.

These 'musts' lead one to the conclusion that methods of deployment and movement are too slow, mainly because there are too many vehicles, supporting weapons, and items of stores. Deployment can be streamlined by having supporting fire provided by other arms and doing away with battalion support weapons, thus cutting out the lengthy and ponderous regrouping at present so often found necessary within the battalion.

The four rifle companies should consist of four rifle platoons, each of three sections of seven. The fourth rifle platoon is required to give depth to a large company locality. The section of seven is easy to handle and represents a normal war-time figure.

Headquarter company should include an innovation, a scout platoon, replacing the intelligence and sniper sections. These men should be specially trained in observation and reconnaissance work and should also be snipers. With such large areas to cover, and the need for rapid movement in and out of harbour areas, theirs will be a very important responsibility and they must be boldly used.

The Infantry Brigade. The infantry brigade will hold defensive pivots about which the armour can manoeuvre, and in attack will be responsible for the investment of and assault on enemy fortresses. Its main requirements will be control of its own artillery, its own reconnaissance force, and a substantial counter-attack force.

Every brigadier will feel isolated and cut off in defence. Therefore, he must be given the means to see, and keep contact with, his neighbours. This requires an armoured car squadron in each brigade. One would like to see a regiment, but the

Army could not provide that amount of cavalry. Its importance will be realized when one thinks of the enemy's inevitable attempts at infiltration, and the higher commander who cannot use his atomic weapons until the enemy's concentrations have been accurately discovered.

As the brigade will be holding such a large area its own counter-attacks must be powerful. This necessitates a fourth battalion.

The task of anti-tank defence requires mobile weapons which can concentrate in superior force against the tank threat. It follows that each brigade will need a squadron of armoured tank destroyers. The present heavy gun tank has obvious disadvantages for this role, the main one being that it cannot travel by air. In the offensive stage of a future war 'airheads' will be vulnerable to armour and so the tank destroyer must be air transportable.

An engineer squadron completes this impressive command. Its tasks will be the improvement of local obstacles, laying of mine fields, and assistance in the making of defence works.

The Armoured Brigade. The armoured brigade must be compact and capable of local self protection, and must provide its own reconnaissance. It does not require any artillery to itself since it has its tank guns and can rely on the artillery with the infantry brigades to support it when engaging the enemy. A brigade composed of only two armoured regiments, an infantry battalion carried in A.P.C.s, and an armoured car squadron seems to meet all the requirements.

The Engineer Brigade. The need for a 'siege train' of specialized armour in the attack has been shown, but there will be just as important engineer tasks in defence. Obstacles will have to be made more impassable with demolitions, craters, and mines. The wreckage caused by atomic bombs must be removed from main arteries. All this must go on in the open, so engineers will need armoured vehicles and must be constantly ready to defend themselves.

The Division. So far this paper has dealt solely with the brigade, which appears to be the most convenient tactical formation. It has been shown that actions will be fought using a combination of infantry and armoured brigades. These combinations are likely to vary on each occasion. It would, therefore, seem that there is no point in any rigid organization of a number of brigades into divisions, since regrouping would constantly be required to produce the right force for a particular operation. It is this regrouping which clogs roads and makes movement so slow at present.

The divisional headquarters of to-day is too immobile and too easily found and destroyed from the air. Most of the fighting divisional troops, as has been shown, will have been dispersed to brigades. The administrative units will also be dispersed further back. The headquarters remains. It has a task, strategical preparation for, and tactical control in, battle. Stripped of the divisional troops and its administrative responsibilities, it becomes very small indeed, which is ideal since it can easily flit from place to place unobserved. It is suggested that it be redesigned on the analogy of present corps headquarters to control from one to a number of brigades of any sort as the situation requires. The commander will need excellent signals, a predominantly general and intelligence staff, and a number of highly-trained liaison officers. His administrative staff will only consist of a small planning 'cell' whose task will be the anticipation of future demands by skilfully 'reading the battle.' The importance of the divisional commander not being bowed down with administrative worries cannot be too heavily stressed.

Corps and Army Headquarters. Army headquarters remain responsible for strategic direction, which includes the preparation of demolition and deception plans, and the allocation of brigades to divisions. Army headquarters will also have control of atomic missiles, and engineer brigades. With its affiliated air headquarters, it will co-ordinate the use of air support.

Each army area should be divided into several corps areas. A corps headquarters should be given the task of controlling the administration of all formations. It will thus command all administrative troops in its area. This is a logical development since all administrative dumps must be scattered over such a wide area that control by lower formations would lead to chaos. Corps can keep in touch with the administrative situation through its 'cells' at divisional headquarters and by being kept constantly aware of the army commander's intentions.

ADMINISTRATION

At the beginning of this article some idea of future administrative difficulties was given. These become greater the more one studies the way battles will probably be fought. They can be summarized as threats from the air and infiltrating light armour to installations and supply columns. The remedy for the threat to installations would seem to be the use of numbers of ports, some perhaps 'Mulberries,' supplying a great number of small dumps, each containing a complete range of supplies and stores. The delivery of these supplies to forward troops by helicopter or air transport appears to overcome the dangers of ground attack, but unfortunately in the early stages of war the air situation may not allow these methods to be used except in emergency, and just as sea transport will never be completely superseded by air, so a large part of the army's supplies must continue to travel on land. To do this with any safety the R.A.S.C. needs to become a fighting arm, driving small convoys of armoured load-carrying vehicles protected by tanks from their dumps across country to brigade fortresses. On the way they may have to fight predatory enemy armour or, if the force is too big, scatter and rally at an agreed rendezvous. With these convoys will go R.E.M.E. detachments to recover and repair damaged vehicles. The evacuation of wounded is essentially a task for helicopters which can deliver them direct to base hospitals.

This new administrative idea will require the working out of many new staff techniques. For instance, in all 'A' matters, brigades must deal direct with army or theatre headquarters. The communication problems are immense but they must be faced, and soon.

CONCLUSIONS

When reading this paper, one may perhaps be struck by the analogy to naval warfare—the need to destroy the enemy's fleet (his armour and air force) before assuming the offensive; the convoys of supply ships (R.A.S.C. vehicles) moving from port to port in danger from enemy submarines (light armour). It is an interesting idea for it shows the inevitable truths of strategy. It results from the immense areas over which battles will be fought.

No one wants atomic war, but one may be forgiven for hoping that the vastness of the problems raised by these new weapons will give the Services a new lease of life. They offer a challenge to produce new ideas, new methods, new techniques, and new systems of training. Above all they require young fresh minds in our commanders. Societies usually refresh themselves and take on new vigour with the free flow of original ideas. There are many who think such a flow is to-day overdue in the Services.

FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF AIRBORNE FORCES

By "ROMULUS"

IT is doubtful if there has been very much objective thought since the end of the last war on the employment of airborne forces in any future war. In spite of considerable progress in and development of airborne technique and equipment, present-day airborne doctrine remains based squarely on the experience gained from airborne operations undertaken in the 1939-45 War.

The British Army as a whole is now actively engaged in studying the implications of atomic warfare as they are likely to affect our current tactical methods, organization, and equipment. It may not therefore be inopportune to consider the scope for the future employment of airborne forces against this same background, though this background is, as yet, by no means very clear or sharply defined.

CURRENT SERVICE OPINION

It is probably true to say that there are at present two distinct and opposed schools of Service thought on this subject.

One school of thought maintains that the air situation likely to prevail in another major war precludes the possibility of employing airborne forces until the air war has been won, which will mean, to all intent and purposes, that the war has been won. Thereafter, they argue that provision and maintenance of suitable transport aircraft, in the numbers necessary to lift an airborne force of a size that is likely to exert any real influence on the course of events, is beyond our national resources, both in peace and in war.

Their conclusions, stated simply, are that :—

- (a) It will not be possible to use airborne forces in worthwhile numbers until the final stages of a war.
- (b) They are extremely expensive to maintain and, in view of (a) above, we are not justified in maintaining airborne forces, except possibly in small numbers for use in local wars or in police operations.

The other, opposed, school of thought argues from different premises. They contend that air superiority, as we knew it in the last war, is a thing of the past ; that the air situation is likely to remain extremely fluid as long as both contestants are capable of carrying out atomic attacks on each other ; that, as a result, air superiority is likely to change hands rapidly and frequently in direct relation to the success of atomic attack on airfields and connected installations ; that, provided the necessary atomic and air effort is applied, it will always be possible to achieve a local and temporary air situation which will allow airborne operations to be executed ; and, finally, that it will be possible, by using atomics, to achieve the necessary air situation more rapidly and with far less expenditure of air effort than was possible with the conventional methods of the last war.

From there, they go on to emphasize that we shall not be required to fight another major war relying solely on our own national resources. We shall fight as a member of N.A.T.O., where in furtherance of N.A.T.O. plans it is not unreasonable to assume that there will be some pooling of the military resources of the member states. In that case, the airlift for a British airborne force to be employed on a N.A.T.O. mission could and would undoubtedly be provided from U.S.A.F. resources. (The fact that

British airborne forces are trained to operate with U.S.A.F. transport formations may lend some weight to this argument.)

They complete their arguments with a claim that airborne forces are the ideal complement to atomic weapons, in that they provide the obvious most effective follow-up to atomic attacks, whether on tactical or strategic targets.

The truth, as is usual in such cases, probably lies somewhere betwixt and between the extreme claims of these conflicting schools of thought.

If, however, we are to reach any balanced and worthwhile conclusions, we must go a little deeper into these arguments. To do so, it is essential to appreciate the principal attributes and disabilities of airborne forces as organized and equipped to-day.

ATTRIBUTES AND DISABILITIES

The main attribute of airborne forces is their ability to achieve *surprise*, a principle of war not fully appreciated by the British, if we accept the criticisms of some of the most redoubtable of our late opponents, the Germans. This ability to achieve surprise stems, of course, directly from their extreme strategic mobility.

There can be little doubt but that the great range, speed, and capacity of modern transport aircraft, and the flexibility of air forces, means that airborne forces can be used to strike hard, without warning, at the most vital spots in an enemy's military anatomy, with few geographical limitations as to the selection of the target. Moreover, if such operations are planned with due regard to secrecy, the actual target can remain undisclosed until the very last moment, so making effective enemy counter-preparations very difficult, if not impossible.

On the debit side of the balance sheet, airborne forces suffer certain inherent disabilities that restrict the scope of their employment.

First, airborne operations require certain minimum conditions of weather, and whatever progress the Royal Air Force may make in all-weather flying, these minimum conditions are likely to remain necessary for airborne operations. Large numbers of aircraft taking off from perhaps 10 or 12 different airfields must be marshalled, when airborne, into the correct tactical order and thereafter must navigate and fly accurately, in close formation, to a margin of error of seconds and yards in time and space.

The individual parachutist cannot be dropped, without a disproportionate casualty rate, in surface wind speeds greatly in excess of 20 knots. It is, therefore, not possible to guarantee airborne operations, that is to say, it may not always be possible for airborne operations to take place at the time ordained. When, as is usual, airborne operations are an integral part of a major ground plan, this is a very serious matter and may create the most complex problems for both army and air force commanders and staffs.

The second major disability is the time required to mount an airborne operation. A great deal of very detailed joint army/air force planning and executive staff work is necessary, and it is a fact that the time required increases in direct ratio to the size of the force. Thus, while it may be possible to mount a brigade group operation in some 72 hours, it may well take five days to mount an operation on the divisional scale. As the result, there is a considerable time lag between the concept of using an airborne force and the execution of the operation. This seriously restricts the use of airborne forces in fluid or fast moving operations, or on targets of opportunity generally.

As the use of atomic weapons is likely to create just such fluid and fast changing situations, it is obvious that this time lag must be reduced if airborne forces are to play a worthwhile part in future, and to pay dividends in any way commensurate with the national capital invested in them.

It is an unpalatable fact that the complex and detailed arrangements necessary to prepare heavy equipment for parachuting may well tend to increase this time lag. Simplicity in the procedure involved and in the equipment provided is absolutely essential to avoid increased delay.

Finally, there are certain minor tactical disabilities, mainly due to limitations in the number and size of heavy weapons and vehicles which can be parachuted.

When it appears likely that streamlining of the infantry as regards both weapons and vehicles will be necessary, for the future, these limitations cease to have any particular significance and parachute forces are unlikely to suffer the same comparative disability with normal ground forces as has been the case in the past.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

It would probably be both unwise and unrealistic to assume now that a future atomic war could be fought and won entirely on the use of such weapons. Land fighting will probably still be a necessary adjunct of atomic warfare, both to exploit or consolidate atomic gains, or to prevent the enemy from doing so. In exploiting or consolidating successful atomic attack, speed in the follow-up will be all important and it may well be that airborne forces will constitute the ideal follow-up.

They can be dropped a matter of minutes after any air burst attack, and in the case of ground burst attacks, airborne forces can be dropped so as to avoid areas of radio-active contamination and great destruction, either of which might complicate and delay a follow-up by ground forces. It also seems inevitable that the general pattern of future tactics will be designed to manoeuvre the enemy into a degree of concentration which will present a suitable target for atomic attack, while avoiding similar concentration oneself.

If that is correct, the bold and skilful use of airborne forces to this end has obvious possibilities. Airborne forces could be dropped on defiles with the object of creating vulnerable 'log-jams' of both operational and administrative troops, in either advance or retreat.

By seizing ground which is vital to the enemy, it may be possible to make him concentrate prior to putting in a properly organized attack to regain it, and so render himself vulnerable to atomic attack in the process. In operations of this type, well planned atomic support for the airborne force employed should allow it to exert an influence greatly in excess of its numerical strength, and should allow bolder operations than have been possible in the past, where the comparative lack of both punch and staying power of airborne forces has always been a limiting factor.

Finally, when lines of communication are destroyed or disrupted by enemy atomic attack, the only way in which it may be possible to reinforce a vital sector may be by using an airborne force.

On the other side of the medal, it is obvious that massive airborne operations in the tactical role are themselves likely to be very vulnerable to enemy atomic attack, both in the mounting phase and, perhaps more particularly, immediately after dropping, i.e., when concentrated, and before they can either gain protection by dispersion or by digging-in on their objectives.

If this vulnerability is taken into account together with the time lag in mounting large scale operations, one is led to the conclusion that the size of airborne forces used in the tactical role will have to be limited, possibly to brigade or battalion group operations. Such forces, if used in conjunction with atomic weapons, may well, however, still be able to exert a decisive influence on the battle.

STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT

Another major war will inevitably be a global war from the outset, and the initial stages may well see a scramble for strategic positions on a global basis. Airborne forces are well suited for seizing these strategic 'plums', because their strategic mobility greatly exceeds that of any comparable land, seaborne, or air-transported force.

An airborne force requires no secure entry airfields, no reception committee or advance arrangements, can land against a degree of local opposition, and has considerable latitude as to where it lands both in relation to its objectives and possible opposition. Speed and surprise are likely to be the decisive factors in operations of this sort, and the air confers just these advantages on airborne forces.

It is unlikely that worth-while strategic targets will be easily or directly accessible overland or, to a lesser degree, by sea. None can, however, be regarded as inaccessible from the air, and it is here that airborne forces may have a great contribution to make. Such operations may be executed in conjunction with strategic air action, or in co-operation with air-transported, seaborne, or overland operations. It might well be possible, in the initial stages of a war, when enemy air and ground defences may not have completed their deployment, to use large airborne forces for the seizure of such vital strategic targets. The possibility of timely and effective enemy interference with such operations will depend very largely on the speed with which such operations are undertaken, and on good security and deception arrangements. It appears probable, therefore, that the scope for future employment of large scale airborne forces may be mainly in strategic operations.

LOCAL WARS

There is obvious scope for the employment of airborne forces in local wars, on the pattern of Korea, Indo-China, or in police operations in such places as Malaya and East Africa, provided the terrain is not totally unsuitable. In Malaya, operations involving both parachute and helicopter troops have been carried out in miniature and no doubt considerable operational experience has been gained. Larger scale airborne operations were carried out in Indo-China, but confined almost entirely to the reinforcing role, and it is unlikely that we have much to learn from such operations.

It is, however, a matter of simple mathematical calculation to work out that an airborne force suitably located, and with the requisite airlift available at short notice, would dispense with the necessity of deploying large numbers of troops in areas of potential unrest. Local garrisons could be reduced and very considerable manpower and financial economies achieved in this way. Once more, the superiority of airborne forces over air-transported forces in such employment is worth stressing.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

It is possible that in the next few years we may see the helicopter or convertiplane developed to a stage when it can be considered as an alternative to the parachute as a method of committing troops to battle from the air. It is also possible that extravagant claims will be made for its all round superiority over the parachute in this form of employment.

Its more obvious advantages are that no specialized troops, training, or equipment will be necessary, and that it will not be unduly susceptible to bad weather, so making it possible to guarantee airborne operations in future. Mounting an airborne operation will be little more complicated a process than embussing the assault troops in motor transport, thus cutting down the time lag which is so restrictive at present.

It is equally apparent that its lack of range, which cannot be materially increased without a disproportionate and unacceptable loss of payload, will preclude any possibility of its use in the strategic role. It also appears likely that its vulnerability whilst depositing its loads may make it essential for large scale helicopter landing zones to be secured in advance by parachute troops.

A reasonable interim conclusion may therefore be that while the helicopter has obvious tactical possibilities, it is unlikely to be suitable for strategic use, and that it is possible that the helicopter and the parachute may prove to be complementary in the sphere of airborne assault operations.

CONCLUSIONS

There is likely to be very considerable scope for the employment of airborne forces in both an atomic war and also in local wars and police operations.

In an atomic war, the greater scope will be in strategic employment and the use of large scale airborne forces may be practicable. Tactical employment in an atomic war is likely to be limited in scale to brigade or battalion group operations. In conjunction with atomic attack, or with direct atomic support, such forces may well exert an influence out of proportion to their numerical strength and this will extend the scope of their employment beyond what has been possible in the past.

Airborne forces, held in strategic reserve or in the 'fire brigade' role, makes it possible to achieve large scale economies in local overseas garrisons.

The helicopter and the parachute may eventually prove to be complementary.

The time now required to mount an airborne operation must be reduced, and this can only be done by joint army/air force simplification of procedure and of all specialized airborne equipment.

SOME THOUGHTS ON HOME GUARD

By A MEMBER OF THE HOME GUARD

THERE are so many ways of looking at the Home Guard. To the comedian it is a joke ; to the politician a bone of contention ; to the old soldier perhaps a chance of playing at soldiers once again—" the image of war without its guilt and only five and twenty per cent. of the danger," as Surtees might have said. Which of these points of view is the more nearly correct ? Perhaps none of them is very near the mark, but you, my dear reader, shall judge.

In our particular district we are a keen bunch—if bunch is a suitable term for the nucleus (the key men) of a company. We are C Company. Alec Simpson is our Company Commander. I command No. 7 Platoon. Jenkins and Jones command the other two platoons. That, I think, is about all the chaps I need introduce to your notice. But I was forgetting Colonel Bailey, our battalion commander, and he is not one to be forgotten lightly. He is an ex-Regular officer, though I must say he has some most irregular ideas.

He says that the Boers had the only really sound system of promotion. The individual burghers attached themselves to whatever commando they liked, and the best of them did in fact join the leaders who were most successful. In this way the best leaders got the most men and not only the most men but also the best men. They were, in effect, promoted.

Colonel Bailey does admit this system has its drawbacks and would be difficult to apply in this Country. He quotes it, I think, as a bit of naughtiness when he wants to pull the leg of the too stereotyped. But he does really believe that we ought to do away with peace-time barracks. They are too dangerous, he says, because of the possibility of a ' Pearl Harbour.' He likes the Commando plan of having no barracks. Modern soldiers ought to be ' trencher fed,' according to him.

I knew that was a hunting expression, so I asked him what it meant. " Oh, living out," he said, " day boys, not boarders."

" Like the Home Guard ? " I asked.

" Yes," he replied, " dispersion is one of the outstanding qualities of the Home Guard."

It seemed to me an idiotic idea, but I did not say so. I only quote the incident to show what an unexpected sort of chap our C.O. is. He rather enjoys pulling my leg, too.

Some of us asked him one day if we in the Home Guard were likely to meet atom bombs. " If you do," he replied " it will be a great honour ; you will have to fight very well and be a great nuisance to the enemy before you are awarded one—it would be like a V.C.—a posthumous one, I fear," he added, looking at me. He knows that I am scared stiff of hydrogen and atom bombs.

Today we are off in vehicles, moving to a place beside our local aerodrome, which in theory is being invaded. Once there we are to take up a defensive position (along with contingents from other companies) and hem the enemy in ; to stop him, in fact, from breaking out.

Our C.O., Colonel Bailey, says that Home Guard have no proper supporting weapons to enable them to attack, but they must be aggressive. They cannot attack, but they must hasten to meet the enemy and block his movements. To sit down and

wait for the enemy is to be a rabbit. But to march to the sound of the guns is to be a soldier. I thought that marching to the sound of the guns seemed a bit old-fashioned, but he says it is an ageless maxim. "The ability to concentrate quickly round any invaded aerodrome is one of the outstanding qualities of the Home Guard," he says.

Anyhow, here we go marching (or rather motoring) towards the sound of imaginary guns on our local aerodrome. The old devil has got permission for us to dig our defensive position; he says we must not have too many things imaginary. Fortunately it is sandy soil, but it is making me pretty tired. The C.O. has just appeared; he looked at my pit. "You must dig harder," he said, "it's the one chance you have of a non-posthumous V.C." I felt rather annoyed and as soon as he had gone I sat down for a bit of a rest. I had worked very hard.

* * * * *

It was just after this that there came a sudden blinding light to the north-east, followed by a shock rather like an earthquake I once experienced. Then we saw what appeared to be a glowing cumulous cloud in the direction of Salisbury Plain. Shortly afterwards came repetitions of these phenomena but apparently farther away; anyhow, they were not so pronounced.

No one knew what on earth it was, but of course when we got home we heard the awful news: how the enemy had dropped atom bombs on all our military barracks, all our R.A.F. establishments, and all our naval ports.

The result apparently is that the Army, Navy, and Air Force at home have been desperately hard hit. Our C.O. seems to blame himself for this. Apparently he has tried for a long time to persuade the authorities of the danger of what he called a modern Pearl Harbour. But he was not successful.

I had heard him say that 'Pearl Harbours' were dreadful and atom bombs frightful, but that the two together just did not bear thinking about. He is the only person, too, that I know who has thought all along that the enemy would use their atom bombs mainly on what are called military targets—not just for reasons of humanity, but because if you want to win a war, military targets are the most worthwhile. He seems to have realized so well what was likely to happen that we have all been asking him, "what next?"

"Well, several things are pretty clear," he said, "I think you will hear soon (we did, of course) that the enemy have also made a 'Pearl Harbour' attack on the American stockpile of hydrogen and atom bombs, but I hope and think that the Americans have this well scattered and that the enemy do not know where it all is. In that case America will now be hitting back." (This we also learned later.) "But," he said, "what concerns us much more directly is this: on the Home Guard will now fall the chief responsibility for defending this Country. I do not think, though, that the enemy will be able to undertake an invasion of this Country until they have established themselves on the French Coast. That should give us at least two months."

The following morning we heard that the enemy had started attacking in Germany and were already on the move westwards.

We only came to realize the appalling devastation in this Country very gradually. Although the enemy's targets had primarily been military, there was an enormous amount of incidental damage of a non-military character. The Civil Defence authorities were overwhelmed, but doing what they could.

The next day, I think it was, we heard that General Grant had been made Supreme Commander of all Home Forces. Colonel Bailey was overjoyed. General Grant was a friend of his and they had much the same ideas.

The enrolling of men for the Home Guard was begun immediately. We took in men just as fast as we could deal with them. Some of us (I mean some of the key men in the company) took on the administrative work of getting the men into uniform and issued with arms. I was glad to be put on the job of training. We began with individual training, but fairly quickly we got on to section training, which we did thoroughly; then gradually to platoon training, and so to higher things.

My memory rather fails me over this period. Reports of retreats and disasters came ceaselessly from Europe, but we were too busy to think much about it. It was absolutely hectic, of course. There are, however, a few incidents that stand out in my mind.

One was the day we went to battalion headquarters and the Prime Minister addressed us. He told us that the hope and trust of the whole Commonwealth rested largely on us in the Home Guard, but the point he made which caught my imagination most was this: that the existence of a Home Guard gave no nation any excuse for building up its army; it could not lead to an arms race; indeed, if only Home Guards were sufficiently formidable, aggressors would not dare to make war, and armies would not be needed. Here perhaps lay grounds for real hope—a new hope of peace.

"Yes," said our C.O. afterwards, "I had not thought of that; ability to fulfil the role of dove may prove to be an outstanding quality of the Home Guard."

Another day, an expert was sent to give us a lecture on hydrogen and atom bombs. Colonel Bailey was furious. He said that people already knew all the precautions one could take and beyond that one either 'stopped a bomb' or one didn't. Lectures on the subject could only spread alarm and despondency. I believe he rang up his immediate superior, but he did not succeed in getting the lecture stopped. I must admit that I hate the idea of hydrogen bombs and I found the subject most depressing.

However, directly the lecture was over Colonel Bailey was on his feet. He made the lecturer admit that these bombs are nothing like so formidable to the human race as myxomatosis is to rabbits. And if rabbits can take it, so can we. That was his argument. It seems that after an enemy has done his worst, at least 80 per cent. of the whole population of this Country will still, in all probability, be left alive. At that, a 1914 'Old Contemptible' got up and said that infantry were quite used to that sort of proportion of casualties. Really, the infantry private soldier takes a bit of beating!

Our C.O. then got up again and said that, of course, if a hydrogen bomb came to us that was that; but generally speaking the Home Guard were likely to be safer than most people. The Home Guard were scattered over the whole of the United Kingdom and were mainly in country districts, both of which facts would give them a large measure of protection. Moreover, when at grips with the enemy, the Home Guard would probably be quite immune, for the enemy would have to be very careful that he does not kill his own men. "Comparative immunity from hydrogen and atom bombs is one of the outstanding characteristics of the Home Guard," he said. Certainly in the 1914-18 War, I remember, we used to escape a lot of shelling when we were really close to the German trenches, so I daresay he is right.

Anyhow, as he says, we either get atom-bombed or not ; there is nothing we can do about it. In the end my morale was almost restored. It may be thought that I am dwelling too much on this subject, but naturally it is one that is very much in our minds at present.

The Supreme Commander seems to have all the same ideas as his friend, our battalion commander. He does not let us waste training time on such things as lectures on gas, first aid, unarmed combat, traffic control, aid to Civil Defence, etc., most of which used to figure prominently in our peace-time training programmes. Such things might be useful if we had time for them, but, as he says, the first thing is to learn to be fighters and that will take up all the time we have available.

As soon as a platoon has finished its platoon training, it is taught about embussing and debussing. Then it has to motor off and take up defensive positions round an aerodrome (or invasion point as they seem to be called now). Finally, we have to learn the art of ambushing. What the object of that is, I cannot think ! Perhaps it is considered a good exercise for junior leaders—likely to teach them initiative. Our C.O. apparently approves of the idea ; he just says, " Proficiency in ambush work is an outstanding quality of the Home Guard."

Certainly in the course of this training we have found that any good non-commissioned officer, with a section and one day's training, can, provided the place is chosen for him, ambush any enemy (no matter how strong) and make a safe getaway. Every time the result is the same—the umpires agree that at least the two leading vehicles of the enemy would have been completely destroyed, and the ambush team would have escaped scot free. But it is the hemming-in of aerodromes that appeals to me. That seems to be quite ' up our street.' We old sweats, who served in the 1914-18 War, fancy ourselves at static defence, and for that job we are really suitably armed.

The fact that our legs are not all that they were is almost an advantage. In the 1914-18 War, I used to be tempted sometimes to run away, but now I know that my legs are not good enough ! From sheer necessity I will have to stand my ground. Shakespeare makes a brave man say, " I'll kill my horse because I will not fly." But even a coward may say, " I will not fly because my horse is dead (or because my legs are not strong enough)."

The important thing is that neither mean to fly. I remember a wise old infantry officer of the 1914-18 War who used to say, " Ten per cent. of your men will be supreme, and ten per cent. will be worse than useless ; the art of leadership is to get the remaining eighty per cent. to throw in their lot the right way. The chief difficulty is that you won't know beforehand which of your men will fall into which category."

If, then, in the Home Guard both the brave and the not so brave can be trusted to stand firm, surely that is going to count for something ? The C.O. just says, " Stubbornness in defence is likely to prove one of the outstanding qualities of the Home Guard."

At dawn this morning we realized that the long expected invasion had started. There began a non-stop drone of aeroplane engines, and the noise of bombs and gunfire from our local aerodrome. We have practised for this moment so often that it did not take us long to get under way.

We have been sleeping of late in a condemned and disused almshouse with, of course, our weapons and ammunition beside us. Parked not far away are our vehicles. So we were off in 20 minutes.

It seems surprising now that I ever questioned the maxim of rushing towards the sound of the guns. If we had had to wait for orders this morning it would have lost us an hour very likely; and what additional useful information could such orders have contained?

We know, of course, exactly where to go; we have practised 'hugging' this aerodrome many times in the last few weeks. If all Home Guards were to stay put, an enemy might get control of this Country without having to fight more than, say, about 20,000 of them. As it is, with Home Guard hugging all his invasion points, he may well have to fight a million (fifty times as many). Certainly Shakespeare had no doubts on the subject; he says, "The more we stay, the stronger grows our foe." Such were my thoughts as we motored along.

We had not very far to go. As we approached, we saw masses of parachutists floating down. Our company commander decided to debus us at the further of our two previously selected debussing points. Personally, I wanted to stop at the first one, for we had very strict orders against letting any of our vehicles fall into enemy hands. However, Alec proved to be right and it saved us quite half a mile on foot.

The moment we were clear of our vehicles they turned and made off, though one of them will still belong to us and act very much in the background as our supply vehicle, linking us with the School Meals Service people.

My platoon was leading with two sections forward. We had only gone about half a mile when, on reaching the top of a small rise, we saw a most amazing sight. Crossing our front about 200 yards away was a crowd of men all moving in the same direction. I had seen parachutists dropped before and I realized at once that these were parachutists moving from their drop to their forming-up place. I gave a sign to my leading section commanders, and next moment we were pumping bullets into them. I had never expected things to happen so quickly.

In a surprisingly short time there were no enemy in sight except for dead and wounded, of which there were a lot. But the fire was coming back at us now. And then I found Alec at my side. I told him what had happened. "They'll attack, I expect," he said, but he was wrong. They had not formed up yet, so were not grouped in proper units.

It flashed through my mind that rushing to the sound of guns had paid a big dividend, for we had done well so far.

We were within about 300 yards of our intended position but the enemy were too numerous for us to attempt to move forward. Our orders are not to attack, so we just took up a defensive position. I rather felt we ought to do more, but at least we were occupying more than our own numbers. And if we were pinned, so were they.

I crawled to each of my three sections and told them to go easy on ammunition. Soon after this the enemy began mortaring us; my platoon was the only one they could see, so we got the brunt of it and it was certainly very unpleasant. I fancy it might have been worse, but the parachutists were probably not very flush with ammunition. I remember thinking that the Egyptians had probably suffered a higher proportion of casualties when all their first-born were killed in the plagues of Egypt; but they had refused to let the Children of Israel go then and we must stick to our enemy now.

IRREGULAR PAGINATION

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Then the mortaring stopped and the enemy attacked. Our platoon was not in very good shape, but we fired as best we could. The attack was coming from our left, evidently meant to take us in flank ; but the enemy had not reckoned with No. 9 Platoon who were in position on that side of the rise and rather behind it, and so had not been under mortar fire at all. They gave them hell, and the attack failed.

Meanwhile, lots more enemy troop-carrying planes had been arriving on the aerodrome, but more and more Home Guard were coming up too.

Later (I don't remember what time it was), a battle seemed to develop on the far side of the aerodrome and at that moment our C.O. appeared. "This is the moment to edge in on the enemy," he said. I did not fancy the idea myself. Fortunately No. 8 Platoon was chosen for the job—they had not had any casualties at all.

There was a certain amount of cover on the right and, by taking advantage of it, No. 8 got forward about 300 yards ; and we were then moved up to join them, my platoon (No. 7) being placed in reserve.

The new position was a great improvement. From it Jenkins and Jones with their Bren guns were able to tickle up (at rather long range, it's true) the troop-carrying aircraft as they reached the end of their landing run. The troops had been jumping out as the planes came to rest ; but now they stayed in while the plane taxied farther away, so our fire must have bothered and delayed the enemy a bit.

Unfortunately, we were too busy digging to be able to watch very much. My platoon had had five men killed and six more 'stamped' (company commanders put the company rubber stamp on the wrists of men who were seriously wounded—this authorized them to leave the battlefield in search of 'medical comfort' as our regulations so quaintly put it). Actually two of our stamped chaps were too bad to move, so they had to be left.

Towards evening the enemy stopped landing troops, but by that time the whole aerodrome was packed with them. I hardly think that they will attack in force tonight ; it would be difficult for them to do that in the dark without confusion and disorganization. But certainly it will come quite early tomorrow. We have been reinforced by a lot more Home Guard contingents, but even so the prospect looks pretty grim.

"I wish we had more of those Civil Defence blokes in the Home Guard," someone said. It's strange how such a short time ago Civil Defence was considered so very important. It is not that the hydrogen bomb is less terrible than we expected, but all the Civil Defence can do is to mitigate the devastation. No country is beaten until it is successfully invaded, and Civil Defence have virtually no anti-invasion value.

In the last resort fighting men are the only thing that counts, and the Home Guard are blessed in this : they have no administrative tail. Every man is a fighter—the ideal from which modern armies have been slipping away for so long. Our C.O. expresses the idea rather crudely ; he just says, "Freedom from hangers-on is one of the outstanding qualities of the Home Guard." 'Hangers-on' was not actually the word he used.

But what of the cry, "I wish we had more men?"

Shakespeare's *King Henry V* had something to say about that. "I pray thee, wish not one man more." I was trying to remember more of that famous speech when

Alec appeared and told me that as soon as it was dark we were going to withdraw. There were lots of Home Guard who had not been seriously engaged, so I was not altogether surprised at the idea of being relieved. But when he told me that everyone was to withdraw, I was horrified. It had been just the same, I remember, at Mons in 1914. We had given the Germans something to think about, and then had come the astounding order to retreat.

At that moment some battalion specialists appeared and started fixing up a patent sort of rifle. I had seen one before. It was meant for withdrawals and had a contrivance so that it would automatically fire one round every so often—you could set it at what you wanted. The idea was that it made the enemy think you were still there.

I admit I was pretty disgusted. After all we had had to put up with, to go and withdraw and set the enemy free was just plain stupid. Besides, it meant moving back into an area where we might get an atom bomb.

We were all very tired and dispirited as we marched away. The orders were that we had to be five miles back by midnight. Fortunately, we only had to march about two miles. Then our transport picked us up. I certainly was hungry and we did bless the Schools Meals Service people that night. They have been magnificent.

By midnight, I was asleep, but I did not sleep for long. For, at midnight, there was a blinding flash and a terrific shock wave. Apparently we have burst an atom bomb over all the enemy assembled in that aerodrome.

Later, I discovered that it was a stratagem contrived by our C.O.'s general friend. The Home Guard were used to 'hem in' and so arrange a nice target, and then get five miles clear before the bomb zero hour. "Suitability for this manoeuvre is one of the outstanding qualities of the Home Guard," said our C.O.

General Grant's plan of hugging invasion points allowed him to use atom bombs while the enemy who were being hugged could not do so, for they could not in the same way suddenly open up a five-mile no man's land; and so they could not safely use them on their tormentors—subtle but effective.

Next morning we were sent home. Other, fresher Home Guard contingents moved in on the aerodrome to mop up. I heard afterwards that it was a ghastly shambles, like a rabbit warren after myxomatosis. I am glad we did not have to go.

We had a proper night in bed that night, but next morning there was fresh excitement. The enemy had invaded a lot of aerodromes and not all of them had been successfully atom-bombed. At some, the enemy had broken out; and they were also landing at one or two beaches.

So now there are highly mobile enemy columns sweeping across the Country and we seem likely to be in action again very soon. The outlook seems black after having been so rosy, but our C.O. is undismayed. "That's why we studied ambushing, Bates," he said. (He knows I have a fancy for *King Henry V.*)

I remember now that he used to say in lectures that ambush was the answer to *blitzkrieg*. Well, we shall see. The ambush teams are very small, and as my platoon has suffered more than most, they are not being taken for this job.

It does not take very many men to arrange, say, one ambush every five miles on all main roads. It happens, though, that I have been one of the ambush instructors, so I am going on this job, though not with my own platoon.

We knew, of course, just where to go. We had practised this particular ambush at least twice. We had a nice little truck to go in, and within an hour we were properly established with sentries posted.

As we waited I thought about the changing fashions of war; how each period has its super-weapon: the battleaxe, the bow, the musket, the rifle, and the gun; and how each in turn have lost their absolute power.

Today, we think the atom and hydrogen bomb supreme. What will be their fate? Strangely enough, with the arrival of atomic and guided missiles the effectiveness of guerilla fighting has definitely increased; and yet is it really so strange?

The guerilla fighter has his small arms and he has explosives. All the new weapons that have arrived since are of the 'area-strafting' type—only worthwhile if there is sufficient enemy within a certain area. Thus, a bunch of 100 men may be worth an artillery concentration of shells, 1,000 men in an area of 10 acres may be worth bombing from the air, 10,000 men in a square mile may be worth an atom shell, and so it goes on. But even so there are limitations; before devastating an area, one has to be sure that it is sufficiently remote from one's own troops.

Have we not failed to grasp that these new area weapons are no real threat to the guerilla fighter? When will he ever want to mass into worthwhile targets, except when 'hugging' an enemy, and then he is safe because he is so close? He is more formidable than ever, just because armies have put so much of their strength into these new weapons. They have a huge administrative tail; he has none.

And what can these new weapons achieve against him? The boot is on the other foot. These fine new weapons and their 'tail' provide some excellent targets for the guerilla.

And then, I thought, if guerillas can and do achieve so much, how much more still is possible with a well-trained, well-directed Home Guard—and a British Home Guard at that?

No country need be defeated until it is successfully invaded and this island need not be successfully invaded while it has a Home Guard. For the business of invading an island is still difficult, and if the Home Guard act at the critical moment, it can be decisive.

"This England never did, nor never shall, lie at the proud foot . . .," but at that moment the sentry waved his flag. That meant that a mobile column was approaching.

I reckon we were the first ambush the enemy had encountered. They just came along, hell for leather, no precautions. They could not have taken any precautions going at 20 or 25 miles an hour. The leading vehicle was a tank. I waited till it was almost opposite me and then I pressed down the handle of the little box beside me.

The result was impressive. Instantly the road was on fire for a length of 50 or 60 yards. It was an inferno. The flames were tree-top height. My second-in-command had 'bazouka-ed' the tank to make doubly sure. We threw grenades and emptied sten guns into the shambles, and then in less than half a minute we were withdrawing to our truck which was parked up a side road.

We had obstacles, too, between us and the enemy, and booby traps as well, but really they were quite unnecessary. Within ten minutes we were five miles away with nothing to connect us with our escapade. Johnson swore that the long tank gun had drooped in the heat.

The enemy bumped three ambushes while in our battalion area, and I heard later that their approach to the last one was very timorous. They advanced very cautiously and the leading vehicles were stopping continually while men got out and went forward on foot to explore any suspected place. Even so they were scotched, for it happened that that particular ambush was in an apparently very innocent looking place.

Their two leading vehicles were destroyed completely three times over in about 11 miles—no casualties on our side. That was the result. No, that is wrong. The real result was that the enemy were stopped. Apparently men could not be got to go in leading vehicles any more.

And as soon as the enemy were stopped, the Home Guard began their hugging tactics once more. That was the plan. We got the idea, too, of making plenty of dummy ambush places to scare the enemy if they ever got moving again.

In some places the enemy used tactical atom shells, but they had to shoot them beyond the Home Guard ring for fear of hurting themselves. These shells did, of course, devastate a good many isolated farms and they did hit some Home Guard who were in the background, but they had no real effect on the campaign.

On the other hand, when our bosses thought the time was ripe for an atom shell, we were quietly withdrawn leaving behind all sorts of devices to prevent the enemy knowing we had gone. And directly we were far enough back—'boom' went the *coup de grace*.

In a surprisingly short time the invasion danger was over. A lot of things contributed to bring this about. Our guided missiles had taken a big toll of enemy aeroplanes. What was left of our Army, Navy and Air Force after the original 'Pearl Harbour' were reorganized; they were very reduced in number but they did play a fine part, though not in our district. The Civil Defence, too, did wonders in mitigating the effects of hydrogen and atom bombs.

Still, basically it was a Home Guard victory.

The day after it was all over our C.O. came round. "I am putting your name in for the V.C." he said abruptly. 'V.C.' That brought back a memory. Surely he had said that before? Suddenly I realized that it had all been a dream.

* * * * *

I jumped up guiltily out of my rifle pit. The C.O. was looking at me. "Yes," he said, "your V.C. will certainly be posthumous. That hole doesn't look any deeper than it was before."

Later, I told Colonel Bailey that I had written a story about the Home Guard and did he think the War Office would like to buy it. "No," he said, "cheapness to the taxpayer is one of the outstanding qualities of the Home Guard."

So here is the story. Does anyone want it? Quis?

THE CHINDIT OPERATIONS OF 1944

By LIEUT.-COLONEL P. W. MEAD, R.A.

THERE were two Chindit campaigns. The first took place in 1943, when Brigadier Orde Wingate led across the Chindwin and deep into enemy territory a force of eight columns, totalling about a brigade strength. This force remained in Burma for a little more than two months, destroyed a number of Japanese communications, and occupied the attention of a quantity of their soldiers, losing about a third of its strength in the process.

It neither attempted nor achieved any major tactical success, but it taught our leaders in the eastern theatre two lessons which proved decisive—first, that air supply could be used as the sole means, and not only an emergency means, of supply, and secondly, that ordinary British soldiers could be trained quickly into first-rate jungle fighters.

The second Chindit campaign, which took place in the following year, was a far more ambitious project. This Chindit force consisted of six strong brigades, and was supported for part of the time by an independent air force formation. Its operations, together with those of General Stillwell's Chinese-American force, were designed to attain, and did attain, decisive tactical results.

About this second Chindit campaign very little seems to be known by the average soldier. Brigadier M. R. Roberts, D.S.O., for example, in his recent paper on the Burma campaign,¹ hardly referred to it, while the examiners in the latest captain to major promotion examination commented particularly on the ignorance of their candidates on the subject. Perhaps the ensuing account of the 1944 Chindit campaign will serve to dissipate some of this ignorance.

SITUATION IN BURMA IN JANUARY, 1944

The Allied forces on the Burma front in January, 1944, were in five main groups (see Map 1). In the north, General Stillwell's Northern Combat Area Command (N.C.A.C.) of three divisions was moving very slowly southwards from Ledo. On the central front, the IVth Corps of three divisions occupied the Imphal plain, patrolling forward to the Chindwin. In the Arakan, the XVth Corps of three divisions was moving cautiously south towards Akyab. The fourth group, the Chindits—or Special Force as they were officially termed—was concentrating in the Sylhet area and in north-east Assam. Lastly, far to the east across the River Salween, a Chinese Expeditionary Force of some 200,000 men was in process of forming.

Allied plans for 1944 had originally been ambitious. The retention in Europe of all available landing craft, however, had led to their severe curtailment, and they now included only:—


- (1) In the Arakan, a limited offensive along the Mayu peninsula.
- (2) In the north, an advance from Ledo to the line Myitkyina-Mogaung, to enable a start to be made on the road from Assam to China.
- (3) Chindit operations in support of this advance.
- (4) IVth Corps to advance across the Chindwin if the Chindit operations created a situation favourable to such a move.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek would commit himself to no promise of action by the Chinese Expeditionary Force.

¹ *Brief Outline of the Burma Campaign of 1941-45*, by Brigadier M. R. Roberts, D.S.O., *Army Quarterly*, July, 1954.

BURMA - January, 1944

(SHOWING PRINCIPAL DISPOSITIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS)



RIVERS
RLYS
ROADS OR TRACKS

SCALE - 160 MILES TO 1 INCH

MAP 1

PRINCIPAL CONCENTRATIONS
ENEMY
OWN TROOPS (IV CORPS)

THE CHINDIT PLAN

The three tasks given to Major-General Wingate, in order of importance, were²:—

- (a) To help the advance of Lieut.-General Stillwell's forces to the Myitkyina area by drawing off and disorganizing the enemy forces opposing them, and preventing the reinforcement and supply of these enemy forces.
- (b) To create a favourable situation for the Chinese Expeditionary Force to advance westwards from the Yunnan across the Salween.
- (c) To inflict the maximum confusion, damage, and loss on the enemy forces in northern Burma.

The Japanese communications to their forces on the northern front were confined to the River Irrawaddy, the road and railway from Mandalay to Mogaung and Myitkyina, and the road from Bhamo to Myitkyina. Wingate proposed to cut these communications, or at least the roads and railway, and to keep them cut. He intended that his columns should establish themselves firmly in that area of Burma and should stay there until the monsoon. He expected them to be relieved at that stage by non-Chindit battalions of the Fourteenth Army, so that they could be withdrawn and prepared for future Chindit operations. To what extent these future plans had been agreed by the army commander is not known, but Wingate was confident in the outcome.

The railway town of Indaw had particular importance, being on the main road and rail route to the north, being on one of the main routes to the Chindwin front, being in an area rich in enemy supply and ammunition dumps, and possessing two airfields. This was, therefore, the centre of the chosen zone of operations of the Chindits. Wingate intended initially to commit two of his brigades, and part of a third, in this zone. The 16th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier B. E. Fergusson, D.S.O.) was to infiltrate on foot, starting from the Ledo area and directed on Indaw itself. The 77th Indian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier J. M. Calvert, D.S.O.) was to carry out initial glider-borne landings on selected sites east of the Indaw-Mogaung railway and west of the Irrawaddy. When airstrips had been constructed on these sites the rest of this brigade would fly in by Dakota. The brigade would then cut the road and railway north of Indaw. The 111th Indian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier W. D. A. Lentaigne, C.B.E., D.S.O.) was, except for one small detachment, to follow up the 77th Brigade by air and to operate in the Indaw area.

One battalion of the 111th Brigade, the 4th/9th Gurkha Rifles (Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Morris, D.S.O.), in two columns, was to be landed by glider east of the Irrawaddy and was to operate against the Bhamo-Myitkyina road. With them would land a small column of Burmese riflemen, known as 'Dahforce', which was to operate far to the east on the China border.

The 14th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier T. Brodie) and the 23rd Infantry Brigade (Brigadier L. E. C. M. Perowne, C.B.E.) were to be held in reserve initially, while the battalions of the 3rd (West African) Brigade (Brigadier A. H. Gillmore, O.B.E.) were to be used as garrison battalions for the 'strongholds' to be established by the various brigades.

² Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia, 1943-45 (H.M.S.O.), page 36.

THE CHINDIT OPERATIONS OF 1944

The Chindit 'stronghold' was essentially a Wingate conception. In other airborne operations the airborne forces have, in effect, had no base until the land-based forces could link up with them; Wingate intended that his brigades should establish strongholds in or near their zones of operation, strongholds provided with airstrips and light aircraft and stocked by air supply, protected as much by their remoteness from established communications as by their anti-aircraft and field guns, their barbed-wire and mines, and their 'garrison battalions'.³

Since, except in the strongholds, the force would have no artillery, air support was doubly important. In direct support of Special Force was No. 1 Air Commando U.S.A.A.F. (Colonel Philip Cochrane), a specially formed and trained formation containing fighter/bomber, medium bomber, transport, light aircraft, and glider squadrons. In addition to the transport squadron of No. 1 Air Commando, R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. squadrons of Troop Carrier Command were to assist in the fly-in.

The sites selected for the initial glider-borne landings were three—two for the 77th Brigade between the railway and the Irrawaddy, and one for the 4th/9th Gurkhas east of the Irrawaddy and south of Katha. These sites, mere spaces in the jungle, were given code names 'Broadway', 'Piccadilly', and 'Chowringhee' respectively (see Map 2).

FIRST PHASE—THE FLY-IN

On 5th February, the 16th Brigade started its long march from Ledo.⁴ On the day before this, however, the Japanese had taken the initiative in the Arakan, the first stage of their planned invasion of India, and this battle continued until early in March, when the Japanese were back where they started and the XVth Corps was free to resume its advance. For most of this period a large part of our forces engaged were supplied by air, an unexpected call on the transport aircraft which were to be needed for forthcoming Chindit operations.


On 5th March, Operation "Thursday", the fly-in of the 77th and 111th Brigades, commenced. The glider-borne striking force was provided by the two columns of the 1st King's (Liverpool) Regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel W. P. Scott, D.S.O., M.C., and the first gliders were due to be towed off from Lalaghat (near Sylhet) at 1700 hours. A few minutes before this hour, last-minute air photographs of 'Broadway' and 'Piccadilly' revealed the latter to have been blocked by tree trunks during the last four days, making glider landings impracticable. The hard decision was made to go ahead with the operation, flying only to 'Broadway'. There were more misfortunes to come, for 17 of the heavily-loaded gliders came adrift from their tows, eight over friendly, nine over hostile territory, while hidden ditches on the 'Broadway' landing area and other causes led to five more gliders crashing on arrival. Brigadier Calvert, however, who had accompanied the striking force, ended the night with 350 fighting men at 'Broadway' at the cost of some 55 killed or wounded, and there had been no enemy reaction. All of the 17 gliders which came adrift *en route* were landed safely, and most of their occupants escaped.

³ For further details the reader is referred to Wingate's own training instruction on the subject, reproduced as Appendix II to Michael Calvert's *Prisoners of Hope* (Jonathan Cape).

⁴ This march is fully described in Part I of Bernard Fergusson's *The Wild Green Earth* (Collins).

NORTH BURMA - Mid-April, 1944

(SHOWING GENERAL SITUATION.)



RIVERS. CHINDWIN

R.L.YS. + + + + +

ROADS OR
TRACKS. - - - - -

SCALE - 50 MILES TO 1 INCH.

MAP 2

PRINCIPAL CONCENTRATIONS

ENEMY (solid black oval)

OWN TROOPS. (open oval)

CHINDIT STRONGHOLDS. P

By the following evening, a Dakota strip was in action at 'Broadway' and the Dakotas started to fly in the remainder of the 77th Brigade. Meanwhile, a small glider-borne force landed at 'Chowringhee' and started to prepare a Dakota strip there for the landing of the 4th/9th Gurkhas and also, in the new circumstances, for the 111th Brigade. This strip was quickly completed and troops were now flown in to both 'Broadway' and 'Chowringhee' at a fast rate. General Wingate, however, who visited 'Broadway' and 'Chowringhee', mistrusted the exposed position of the latter and on 8th March he ordered those columns of the 111th Brigade who had not yet started for 'Chowringhee' to be diverted to 'Broadway'. Three columns of the 111th Brigade (including Brigade Headquarters) were, however, at 'Chowringhee', with the Irrawaddy between themselves and Indaw. One of these columns (of the 3rd/4th Gurkhas) was added to Lieut.-Colonel Morris's battalion operating east of the river, and this force was in future known as 'Morrisforce'. The other two columns possessed themselves of boats landed in gliders beside the river, and hastened across it.

By 11th March, the fly-in of the 77th and 111th Brigades was complete. There had been no enemy air interference, and for that Colonel Cochrane, of No. 1 Air Commando, must take great credit. Inspired by good intelligence and better intuition, he sent his fighter bombers on 8th March to the Japanese airfields at Shwebo and Onbauk, which were used as staging airfields for their main air forces held back in Thailand and Indo-China. On these fields they found and destroyed 34 enemy aircraft.

Four days after the conclusion of Operation "Thursday", the second stage of the Japanese offensive began, three divisions crossing the Chindwin directed on Imphal and Dimapur. The immediate effect of this offensive on Special Force was the loss of its 23rd Brigade, which was placed under command of the XXXIIIrd Corps now forming north of Dimapur and destined later to fall upon the northern flank of the Japanese advance. Wingate decided to commit immediately his remaining reserve—the 14th Brigade—and the remaining battalions of the 3rd (West African) Brigade. For their fly-in, an area was selected some 30 miles north of Indaw, and was given the code name 'Aberdeen'; this was also to serve as a stronghold for both the 14th and 16th Brigades.

This second fly-in started on 22nd March. Transport aircraft were now, however, in great demand in support of the battle around Imphal, which was soon cut off from any form of supply but air supply, and less aircraft were available, therefore, for the fly-in. The latter was not completed until 12th April.

SECOND PHASE—DOMINATION OF THE INDAW AREA

Brigadier Calvert had wasted no time at 'Broadway', and within five days had established himself across the road and railway some 25 miles north-east of Indaw. He was promptly attacked here, but quickly cleared the area of enemy and established a very strong position, henceforth known as 'White City'. Defence stores of all kinds were dropped to him, and two anti-tank guns were landed by glider. The glider strip was expanded into a Dakota strip, and on 5th April a 25-pounder troop and a Bofors troop were flown in to strengthen the defences.

The Japanese, on the whole, reacted coolly to the emergency of the Chindit landings. They did not withdraw troops from their main offensive, or, initially, from the northern sector, but, instead, formed assault groups from L. of C. troops and from reinforcements coming up from south Burma. One of these assault groups

(of approximately brigade strength and supported by guns and heavy mortars) was now launched against 'White City', where a succession of battles raged from 6th to 14th April. The garrison, first under Brigadier Calvert, later under Brigadier Gillmore of the 3rd (West African) Brigade, successfully withstood every assault.

On to the other Japanese lines of communication to the north—the Bhamo-Myitkyina road—'Morrisforce' debouched on 13th April. It occupied no permanent road block of the 'White City' model, but carried out instead a series of tip-and-run raids, ambushes, and demolitions, which effectively closed this route for the next month. Dahforce, after a long and arduous march, eventually reached the Chinese frontier where it carried out a number of small-scale operations.

The two halves of the 111th Brigade had concentrated by the end of March in the area west of Indaw. To begin with they were given the task of interrupting Japanese communications to the central front, and they carried out a number of road ambushes to this end. It was soon realized, however, that the enemy, having several alternative roads available farther to the south, was routeing little or no traffic through Indaw. The 111th Brigade was thereupon given, instead, the dual role of covering enemy approaches to the stronghold 'Aberdeen' and of destroying the many supply dumps west of Indaw. These dumps were mainly of petrol and ammunition and were destroyed with zest.

On 20th March, the 16th Brigade columns were in 'Aberdeen'. They had encountered only a few weak enemy forces, but they were somewhat exhausted by their long march over gruelling country. Four days later they set out to attack Indaw. A week later it was clear that their attack had failed, and they were withdrawing on 'Aberdeen'. Indaw was held by both Japanese and Burmese Traitor Army (B.T.A.) troops, and the former at least offered stiff resistance. They clearly expected the coming attack and were ready for it, and in a dry area they clung to the principal water points. Only the two columns of the 2nd Leicesters made progress; they captured and held for two days a village on Indaw Lake, less than two miles from the town itself and from one of the airfields, but they could do no more without support, and the other columns were bogged down by enemy resistance and lack of water.

The 14th Brigade, after being landed at 'Aberdeen', was directed south. Destroying a large supply dump *en route*, on 13th and 14th April it cut the railway line some 20 miles south-west of Indaw, blowing up three bridges, destroying rolling stock, and killing many Japanese.

The two strongholds, 'Broadway' and 'Aberdeen', had been put, meanwhile, into a high state of defence. Each had its troop of 25-pounders and its troop of Bofors guns, and each had a liberal supply of mines and wire. 'Aberdeen' was never visited by the enemy except for an occasional air attack, but 'Broadway' was attacked by a Japanese mobile column on 27th March. The stronghold garrison was the 3rd/9th Gurkhas, while the two columns of the King's were patrolling in the area. They had no difficulty in repelling the attacks, which persisted during the next two days, and no further enemy threat developed against 'Broadway'.

Throughout all these operations the air forces, particularly No. 1 Air Commando, played a vital part. Without artillery, the Chindit columns depended on air support far more than did conventional units; again and again the swift, well-directed attacks of the fighter-bombers proved decisive, never more perhaps than in the battles around 'White City'. Pre-briefing of pilots as to their targets was usually impossible;

it was more usual for such briefing to be given by wireless by the column itself when the aircraft arrived, and in this manner during these few weeks a closer relationship was established between the pilot and the soldier supported than had existed before and closer perhaps than has since been attained.

The light aircraft of No. 1 Air Commando, too, were ubiquitous. Strips were made by the columns all over Burma and the light planes plied to and fro between these and the Dakota strips, carrying out the casualties. Air supply was, of course, continuous, though the bulk of this was carried out by Troop Carrier Command aircraft, not by No. 1 Air Commando.

The general situation in the middle of April can be seen from Map 2. The Japanese had surrounded the Imphal plain and were thrusting at Kohima, but on their northern flank the newly formed XXXIIIrd Corps was beginning to threaten, with the Chindit 23rd Brigade on the eastern flank. In the north, Stillwell had halted, nervous about the threat to his lines of communication at Dimapur; this was unfortunate, since it greatly modified the effect on the Japanese facing him of the severance of their communications.

Firmly established across these communications, however, 80 miles behind the Japanese front line, the Chindits held full sway, and the first phase of Wingate's plan had certainly been successful.

But on the evening of 24th March, an event had occurred which more than compensated for these initial successes. General Wingate had flown to 'Broadway' that day in one of Cochrane's Mitchell bombers; later, he landed at Imphal and visited the R.A.F. Group Headquarters there. Taking off again late that evening, his aircraft crashed in the Naga hills with the loss of General Wingate himself and all other occupants. Of all the Allied commanders whom the Japanese faced, they probably feared Wingate most; he was a great general and he always saw clearly the way to the enemy's destruction. His death was the gravest loss to the whole Allied cause; for the Chindits it was irreparable.

THIRD PHASE—THE MOVE NORTH

General Wingate was succeeded by General Lentaigne, who flew out from the 11th Brigade to assume command. Lentaigne's successor was Lieut.-Colonel, now Brigadier, Morris, but the latter was heavily committed on the Bhamo-Myitkyina road, so Lentaigne left his brigade under his former brigade major, Lieut.-Colonel Masters.

Within four weeks of Wingate's death, his plan of campaign had been abandoned. The situation in Assam was such that there seemed no prospect of any relieving force for the Chindit columns in the Indaw area; they had either to get out or to remain there through the monsoon. The latter alternative was quickly dismissed; it was considered that in the monsoon all the Dakota strips would become unserviceable and the supply-dropping planes would seldom get through; furthermore, the effect on the morale of the troops, who had been assured of early relief, would be formidable. It was therefore necessary for the Chindit brigades to make for an all-weather Dakota strip whence they could be flown back to India. The 16th Brigade, which was near the end of its tether, needed to be withdrawn particularly early, and it was planned to give it one more go at Indaw and then fly it out before the monsoon broke.

Stillwell clamoured against any further withdrawals from Special Force, and it was finally agreed that it should move north, block the enemy supply routes again, and in due course join N.C.A.C. to be flown out from airfields in that area.

No attempt is made here to apportion responsibility or blame for the abandonment of the Wingate plan. It should not have been abandoned, nor would Wingate have abandoned it. Within a few weeks Kohima was to be relieved and after that it would always have been possible to find battalions to relieve the Chindit columns around Indaw. Air supply did in fact continue throughout the monsoon. The hardships suffered by any columns which might have had to stay in the Indaw area through the monsoon could hardly have exceeded the hardships they were in fact to suffer around the Mogaung valley in the next few months.

The 16th Brigade's second attack on Indaw was unopposed. It occupied the Indaw west airfield for a couple of days and then withdrew, part to 'Broadway' and part to 'Aberdeen', whence it was flown back to India. Those two strongholds were then evacuated, their artillery was flown out, and their garrisons moved north. 'White City' was evacuated in the same way on 9th May, in one night's intensive flying from the Dakota strip; it had been defended triumphantly for over seven weeks, and at least a thousand Japanese had perished around its perimeter.

The site for the next road and rail block was some 30 miles south-west of Mogaung. The 111th Brigade established its strongpoint, to cover this block, about two miles west of the railway on a steep wooded hill, and called it 'Blackpool'. It was not in any sense a Wingate stronghold, for it was far from inaccessible, nor was it adjacent enough to the road and railway to form an adequate block. Here the brigade prepared a Dakota strip, and field and anti-aircraft guns were flown in on the nights of 12th and 13th May. The enemy's reaction was swift; his artillery fired on the Dakota strip on both those evenings, and one of his patrols put an abrupt end to the first night's flying. On 22nd May, the enemy set about 'Blackpool' in earnest, employing a considerable force of infantry and field artillery, and using anti-aircraft guns in some quantity to prevent the air supply of the garrison. Fighting went on until the 25th, but for the 111th Brigade it was a losing battle all the way, and its guns had early been overrun. On the 25th, the brigade withdrew in good order, unpursued by the enemy, and concentrated on the shores of the Indawgyi lake. Flying-boats landed on this lake and evacuated the wounded, but malaria and scrubtyphus were rampant and there were soon far more sick than there had ever been wounded.

The 77th Brigade meanwhile had reached the hills east of the Mogaung valley (that is the valley running south-west from Mogaung) and had almost a front seat for the 'Blackpool' battle. It was powerless to intervene, however, for the Namyin river was in flood and a mile wide, and no way to cross it could be found.

The 14th Brigade, in its move north, reached the Kyunsalai pass (see Map 2) on 21st May. This was the only practicable pass through the formidable range of hills between the Mogaung valley and the Indawgyi lake area; it was of the utmost tactical importance. This seemed to have been somewhat tardily appreciated by the Japanese, for their first party to climb the pass was anticipated by a few hours by the 7th Leicesters, ambushed, and severely mauled. Three days later, both sides having been reinforced, the second battle for the pass took place and ended in one of the most overwhelming successes of the campaign. The Japanese made no further attack on the Kyunsalai pass.

The (3rd West African) Brigade, now reconstituted as an integral Chindit brigade, was the last to move north, and undoubtedly had the hardest march. In the monsoon weather which now prevailed, many supply-dropping sorties failed to get through, and the troops were on very short commons.

Special Force was now under the direct command of General Stillwell, and General Lentaigne's tactical headquarters was in the Hukawng valley, north-west of Mogaung. On 17th May, Stillwell's American contingent, known by code-name 'Galahad', after a fine forced march across the hills north of Myitkyina, had descended suddenly upon the airfield west of that town and captured it. His reserve Chinese division had been flown in and the fall of Myitkyina had seemed a matter of hours. But the Japanese garrison held out, the moment passed, and a weary period of unimaginative siege warfare began. At Stillwell's order, 'Morrisforce' ceased its successful guerrilla operations on the Bhamo road, and began a series of costly and unprofitable attacks on the villages facing Myitkyina on the east bank of the Irrawaddy. In these its strength was quickly dissipated, and it played little further part in the campaign.

By the end of May, therefore, thanks to their capture of 'Blackpool' and to the fortunate disappearance of 'Morrisforce' from the Bhamo road, the Japanese had at last cleared the two main supply routes to their Mogaung-Myitkyina position.

FOURTH PHASE—MOGAUNG

The clearing of these supply routes, the deadlock at Myitkyina, and the slow progress of the Chinese advance down the Hukawng valley did not augur well for the chances of forcing the Myitkyina-Mogaung position, which had been the target for this N.C.A.C. campaign.


At the end of May, however, General Stillwell ordered Brigadier Calvert and the 77th Brigade to capture Mogaung. This was indeed a formidable task for a Chindit formation. Unsupported by artillery or engineers, possessing no wheeled transport, they were now to leave the jungle, descend from the hills, and assault, across flat, boggy country, a dug-in enemy in a fortified town. Few formations could have achieved this, but they were fine battalions—1st Lancashire Fusiliers, 1st King's, 1st South Staffords, and 3rd/6th Gurkhas—and in Mike Calvert they had a great, inspiring commander.

Leaving his base in the hills, he moved forward on 5th June and, after fierce fighting, ejected the Japanese from Pinhmi, a key village on a stream two miles south-east of Mogaung; the actual bridge over this stream was not captured, however, until the 10th. The advance continued methodically, against the usual obstinate resistance, until, by the 13th, it came to a halt some 600 yards east of the suburb of Natgyigon. Exhausted by its long fight in the mud, and decimated by casualties, the brigade paused to rest and reorganize.

On 18th June, leading elements of the Chinese 114th Regiment reached the Mogaung river from the north. They appeared full of fight and they had artillery; so, after consultation between the respective commanders, the Chinese moved round to the south of Mogaung to cover Calvert's left flank and to use their guns against the Japanese artillery within Mogaung.

NORTH BURMA - August, 1944

(SHOWING SITUATION AT END OF CHINDIT CAMPAIGN.)



RIVERS. CHINDWIN

R.R.'S. + + + + +

ROADS OR TRACKS. - - - - -

SCALE - 50 MILES TO 1 INCH

PRINCIPAL CONCENTRATIONS.

ENEMY.

OWN TROOPS.

MAP 3

Air support of Calvert's advance had been stepped-up steadily. The 10th Air Force pilots, as the pilots of No. 1 Air Commando had done before, established the closest liaison with the ground forces, and were directed again and again on to targets in the closest proximity to them.

On 23rd June, the attack on Natogyigon opened. Flame-throwers and detachments were flown in to help to deal with the network of foxholes and defended buildings which now faced the assaulting troops. Air support was intense. The 3rd/6th Gurkhas (who won two V.C.s that day) and the South Staffordshires bore the brunt of the most savage fighting of the campaign; gradually they fought their way into strongpoint after strongpoint, and by nightfall they held the railway line from the bridge at the north of the town to the station at the south. On the following day the advance was resumed by the Lancashire Fusiliers and the brigade defence platoon. By that evening only a small remaining strip of Mogaung remained in enemy hands, and that fell to the 3rd/6th Gurkhas early next day. In this manner was the first Burmese town recaptured from the Japanese.

This was the climax of the Chindit campaign, but a few more battles remained to be fought. The 111th Brigade, greatly depleted, moved into the hills to the west of Mogaung, and the 14th Brigade into the hills overlooking Taungni (see Map 3). The 3rd (West African) Brigade concentrated in the plain west of Mogaung and fought some hard but indecisive engagements around a feature known as 'Hill 60'.

The capture of Mogaung had knocked out the hinge of the Japanese position and, on 1st August, after a Chinese column had penetrated deeply into Myitkyina, the Japanese pulled out; the town had defied capture for ten weeks. The British 36th Infantry Division started to fly in to Myitkyina and to relieve the Chindits in the field. The last to be engaged were the West Africans and the 14th Brigade, who supported the 36th Division's advance on Taungni. The 14th Brigade ended its campaign on a most spirited note, driving the Japanese out of their hill positions into the Mogaung valley and linking up with the 36th Division in Taungni on 13th August.

The general situation in Burma at the end of the Chindit campaign is shown in Map 3. The Assam battle had been won, and the Japanese were everywhere in retreat for the Chindwin. In the east (not shown in Map 3), the Chinese had crossed the Salween. In the north, the Mogaung-Myitkyina position had at last crumbled and a disorganized enemy was withdrawing south.

THE CHINDIT CAMPAIGN—ITS COST AND ITS RESULTS

The Chindit brigades were flown to central India to refit and recuperate. Their casualties had been appalling—about 1,500 killed, 2,500 wounded, and some 7,000 hospital cases from sickness—and in effect it never proved possible to recreate Special Force again.

Results of the campaign are not easy to assess. The three tasks assigned to the force were certainly carried out. It had helped Stillwell's advance to the Myitkyina position; indeed, without the Chindits it is inconceivable that Stillwell could have forced this position. The Chinese had crossed the Salween. Finally, there can be no doubt as to the confusion, damage, and loss inflicted on the enemy forces in north Burma; over 5,000 Japanese were killed by the ground forces alone, and many more by the air forces whose attacks they directed; quantities of petrol, ammunition, and supplies were destroyed.

The collapse of the Mogaung-Myitkyina position and the disintegration of the Japanese forces on that front had far-reaching results. In December, when the IVth and XXXIIIrd Corps reached the Chindwin, the 36th Division was in Indaw and Katha. The Japanese, who had been expected to make us fight hard for the Chindwin, were outflanked to the north. They had to withdraw to the Irrawaddy position; the dry plains north of Mandalay were given up almost without a struggle.

Now, the final operations culminating in the capture of Rangoon "beat the monsoon by only a few hours",⁸ so that a delay of a few weeks on the Chindwin would probably have postponed the liberation of Rangoon for a further six months. Nevertheless, for all this, one cannot feel certain that the campaign was worth its cost.

LESSONS OF THE CAMPAIGN

The conception behind Wingate's plan for this campaign was a new one. A large force was to settle down permanently across the enemy's communications, some 80 miles or more behind the fighting formations whose supply line it was cutting. This conception was sound, but it was made so by the topography, which canalized the enemy's communications and prevented his concentrating in sufficient numbers against our strongholds. It was made possible also by complete air supremacy.

If operations of this kind against a force's supply line are to be fully effective, that force must be made to fight hard, to use up its reserves of food and ammunition, and, where applicable, petrol. As we have seen, Stillwell, influenced by the apparent threat to his lines of communication, paused in his advance just as Chindit pressure on the Japanese lines of communication began to be felt. Had he pushed on energetically and continuously, his opponent might have collapsed the quicker.

Finally, there is the lesson which we do not appear to have learned, the lesson that air support should be close and intimate, with direct contact between the pilots and the troops supported. The Chindits had to have it so, for it was their artillery.

The bulk of the crippling casualties suffered by this force took place in the second half of the campaign, after the Wingate plan had been abandoned, when the columns were fighting battles in the forward area, frequently in conditions utterly unsuited to their armament and training. This part of the campaign should not be quoted against Wingate or against his strategy; he was a great general and we have much to learn from him.

⁸ Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia, 1943-45 (H.M.S.O.), page 157.

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER IN THE ENGLISH CHANNEL

By "G. V."

AS soon as it appeared probable that Germany was going to accept the terms of unconditional surrender, the Admiralty commenced to make arrangements for all U-boats then operating off our coasts to comply with the terms. To effect this, a signal announcing the fact of surrender would be broadcast at frequent intervals, ending with an instruction that any U-boat receiving the signal was to surface and await further orders, which would be conveyed by surface escorts or aircraft.

So far as the English Channel was concerned, the Cs-in-C. Portsmouth and Plymouth arranged, with Admiralty approval, to make Flag Officer-in-Charge Portland responsible for bringing all U-boats into Portland Harbour. This was an obviously convenient arrangement, since the meridian of Portland Bill was the line of demarcation between these two naval commands and it simply meant that Portsmouth would provide the necessary escorts for U-boats surfacing to the east of the Bill and Plymouth for those surfacing to the westward, until the Portland sub-command took over the responsibility.

Altogether, three U-boats surfaced in the Channel—all to the westward of Portland Bill—viz: *U249* and *U1023* on 10th May, and *U776* on 15th May, on which date the Admiralty announced that the total bag to date amounted to 24. This account deals solely with the three which surfaced in the English Channel and which were subsequently brought into Portland Harbour.

As a preliminary step, a conference was held at Naval H.Q., Portland, attended by two submarine officers from the 5th S/M Flotilla at Portsmouth. These specialists outlined the technical requirements both for the preliminary search of a U-boat which would take place in Weymouth Bay (weather permitting), and for the final search which would take place inside Portland Harbour.

On conclusion of this conference, F.O.I.C. Portland immediately issued his orders for the operation which, in broad outline, conformed to the following plan :—

(a) Two trawlers would be anchored in a suitably sheltered position in Weymouth Bay. The Portsmouth/Plymouth escorts would accompany the U-boat to one of the War Channel buoys in the vicinity of Portland Bill, where these escorts would be relieved by two motor launches from Portland, on board which would be the R.N. submarine officer and ratings detailed to carry out the two searches previously referred to, the staff officer detailed to obtain the German C.O.'s signature to the 'instrument of surrender', and a naval guard to disarm and search the German crew. The prime object of the preliminary search would be to ensure against sabotage, including arrangements to scuttle, to segregate any necessary German key ratings required to bring the U-boat into harbour, and to hand over to the military as prisoners of war all German officers and ratings not required on board during the passage into Portland Harbour.

(b) On conclusion of the preliminary search, a tug would proceed alongside the U-boat and tow her into Portland Harbour, where she would be berthed and the remainder of her officers and ratings handed over to the military as prisoners

of war, after which the final search would be carried out. When this had been completed, the Admiralty would require to be informed how soon each U-boat could be got ready to proceed under her own steam to the final port of internment.

The first intimation received by Naval H.Q., Portland, that the Channel surrenders had commenced was the receipt at 1000 on 9th May of information from C.-in-C. Plymouth that *U249* had surfaced and was being escorted to Portland by H.M. Sloops *Magpie* and *Amethyst*. At 1500, H.M.S. *Magpie* informed Portland that she expected to turn her charge over to us at about 0630 the following morning. In view of the detailed arrangements already made, it was fondly imagined that the Portland Sub-command would not be required to come into the picture until then. Unfortunately, the publicity arrangements of this age had been overlooked by us—but not by My Lords!

In the course of the afternoon we were informed by C.-in-C. Portsmouth that as this was the first of the U-boats to surrender unconditionally to the Royal Navy, orders had been received that it was to be regarded as "a matter of historic interest", and that the fullest possible publicity was to be given to the event, including facilities to the B.B.C. to film the operation, accompanied by press representatives and photographers who, hot on the scent, had already started to descend on Weymouth.

It soon became apparent that the publicity part of the programme must be settled first, partly because the necessary arrangements would take time to plan and also to ensure that the staff would be free to concentrate on the operational part of the surrender plan when it became necessary. F.O.I.C. Portland accordingly decided to invite all available press representatives and the B.B.C. officials to his headquarters at 1900, and he arranged that while he would confer with the B.B.C. experts on the part which they would be called upon to play next morning, his Chief Staff Officer would hold a press conference at the same time, with the object of briefing the press representatives as to what had already happened, giving them an outline of the operational orders issued for the surrender, and explaining to them the arrangements for conveying them to Weymouth Bay in time to see the arrival of *U249*, and then taking them back to Naval H.Q. to witness the final act.

By the time the press conference was over, the B.B.C. people had completed their own arrangements with the admiral, including a brief script. The climax would be reached when the staff officer who had boarded the U-boat and obtained her C.O.'s signature to the 'instrument of surrender' entered the admiral's office and presented this document to the admiral. He would read it out into the microphone and then say, "I hereby accept this unconditional surrender and shall duly report the matter to the Admiralty and other authorities concerned." He would then counter-sign the document in ratification. To add to the publicity effect, it was decided to give the inhabitants of Weymouth a chance of seeing all they could from the beach, and for this reason the submarine's arrival at the Portland rendezvous was postponed until 0900.

In the meantime, an unexpected incident arose which was to have repercussions the next day. At about 1800, an American rear-admiral, accompanied by two staff-officers, suddenly arrived by car from Plymouth and, on being shown in to F.O.I.C. Portland, the American admiral asked to be briefed as regards to-morrow's events, since he understood that the U-boat had first been sighted by a U.S. aircraft which continued to circle overhead until the arrival of the British escorts; no doubt, therefore, F.O.I.C. would agree to regard to-morrow's ceremonies as a joint surrender.

A brief telephone conversation with C.-in-C. Plymouth established the fact that it was a British aircraft which had spotted and circled the U-boat, and that no other aircraft had been in sight at the time. On this being explained, the U.S.N. rear-admiral confined his request to asking whether an American naval officer might be present at the proceedings as a spectator, a request which was readily granted.

Next morning, the Portland escorts were sailed in time to take over from H.M. Ships *Magpie* and *Amethyst* at the pre-arranged rendezvous at 0900, three Polish M.T.Bs being selected for this duty. This arrangement had obvious advantages apart from the linguistic accomplishments of the Poles, since some of them had made the acquaintance of German concentration camps before escaping to England and could therefore be relied upon to know how to deal with any truculence. The Polish flotilla did not lack for volunteers for the duty of putting a guard on board the U-boat, which also included the task of searching the entire German personnel on board.

The operational timetable had been strictly adhered to, and very shortly after U249 had secured alongside one of the trawlers in Weymouth Bay, the admiral's staff officer was on his way back with the signed 'instrument of surrender' and two copies. A tug was already alongside the U-boat ready to tow her into Portland Harbour on receipt of orders to do so from the R.N. submarine officer now in charge of the submarine, and the admiral (who had gone afloat to witness events in Weymouth Bay) was back in his office ready for the final act.

It was just as well that he was back there, as when I reached the door soon afterwards I failed to see how anyone else was going to get in or out. Immediately around the admiral stood the U.S. representative, the C.O. of the Polish flotilla, the military liaison officer, and the B.B.C. engineer in charge of the microphone with one of his assistants. In front of the admiral's desk sat, knelt, or stood a packed mass of press correspondents and photographers, including at least a dozen Americans dressed as seamen and euphemistically described as official photographers, the whole forming a solid phalanx between desk and door.

It was true that the 'instrument of surrender' had been signed, but it was far from clear how the document would ever reach the admiral for ratification, for which purpose the staff officer had to come in from outside and bring it up to the admiral's desk. Clearly a lane from door to desk had to be made and kept if the proceedings were to be carried out with the dignity and decorum due to the occasion. However, the B.B.C. engineer explained to the assembled multitude his plan for filming the scene and that everything depended on his being given the necessary room to make the film. In a few moments the necessary space had been cleared, and the scene was now set for the culminating act.

The staff officer who had obtained the German C.O.'s signature to the 'instrument of surrender' was summoned and gave the document to the admiral who first read it aloud into the microphone and then countersigned it in ratification. This appeared to be the pre-arranged signal for a perfect barrage of flashlight and other forms of photography, to say nothing of cine-cameras with whirring wheels. It sounded like pandemonium let loose! But the admiral took it all in his stride and, having blotted his signature, spoke his final script into the microphone. This caused another fusillade of clicking cameras and flashlight bulbs, as the climax of this historic event was photographed. The presence in the photographs of the U.S.N. representative had an interesting sequel. The negatives were immediately flown to the U.S.A.,

with the result that within 48 hours a chain of cinemas in the United States were able to exhibit a picture of the first German U-boat making her surrender jointly to the U.S. and British Navies, while simultaneously audiences in London were witnessing a film of the first U-boat to surrender unconditionally to the Royal Navy. No doubt both audiences were equally gratified!

By the time these proceedings were over, *U249* had been berthed inside Portland Harbour and the final search was being carried out far from any maddening crowd. But by this time yet another U-boat—*U1023*—had surfaced in the area of the Plymouth Command, and it was a question of whether she, too, could be berthed alongside her comrade in arms before dark or whether the escorts would have to delay her arrival until daylight the next day. In the event, the rendezvous in the vicinity of Portland was reached with daylight to spare, and the preliminary search was carried out as before in Weymouth Bay, after which valuable time was saved by the R.N. submarine officer, who triumphantly brought her into Portland Harbour under her own power, the German crew operating the engines under the supervision of British key ratings, with a British coxswain at the wheel and a thoroughly ugly-looking Polish guard ready to kill all and sundry at the smallest hint of trouble. *U1023* was finally berthed alongside *U249*, so by the late evening of 10th May, two U-boats had been satisfactorily dealt with and placed in the safe charge of the Royal Navy.

One could not help comparing the quiet smoothness with which this second U-boat was dealt with when one's thoughts went back to all the hustle and bustle inseparable from the organized publicity which had marked the scenes of the surrender of the first U-boat a few hours previously. None the less, the first U-boat was not to steal all the limelight. On her passage to the rendezvous, H.M.S. *Magpie* had reported that the C.O. of *U1023* claimed to be the first C.O. to use Schnorkel, the device whose effects had so worried our experts of late, so it was only natural that the Admiralty lost no time in organizing teams of experts—both naval and civilian—to examine this device as actually fitted.

This naturally entailed special security measures, and in the early hours of next morning *U1023* was shifted to another berth, all approaches to which were placed under strict control to ensure that none but authorized persons could approach within 500 yards of her. The surrender of the third U-boat—*U776*—did not take place until 15th May, when the operation was repeated for the third and last time so far as the Portland Sub-command was concerned. This U-boat was also fitted with Schnorkel, but the experts were evidently satisfied with what they had learned from examining *U1023*, so that *U776* merely represented one more in the bag.

It was not many days before all three U-boats were ordered to their final port of internment, but Portland can always claim to have played a part in "a matter of historic interest".

THE MALTESE LEGION IN THE FRENCH SERVICE, 1798-99

By LIEUT.-COLONEL M. E. S. LAWS, O.B.E., M.C., F.R.Hist.S.

TO the British people at least, one of the most unexpected of the many surprises produced by the 1939-45 War was the apparent facility with which Hitler raised fighting units recruited from the peoples conquered in the *blitzkrieg* of 1940-42. That defeated nations might be compelled to produce labour for Germany was understandable, but that a number of men from several of these nations should fight in national units alongside the Nazis was indeed a surprise. Yet in this respect, Hitler was but copying the actions of Napoleon, and it is therefore of interest to recall the French attempt to induce the Maltese to serve under the Tricolour immediately after their island had been overrun as the result of a totally unprovoked assault.

On 9th June, 1798, a large French fleet, with transports carrying General Napoleon Bonaparte and his Army of the Orient, appeared off Malta, which was held by the Order of St. John of Jerusalem and was at peace with France. French agents had already prepared the way for aggression by recruiting 'Quislings' among the Knights of St. John, and when the French landed there was little opposition. On 12th June, the Grand Master (Baron Hompesch) capitulated, and five days later left the island with the first instalment of a French pension in his pocket.

At 5 a.m. on 14th June, all Maltese troops in the service of the Order of St. John were ordered to parade at Birchicara, just outside Valetta, when they were inspected by the French General Dugua, who had Napoleon's instructions to persuade all suitable men to enlist for service in the Army of the Orient. The units duly paraded as follows, many officers and men being absent:—

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Approximate Establishment</i>	<i>Number on Parade</i>
The Grand Master's Guard	200	1 officer and 147 other ranks
Regiment of Malta	500	— 60 " "
Bataillon des Galères	250	1 officer and 105 " "
Bataillon des Vaisseaux	250	11 officers and 172 " "
Chasseurs	800	17 " and 417 " "
Artillery	200	—
TOTAL	2,200	30 officers and 901 other ranks

Of these units, the Chasseurs were partially uniformed and almost untrained militia, but the remainder were Regular troops. The Bataillon des Galères and the Bataillon des Vaisseaux were intended for service afloat and included a proportion of men trained as artillerymen. As the Order of St. John had no pension system for its forces, soldiers were permitted to serve on and to draw pay until they died, even though quite unfit for any military duty; there were two soldiers in the Grand Master's Guard over 80 years old! By no means all the 900 men on parade were therefore suitable for service in the French Army.

When, however, General Dugua asked for volunteers, he received a very poor response. A few non-commissioned officers and five men of the Grand Master's Guard, together with 24 men of the Regiment of Malta, offered to enlist: a few of the men of the two sea service units agreed to serve the French in Malta, but none would volunteer to serve abroad. When the matter was referred to Napoleon, he

decided to disband the Chasseurs, to put the two marine battalions at the disposal of his naval commander, and to enlist the whole of the Grand Master's Guard and the Regiment of Malta for service in Egypt with his own army. He therefore ordered the two latter units to parade at St. Elmo at 5 a.m. on 16th June, and at the same time gave orders for accommodation for them to be prepared on various ships of the French squadron.

It seems clearly established that when the Grand Master's Guard (120 strong) and the Regiment of Malta (350 strong) paraded at Fort St. Elmo on the 16th June, 1798, they had no desire or intention to embark. The units were divided up into platoons of about 35 men each and were ordered by French officers to march off towards the quayside. At once there were protests, and the men refused to move, despite the efforts of some of their own non-commissioned officers. Eventually, however, they were got on board ship (either by persuasion, or, more probably, by force), being accommodated one platoon each on board the French battleships *Orient*, *Franklin*, *Peuple-Souverain*, *Causse*, *Spartiate*, *Tonnant*, *Guillaume Tell*, *Aquilon*, *Timoléon*, *Mercur*, *Guerrier*, *Conquérant*, *Généreux* and *Heureux*. There can be no doubt that the Maltese did not embark voluntarily, and the formality of regular enlistment appears to have been overlooked.

During the six days after the surrender of Malta and before the French Army left for Egypt, Napoleon reorganized the island's administration as well as its military establishment. As regards the latter, his object was twofold—to remove any potential rebels against French domination, and to make what use was possible of Maltese manpower to aid General Vaubois's French garrison. He therefore removed the Knights of St. John, some of whom were exiled and the rest taken with the Army to Egypt; the Chasseurs were reformed from Maltese thought to be friendly to the invaders; and a National Guard was recruited from the merchants and others whose interests would be best served by the preservation of law and order. Sixty boys between nine and 14 years of age from the best Maltese families were ordered to be sent to Paris (at their parents' expense) for education in French schools, and six others were forcibly taken for the French Navy as *aspirants de marine*. Maltese soldiers who had served the Knights of St. John were formed into four companies of veterans, the first two of which were destined for Corfu. In addition, four companies of artillery were formed to man the numerous coast batteries of Malta. To encourage volunteers for Egypt, Napoleon authorized a family allowance, by which the wives of non-commissioned officers received 30 sols per decade and soldiers' wives 20 sols; children under 10 years of age were allowed 15 sols for non-commissioned officers' families and 10 sols for soldiers' families. Children over 10 years of age received no allowance as they were expected to serve as ships' boys. The Colours of all Maltese units previously in the service of the Knights of St. John were sent to France by the frigate *Sensible*, which was captured en route by H.M.S. *Seahorse*; the Colours were thrown overboard.

On 18th June, Napoleon sailed from Malta, leaving General Vaubois with a little over 4,000 French troops. On 18th August, the following Maltese units had been formed and were serving in Malta:—

4 Companies Maltese Artillery 12 officers	270 other ranks
4 Companies Maltese Veterans 8 "	192 " "
Chasseurs de Malte 26 "	558 " "

TOTAL 46 officers 1,020 other ranks

On 2nd September, 1798, the inhabitants of Malta rose in revolt and drove the French garrison into Valetta, which was closely blockaded. The Chasseurs de Malte joined the insurgents practically to a man, and on 8th September Vaubois forbade officers and non-commissioned officers of the Regiment to wear uniform. The Maltese Artillery, being inside the besieged city, could not desert in a body, but by November, 1798, there were less than 100 left on duty and the four companies were reorganized into a single unit. Even then the men could not be trusted, and, in fact, they deserted whenever an opportunity offered. Nothing is known of the Veteran Companies, but they certainly took little part in the defence of Valetta, and it is believed that they were disbanded and the men discharged and put in prison in order to keep them out of harm's way.

Meanwhile, the French Army of the Orient reached Alexandria and, landing against minor opposition, was soon able to overrun the whole country which was, of course, quite unprepared to meet a sudden attack. On 5th July, 1798, Napoleon ordered General Dumuy to collect the Maltese soldiers ashore and to organize them into an infantry battalion of nine companies, to be called *Légion Maltais*. The officers for the unit were selected from among French Knights of the Order of St. John who had been brought from Malta on board the fleet: there was only one Maltese officer and he was a subaltern. The Chef de Bataillon was Bourbel, a French officer selected from staff employment. The Grenadier Company, composed of specially selected men, was able to take part in the operations of a mobile column under General Dumuy, which left Alexandria on 17th July for Damanhur; the column had hard fighting before returning to Alexandria on 20th July, and the Maltese Grenadiers, who formed the rearguard, were officially reported as having "*très bien soutenu le feu de l'ennemi*."

The organization of the Maltese Legion, which was intended to form the chief and permanent part of General Dumuy's mobile column, had been hindered "*par le dévouement absolu de cette troupe*" and the difficulty of finding equipment. General Kléber, who commanded at Alexandria, therefore put the Legion to work on the new fortifications, since he believed that the men were acclimatized to the heat. On 2nd August, the whole unit, with a Grenadier company of 69 Demi-Brigade under General Dumuy, set out for Aboukir in order to maintain communications with Rosetta. This march was also opposed by the Arabs and the Legion lost three killed and 11 wounded, including, among the latter figure, its commanding officer. On this occasion General Dumuy complained bitterly of the "*mauvaise conduite d'un certain nombre de soldats Maltais—plusieurs d'entre les volontaires qui le composaient ont tenu des propos très violents vis-à-vis de leurs officiers et décourageaient leur camarades par leur lâcheté et mauvais vouloir*." He added that it was essential to post Frenchmen with the Maltese in the various posts—the inference being that the Maltese would desert if left alone. Captain de Peyroux took command of the Maltese Legion in place of the wounded Bourbel, and already there was a considerable number of men sick ("*impotent ou aveugle*") at Alexandria. Food was very scarce and there is no evidence that the unfortunate Maltese had received any clothing or pay.

On 11th August, the mobile column marched from Aboukir and reached Rosetta on the 13th, escorting a convoy: on its return to Aboukir it received orders for the Maltese Legion to march to El Rahmanieh to establish a strong point from which to control the Alexandria Canal. The Legion set out on 18th August and arrived at El Rahmanieh on the 25th. Its strength was then 21 officers, 20 sergeants-major and

sergeants, 38 corporals, 4 drummers, and 228 privates, 311 all ranks. There were, however, many men employed as workmen, bakers, medical orderlies, and servants.

On 30th August, Captain MacSheehy, who was serving on the army staff as "*adjoinant au Adjudant-Général*," was appointed to command the Maltese Legion. The strength of the unit was so low that orders were issued on 2nd September, 1798, for all employed Maltese soldiers to be returned to duty, and in addition Napoleon issued instructions to General Kléber to induce Italian seamen on board the neutral ships at Alexandria to join the Maltese Legion. Despite very strong pressure and a promised bounty of one louis, the sailors could not be induced to enlist, and the Legion was then authorized to enlist Turks! That any sane man could imagine such inveterate enemies as Maltese and Turks serving together in a battalion seems incredible, but it does not appear that the experiment was ever tried, for the only Turks who were induced to serve the French did so in their own units. The Legion did include a certain number of men—probably Italians—who had served in the Papal forces, but there is no doubt that the great majority of the men were Maltese.

While stationed at El Rahmanieh, the Legion was employed chiefly to escort convoys to and from Alexandria, and to patrol and protect the canal. There were numerous skirmishes with Arab bands and some casualties were suffered. On 22nd November, 1798, General Berthier sent orders for the Legion to be despatched to Giza immediately it was relieved at El Rahmanieh by 2nd Bn. 69th Demi-Brigade. The Maltese left for Cairo on the evening of 24th November. Its effective strength by 22nd October had fallen to 13 officers and 208 other ranks.

During its stay at Cairo, the Legion was ordered to provide 10 selected men for the newly-raised Regiment des Dromadaires. In mid-January, 1799, the Legion set out (with 200 galley slaves from Malta) under General Junot for Suez, where it arrived, after a trying march, on the 29th. Suez was extremely unpleasant for garrison duty; food was very scarce, water was bad in quality and severely restricted in quantity, and the local Arabs were determined and skilful enemies, always ready to attack small detachments. On 14th February, 1799, General Junot left Suez to join the army about to invade Syria, taking with him as escort the Grenadier Company of the Maltese Legion; this company marched via Bilbeis and El Arish to Gaza, where it arrived on 25th February and where it remained as part of the garrison for three months. After constant convoy escort duty, the Grenadier Company withdrew to garrison El Arish when the French Army retreated from Acre, and early in June it was ordered to rejoin its unit.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the Maltese Legion garrisoned Suez, less a detachment left in Cairo Citadel. On 27th April, the British 50-gun ship *Centurion* and 18-gun brig-sloop *Albatross* appeared off Suez, and soon established touch with the Maltese troops. The latter learned of the revolt in Malta and of the assistance provided to their countrymen by the British; obviously this was the opportunity to get back to their homes. Almost immediately the Maltese started to desert, and no counter measures taken by their commander were of any avail. Sentries at advanced posts went off at night and eventually no Maltese sentry could be trusted alone. So alarming were the reports sent in by Chef de Bataillon MacSheehy that General Dugua (who was commanding in Egypt during the absence of Napoleon in Syria) hurriedly sent the 3rd Battalion, 69 Demi-Brigade, from Cairo to Suez as reinforcement. The arrival of the French troops checked the desertion temporarily, since the Maltese were more closely watched, but as soon as General Dugua was

convinced that the British were not strong enough to land and capture Suez, he withdrew the French unit which was badly needed for internal security duties elsewhere in Egypt.

Immediately desertion started again, and it was mere chance that 20—the whole Maltese garrison of Fort Adjeroud—did not escape in a body. There were also cases in which the men refused to obey orders, and in despair MacSheehy formally asked to be relieved of the command of "*ces misérables*," whom he recommended should be incorporated into French regiments or be employed as interpreters, and on non-combatant duties. He attributed all the trouble in the Legion to a natural cowardice and a lack of military spirit, a sweeping and comfortable explanation which could obviously not be applied to a people who, almost unarmed and quite unsupported, had blockaded 4,000 veteran French troops in Valetta since September, 1798. Such a people could hardly be said to lack courage.

The true explanation was found by General Dumuy, who had been sent to Suez to report on the trouble in the Legion. The Maltese, he explained, had never wished to serve the French in Egypt and had been embarked by trickery; they were very badly clothed and had received no pay. They had been almost starved, having received a meat ration only once during their five months at Suez, and there was an acute shortage of water. When, therefore, the British offered them an opportunity to escape from a country which they hated and to return to their own homes, they considered that they were in every way justified in deserting. It was admitted also that it was the best soldiers who were the most determined deserters.

This report was sent to Napoleon who, without comment, relieved the Maltese Legion at Suez and collected the unit at Cairo, where it was disbanded by an order dated 12th July, 1799, the companies being drafted into French units. Prior to disbandment, two men were drafted from the Grenadier Company to the Regiment des Dromadaires, and each company in addition sent two men to the French Cavalry. The disposal of the remainder of the *Légion Maltais* was as follows:—

Company	Effective Strength	Incorporated in
Grenadier	41	18 Demi-Brigade de Ligne
1	27	32 " " " "
2	28	13 " " " "
3	25	85 " " " "
4	26	9 " " " "
5	33	22 Demi-Brigade Légère
6	25	18 Demi-Brigade de Ligne
7	18	25 " " " "
8	29	75 " " " "
—	—	
Total 9 Companies	211	

Napoleon's later efforts to raise troops from among the peoples his armies had conquered were more successful, which makes it all the more creditable to the Maltese that they alone of the small nations refused to serve the invader.

THE LURE OF THE RED COAT

By COLONEL J. M. COWPER, T.D.

(Late Women's Royal Army Corps.)

THOSE of us who were honoured by being amongst the first women ever to receive a Regular commission in H.M. land forces in 1949 are rather apt to look upon ourselves as pioneers. Yet the story of women's service for the Army goes back to the days before we, in this Country, had a standing army at all.

Normally, no soldier of the XVIIIth Century or earlier ever handled any of his pay, for it was all administered by his officers, his clothing provided out of it, his rations bought, and his bills paid. He was hired for a particular campaign and he hoped for a goodly share of loot. At the end of the campaign he was discharged and, when his booty had all gone, as a soldier of fortune, he looked round for another war in which to fight, often hiring himself out to a foreign Power.

In all countries a certain number of married men were enlisted and the wives were given a small amount of the men's pay in return for which each made herself responsible for the washing and feeding of a particular party of, usually, about 12 men, who clubbed together and made a 'mess.' At the end of the campaign the wives were also cast adrift with their husbands.

The trouble began in England when King Charles II was restored to the throne and, for the first time, was voted a sum of money by the Parliament of the day for the protection of his person. It was soon found impossible to limit the number of women with the Army, for nothing could prevent them, whether married or unmarried, from following the Colours. Controversy soon raged among the military writers of the time, for some said that these women were more trouble than they were worth, while others asked who would do their work if they were "chased away."

The first regulation on the subject was published in 1685, when a man was forbidden to marry without the permission of his captain, and from then on many attempts were made to regularize the position. That it never wholly was regularized is apparent from the many heartrending scenes which took place when a regiment was sent overseas. Almost invariably there were more women than the regiment was permitted to take with it and lots had to be cast to decide who should go. Those left behind were given 2s. 6d. and passed from parish officer to parish officer until they reached their respective homes.

There were no barracks in those days and the soldiers were often scattered over a considerable area, their task being to assist the civil power or to control smuggling. So a company only would be in one place. On arrival in a village the men would be paraded and the Colour lodged at the inn, where the company commander had taken up his residence. The men would then disperse to the neighbouring ale houses or other places where they were billeted. Theoretically, every mess had its one married man and approximately 12 men and one woman would repair to each billet. Here they were only entitled to room in the attics, where they were provided with uncooked rations, small beer, coal, and candle. The company commander paid the innkeeper out of the men's pay, and the woman in each party took charge of the uncooked meats, cooked them, and shared them with the men. If she failed in her duty she was chased away from the regiment and another man was permitted to marry and so bring his wife 'on the strength.'

The devotion of regimental women to their duty was shown again and again. One of the earliest overseas expeditions after the raising of the British standing Army in 1660 was to garrison Tangier, a small port on the north coast of Africa opposite to Gibraltar, which came into English possession as part of the dowry of King Charles's queen, Catherine of Braganza. All embarkation returns include the women, and the sailing orders specify the number permitted. In the valuable collection of papers in the possession of the present Lord Dartmouth, there are a number concerning the evacuation of Tangier in 1683 and many of them throw light on the tasks of regimental wives. Hospital ships of the time also carried as part of their complement, female nurses or 'tenders.'

The flight of King James II, and the accession of his sister Mary and her Dutch consort, King William III, plunged the Country once more into war when King James returned with an army to Ireland. With King William's Army in that country there were two forms of hospital, one 'fix'd' and the other 'marching.' Both had establishments showing the employment of matrons, nurses, and tenders, all of whom are described as female. One interesting point, in view of the later development of the women's services, is that the matron was regarded as the equivalent of a sergeant and drew the pay of a sergeant, while the female tenders drew 8d. a day, as did the private soldier. There was then no question of the two-thirds drawn by the Auxiliary Territorial Service during the 1939-45 War, or even the three-quarters of the Women's Royal Army Corps of to-day.

Women accompanied the Army throughout the early campaigns of the XVIIIth Century in France and Flanders, the Seven Years' War, the War of American Independence, and all the other expeditions in which British troops were employed. There was no such thing as total war, and campaigns in those days were fought according to well established rules, of which perhaps the most important was that operations only took place in the Summer months when the troops could live on the country. During the Winter they withdrew to Winter quarters.

It was the Americans who first shattered this convention by attacking one of King George III's German regiments while they were recovering from their Christmas dinner. Then Napoleon flouted all the rules, and the Duke of Wellington was hard put to it to administer his Army in such a way that it was able to contend with the new conditions of warfare. He had to adopt strong measures to reduce the baggage, to require the presence of officers with their regiments even in the Winter months, and generally to ensure that the men were ready to fight when and where they were required. He never succeeded in solving the problem of the Army's women, and for the whole 20 years of the wars with France there are many references to them.

The wife of Surgeon Maguire, of the 4th Foot, was a soldier's daughter who had been born within sound of the guns firing at the battle of Bunker Hill in 1775. She married at the age of 16 and her eldest son, Francis, was born in 1791. She had at least two sons when, in 1797, she embarked at Halifax to return to England with the cadre of the regiment. Their ship, H.M.S. *The Three Sisters*, was small and no match for the French privateer, *La Vengeance*, which gave chase to her during the voyage. Eventually she had to capitulate, but Mrs. Maguire saved the regiment's Colours from capture by wrapping them round her flat irons and dropping them through a porthole into the sea.

All on board were taken prisoner and, when she landed in France, Mrs. Maguire was incarcerated in a prisoner of war camp. Here she was the only woman among 200 men and, with the beds so close together that she could touch those on either side

of her, she gave birth to her first daughter. We know little more of Mrs. Maguire except that a commission in his father's regiment was bought for Francis at the minimum age then allowed, 16, and that five years later he was killed when he led the 'forlorn hope' at the second siege of San Sebastian on his 21st birthday. Her second son, Peter, went to sea, and he also was killed and Mrs. Maguire was one of the first women to benefit from a new regulation granting pensions to dependants of soldiers and sailors killed in action. In fact, she drew two, one for each son.

A great change had recently come in the lives of British fighting men, for the pay of a private soldier had been raised to 1s. a day and, after all deductions had been made from his pay, he was left annually with the sum of 18s. 10½d., to be used at his discretion. He also had 1d. a day beer money and, if married, 1d. a day marriage allowance. This did not at first affect the position of the wives. They accompanied all the expeditions which tried in vain to gain a footing on the Continent, now almost entirely under French rule, including the one commanded by Sir John Moore which approached the Portuguese coast in 1808.

When Sir John Moore landed on the Portuguese coast at the end of August, a number of women accompanied the troops, including four with each company of the advance guard. It was not until October, however, that the march into Spain began, and it looked as though Winter campaigning might be necessary. Consequently, the Commander-in-Chief instructed his divisional commanders to leave the women behind, but it was a useless precaution. The women were determined to stay with their men; they took no notice of the order, nor of those which followed as the Army marched over the fringe of the mountains which divide Spain from Portugal.

Under the direction of the regimental quartermaster, they took up their accustomed place with the baggage, the wives of the more senior officers occasionally travelling in a carriage but more usually on horseback, while those of the junior officers and the other ranks walked. As the regiment bivouacked at night, the women would go out and collect food and fuel while the men put out their guards and picquets. Then, in the morning, the column would re-form and move on.

As the Commander-in-Chief had laid down on this occasion that no carts whatsoever were to be allowed for the use of the women, it was only in direct contravention of his orders that the carriages of the senior wives could be there, and it seems likely that on this occasion all walked or stayed behind. Women were entitled to half the man's ration of a pound of bread daily and a pound of meat, a quarter of a pint of spirits or a pint of wine being supplied on salt-meat days. Children received a quarter.

This was the position on 23rd December, when Sir John learned that the French under Napoleon in person were moving against him in great strength. There was nothing for it but to make for the sea and there began that famous forced march through snow and ice, over flooded rivers and almost impassable passes—a march which ended with the battle of Corunna, in which Sir John Moore was killed.

Two examples suffice to illustrate the hardship which the women had to share. A soldier's wife crawled under a broken bullock cart to give birth to her child, and was later found dead, with the child alive at her side. During the last few days an eye-witness stated: "Few women were still to be seen, the majority lay behind somewhere between Villafranca and Lugo. In one of the villages through which they went . . . one of them sank to her waist in a bog, whereupon, the mud and slime preventing her from rising, she fell and the whole column marched over her." There is no record of any woman or child being embarked from Corunna, and it seems that not one survived that terrible journey.

In the later campaigns in the Peninsula the Duke of Wellington did all he could to leave the women at the base or in Winter quarters, but, even so, there were some who troubled him every year. Their life was with the Army, and they insisted on remaining with it. Only at Waterloo does it appear that no women were present.

After Waterloo, there followed a period of peace in which police forces were formed. The Napoleonic Wars had shown the dangers of lack of military training and, as their duties in aid of the civil power decreased, it became possible to concentrate soldiers in specially built barracks. The standing orders of the 12th Foot, published in 1817, show clearly the place of the soldier's wife in barrack life. "No more than two women," they ordained, "or four according to size, to be allowed to each barrack room. They are to wash and cook for the men, when the orderly cooks attend parades. They must invariably be as clean in their person and dress as their work will admit, and on the first instance of irregularity, dirt, want of sobriety, or inattention to what is required of them, they will be deprived of the indulgence of living in barracks. They must not, on any account, hang up clothes or other things in any part of the room." The same orders later laid down: "Any woman of the regiment found selling wine or spirits to the soldiers or buying their necessaries, to be drummed out of the corps."

Side by side with the increase in the number of barracks, there came a change in the national attitude towards women and public opinion began to demand segregation of the sexes. There was a period in which they were forbidden to live in barracks, but it was soon found that they were then not able to do their job and the rule was seldom enforced. Instead, it became customary for the men to erect canvas screens in a corner of the barrack room and here the family lived. In the day-time the woman cooked the ration, washed and mended the men's clothes, and at night the boys occupied the vacant beds of the men on guard while the girls retired behind the parental screen.

In the year 1852, Private Evans brought his bride to the barrack room in Ashton-under-Lyne and she began her married life in this manner. There were still no children two years later when their regiment was ordered to the Crimean War. Thirty-three women embarked at Leith but, when the regiment went on from Malta, only 17 remained, for the rest had been persuaded to go home. In due course, these 17 arrived at Varna, the British base, and, when the army went on, the women were forbidden to follow. They were ordered back to Scutari where, before long, they were given the task of doing the washing for the hospitals after the arrival of Miss Florence Nightingale and her nurses. Mrs. Evans in old age was an attractive woman; in her youth she must have been irresistible. Certainly the officer in charge of the embarkation of her battalion was not proof against her entreaties, and Mrs. Evans, Mrs. Box, and an Irishwoman whose name is not known were amongst those women who contrived to disembark in the Crimea with the expeditionary force. There were some others with other regiments, and a number of officers' wives.

Soon the Army formed up to fight its first battle on the banks of the River Alma. The women stood on the hill behind with the staff and, from their position, they could see the whole field of battle. On the right were clearly visible the blue coats of their French Allies and on the left the scarlet coats of the British soldiers. On the far bank of the river were the gun emplacements of the Russian enemy, his soldiers wearing their traditional grey. As they stood waiting for the first shot to be fired a staff officer turned and said: "Look well on that, Mrs. Evans, for the Queen of England would give her eyes to see it." Then the guns opened fire and the whole

field was hidden in smoke. As the Army advanced, so the women followed, picking their way forward amongst the dead and dying and doing what they could to help the wounded. Their hearts leaped into their mouths if they saw a man wearing facings of the colour of their own regiment, and the little Irish woman was last seen by Mrs. Evans as she kneeled beside the body of her husband. The other two went on and were with the Army when it invested Sebastopol.

Mrs. Duberly, wife of Captain Duberly of the 8th Hussars, took up her residence in Balaklava harbour in the ship *Southern Star*, and on the morning when the battle of Balaklava was fought, her husband sent a horse down for her so that she could come up to headquarters and watch the battle from the heights. But the soldiers' wives remained with their regiments. When the Turks abandoned their positions and fled towards Balaklava they had to pass the camp of the 93rd Highlanders and one of the soldiers' wives rushed out and fell upon them, belabouring them with a stick, kicking them, cursing them for cowards, pulling their hair and boxing their ears, and so pursued them to the harbour. In the camp in front of Sebastopol, Mrs. Evans and Mrs. Box alone remained with their regiment. Mrs. Box was tremendously strong and was said to have been able to carry two men easily upon her shoulders. She was also not above crawling across the valley which separated the French from the British camp, a valley continually under fire, to steal brandy which she took back and hawked round the British camp, much to her advantage! She is known to have been among the first to join the nurses, probably at the hospital at Balaklava, and she appears to have left the regiment before the battle of Inkerman. Only Mrs. Evans remained in camp that day with the drummer boys, who gathered round her as she sat quietly mending the Colours which had been damaged at the Alma.

Sergeant Evans was wounded soon afterwards and, when he was evacuated, his wife also went home. She had been with him throughout the campaign and had even crawled out after him when he was on outlying picquet. Years afterwards she said that she rather thought the officers knew that she did so but kindly looked the other way. She and the other wives in the Crimea were the last ever to accompany their husbands beyond the base, and it is significant that their departure from the front line almost coincided with the reinstatement of women nurses on the establishment of military hospitals for, as is well known, Miss Florence Nightingale's nurses were the forerunners of Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps of to-day. Mrs. Evans herself lived to a ripe old age and died in 1913 when she was given a military funeral—then almost unheard of for a woman.

MILITARY TRAINING BY CORRESPONDENCE COURSE

By MAJOR J. T. PAGET, COLDSTREAM GUARDS

ONE of the many problems facing a commanding officer today is how to get his officers and non-commissioned officers trained in the many specialist subjects which they must learn in a modern army. He usually has to send them away on courses, but that means leaving himself shorthanded in the unit, which he is obviously reluctant to do. One way in which this difficulty could be largely overcome would be by the extension of instruction by correspondence courses.

Obviously, correspondence courses could not replace practical training, but they could cover a large field of theoretical knowledge, and they have the great advantage that they would enable officers and non-commissioned officers to acquire that knowledge while remaining with their units, and so available for duty. They would also provide a means by which E.R.E. personnel, reservists, and members of the Territorial Army could keep themselves up-to-date.

METHOD

The courses could be run by the basic school of each arm or service of the Army, e.g. the School of Infantry would be responsible for all infantry courses, for personnel both at home and overseas. Since these schools are directly subordinate to the War Office, the necessary co-ordination and control could be exercised by the Directorate of Military Training with the minimum of duplication down the channels of command.

This system would have the advantage that the courses would be prepared and run by those most interested in the subjects concerned, and therefore most capable of disseminating a sound doctrine. All the information would be as accurate and up-to-date as possible, and would on occasions even supersede that in the standard pamphlets.

The correspondence courses would be closely co-ordinated with the practical courses which the school would continue to run; students for many practical courses could be made to take preparatory correspondence courses before reporting to the school. In this way, greater value should be obtained from the practical course, and yet it might be possible to shorten it, since the theoretical aspect would have been covered before the students arrived.

SUBJECTS

The subjects to be covered by correspondence course would be decided by each school, subject to approval by the War Office. In some cases the correspondence course would cover the whole subject, and in others it would be by way of preparation for a practical course. The main schools which might obtain value from running these courses, would be the Schools of Artillery, Military Engineering, Infantry, Signals, and Education. Other schools should also find them of use to a lesser degree.

The material for these courses would be prepared by the school instructors based on their current teaching, and should be in the form of precis or small pamphlets, such as are provided by the Metropolitan College for the Staff College entrance examination at present. Standard pamphlets would be used for reference, and any other books or documents required could be made available in unit or command libraries. The courses would not duplicate the basic instruction contained in the pamphlets, but would go one step further by discussing the material in them as well

as commenting on recent changes and developments. They would make students think about the problems involved and would give them a greater incentive for study, as well as offering guidance and constructive criticism.

A certain number of subjects of interest to all arms could be made the responsibility of one school, who would then co-ordinate with all concerned. The Staff College, for instance, might cover certain aspects of staff work, the additional staff required being fully justified, one hopes, by the improved standard of work which should result, particularly among adjutants and officers who are in staff appointments but who are not p.s.c.

TESTS AND EXAMINATIONS

Some form of test on each lesson and an examination at the end of the course would be desirable in all subjects. Only in this way would it be possible to ensure that the student was digesting the material presented to him. Tests would also provide a means of grading and reporting on students, and a certain standard could then be made a requirement for promotion, for particular jobs, and for attendance on certain courses; it could also be made to count towards 'bonuses' in the Territorial Army.

The drawback to tests and examinations is that they would need individual marking, and that would mean additional staff, if delays were not to be excessive. However, the amount of work involved could be reduced considerably by the use of objective rather than subjective questions, thus enabling the marking to be done very quickly by hand or by machine, and the tests to be returned to students within a few days. The advantages of this system would be, first, its speed, and secondly, its simplicity, so that only limited skill and military knowledge would be needed by those correcting the papers.

The main argument against objective questions is that they encourage stereotyped thinking and do not require reasons to be given for answers; it should be possible, however, to frame objective questions of such a type that students would have to go through the same process of logical thought as they would for a subjective type of question, even though the answer might not show this reasoning. Also, in the majority of cases where objective questions would be used, the aim would be to test the student's factual knowledge rather than his ability to express himself on paper.

Objective questions could even be used in papers on tactics. For example, students could be issued with maps and a series of narratives painting the tactical picture; they could then be required to state their action in certain situations and, in each case, they would have to make a mental appreciation of the situation before they could be sure of picking the correct solution out of the several possible ones offered to them. Another method would be to issue students with overlays showing several possible solutions and then make them decide on the correct one. They could thus be made to choose defensive positions, lines of approach, objectives, DF tasks, and so on. Again, in each case, detailed logical thought would be necessary to pick the best solution.

Since there would be no chance for students to challenge the Directing Staff personally, the 'D.S. solution' would have to contain not only the approved answer, but also detailed and convincing reasons for that solution rather than the other possible solutions. However, these comments could be prepared in advance and then sent out to each student together with the 'D.S. solution' and his corrected papers, so that he received them while the problem was still fresh in his mind.

At the various schools running correspondence courses, the clerical work would consist mainly of recording details of students and their work, and in sending out lessons and test papers. This is all comparatively unskilled work and would not need a highly trained staff; it could be done by civilians. The setting and correction of papers, on the other hand, would entail the employment of a more experienced staff, and it is suggested that recently retired officers with the necessary qualifications might be re-employed for this purpose.

ADMINISTRATION

Details of both practical and correspondence courses run by each school might be published in Army Council Instructions, and based on this information, commanding officers would detail officers and non-commissioned officers for courses just as at present. As soon as an application for a correspondence course was received by the school concerned, it would forward the first papers, either direct to the student or to the unit training officer for distribution. Much of the success of this scheme would depend on the part played by the unit training officer or education officer in helping candidates with their work. He should ensure that they kept to their timetable and completed their work properly; he could also help by providing amenities for work, which would include examination conditions under which to do test papers.

On the successful completion of a correspondence course which was intended as preparation for a practical course, the student would be ready to report to the school and put into practice the theory which he should have learned.

It would clearly cost a certain amount to run these courses, but this expense must be weighed against the advantage gained by shortening practical courses, which should make it possible to train at least the same number of officers and men as at present with a reduction in the time spent away from their units.

It is of interest that the United States Army, which has used this method of instruction extensively since 1945, now runs correspondence courses for some 6,500 students ranging from corporal to colonel. They do this with a staff of approximately 650 at a cost of about five dollars per student, and both these figures could probably be reduced.

USE BY TERRITORIAL ARMY AND RESERVE

The correspondence course system would be particularly well suited to the needs of the Territorial Army and the Reserve, where the major problem is finding time to train and keep up-to-date. These courses, which could be done at home in a man's spare time, could provide the ideal solution. Not only would they make it possible for officers and men to be taught more, but as a result of them, much greater value should be obtained from the brief periods of practical training. Many courses might be made compulsory as part of the training programme and the passing of them could be made a qualification for 'bonuses' and promotion.

CONCLUSION

The knowledge which both officers and men must acquire nowadays becomes daily greater and more complicated. Yet both officers and men are needed more than ever within their units to train National Service men and to carry out difficult internal security roles throughout the world. The development of instruction by correspondence course would help to reconcile these conflicting demands.

MAX HORTON AND THE WESTERN APPROACHES

A COMMENT

By REAR-ADMIRAL L. W. MURRAY, C.B., C.B.E., R.C.N. (RETD.)

THE recently published book by Rear-Admiral W. S. Chalmers, *Max Horton and the Western Approaches*, is one of the most gripping biographies of a man of action to appear in recent years. For that reason I have no desire to criticize its shortcomings, but there are at least three points upon which I feel comment should be made in the interests of historical accuracy.

My first point is that by holding out Sir Max Horton as the architect of victory in the anti-U-boat war, the author does less than justice to Horton's two predecessors as Commanders-in-Chief, Western Approaches—Admiral Sir Martin Dunbar-Nasmith, V.C., and Admiral Sir Percy Noble.

He falls into this error quite unconsciously. From time to time he endeavours to give credit to Dunbar-Nasmith, or to Noble, for originating measures that set the stage for final victory, but all effort in this direction is brought to naught by his own power of focusing the mind of the reader upon the central figure of his biography, a figure with whom we have been made acquainted in the first half of the book, before the Western Approaches are brought into the picture.

From this book the uninformed reader will not learn of the achievements of the Western Approaches Command before the appointment of Admiral Horton. He will, most certainly, not be made to realize that, under the inspiration and guidance of these two former Commanders-in-Chief, the escort forces then available, though extended to their uttermost limits, managed, by sheer guts and will power, to hold the ring against the U-boats for upwards of three years; that in that time they invented and developed new weapons; that they built more and more ships and trained their crews; that they perfected the organization, communications, and repair facilities essential for victory; and then—that they placed the ball at Horton's feet.

The ingredients in the recipe for victory, attributed by the author to Horton, were:—

1. Training, training, and more training, particularly group training;
2. Co-operation by air forces; and
3. Support groups.

All these requirements were fully appreciated long before the appointment of Admiral Horton, and the necessary measures had been taken to put them into effect as soon as men and ships could be found.

Only one who has been intimately connected with this problem can fully realize the frustrations of the 'build-up' period. Every available ship was, and had to be, committed to the front line. There was no reserve. Gaps in the ranks caused by enemy action, or by weather damage, had to be filled, or left unfilled, depending on the state of the force available at the time.

Before new ships become available, new commitments had to be accepted. In 1940, there was the Norwegian campaign and a severe setback in the number of escorts available due to the losses in the evacuation from Dunkirk; in midsummer of 1941, the escort system had to be extended to the full width of the Atlantic, and down the African coast; in August 1941, escorts were required for convoys to North

Russia ; early in 1942, ships had to be released to assist the United States in escorting trade convoys along the U.S. coastline and in the Caribbean ; and later in 1942, escorts had to be found to cover and maintain the North African landings.

When Admiral Horton assumed command of the Western Approaches on 17th November, 1942, the shortage of escorts was still so serious that it formed the subject of his first memorandum to the Admiralty. Undoubtedly he was quite right to place this situation on record as he found it, but, in the portions of that memorandum quoted in the book, I can find nothing that would not have been included in similar memoranda from either of his predecessors over the preceding three years. How happy would they have been with a tithe of what, due to their efforts and foresight, was at last beginning to come off the production lines.

On Horton's behalf the author says, " He sustained the morale and health of all ships' companies by arranging that the intervals between trips should allow time for rest, recreation, and repairs." In the earlier years, alas, health frequently had to be sacrificed to grim necessity, and morale had to be sustained by the inspiration and leadership provided by the Commanders-in-Chief, coupled with the realization throughout all ranks that the organization was good, that they were never called upon to do anything that was not directly to the point, and that their ships and equipment were being used to the fullest possible advantage.

TRAINING

For those first three years all forms of training had to be carried out at the expense of much needed rest : six days in harbour a month was the rough rule and training as a group was practically impossible. During each period in harbour, one or more ships of the group would be laid up for repairs, for boiler cleaning, or for fitting improved equipment such as radar, H/F D/F, or ahead throwing weapons.

For most of the ' build up ' period, too, though the system of keeping ships together in a group to develop team work was recognized as essential for efficiency, it was far from possible to attain this ideal. Only too frequently a ship returning to harbour for rest with one group would have to sail again within 24 hours to fill a gap in another.

AIR CO-OPERATION

Nor was Admiral Horton unique in his appreciation that the use of aircraft over the sea was an essential factor for success against the U-boat. During 1918, of the many thousands of ships having a combined escort of surface vessels and aircraft, only four were sunk—and that was before the invention of asdic. During the 1914-18 War, the Navy was fully aware of the importance of aircraft in keeping the U-boat submerged, and to that end had developed an air service second to none. This force became part of the R.A.F. on the inception of that Service in 1918, but despite that upheaval in its organization, with a strength of some 190 aeroplanes, 300 seaplanes or flying boats, and 75 airships, it flew an average of 14,000 hours a month on anti-U-boat operations for the last six months of that war.

With the formation of a separate air force the Admiralty, though still saddled with responsibility for the maintenance of sea communications, was shorn of all authority to provide itself with the air power essential for meeting that commitment. This is, perhaps, the most notable example of a break in sound organization perpetrated by the British fighting Services within living memory. Such a situation would not be allowed to stand for a moment in business or industry. Instead of having direct control of the operation of aircraft in its domain, the Navy was made dependent

upon the co-operation of the R.A.F. That this co-operation was most loyally given by the Coastal Command, to the full limit of its ability, does not excuse the break in the chain of responsibility that this form of organization imposes.

The R.A.F.'s selection of priorities in the immediate pre-war period, albeit a difficult choice, left Coastal Command a sadly inadequate force at the outbreak of war. The co-operation they could offer was, naturally, limited by the strength of forces in the Command, and this was lacking, not only in the numbers and types of aircraft available but also in the numbers of its personnel trained in naval co-operation, or indeed in the primary, though by no means simple, task of flying and navigating over the sea.

In the interests of this co-operation, Combined Headquarters for Navy and Air Force had been set up in each command. At Derby House the A.O.C. 15 Group occupied the office adjoining the Commander-in-Chief's, and had done so from the time the command of Western Approaches was moved to Liverpool from Plymouth, in February, 1941. Even this was found not to be sufficiently positive, so the Commander-in-Chief Coastal Command, R.A.F., was placed under the operational direction of the Admiralty on 15th April, 1941—19 months before Admiral Horton's appointment.

In spite of this hand-in-glove co-operation, the 14,000 hours a month set up by the ex-R.N.A.S. in 1918 was not reached by Coastal Command until the middle of 1943.

To beat the U-boat it was imperative we should have aircraft that could cover the space in mid-Atlantic known as 'the gap.' Ability to operate 300 miles farther to seaward was all that was needed. A most suitable aircraft, the Liberator, was in production in the U.S.A. and available to the R.A.F. One squadron of Liberators was given to Coastal Command, and converted to use anti-U-boat weapons, as early as 1941, but again, other priorities inside the R.A.F. over which the Admiralty had little influence, made it impossible for Coastal Command to obtain these essential V.L.R. aircraft in the numbers necessary for the Battle of the Atlantic, until March, 1943. By that time, the Navy had taken its own steps to provide air cover over 'the gap' by means of escort carriers and mercantile aircraft carriers, both types operating planes of the Fleet Air Arm. Provision of aircraft from all these sources enabled Admiral Horton to take the offensive in 'the gap', a course of action not available to his predecessors.

SUPPORT GROUPS

The importance of support groups, to reinforce the escorts of convoys under attack, was recognized by all in authority from the date of the first wolf-pack attack. The efficacy of support group tactics was amply demonstrated in the action of two corvettes from my Newfoundland Escort Force on the outskirts of a pack attack on Convoy S.C.42, in September, 1941. These two corvettes, under the command of Commander J. D. Prentice, had snatched a free week of harbour time for an early attempt at group training. They were stationed in a position from which they could reinforce one of several convoys at short notice. By approaching the pack from the outside they surprised and sank a submarine which had been concentrating all its attention upon the oncoming convoy. Prentice, incidentally, besides being a cattle rancher between the wars as mentioned in the book, was a retired commander of the Royal Navy, trained at the R.N. Staff College, and a winner of the R.U.S.I. Essay competition in 1928.

To put the system of support groups into operation it only remained to find enough escorts of a suitable type—destroyers or fast frigates—free from the daily grind of close escort work. For reasons already stated this was not easily achieved, but in September, 1942—two months before the appointment of Admiral Horton—Sir Percy Noble managed to scrape a group together. But alas, the coming commitment of the North African campaign made it necessary to put this group back on close escort work before it achieved any success.

My second point is the injustice the author does to Sir Max Horton in one astounding statement. After explaining the scope of the responsibility and the authority of a commander-in-chief "within his command," and giving the boundaries of the Western Approaches Command, the author goes on to say, "By general assent, however, he later controlled operations on both sides of the 'chop' line. There was no question of any other supreme commander while Horton was at Derby House." A footnote describes the 'chop' line as the line of demarcation between British and Canadian control. This statement cannot be allowed to go unchallenged. Does Admiral Chalmers, or anyone else, really believe we could have defeated such a clever opponent as the U-Boat if a slipshod organization and lack of discipline such as this statement envisages had been allowed to exist?

In the first place, when Admiral Horton took over command, 'chop' was the point of demarcation between United States and British control. I have no exact knowledge of Admiral Horton's relations with the U.S. Naval Command at Argentia, Newfoundland, during the Winter of 1942-43, but, from the time I assumed command as Commander-in-Chief Canadian North-West Atlantic, in the Spring of 1943, there was never, at any time, the slightest suggestion that the authority of the C-in-C. Western Approaches should extend beyond 'chop'.

The very meaning of the word 'chop' (coined by the U.S. Navy and retained after their withdrawal) was 'the place where control was turned over from one to the other'. At 'chop' the escort and commodore of convoy changed their radio receiving frequency in order to receive their instructions direct from their new controlling authority. Strictly speaking, 'chop' was not a line, but a time.

With eastbound convoys I was responsible for sailing the mid-ocean escort from Newfoundland, together with any ships to join the convoy, and for effecting the junction with the main convoy which would have started its voyage from New York or Halifax. In the fogs which prevail off the Grand Bank, this junction was not always a simple matter, even after the escorts had been fitted with radar. To allow for contingencies, control of convoy and escorts remained in my hands for 24 hours after the time set for the original rendezvous. The westbound convoys arrived on the western side of the Atlantic at most irregular intervals, depending on the type of weather encountered by the ships, mostly in ballast and frequently not sufficiently ballasted. The responsibility for joining up the western local escort, as it was called, also devolved upon me, and to help me carry it out the control of the convoy and escort was turned over to me 24 hours before the time set for the original rendezvous. The time of transfer of control—24 hours to eastward of the rendezvous in each case—was 'chop'.

My routeing problem was complicated by the sailing of small convoys from Halifax and Sydney, as well as from St. John's, Newfoundland, to join the eastbound convoys, preferably during daylight, and by the breaking off and escorting of portions of the westbound convoys to St. John's, Newfoundland; Sydney; Halifax;

Saint John, New Brunswick; and Boston. Keeping these various groups of ships clear of submarines, icebergs, and of each other in fog, snow, gales, and darkness, whilst operating a very tight schedule for the escorts, presented a very pretty problem indeed. The situation changed from hour to hour and each situation demanded individual treatment. Nothing could be left to routine. I have no doubt that a man of Max Horton's drive and character would not have shrunk from seizing authority if he thought he could use it to advantage, but he was much too sound a seaman to believe that any useful purpose could be served by remote control interference in that area.

For the same reason—local conditions—he never showed any inclination to question my disposition of the Canadian and American V.L.R. aircraft which operated from Newfoundland and Labrador under my direction to the full limit of their endurance, regardless of the position of 'chop'.

My third point is that some statements in the book mislead the reader into believing that the Battle of the Atlantic was fought entirely under the control of Western Approaches. For example, (a) the setting up of a machine shop and repair base at St. John's, Newfoundland, is mentioned in the same paragraph as similar facilities in the Western Approaches itself, and is attributed to the efforts of Engineer Admiral Wildish; (b) the setting up of a Tactical School at St. John's, Newfoundland, is treated in the same manner; and (c) Appendix X shows the five Canadian escort groups, at that time employed on the mid-ocean portion of the route, as being part of the Western Approaches Escort Force. Those five groups formed part of the Newfoundland Escort Force; they were based on St. John's, Newfoundland; and they were manned, trained, maintained, and administered by the Flag Officer, Newfoundland, as part of the Canadian Command. It is true they were turned over to the operational control of the C-in-C., Western Approaches, when to eastward of 'chop', but similarly, the seven British groups shown in that appendix were turned over to my operational control when to westward of 'chop'.

In this matter I suspect, the author has himself been misled by the *Official Account of the Battle of the Atlantic*, published by the Stationery Office in 1946. Further criticism in this article refers to the official account and not to Admiral Chalmers's book.

This pamphlet was obviously published in haste, for home consumption, and composed by someone who had seen the Battle of the Atlantic from one end only. In the result, it gives a somewhat biased twist to history.

Though it does mention that in September, 1941, "... the United States had undertaken the escort of the faster trade convoys in the western Atlantic ...", it does not mention that on 15th September, 1941 (nearly three months before Pearl Harbour), the control and escort of all trade convoys to westward of the Mid-Ocean Meeting Point, south of Iceland (in about 26°W.), was placed under United States naval command. Nor does it mention that the Newfoundland Escort Force, then under my command (comprising about 38 ships of the Royal Canadian Navy and about 40 ships of the Royal Navy, Royal Norwegian Navy, and the Free French Navy), together with the remaining escort resources of the R.C.N., was placed under U.S. naval operational control for this purpose. Quite a strange situation, after two years active U-boat hunting, to find ourselves operated by an admiral who was not, himself, at war.

This division of command in the Battle of the Atlantic remained in effect until the reorganization in the Spring of 1943. At that time the R.C.N. had expanded sufficiently to relieve the U.S. forces for work in the Pacific, so the R.C.N. accepted responsibility for operations in the western area. At this time, in place of the 26°W. line of demarcation, a 'chop' was arranged that split the distance from New York to Liverpool into roughly two halves. The longitude varied in each case with the expected position of the convoy during daylight hours on the day of the original rendezvous. It was usually between 42°W., and 47°W.

The pamphlet does not appear to make any mention of the contribution of the U.S. escort groups during this period, under the command of two able officers—Vice-Admirals Bristol and Brainerd—nor do I find any reference to the efficient repair base operated by the U.S. Navy near Londonderry.

Except for an early paragraph describing the phenomenal expansion of the R.C.N. and the R.C.A.F., and an occasional reference to some exploit of a Canadian ship or aircraft, the pamphlet appears to cover Canada's contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic with one sentence. In referring to the situation in June, 1941, when it became necessary to escort convoys all the way across the Atlantic, it says, "Valuable help was given in the far west by the Royal Canadian Navy, which based all its available destroyers and other anti-submarine craft at St. John's, Newfoundland".

That this bias is unintentional is borne out by a sentence in the final paragraph which reads, "In truth, the Battle of the Atlantic was won by the entire peoples of the United Nations".

Though I do not agree with Admiral Chalmers that the whole credit for victory in the battle against the U-boats should be attributed to Sir Max Horton, it is a fact that they were beaten during his period in command of Western Approaches, and I yield to no one in my admiration for the achievements of that Command under his drive and guidance. I also treasure the memory of working in the closest harmony with him for upwards of two years in one of the decisive battles of history.

Both the book and the pamphlet contain many tributes to the officers and men of the Merchant Navy, with which anyone connected with the escorting forces would wish to be associated. Without their courage, and their determination to keep the route to Britain open, all efforts of the escort forces, or indeed of the whole nation, would have availed nothing.

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION¹

By A. K. CHESTERTON, M.C.

EUROPE

EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY IN BEING

SEVERAL important events during the last quarter have taken place without causing much stir. After months—indeed, years—of struggle to secure French acceptance of a supranational defence authority in Western Europe, proponents of Western Union were accorded their cherished victory when the Council of Europe ratified the London and Paris Agreements. Yet public opinion in France was strangely unexcited by the result, perhaps because the realistic French knew that sooner or later the strong pro-Union pressure-groups inside and outside the country would carry the day. Those who had been maintaining that only the creation of a Defence Community was needed to heal the ancient Franco-German quarrel should have been, but probably were not, disconcerted to find the Saar dispute flaring up on the morrow of ratification. Believers in European unity, as distinct from European Union, hold that the quarrel will be composed, if at all, by dealing with facts and not by building artifacts. They agree that though the ground became clustered with international institutions there can be no solution to the problem of the Saar unless the French are prepared to concede that it is a German land which cannot in the long run be alienated from Germany.

The same type of argument can be applied to the Defence Community itself. It will work only in so far as it is based on facts. As the French would not tolerate shaping their army according to German requirements, so will Germans eventually refuse to maintain a German army fed on French traditions or based on American or British specifications. Germany's present leaders, to bring their dozen divisions into being, appear amenable to foreign influences, but armies cannot exist, let alone fight, in an emotional vacuum, and any failure to acknowledge this truth will cause confusion and chaos. The squabble at Bonn about whether the President or the Chancellor of the Federal Republic should be the Commander-in-Chief suggests that the Germans themselves are allowing foreign preoccupations to cloud their thinking. First among these preconceptions is a misconception—that the German Army has played a distinctive political role in German history. There is no evidence whatever to support that view.

AUSTRIAN PEACE MOVE

The Russians, after steadfastly refusing to negotiate a separate Austrian Treaty, executed one of their tactical 'about-turns' by inviting an Austrian delegation, headed by the Chancellor, Herr Raab, to take part in preliminary talks at Moscow. Agreement was swiftly reached under seven headings, the main provisions being an undertaking by Austria not to join any military alliance or allow any military bases on her territory, and to "follow a policy of independence," which has been taken to mean that she will not consent to any form of German *anschluss*. Russia in return agrees that the Occupation of the four Powers should be withdrawn before the end of the year. Following swiftly upon the return of the Austrian delegation, M. Molotov broached the subject of an Austrian State Treaty to the United Kingdom, the United States, and France.

¹As deduced from reports up to 21st April.

As the Soviet Union is never actuated by altruism, it would be unrealistic to suppose that the Russian heart has suddenly begun to ache for Occupied Austria. The steps now proposed could have been taken at any time during the last ten years. Beyond doubt Moscow, by conceding the possibility of a free, united, neutral Austria, wishes to set German minds dwelling upon the prospect of a free, united, neutral Germany. All that the Germans have to do is to renounce the Western Alliance and disallow foreign military bases on their soil, in order to be rid as well of the Russian occupation. That is the prospect held out to them. It will seem to thoughtful Germans much too good to be true, as indeed it is. The German and Austrian problems are not comparable. Austrian commitment or non-commitment in the existing line-up would have no decisive effect upon the balance of power, whereas the battle for Germany is the battle for Europe and for the world. It is exceedingly improbable that Russia would withdraw from the Eastern Zone unless she were convinced that the Communist cadre she leaves behind was strong enough to hold the fort on her behalf, and as this fact is all too apparent to intelligent Western Germans they will not fail to take the Soviet's wooing of Austria at its real worth. That is why Austria should not set too much store by the Russian promise of a treaty. If the Kremlin has miscalculated German reactions, the Austrians may be kept whistling for their independence, if not for ever, at least until something transpires to shake and transform the world position.

BRITAIN'S POSITION

Now that the London and Paris Agreements have been ratified by most of the national assemblies, the British promise to maintain four divisions or their equivalent in present striking power, together with units of the R.A.F., becomes a contractual obligation. It remains to be seen whether the pressure-groups intent upon the political and military integration of Western Europe are content with this form of association or whether they will try to push us into outright membership of the Defence Community. The ease with which public acceptance was secured for our military commitment is known to have given great encouragement to the federalists.

What would be the attitude of our present British Government towards outright federation under a supranational authority? There seemed to be no doubt of Mr. Macmillan's own attitude as revealed in the House of Commons Debate on 1st March, when as Minister of Defence he declared:

"Genuine disarmament must be based on two simple but vital principles. It must be comprehensive, by which I mean that it must include all weapons, new and old, conventional and unconventional. The control must provide effective international, or if we like supranational, authority invested with real power. Hon. Members may say that this is elevating the United Nations, or whatever may be the authority into something like World Government. Be it so, it is none the worse for that. In the long run this is the only way out for mankind. Of course, it will take time and patience to reach our goal. We have had disappointments, we have had setbacks, but we shall persevere. For disarmament is two things—and when we achieve it, it will be this double triumph: it will be both the symbol of peace and the means of preserving it."

That is, if not a statement of policy, at least a pointer to the direction in which, as Foreign Secretary, Mr. Macmillan may be expected to steer. The opposite direction was that indicated in another recent debate by Major Legge-Bourke, who said:

"Some Hon. Members think that national sovereignty today is not important. The Right Hon. Gentleman the Member for Blyth suggested that

people should shed their nationalism as though it were an old overcoat. I personally believe that if a few more people in this Country would think more of their own nationalism here it would be a very good thing for the world at large. It is practically impossible, for instance, for any Member of this House to be in favour of a supranational authority and be loyal to the oath we take when coming into this House."

It is not for the present writer here to offer an opinion as to which attitude is correct, but he can at least express his belief that this is the only political issue of first-class importance at the present time.

ASIA

ANTI-CLIMAX IN THE EAST

Despite the emphasis placed by the United States on the defence of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, the rest of the Western world, after an initial spell of agitation, has not been keeping its eye on this particular ball. Congress has been content that the decision for staying or going—for war, local or general, or a withdrawal to Formosa and the Pescadores of the non-Communist defence line—should be vested in President Eisenhower. Americans, having been led to expect an all-out offensive on the islands, must have been surprised when Chou En-lai, at the moment of the anticipated explosion, put several thousand miles between himself and his own country by flying to the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandoeng. During this period of anti-climax Mr. Foster Dulles called attention to the large-scale concentration of air-power on the Chinese mainland fronting the Formosa Strait, and the general suggestion was created of a build-up for offensive action against the offshore islands and even Formosa. In fairness to Peking, however, it should be remembered that Chiang makes repeated announcements of the imminence of his invasion of Continental China, so that there is some justification if not for alarm, at least for preparedness on the part of the Chinese Reds. The chances are that for the time being the contest will be confined to a battle of threats.

VIETNAMESE DEBACLE

The undermining of the French power in Indo-China is now producing the disintegration which should have been foreseen and which was in fact long ago foretold in these notes. During the last three or four years of the war, when the French were becoming increasingly dependent on foreign economic aid, they were required to act more and more on the assumption that they had only to meet the "nationalist aspirations" to create a bulwark against Communism more reliable than their own military strength and the coherence of their own administration. That this was one of the many lethal fictions of the age is now apparent. After head-on clashes between the Vietnamese Prime Minister and his leading generals, there is now open civil war, with the three religious sects, the Caoists, the Bin Xugen, and the Hoa-Hao investing Saigon and seeking to overthrow the Government by force. The Emperor Bao Dai exercises a distinctly remote control—from Cannes.

MALAYA AND S.E.A.T.O.

The Western defence pattern in South-East Asia is now becoming clearer. It seems that Australasia is being cast for the same role as that designed for tropical Africa in the Middle East—a concentration and dispersal area, with perhaps a large headquarters base at Darwin. Malaya being in the front-line of this system, and the

fact that Australian and New Zealand troops are to serve there, may be an indication of the general set-up, which is unlikely to be a specific Commonwealth responsibility. Although little definite appeared to emerge from the Bangkok Conference, the fact that the Commander of the United States Air Force, General Partridge, has been to Kuala Lumpur to "discuss plans for increased co-operation on Malaya's air defence" shows that the supposedly shapeless S.E.A.T.O. is in fact being given a shape.

Meanwhile, the political parties in Malaya all take for granted that the country is to become 'independent' in the near future. A pointer to what lies ahead is the success at the recent Singapore elections of the Labour Front, which promised, not to help end the emergency, but—what seems somewhat simpler—to end the emergency regulations. Optimism about the future of the Peninsula itself, if it survives a glance at developments in Indonesia and Indo-China, will indeed prove itself a hardy plant.

THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE

The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandoeng is chiefly remarkable as a portent. Much has been made of the lack of unity of purpose of the countries which participated, but that fact is perhaps not of the first importance. The centre of the stage at the conference, as in Asia, was taken by Mr. Chou En-lai and Mr. Nehru. India, as the moving spirit behind the gathering of the Asian clans, has, in effect, used its special position between the Communist and Western worlds to provide a first-class platform for Communist China such as Peking has nowhere else enjoyed. Mr. Nehru, sincerely pursuing a 'neutralist' policy, seems not to have given thought to the historical role of Kerensky and Benes. It has been from the first the destiny of Social Democracy, in courting or conciliating Communism, to make smooth the Communist path.

Chou En-lai must have listened with satisfaction to the denunciations of 'colonialism' in which all the delegations joined. That precisely matches the view, held with conviction by Marx and Lenin, that the British Empire formed the greatest obstacle to the advance of World Communism. It may seem strange that so many anti-Communist elements, by no means confined to Asia, should be intent upon pulling down that obstacle.

MIDDLE EAST

BRITAIN AND THE TURCO-IRAQI TREATY

Britain's adherence to the Turco-Iraqi pact has taken the place of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty whereby we were entitled to maintain air bases in Iraq. Provisions for the supply to Bagdad of British equipment and training facilities have been made public, but at the time of writing there is no firm information about arrangements, if any, for the redeployment of our air strength in the area.

The debate in the House of Commons on these strategical changes was a curious business. There seemed to be no disposition to enquire about the future of Britain's strategical or economic interests—had anybody mentioned the word 'oil' it would have been considered bad taste. Instead, so much concern was expressed for the Israeli position that Mr. F. M. Bennett, M.P. for Reading North, was moved to declare: "Judging by nearly every speech from Hon. Members on both sides of the House, one might be forgiven for imagining that the debate was primarily concerned with the effect of the pact on Israel." Sir Anthony Eden had no difficulty in showing that Britain's participation in the Turco-Iraqi alliance was a reassurance to Israel that it was not directed against her.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL, or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL—EDITOR.)

ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

SIR,—Major Milsom's letter in the November JOURNAL¹ seems to indicate such a sketchy knowledge of atomic energy that a short reply in a letter is difficult.

There are not two types of atomic bomb but one, although the fissionable material used may be either uranium 235 or plutonium.

There is also the hydrogen bomb, which, although using an atomic bomb as a detonator, releases its terrific energy as a result of the fusion or melting of the atoms as opposed to the fission or splitting of the atoms, which is the principle employed in the atom bomb.

Both will produce radio-active contamination if exploded near or under the earth's surface or water. In order, however, to obtain the maximum blast and heat efficiency of the H bomb, it has to be exploded so high above the target that direct radiation is unlikely to affect a large area in field operations at any distance from ground zero. But dust, etc., will be sucked up into the air as a result of this vast explosion, where it will become radio-active to a greater or lesser degree, and this may, if and when it falls to earth, cause widespread radiation risks. But from a Service viewpoint, this fall-out would not affect military operations in the relatively speaking near area of the explosion.

Is not Major Milsom optimistic in thinking that any nation which decides to use atomic or hydrogen bombs will nominate a series of targets in advance "on humanitarian grounds", in order to give inhabitants time to evacuate. Cities and factories can be rebuilt considerably quicker than human lives and, surely, whereas the original principle of war was to destroy the opposing army, it must now be to destroy the opposing nation, both Service and civilian alike. It is difficult to understand why a population warned of the wrath to come would be more likely to lose morale than one attacked without any warning.

One presumes that the notification of the type of bomb used against a commander will come from his own side and not from the enemy, but surely it will be the effect of the explosion on his available forces which is going to worry the commander of the future, and not the question of whether it was caused by an A or H bomb.

It must be questionable whether the use of H bombs in the field would be an economic proposition from a nuclear energy aspect, as their employment might grossly over-hit the target, or react on the army of the bomb user.

The writer's statement that the "plutonium type of bomb is the deadliest nuclear weapon" is quite inaccurate. All things being equal, plutonium is no more, or less, effective for a nuclear bomb than uranium 235.

Plutonium is certainly more expensive, as it is an element not found in nature, but produced from uranium 235 in an atomic pile. Its principal advantage is that its production helps to overcome the shortage of uranium.

The connection between the Great Powers, the cost of nuclear weapons, and N.A.T.O. seems rather obscure, as the Power with certainly the second largest stock of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons has nothing to do with N.A.T.O., unless the writer is advocating a unilateral abolition of such weapons.

¹ Page 606.

Might it not be well too sometimes to remember that the countries which have the largest stocks of fissile material and the knowledge of how to use them for the purposes of peace, as well as war, will have a big lead in world economics in a comparatively few generations.

In a world without war, for those countries such as ours with a diminishing coal supply and negligible oil or water power available, nuclear energy alone will provide the heat, and consequently power, on which peace, prosperity, and plenty will depend.

In Utopia the use of nuclear weapons will doubtless be banned, but the peace-time applications of nuclear energy, whether industrial or medical, may well prove to be the salvation of future generations throughout the world.

G. G. R. WILLIAMS,
Brigadier (Retd.)

4th February, 1955.

MAX HORTON AND THE WESTERN APPROACHES

SIR,—I have just read that most interesting book *Max Horton and the Western Approaches*. I have also read a review of it in which it is called "a very fine piece of historical writing," the inference being that it is a history of the Battle of the Atlantic during certain years. I am afraid that I personally cannot quite agree with that opinion. While the author has given an excellent broad picture of the Battle of the Atlantic as a background to the life and achievements of Admiral Sir Max Horton, I have found, from my own small knowledge, certain inaccuracies both of major fact and minor detail, made by direct statement and by inference, which shake my faith in the book as an entirely accurate historical document.

On page 155, it is stated that Admiral Horton "controlled operations on both sides of the 'chop line.' There was no question of any other supreme commander." This obviously means that no other commander-in-chief was responsible for the trans-Atlantic convoys.

That was so until the convoys were off St. John's, Newfoundland. At that point many of the ships were still more than 1,000 miles from their destination in New York, and from that point and to that point the convoys and their escorts came under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, Canadian North-Western Atlantic, Rear Admiral L. W. Murray, C.B., C.B.E., R.C.N.

I am writing without access to records and purely from memory, but I know that C.-in-C., C.N.A., controlled all shipping on the convoy routes between New York, Halifax, and St. John's, the Triangle Run as it was called, and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. He had under his command between 130 and 150 escort ships, including those refitting and those under training. He also was the senior officer at a Combined Headquarters, that in Halifax. He also was a 'supreme' commander within the limits of his own command.

That command was not, perhaps, comparable in size or responsibility to that of C.-in-C., Western Approaches, but any book about the Battle of the Atlantic which denies its existence is not historically accurate.

Throughout the description of the Battle of the Atlantic the need for continuous and intensive training is very rightly stressed and many details of the methods used are given, so many, in fact, that the inference to be drawn is that all ships concerned in that Battle were trained solely at the places mentioned. Now not too small a proportion of those ships were Canadian and there was a training organization under C.-in-C., C.N.A., with similar facilities to those under C.-in-C., W.A. This is not mentioned, even in a footnote, nor is one very important advance in escort ship training developed during these years, the Night Escort Teacher. This was originated in Halifax, where it was called the Action Room, by Commander, now Rear-Admiral, J. C. Hibbard, D.S.C., R.C.N. It enabled the whole bridge personnel, asdic and communication teams, and depth charge crews of a ship

to be exercised ashore under very realistic night action conditions. It was adopted by both the R.N. and the U.S.N. and, in my opinion, deserves to be mentioned equally with the other training developments.

Further, though it is a minor matter, I myself am quoted in a short paragraph on page 157, in which there are several inaccuracies. The impression given is that I was a rancher who had joined up for the war. Actually, although brought up on a cattle ranch, I left it in 1912 to go to Osborne and did not return to it until three years after I went on the Retired List in 1934. I did keep half my escort at visibility distance from the convoy during daylight, but my object was to keep the U-boats down so that we could not be shadowed, not to "keep 'em well stirred up" as stated; that I considered to be the job of the support groups whose introduction I had advocated in 1941. As regards the success of these tactics, they were used with four convoys in the fall of '42. According to the plot, each convoy passed through a heavy concentration of U-boats. We sighted at least one. No convoy was attacked. These facts are not in accord with the statement made in the paragraph in question.

This letter is written in no spirit of carping criticism but merely to find out whether any other members agree with me that, while *Max Horton and the Western Approaches* may give an excellent account of the great Admiral's wonderful achievements in the Battle of the Atlantic, it is not a complete and accurate history of that Battle during his period of command.

J. D. PRENTICE,
Captain, R. C. N. (Retd.)

21st February, 1955.

VALOUR WITHOUT TRUMPETS

SIR,—Major F. A. L. de Gruchy, in his kindly comment² on my article, *Valour Without Trumpets*, suggests, and I think rightly, that *au fond* another course was open to Elphinstone on that "sombre Christmas Day of 1841". To anyone but Elphinstone—agreed. But the British commander had taken council of his fears, refusing to recognize the validity of the advice proffered by Major Pottinger and other more stout-hearted members of the garrison. Elphinstone took the only course that seemed open to him—because he was Elphinstone.

REGINALD HARGREAVES,
Major (Retd.)

3rd March, 1955.

FIRST IN THE FIELD

SIR,—Although not in the employ of *The Times* there were earlier war correspondents than W. H. Russell and H. C. Robinson. Major Hargreaves and Mr. Terraine³ appear to have forgotten the part played as war correspondents by several Roundhead army chaplains in the Civil Wars. The late Professor Firth on page 328 of *Cromwell's Army* (1902) writes:—"They [the chaplains] drew up narratives of the proceedings of the armies to which they were attached for publication in the Press, and they were in fact the first war correspondents."

Adoniram Byfield and Thomas Case of Essex's army published accounts of Edgehill. Simeon Ashe and William Goode wrote detailed accounts of Manchester's 1644 campaign; Ashe's narratives of Marston Moor and the second battle of Newbury being particularly well written. Edward Bowles reported on the first year of the "New Model" in the West of England; while the notorious Hugh Peters wrote accounts of the later battles and sieges. When Edgehill was fought, *The London Weekly Courant* was already 20 years old, but *The Times* did not appear until 1788.

OSKAR TEICHMAN,
Major (Retd.)

4th March, 1955.

² See JOURNAL for February, 1955, p. 120.

³ See JOURNALS for November, 1954, p. 537 and February, 1955, p. 120.

HELICOPTERS FOR THE ARMY

SIR,—“Father William’s” article on *Helicopters for the Army*⁴ is stimulating reading. I would, however, like to differ with him on one fundamental point

I think that he would agree that the Army’s requirement is for two types of helicopter. The first is a light aircraft capable of carrying say a section of fully armed infantrymen. Obviously, this helicopter must be flown and operated by the Army in the forward areas in much the same way as the present A.O.P. and Light Liaison Flights. The second type is a heavier aircraft capable of carrying say five tons of stores or 40 fully armed men. It is on the operation and maintenance of this aircraft that I differ from “Father William.”

The size of the aircraft will be about that of the Hastings, at present flown by R.A.F. Transport Command. Its maintenance will be just as complicated. Its crew will probably have to be a captain, a second pilot, wireless operator, and/or engineer. They will be flying to unprepared ‘heli-strips’ and the standard of crew training in resourcefulness, night flying, navigation, and evasion from hostile aircraft will need to be even higher than the present standard in R.A.F. Transport Command. They will probably be flying from rear airstrips where they will pick up their loads from fixed-wing aircraft operated by R.A.F. Transport Command.

If the Army operates and maintains these heavy helicopters it will be in competition with R.A.F. Transport Command in obtaining highly skilled aircrews, ground crews, spare parts, and fuel. Duplication of effort is bound to be uneconomical.

Surely the two future components of R.A.F. Transport Command—fixed-wing aircraft requiring short improvised airstrips and heavy helicopters flying forward from these airstrips—are indivisible?

J. H. G. PERFECT,

Captain, R.E.

8th March, 1955.

REGULAR CAREERS AND FUTURE PLANNING

SIR,—The article headed *Regular Careers and Future Planning* by “Seaborne” in the February issue of the JOURNAL⁵ is an example of a brilliant idea clearly and logically stated. So much so that I felt prompted to write and congratulate you for publishing it. I had been considering writing something on similar lines myself but realized, upon reading it, that I could never have put the case half as well.

One only hopes that such sound common sense will not pass unnoticed by those who matter. It would not surprise me if the author is such a person. I sincerely hope so.

J. W. LUCAS,

Lieutenant-Commander, R.N. (Retd.)

8th March, 1955.

BOOK REVIEWS

SIR,—I was very pleased to see the kind review of *The Mathematical Practitioners of Tudor and Stuart England* by E. G. R. Taylor on page 160 of the February number of your JOURNAL. I wish, however, that your reviewer had pointed out that the book was published by Cambridge University Press for the Institute of Navigation.

M. W. RICHEY.

9th March, 1955.

⁴ See JOURNAL for February, 1955, p. 69.

⁵ Page 82.

THE SOMME

SIR,—It is to be hoped that the present generation will read the letter signed "A Survivor" in your last issue⁶.

It is safe to say that there were no troops in the world who would have endured such terrific casualties as the British and Empire troops suffered in the 1914-18 War. Furthermore as "Survivor" says "There were no prisoners".

Haig in his memoirs writes that they were civilian soldiers and untrained, but that the few survivors acquired the military knowledge and experience on the battlefield to win the war in the end.

SPENCER V. P. WESTON,
Brigadier-General.

9th March, 1955.

COMMUNISM

SIR,—I was horrified to see in the February issue that such an eminent man as Professor H. A. Hodges replied to a questioner after his lecture on Communism that he, the Professor, knew of no better system of ideas than those of Marx⁷. This is a frightening thought because Karl Marx's ideas and those of many modern socialists are based on a fallacy and fundamental misconception of the economic system.

To quote Professor Hodges, Marx thought "that the economic system which exists to produce and distribute wealth to the people becomes a means by which a few grow rich at the expense of the many"⁸. This is the fallacy and it lies in the words "at the expense of the many."

This fallacy is perpetuated in the popular simile of likening the national economy to a cake which is divided up in such a way that the few—the owners and executives—get large slices while the many—the workers—each get a small slice. This is a delightfully plausible idea because it is so obviously true if the simile is correct. Fortunately for mankind and unfortunately for the Marxists, what has been overlooked is that before the cake can be divided up it has to be made. Bearing this in mind, it can be shown that the economic system is such that the few get large slices of cake because the many get larger slices than they would have got had the few not been there to help make the cake. I would go further and say that in a free society unless this is so, i.e. that the many are better off as a result of the efforts of the few, the economic system is such that, to drop the simile, industry will tend to diminish. On the other hand, when there is full co-operation between capital and labour the Country will become more and more prosperous without limit.

It is perhaps a little difficult to see how this limitless prosperity can come about, but it requires more than a letter to explain it. I will therefore merely emphasize that the idea that the rich, in a free community, get rich at the expense of the many is nonsense. The truth is that the rich get rich by making others better off than they would be by their own efforts and taking a small reward from each for their pains. This makes out that the rich industrialist is a public benefactor and in fact that is how he ought to be regarded.

In conclusion, may I say that I am not, and do not expect to become, a rich man.

C. WILLIAMSON JONES,
Group Captain (Retd.).

14th March, 1955.

⁶ See JOURNAL for February, 1955, p.119.

⁷ Page 21.

⁸ Page 14.

SIR,—I am sorry if I gave the impression of seeing nothing wrong in Marxism. I think there are grave errors in it, though I should find the worst of them in Marx's philosophy and sociology rather than in his economics. I thought, however, that I was being asked not whether I knew of anything truer than Marxism in any respect, but whether I knew of any organized body of ideas which could have a stronger appeal, and I do not think I know of such a body of ideas. Other doctrines which may be truer in fundamentals have not been worked out so fully and are not being put across so effectively. Marxism, in short, has the initiative at present. There is not yet an ideological N.A.T.O. in working order.

H. A. HODGES.

31st March, 1955.

THE MILITARY MUSEUM

SIR,—I have read, and re-read, Colonel Boulton's excellent article on The Military Museum⁹. While I agree with a great deal of what he says, I feel, and I have had some experience of running both a regimental museum and a national military museum, that he has missed one extremely important point. I have discussed this point often with curators of regimental museums. The point is—*money for travelling*.

It is excellent that curators should meet and discuss their problems, and for that reason the foundation of the Federation of Military Museums is a great step in the right direction—but, the unfortunate curator *is expected to pay his own expenses*. No warrants are allowed for museum travel. This is perhaps no great hardship in some parts of the Country, but in Scotland it is certainly a grave imposition. Scotland is probably the most difficult case. As a concrete example, the Scottish Federation of Museums and Art Galleries, to which most of the Scottish regimental museums belong, is holding its annual general meeting at Paisley. It's more than a Sabbath day's journey for the Seaforth and Camerons from Inverness to Paisley and means one, if not two, nights away from home. Similarly, if we meet at Inverness it's a long, long way from Ayr, the Depot of the Royal Scots Fusiliers. Is it fair to encourage museums to join their local civilian federations and then expect the curators to finance their own visits? I have said all along that it isn't, and my colleagues on the Council of the Scottish Federation regret, but quite understand, that the regimental museums cannot send representatives to our meetings unless they happen to be close at hand.

Money again enters into the excellent idea of holding courses for certain soldiers before release, in museum technique. When the young soldier is released he is looking for a decent wage and he can earn more making tea for bricklayers than as the attendant in a regimental museum. For that reason regimental museums must continue to employ the pensioner who is glad of the extra money and of something to occupy his time. I am in no way denigrating the efforts of these pensioners. All I have met, and they are many, are doing a first class job of work and putting their heart and soul into it. They also have the added knowledge of regimental traditions. Their museum techniques may be rough and ready but they do very little damage. I have a very great respect for them. The new scheme of visits under the Ogilby Trust will help them considerably. Some federations hold courses for assistants but, again, there is no money to send the regimental museum assistant.

The greatest good from the Military Federation would accrue from attendance at the annual conferences of the Museums Association, but how can one expect the unfortunate curator of a regimental museum to finance a week's conference? Apart from the various papers which are read, it is meeting curators from all types of museum in informal discussions from which one really profits.

It is no good spoiling the ship for a ha'porth of tar, and if the War Office forms a Federation to encourage regimental curators to travel and meet their civilian confreres then they must persuade the Treasury that the travel is for the good of the Army—and

⁹ See JOURNAL for February, 1955, p. 104.

it no doubt is—and that their travel should be at public expense. Until then, I fear that, in a large number of cases, membership of the Federation of Military Museums is an almost complete waste of time.

17th March, 1955.

H. P. E. PEREIRA, Major (Retd.)
Curator, Scottish United Services Museum.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AREA DEFENCE IN JUNGLE WARFARE

SIR,—The sketch attached to Major-General Davies's article in the February number entitled *The Development of Area Defence in Jungle Warfare*¹⁰, gives a quite wrong impression of the Japanese offensive in Arakan in February, 1944.

Their main attack moved up the east bank of the Mayu (or Kalapanzin as the upper reaches of the Mayu is called) to Taung Bazaar, which was a minor administrative area and defenceless against anything larger than a company fighting patrol. There it crossed the river and struck at Sinzweya from the north, after establishing a defensive screen to protect its own rear, and sent a detachment across the Mayu range to attack the Bawli-Maungdaw road. That detachment attacked, unsuccessfully, an administrative area well to the south of Bawli, but it did not venture across the road in any strength or move on Bawli or Nhila. It remained in the jungle-clad hills to the east of the Bawli-Maungdaw road and contented itself with harassing the road. The fact that it remained in the hills made it difficult to pin and destroy and it remained a 'thorn in the flesh' for nearly three weeks. The attack on Sinzweya from the north was, of course, backed by attacks on the forward defended areas north-west of Buthidaung and infiltration between them towards Sinzweya, and attacks on our defended posts east of the Mayu, which are not shown in the sketch.

I have very good cause to know the details of the Japanese main column's move, for the bulk of it passed between the left wing of my brigade (then carrying out a wide 'left hook' on Buthidaung) and the battalion holding my 'firm base', in the fog and darkness of the small hours. It was not till daylight when we intercepted and destroyed the column's administrative tail and its escort that I began to realize what had happened: and though there was nothing I could have done about it, it was very mortifying to find in the morning the track through the paddy, within a few hundred yards of my well concealed headquarters, of a very large column of men. I was, however, very thankful that the column was as unaware of the presence of my headquarters as I was of their passing, for our defenders consisted of a section of an engineer field company and a few 'odds and ends' and would have been overrun in a few minutes, just as Taung Bazaar was a few hours later.

20th March, 1955.

M. R. ROBERTS,
Brigadier, I. A., (Retd.)

SIGNAL "IK"

SIR,—According to letters received from Germany, the word 'flogged' in the penultimate sentence of the third paragraph of my article *Signal "IK"*, which was published in the August, 1954 *JOURNAL*,¹¹ tends to give the impression that the Merchant Navy officer concerned was punished on the Captain's orders. This was not, in fact, the case. The officer was pushed into a recess and beaten by a junior member of the ship's company of unknown rank who had seen the officer walk past the torpedo crews whilst they were drilling. Quite certainly the Captain never gave any order for the British officer to be flogged or beaten; furthermore, he points out that his men were always strictly instructed to treat prisoners of war correctly, and that he never heard any complaint about such an incident from any one of the prisoners of war who were aboard the *Kormoran* at various times. Any misunderstanding over the word 'flogged' is regretted.

DESMOND WETTERN.

2nd April, 1955.

¹⁰ Page 54.

¹¹ Page 431.

MILITARY HISTORY

SIR,—Although it is easy for members to obtain information on the armed forces of the British Isles, there are few easily accessible sources which deal with those of other members of the British Commonwealth, past and present. There are three exceptions, all compact books of easy reference: *India's Army*, by Major Donovan Jackson, published by Sampson Low in 1940; *The Armed Forces of South Africa*, published in 1954 and recently reviewed in this JOURNAL; and *Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954*, just published, by Lieut.-Colonel G. F. G. Stanley¹².

It is understood that at the time of writing two military historians are engaged in collecting data, one on the Australian and New Zealand forces and the other on those raised in the Far East including Ceylon, and that a serving officer of the United States Army is devoting his spare time to the preparation of colour plates of units of all the forces of the British Commonwealth. It is, one feels sure, well known to members how slow and difficult such research work is bound to be; old records have an unfortunate way of disappearing, and old hands, whose memories and memoranda are often of such great value, get fewer every year. It is, surely, not too much to hope that men with the necessary background and knowledge, there must be many of them, will come forward and tackle the remaining areas, the rest of Africa and the West Indies, before it is, perhaps, too late.

G. TYLDEN,
Major.

19th April, 1955.

¹² See review in this JOURNAL, p. 332.

GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

COMMAND CHANGES

Vice-Admiral R. A. Ofstie succeeded Vice-Admiral Thomas S. Combs as Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet and Allied Commander, Naval Striking and Support forces, Southern Europe, on 26th March.

Major-General Patrick W. Timberlake, U.S.A.F., succeeded Lieut.-General Laurence C. Craigie, U.S.A.F., as Commander, Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe, on 8th April.

It was announced by the Ministry of Defence on 1st March that Vice-Admiral G. V. Gladstone is to succeed Vice-Admiral Sir Edward M. Evans-Lombe as Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Northern Europe, on about 1st June.

RATIFICATION OF PARIS AGREEMENTS

It was announced by the B.B.C. on 19th April that by that date the Paris Agreements had been ratified by all the participating countries with the exception of the Netherlands, where the Upper House had yet to debate the Agreements.

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

RATIFICATION OF TREATY.—The South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty came into force on 19th February when instruments of ratification were deposited in Manila by the signatory countries—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

FIRST COUNCIL MEETING.—The first meeting of the Council established by the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty was held in Bangkok from 23rd to 25th February. The meeting was attended by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. France was represented by M. Henri Bonnet.

The Ministers were accompanied by the following military representatives: Lieut.-General H. Wells, Chief of General Staff (Australia); Major-General W. G. Gentry, Chief of General Staff (New Zealand); Rear-Admiral Choudhry, C.-in-C., Royal Pakistan Navy; Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (U.K.); Admiral Felix Stump, C.-in-C., Pacific Fleet (U.S.A.); Admiral Ortoli, C.-in-C., Indian Ocean Area (France); and the Chiefs of Staff of the Philippine and Thai armed forces.

The Council created the following organization: (a) a permanent body of representatives of ambassadorial rank with its own secretariat and headquarters in Bangkok; (b) a group of military advisers; (c) a body of experts on subversion; and (d) an economic working group. It was decided that the groups under (c) and (d) would not have the character of permanent committees and that they would meet when required anywhere within the treaty area.

Foreign Ministers or their designated representatives will represent the Governments on the Council which will meet, usually in the treaty area, at least once a year or more often when deemed necessary. Decisions will be taken by unanimous agreement.

The military advisers, who will not be stationed in Bangkok but can meet anywhere within the treaty area, will make recommendations to the Council on military co-operation under the treaty. They will meet periodically as required, will create their own rules of procedure, and will make any organizational arrangements which may be necessary.

The military advisers at the Council meeting met on 24th and 25th February, and as a result it was arranged for their staff planners to meet in Manila in April to initiate plans in connection with certain military aspects of the treaty.

It was announced in London on 21st March that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner-General in South-East Asia, had been appointed United Kingdom representative on the Council, and that Mr. Berkeley Gage, British Ambassador in Bangkok, would be the alternative representative.

GREAT BRITAIN

NEW MINISTERS OF DEFENCE AND SUPPLY

Changes in the Government after the appointment of Sir Anthony Eden in succession to Sir Winston Churchill as Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury included the appointments of Mr. Harold Macmillan as Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd as Minister of Defence, and Mr. Reginald Maudling as Minister of Supply.

DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1955-56

The Government's Defence Estimates for 1955-56, which were published as a White Paper on 17th February, provided for a total net expenditure of £1,537,200,000, or £102,700,000 less than the amount planned for 1954-55. The total estimate included expenditure of £43,000,000 to be covered by U.S. aid.

Detailed estimates of expenditure were as follows :—

	<i>Excluding receipts from U.S. Aid</i>		<i>Including receipts from U.S. Aid</i>	
	<i>£ million</i>		<i>£ million</i>	
	1955-56	1954-55	1955-56	1954-55
Admiralty	347.00	367.00	340.50	353.00
War Office	484.00	561.00	474.00	535.00
Air Ministry	540.40	537.00	513.90	491.64
Ministry of Supply ...	147.50	151.00	147.50	151.00
Ministry of Defence ...	18.30	23.90	18.30	23.90
Totals	1,537.20	1,639.90	1,494.20	1,554.54

Among the principal announcements made in the White Paper were that Britain is to produce the hydrogen bomb, as a deterrent to war ; that stocks of nuclear weapons are steadily growing and that further work is proceeding with the object of increasing the variety and power of these weapons ; that reduced commitments overseas make it possible to create a strategic reserve of land forces at home ; that a Mobile Defence Corps will be formed as part of the Army and R.A.F. reserve forces, which will be a vital link between the local Civil Defence and the armed forces ; and that all members of the armed forces, including the Home Guard, will in future receive training in elementary civil defence duties as part of their normal military training.

Important details given in the White Paper are summarized below :—

Manpower.—The estimated total strength of the forces at 1st April, 1955, and 1st April, 1956, compared with the actual strength at 1st April, 1954, was shown as follows :—

	1st April, 1955 (estimated)	1st April, 1956 (estimated)	1st April, 1954 (actual)
Regulars	518,700	483,300	524,400
National Service men	283,400	285,500	298,300
Women	21,200	19,200	23,100
Totals	823,300	788,000	845,800

The apportionment of the male Regular strength (officers and men) between the three Services was as follows :—

GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

	1st April, 1955 (estimated)	1st April, 1956 (estimated)	1st April, 1954 (actual)
Royal Navy...	114,700	108,400	121,000
Army ..	222,900	203,000	216,900
R.A.F. ...	181,100	171,900	186,500
Totals ...	518,700	483,300	524,400

Regular Recruitment.—Actual recruitment to the three Services in 1953-54, and estimated figures for 1954-55 and 1955-56 (excluding Women's Services), were shown in the following table :—

	1953-54 (actual)	1954-55 (estimated)	1955-56 (estimated)
Royal Navy...	9,100	8,100	8,100
Army ...	41,300	39,000	39,000
R.A.F. ...	30,700	27,000	26,100
Totals ...	81,100	74,100	73,200

The White Paper stated that the inducements to serving men to prolong their service had been "disappointing" as regards the Navy, but "definitely encouraging" in the R.A.F. In the Army, prolongations by men serving on the older (five year and longer) engagements had shown "a welcome increase," but it was still too early to assess the effect on men serving on the new short (three-year) engagement.

National Service.—Requirements in 1955-56 were put at about 198,000 men; Navy, 7,400; Army, 130,500; R.A.F., 60,000.

Reserve and Auxiliary Forces.—The strength of these forces rose during 1954 from 571,000 to 647,000, and the number of volunteers from 114,000 to 117,000.

Colonial Forces.—The present strength of the armed forces raised by Colonial territories was about 63,000, but was expected to fall to 43,000 by March, 1956, as pioneer units hitherto employed in the Middle East were disbanded. In addition, in certain Colonial territories about 14,000 local personnel were enlisted in the U.K. forces, whilst about 5,000 U.K. officers and non-commissioned officers were serving in Colonial forces to provide the necessary leadership.

Production Programme.—The White Paper estimated that some £600,000,000 would be provided for defence production in 1955-56.

AIR TRANSPORT FOR LAND FORCES

The joint experimental unit for the study of air transport, particularly helicopters, for the Army (*vide* General Service Notes for February, 1955) was established by the Army and the Royal Air Force at Middle Wallop, Hampshire, in March.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

CANADA

EXERCISE "BULLDOG III"

A joint Army and R.C.A.F. exercise known as "Bulldog III" took place in the Yellowknife area, 610 air miles north of Edmonton, between 23rd February and 8th March. The object of the exercise was the dislodgement of an imaginary enemy force which was assumed to have landed in the sub-Arctic and to have taken the airfield at Yellowknife. The troops involved after emplaning at Edmonton were parachuted into the area from R.C.A.F. aircraft, and consisted of the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, with supporting artillery, engineer, signals, medical, and supply units. The assault was supported by the R.C.A.F. with tactical, reconnaissance, transport, and medical evacuation aircraft and also by Edmonton-based Mitchell bombers. The part

of the 'enemy' was played by a company of the 1st Battalion, Le Royal 22e Regiment, and a detachment of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, which travelled with 15 tons of equipment in tracked vehicles from Edmonton to Yellowknife, provided neutral signals.

AUSTRALIA

CIVIL DEFENCE SCHOOL.—A Civil Defence school, the first in Australia, for the training of key personnel for Civil Defence organization, is to be established shortly at Macedon, about 40 miles from Melbourne.

Officers from Australia's defence and civil Services have already been trained overseas as instructors in Civil Defence and will comprise the main part of the staff at this school, which will be under the control of the Director of Australian Civil Defence, Brigadier A. W. Wardell.

PAY INCREASES FOR SERVICE OFFICERS.—Pay increases for officers of the armed forces were announced by the Minister for Defence, Sir Philip McBride, on 13th January. Citizen Force officers also will benefit from the increased rates, which range from £A1 os. 11d. a week for 2nd lieutenants, to £A11 11s. od. a week for brigadiers. The increase for Major-Generals is £A850 a year, and for Lieut.-Generals, £A900.

WEAPONS RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT.—It was announced on 14th January by Mr. Beale, the Australian Minister for Supply, that the Woomera rocket range and its associated long-range weapons establishment and laboratories would be amalgamated into a single organization under the name of Weapons Research Establishment.

INDIA

NEW MINISTER OF DEFENCE.—On 10th January, it was announced in New Delhi that Dr. Katju, Minister for Home Affairs, had taken over the Defence portfolio from Mr. Nehru, and that Pundit Pant had been appointed Minister for Home Affairs.

NATIONAL DEFENCE ACADEMY.—On 16th January, the Chief Minister of Bombay, Mr. Morarji Desai, opened the Indian National Defence Academy, built as a Memorial to Indians who fell in the 1939-45 War, at Kharakvasla, 11 miles from Poona. The Commanders-in-Chief of the three Services, Admiral Sir Mark Pizey, General Rajendrasinhji, and Air Marshal Mookerjee were present. This Academy is an inter-Service institution and will provide a common three-year course for 1,500 cadets of the Indian Navy, Army, and Air Force. After this three-year course, cadets will receive further training in their respective Services.

HONG KONG

WAR MEMORIAL

A granite Memorial inscribed with the names of 2,200 members of the British Commonwealth who gave their lives during the 1939-45 War and who had no known graves was unveiled by Sir Alexander Grantham, Governor of Hong Kong, during a commemorative service at Saiwan cemetery on 20th February. The service was taken by the Bishop of Hong Kong, the Right Reverend R. O. Hall, and ministers of other denominations and faiths took part.

Delegations from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Pakistan attended the service and unveiling; Mr. R. B. Black, the Colonial Secretary, represented the Prime Minister; the Imperial War Graves Commission was represented by General Sir John Crocker; and Lieut.-General S. C. Sugden and other senior officers represented the Services. The Guard of Honour was found by The North Staffordshire Regiment, pipers of the 2nd/7th Gurkha Rifles played the laments, and Last Post and Reveille were sounded by trumpeters of the 7th Queen's Own Hussars.

FOREIGN

IRAQ-TURKEY

TREATY OF ALLIANCE.

A treaty of alliance between Iraq and Turkey was signed in Baghdad on 24th February by General Nuri es-Said on behalf of Iraq and by M. Adnan Menderes and Professor Fuat Köprülü on behalf of Turkey. The treaty was ratified by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and by the two Houses of the Iraqi Parliament on 26th February.

On 30th March, the B.B.C. announced that Sir Anthony Eden had said that it had been decided that Great Britain would become associated with Iraq and Turkey in connection with this treaty.

RUSSIA

GOVERNMENT CHANGES.—Government changes which were announced during the sitting in joint session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. from 3rd to 9th February included: the resignation of M. Malenkov from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister), the appointment in his place of Marshal Bulganin (hitherto Minister of Defence), and the appointment of Marshal Zhukov as Defence Minister.

DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1955.—It was reported in the Press on 4th February that, according to Moscow radio, M. Zverev, Minister of Finance, announced in a statement to the Supreme Soviet on 3rd February that the Russian Government had decided to spend a total of 112,100,000,000 roubles (more than £10,000,000,000 at the official rate of exchange) on defence in 1955. This is an increase of 11,800,000,000 roubles over the amount of last year's defence budget.

UNITED STATES

U.S. AND U.N. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE FAR EAST.—On 7th March, it was announced that General Maxwell D. Taylor, Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, had been appointed U.S. and U.N. Commander-in-Chief in the Far East in succession to General John E. Hull, who would retire on 30th April.

BUDGET, 1955-56.—On 17th January, President Eisenhower submitted to Congress his budget proposals for the year July, 1955, to June, 1956. Total expenditure was estimated at \$62,408,000,000, of which \$40,458,000,000 was for national security. Revenue was estimated at \$60,000,000,000, leaving a budget deficit of \$2,408,000,000.

The principal items under the national security heading were: Air Force, \$15,600,000,000; Navy, \$9,700,000,000; Army \$8,850,000,000; foreign military assistance programme, \$3,675,000,000; atomic energy programme, \$1,910,000,000; and strategic and critical materials, \$783,000,000.

The strength of the armed forces, under present plans, was to be reduced from 3,200,000 to 3,000,000 by 30th June, 1955, and to just over 2,800,000 by 30th June, 1956. Despite this reduction, the strength of the Air Force would be somewhat increased.

TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.—The first of another series of tests took place at the proving ground in Nevada on 15th February and these tests have continued during the Spring. Troops have again been exercised in conjunction with these tests which have been watched by Civil Defence authorities and observers from industrial concerns. On 12th March, in order to test a theory that smoke might protect cities from the extreme heat of bomb explosions, a bomb having the force of 5,000 tons of TNT was set off from a 300-ft. tower above a man-made cloud of dense smoke, under which mice had been placed to measure the effectiveness of the smoke filter. The Atomic Energy Commission said that the test had been successful, but gave no details.

NOTICES

KING EDWARD VII CONVALESCENT HOME FOR OFFICERS,
OSBORNE HOUSE, ISLE OF WIGHT

King Edward VII Convalescent Home for Officers at Osborne House, in the Isle of Wight, which celebrated its Jubilee last year, has cared for some 18,000 convalescents since its opening on 6th April, 1904. It then accommodated 50 officers from the Royal Navy and the Army.

Today, Osborne is open to (a) both serving and retired officers of all three Services, and officers of the Commonwealth forces serving in the United Kingdom; (b) serving officers of the R.N.V.R., Territorial Army, and R.A.F.V.R.; (c) ex-officers—that is officers who have at any time held a temporary commission; (d) established and permanent unestablished members of the Civil Service; and (e) serving members of the Foreign Service and the Colonial Service. Women serving as Regular officers in the forces and women members of the Civil Service and Foreign Service are also eligible.

The charges are 10s. a day, except for serving Regular officers and those recommended by the Ministry of Pensions who are treated free.

All types of convalescents, except strict bed cases, are taken at Osborne, where the emphasis is on rehabilitation. There is a trained nursing staff, with an experienced remedial gymnast, a physiotherapist, and an occupational therapist. A hot pool has been installed for the treatment of rheumatic diseases, fractures, and poliomyelitis.

The House Governor, Lieut.-General Sir Neil Cantlie, K.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., F.R.C.S., is a retired Service medical officer, and has a visiting staff of London consultants to advise him. Contact is maintained with the Naval, Military, and Air Force hospitals, and Service consultants also visit regularly.

Apart from its historical interest as Queen Victoria's favourite residence (the house and 400-acre grounds are maintained as a Memorial to her late Majesty), the setting—with its superb views over the Solent, terraces and fountains, woods and lawns—makes for a peaceful convalescence. There is a private golf course, hard and grass tennis courts, a bathing beach, and facilities for sailing and boating. Indoors, there is a cinema and television. In the grounds is a hostel where wives and relatives may stay while officers are in residence.

Requests for admission to Osborne should be made, accompanied by a doctor's certificate, to the House Governor and Medical Superintendent, Osborne House, East Cowes, Isle of Wight.

WOOLWICH SEARCHLIGHT TATTOO, 1955

The third Woolwich Searchlight Tattoo will take place at Woolwich Stadium, London, from 21st to 24th September, 1955, at 7.30 p.m. each evening with a special daylight performance at 2.30 p.m. on Saturday, 24th September. This year's programme promises to be even more spectacular than those of previous years.

Tickets may be obtained from the Tattoo Box Office, Artillery House, 58 Woolwich Common, London, S.E.18, Tel.: WOO 1494, and all the usual ticket agents. Prices for covered seats are 15/-, 12/6, 10/6, 8/6, 7/6 and 6/-, reserved uncovered seats 5/-, unreserved seats 3/6. There is a party concession rate for performances on 21st, 22nd and 23rd September for parties of 20 or more, also further reductions for the special daylight performance on 24th September. Details may be obtained from the Tattoo Box Office, and postal application for seats should be accompanied by remittances and a stamped addressed envelope.

NAVY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

AIDES-DE-CAMP.—The following have been appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to The Queen :—

Captain (Commodore 2nd Class) Sir Charles E. Madden, Bart., R.N., from 23rd March, 1955, in succession to Captain E. W. J. Banks, R.N.

Captain C. P. Gallimore, R.N., from 10th January, 1955, in succession to Captain E. F. Anderton, O.B.E., R.N.

Instructor Captain F. C. Sobey, R.N., from 20th March, 1955, in succession to Instructor Captain R. E. Shaw, C.B.E., R.N.

THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH.—Admiral of the Fleet the Duke of Edinburgh was present at the Combined Fleet Exercises in the Mediterranean which began on 10th March. H.R.H. embarked in the Royal yacht *Britannia*, which took part in the exercises as part of a convoy, and in her role as a hospital ship by the transfer of 'casualties.' On 15th March, H.R.H. led the Combined Fleets into Grand Harbour, Malta. He left Malta on the 22nd in the *Britannia*, and witnessed a Home Fleet exercise on the 30th and 31st.

BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

FIRST SEA LORD.—Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O., took up his appointment as First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff on 19th April, in succession to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, G.C.B., D.S.O.

COMBINED EXERCISES.—The First Lord, Mr. J. P. L. Thomas, M.P., attended the exercises of the Combined Fleets in the Mediterranean and the subsequent discussions at Malta. He embarked in the *Britannia* as the guest of the Duke of Edinburgh, and was accompanied by the Fifth Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral A. N. C. Bingley, and the Naval Secretary, Rear-Admiral J. D. Luce. The retiring First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, also witnessed the Combined Fleet Exercises from H.M.S. *Glasgow*, flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Admiral Sir Guy Grantham.

FLAG APPOINTMENTS

THE NORE.—Vice-Admiral F. R. Parham, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., to be Commander-in-Chief, The Nore, in succession to Admiral Sir Geoffrey N. Oliver, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O. (early October, 1955).

FOURTH SEA LORD.—Rear-Admiral R. D. Watson, C.B.E., to be a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty, Fourth Sea Lord and Chief of Supplies and Transport, in succession to Vice-Admiral F. R. Parham, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (early September, 1955).

F.O. AIR (HOME).—Vice-Admiral C. John, C.B., to be Flag Officer Air (Home), in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir John A. S. Eccles, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.B.E. (June, 1955).

N.A.T.O., NORTHERN EUROPE.—Vice-Admiral G. V. Gladstone, C.B., to succeed Vice-Admiral Sir Edward M. Evans-Lombe, K.C.B., in the N.A.T.O. appointment of Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Northern Europe (June, 1955).

D.C.N.P.—Rear-Admiral L. G. Durlacher, O.B.E., D.S.C., to be Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (Personal Services), in succession to Rear-Admiral H. W. Biggs, C.B., D.S.O. (January, 1955).

PORTSMOUTH.—Rear-Admiral P. W. Burnett, D.S.O., D.S.C., to be Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, in succession to Rear-Admiral B. I. Robertshaw, C.B., C.B.E. (February, 1955).

TRAINING SQUADRON.—Rear-Admiral H. W. Biggs, C.B., D.S.O., to be Flag Officer, Home Fleet Training Squadron, in succession to Vice-Admiral S. H. Carlill, C.B., D.S.O. (April, 1955).

NAVAL DEPUTY, SACEUR.—Rear-Admiral G. K. Collett, D.S.C., to be Vice Naval Deputy to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe), (February, 1955). This post has been instituted to increase the high level naval representation at General Gruenther's Supreme Headquarters.

GERMANY.—Rear-Admiral K. McN. Campbell-Walter to be Flag Officer, Germany, and Chief British Naval Representative in the Allied Control Commission, in succession to Rear-Admiral R. S. Warne, C.B., C.B.E. (March, 1955). At the same time, Rear-Admiral Campbell-Walter succeeded Rear-Admiral Warne as Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Northern Area, Central Europe.

INDIAN NAVY.—(See under Dominions and Colonies.)

RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

The following were announced on 21st April :—

Admiral Sir George E. Creasy, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., to be promoted to Admiral of the Fleet, to date 22nd April, 1955.

Vice-Admiral Sir Ralph A. B. Edwards, K.C.B., C.B.E., to be promoted to Admiral in H.M. Fleet.

Rear-Admiral L. N. Brownfield, C.B., C.B.E., to be promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet.

The following were announced to date 1st February, 1955 :—

Vice-Admiral Sir C. Charles Hughes-Hallett, K.C.B., C.B.E., to be placed on the retired list.

Rear-Admiral G. V. Gladstone, C.B., to be promoted Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet.

The following was announced on 14th February :—

Rear-Admiral G. F. Burghard, C.B., D.S.O., to be placed on the retired list to date 15th February, 1955.

The following was announced on 14th March :—

Rear-Admiral W. L. G. Adams, C.B., O.B.E., to be placed on the retired list to date 15th March, 1955.

The following were announced in *The London Gazette* on 22nd February :—

Rear-Admirals (E) retire on the dates stated :—Sir Alexander D. McGlashan, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (7th March) ; C. Littlewood, C.B., O.B.E. (28th February).

The following was announced on 26th January :—

Captain (E) Sir John R. Coote, Bart., C.B.E., D.S.C., R.N., to be Rear-Admiral (E) as from 28th February, 1955. He will relieve Rear-Admiral (E) Sir Alexander D. McGlashan as Deputy Director of Naval Ordnance (Material) and Chief Ordnance Engineer Officer.

The following was announced on 16th March :—

Surgeon Captain D. Duncan, O.B.E., to be Surgeon Rear-Admiral with effect from 28th March, 1955, and appointed Medical Officer-in-Charge, R.N. Hospital, Chatham, and Command Medical Officer on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, The Nore, vice Surgeon Rear-Admiral R. W. Mussen, C.B., C.B.E., with effect from 31st March.

The following was announced on 4th March :—

Captain (S) H. P. Koelle to be Rear-Admiral (S), to date 4th March, 1955, and appointed as Command Supply Officer, Plymouth, vice Rear-Admiral (S) A. W. Laybourne, C.B.E., as from 23rd May, 1955.

EXERCISES AND CRUISES

COMBINED FLEETS.—Home and Mediterranean Fleet ships co-operated in exercises known as "Sea Lance" between 10th and 15th March in the Western Mediterranean. On completion of the first serial, surface forces took up an anti-atomic formation and replenished with fuel and stores in an area south of Sardinia. Attacks were launched against them by aircraft and submarines. The third serial was concerned with the passage of a large convoy to Malta in the face of air, submarine, and atomic threat. Some 50 ships and 150 R.A.F. and Fleet Air Arm aircraft took part in the exercises. On their conclusion the Royal yacht *Britannia* led the following ships into Malta :—

H.M.S. *Tyne*, wearing the flag of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Michael Denny.

Four cruisers—*Glasgow* (Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean), *Jamaica* (Vice-Admiral J. P. L. Reid, Second-in-Command, Mediterranean), *Bermuda* (Rear-Admiral R. G. Onslow, Flag Officer Flotillas, Home Fleet), and *Sheffield*.

Two aircraft carriers—*Centaur* (Rear-Admiral A. R. Pedder, Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers) and *Albion*.

Seven Daring Class ships—*Duchess*, *Diana*, *Diamond*, *Decoy*, *Daring*, *Delight*, and *Defender*.

One fast minelayer—*Apollo*.

Eleven destroyers—*Comet* (Rear-Admiral R. D. Watson, Flag Officer Flotillas, Mediterranean), *Saintes*, *St. Kitts*, *Barfleur*, *Chevron*, *Charity*, *Battleaxe*, *Scorpion*, *Agincourt*, *Aisne*, and *Corunna*.

Six fast frigates—*Urania*, *Undine*, *Virago*, *Wakeful*, *Whirlwind*, and *Roebuck*.

Fleet tug—*Reward*.

Royal Fleet Auxiliaries—*Fort Duquesne*, *Brown Ranger*, *Green Ranger*, *Blue Ranger*, and *Wave Sovereign*.

BISCAY EXERCISE.—During the return of the Home Fleet from the Mediterranean, a maritime air exercise involving ships and aircraft of the Fleet and shore-based aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm and R.A.F. was held on 30th and 31st March in the Bay of Biscay and English Channel. With the Fleet were warships of the Royal Netherlands Navy and United States Navy, and the Royal yacht *Britannia* with the Duke of Edinburgh embarked. Submarines of the 5th Squadron took part.

MINESWEEPING DEMONSTRATIONS.—Two squadrons of the most modern minesweepers paid operational visits to Norway and Denmark in February to give demonstrations. The ships included six coastal minesweepers of the 104th Minesweeping Squadron and seven inshore minesweepers of the 232nd Minesweeping Squadron, both based at Harwich. They were accompanied by the *Mull of Galloway*, wearing the broad pendant of the Commodore, Harwich, Commodore J. Lee-Barber; and the minelaying destroyer *Obdurate*. From 12th to 15th February they visited Kristiansand, Norway, and from the 16th to 19th were in Denmark, returning to England via the Kiel Canal.

VOLUNTEER EXERCISE.—The attempted capture of Professor Goldstein, a fictitious nuclear physicist at Kirkmaiden in the Mull of Galloway, was the object of a combined exercise of Volunteer Reserve sea, land, and air forces of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines on 19th and 20th March, known as "Exercise 1984." Territorial Army and

Home Guard units also took part. The naval forces were drawn from the Mersey, Clyde and Ulster Divisions of the R.N.V.R., while the landing on the Mull of Galloway was made by the R.M.F.V.R. from the Merseyside and Clyde Centres. Air cover was provided by the Northern, Midland, and Scottish Air Divisions of the R.N.V.R.

MEDITERRANEAN EXERCISE.—The British aircraft carriers *Centaur*, flagship of Rear-Admiral A. R. Pedder, and *Albion* joined the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Western Mediterranean at the end of January for six days of combined exercises, including flight operations, gunnery, and communications practice, and replenishment at sea. Vice-Admiral T. S. Combs, U.S.N., commanded the Sixth Fleet in the U.S.S. *Northampton*, and among his ships were the carriers *Randolph* and *Lake Champlain* and the battleship *Iowa*.

CYPRUS.—A Greek motor ship, the *Ayios Georghios*, about 100 tons, suspected of attempting to smuggle explosives and arms into Cyprus, was intercepted, captured, and brought into the Cypriot port of Paphos on 26th January by the destroyer *Comet*.

EAST INDIES.—H.M. cruiser *Newfoundland* and the Indian frigate *Tir* were present when President Tito of Yugoslavia arrived at Aden on his return voyage from his tour of India. Full naval honours were accorded the President, who was in his yacht *Galeb*. The *Newfoundland* returned to Portsmouth on 17th February, having steamed over 65,000 miles since leaving Britain for the East Indies over two years ago.

FAR EAST.—King Norodom Suramarit of Cambodia visited H.M.S. *Opossum* and inspected the ship and her company on 14th March at Phnom Penh. It is believed that this is the first occasion on which a British warship has steamed more than 200 miles up the Mekong River to this capital.

AMERICA AND WEST INDIES.—The Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir J. F. Stevens, K.B.E., C.B., in the *Superb*, visited Montevideo from 28th February to 5th March to be present at the inauguration of the new National Council of Uruguay and its President, Senor Luis Batlle Berres, on 1st March.

The President of Haiti and his wife, with the British Ambassador to Haiti, embarked in H.M.S. *Triumph*, cadet training aircraft carrier, when she visited Kingston, Jamaica, in February. They proceeded in the *Triumph* from Kingston to Port au Prince, Haiti.

THE NAVY ESTIMATES

The Navy Estimates, 1955-56, were presented to Parliament on 22nd February. The total gross amount is £391,550,000; and after allowing for mutual defence assistance from the United States and other appropriations in aid, the net sum is £340,500,000. This is a reduction of £12,500,000 on the grant for 1954-55. The Estimates provide for a maximum naval strength of 133,000 in April, 1955, and a reduction of about 6,000 over the year, due to a further decline in Regular recruiting at a time when large numbers of ratings and other ranks entered on special service engagements soon after the war are leaving.

The Explanatory Statement by the First Lord (Cmd. 9396, price 9d.) is fuller than in previous years. Part I sets out, in the light of recent developments and changes, the role of the Royal Navy in the age of thermo-nuclear weapons. Part II gives the customary detailed account of the principal naval services for which provision is made.

In presenting the Estimates in the House of Commons on 3rd March, the First Lord announced two important changes in the career policy for naval officers. Owing to the inevitable reduction in the number of seagoing appointments for executive officers of the rank of commander and above, and to the increase in requirements for officers of these ranks in staff and administrative appointments and on international staffs, it has become no longer possible to provide all executive captains and commanders with sufficient seagoing experience to ensure that those ultimately selected for higher operational appointments have the full measure of up-to-date experience in command at sea essential for the efficiency of the Fleet. It has therefore been decided that it is necessary to divide

the lists of executive captains and commanders into two lists, to be known as the "Post List" and the "General List." Only the officers placed on the Post List will be eligible for seagoing command. Those on the General List will be eligible for appointments in command of shore establishments and for staff and administrative duties. All future promotions of executive officers from commander to captain and from lieutenant-commander to commander will be made to one list or the other. In addition, existing executive captains promoted to that rank on 30th June, 1951, and later, and existing executive commanders promoted to that rank on 30th June, 1950, and later, will now be divided into the two lists referred to. There will be no similar division of the Flag List, but it will automatically become divided in course of time as officers of the seniorities which are being split are promoted to Rear-Admiral and onwards.

The second change concerns the non-executive officer branches. The following changes have been approved to take effect from 7th March, 1955:—

Firstly, the wearing of coloured distinctive lace by all non-executive officers, except medical and dental and wardmasters, will be discontinued. This consequently affects the uniform of officers of the Engineering, Electrical, Supply and Secretariat, and Instructor Branches.

Secondly, the use of the suffixes (E), (L) and (S) will also cease, except for Branch List officers (formerly known as warrant officers and commissioned officers from warrant rank) of all ranks including those who have reached the rank of lieutenant and above. Officers of the Instructor Branch will, however, retain the prefix "Instructor" before their rank.

PERSONNEL

LAST SPECIAL ENTRY CADETS.—At the end of the Easter term on 29th March, the last of the 18-year-old Special Entry cadets left the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. This method of entry has provided some 50 per cent. of the Regular officers of the Royal Navy since 1913. The last group of Special Entry cadets numbered 51, including seven from the Royal Pakistan Navy and five from the Indian Navy.

PRIZES.—Official prizes presented annually to officers of the Royal Navy under training have been awarded for 1954 as follows:—

Newman Memorial Prize to Sub-Lieutenant D. Wright, R.N., H.M.S. *Ark Royal*. It is awarded to the engineer officer obtaining the highest aggregate marks on qualifying for the rank of Lieutenant at the R.N. Engineering College, Manadon.

Rear-Admiral Simpson Memorial Prize to Lieutenant M. J. Neeves, R.N., H.M.S. *Glasgow*. It is awarded to the officer gaining the best results of the three terms of the Marine Engineering Specialist Course passing out each year from Manadon.

Charles Dargaville Ballard Prize to Sub-Lieutenant J. B. Young, R.N., H.M.S. *Diana*. It is awarded to the best all-round Acting Sub-Lieutenant of the Supply and Secretariat Branch promoted from the lower deck on qualifying for confirmation in rank at the conclusion of his training courses.

SINGAPORE MEMORIAL.—A silver high altar cross and two candlesticks which will form a Memorial in St. Andrew's Cathedral, Singapore, to Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, K.C.B., and the 764 officers and men who lost their lives in the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* on 10th December, 1941, were exhibited for two weeks from 21st March at the offices of the Commissioner for Malaya in the United Kingdom at Malaya House.

ENGINEERING AND ELECTRICAL TITLES.—The Queen has approved new titles for ratings in the Engineering and Electrical Branches, with effect from 17th March. The changes eliminate the term 'Stoker' in the former and 'Mate' in the latter. Stoker becomes Engineering Mechanic 2nd class, and Stoker Mechanic becomes Engineering Mechanic 1st class. Electrician's Mate is altered to Electrical Mechanic, and Radio Electrician's Mate to Radio Electrical Mechanic.

SUBMARINE ESCAPE TRAINING.—One thousand trainees have passed through the course in free ascent from submarines in the 100-foot escape tower at H.M.S. *Dolphin*, the submarine base at Gosport. Thus more than a quarter of the men in the Submarine Branch have received their initiation into the theory and practice of the latest methods of escape from a submarine lying on the bottom in circumstances permitting escape.

MATERIEL

H.M.S. ARK ROYAL.—The new aircraft carrier *Ark Royal* was accepted from her builders, Messrs. Cammell Laird and Co., Limited, Birkenhead, on 25th February. The ship is 808 ft. 3 in. in length (720 ft. between perpendiculars) and has an extreme breadth on the waterline of 112 ft. 9 in. She displaces 36,800 tons. Her peace-time complement is 110 officers and 1,522 ratings. When her frontline aircraft are embarked there will be an addition of approximately 100 officers and between 450 and 500 ratings. Captain D. R. F. Cambell, R.N., is in command. A ship's bell of silver, weighing nearly two hundredweight and 19 inches in diameter, which was purchased by the canteen committee of the former *Ark Royal*, sunk in November, 1941, was presented to the new ship at Portsmouth on 26th March.

LAUNCHES.—The anti-submarine frigate *Murray* was launched at the shipyard of Messrs. Alex Stephen and Sons, Limited, Govan, Glasgow, on 25th February. The anti-submarine frigate *Scarborough* was launched at the shipyard of Vickers-Armstrongs, Limited, Walker-on-Tyne, on 4th April. H.H. Princess Marie Louise has consented to launch the anti-aircraft frigate *Leopard* from Portsmouth Dockyard on 23rd May. The submarine *Excalibur* was launched on 25th February at the Barrow-in-Furness yard of Vickers-Armstrongs, Limited. The *Excalibur* is a sister ship to the *Explorer*, launched at the same yard last year and now undergoing trials. In addition to their Diesel-electric machinery, both ships are fitted with turbine machinery for which the energy is supplied by burning Diesel fuel in decomposed hydrogen peroxide.

IMPROVED EVAPORATORS.—Members of the R.N. Scientific Service have found a way of saving £500,000 a year in distilling fresh water from sea water by using a new compound introduced into the evaporators. This compound prevents scaling and the formation of foam. It has increased the operating life of an evaporator fivefold, and increased efficiency by about 30 per cent. With it fresh water can be made from salt water at a cost of 12s. a ton, against 18s. a ton before the present method of treatment, and the saving in fuel oil burned in the boilers to heat the evaporators is 34 tons of oil for every thousand tons of water made.

FLEET AIR ARM

H.M.S. BULWARK.—The first deck landing on H.M.S. *Bulwark* was made on 7th February in an Avenger aircraft flown by Lieutenant-Commander J. W. Nance, U.S.N., of Raleigh, North Carolina, who is on exchange service with the Royal Navy. The *Bulwark*, completed last year, in March took over the duties of trials and training carrier in succession to the *Illustrious*.

NEW LANDING AID.—As a further contribution to the safe landing of aircraft on carrier decks, a new sound device for indicating airspeed has been developed for the Admiralty by the R.A.F. Institute of Aviation Medicine and the Ministry of Supply's Royal Aircraft Establishment, both at Farnborough. Known as Audio, it works on the principle of an electric organ and gives assurance as to correct speed, or warning of incorrect speed, in the pilot's earphones as a background to the voice reception for which the earphones are primarily intended.

HELICOPTER SCOOP NET.—New apparatus to improve the means of rescue by helicopter has been developed by the Search and Rescue Unit at the R.N. Air Station, Ford, Sussex, in the form of a scoop net. The device was used for the first time in an actual helicopter rescue in the English Channel on 18th March, when the pilot of a

Firefly aircraft which had crashed during a training flight was recovered from the sea only three minutes after he had force-landed.

HELICOPTER SERVICE.—Helicopters from naval air stations in the United Kingdom took part in rescue and relief work in snowbound areas in the North of Scotland in mid-January. Food was dropped in isolated areas and medical cases were evacuated to hospitals.

A naval helicopter was used for the first time to pass a line from ship to ship for salvage purposes on 29th January. A Dragonfly of No. 705 Squadron from Gosport with about 1,000 yards of one-inch hemp as a messenger line was able to establish connection between the tug *Sir Bevois* and the freighter *Kingsbridge*, grounded south of the Isle of Wight. A few days later a Whirlwind helicopter similarly passed a line from a tug to H.M.S. *Montrose* when the latter broke adrift while being towed to Portsmouth in a gale.

D.H.110 ORDERS.—The Ministry of Supply have placed an order for de Havilland D.H.110 all-weather interceptor aircraft for service in the Fleet Air Arm. The aircraft is a two-seater supersonic jet fighter of the swept-wing type and is powered by Rolls-Royce Avon engines. Although primarily a high-altitude interceptor, it can be employed as a ground attack and naval strike aircraft. Besides its 30-mm. guns, it is designed to carry air-launched guided weapons.

TROPHY AWARDS.—The Boyd Trophy, highest annual award for the Fleet Air Arm, has been allocated to the Naval Test Squadron at the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment, Boscombe Down, for its direct contribution to the improvement of naval aircraft and the testing of new and undeveloped types. The trophy was presented by Admiral Sir Denis Boyd at a ceremony at the R.N. Air Station, Lee-on-Solent, on 17th March.

The de Havilland Trophy for the fastest flight of 1954 has been awarded to Lieutenant J. R. S. Overbury, R.N., of the Naval Test Squadron, Boscombe Down. He flew a naval Sea Hawk aircraft from London to Amsterdam on 29th July last in 23 minutes 19 seconds, an average speed of 571.5 miles an hour.

GLIDING ACHIEVEMENT.—A climb in a sailplane to 30,500 ft. above sea level was made by Commander Nicholas Goodhart, R.N., over the Sierra Nevada Mountains at Bishop, California, on 9th January. Although this is the greatest height yet reached by a British sailplane pilot, it cannot be recognized as a national gliding record as it does not exceed by five per cent. the height of just over 30,000 ft. reached by Mr. Philip A. Wills in New Zealand on 29th December.

ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE

AIR RESERVE TO CONVERT TO JETS.—In his Navy Estimates speech on 3rd March, the First Lord referred to the conversion of the R.N.V.R. fighter squadrons to jets, which is planned to start this year. It is expected that the R.N.V.R. Divisions will be re-equipped with Sea Hawks, Gannets, and Seamews within the next two years or so. At the same time, it will be necessary to reduce the establishment of these costly aircraft by about one-fifth. Broadly, the new plan envisages the reduction of the fighter content of the Air Reserve and an increase in the proportion of anti-submarine to fighter roles. The readjustments are being made for reasons of economy.

NATIONAL SERVICE OFFICERS.—The Admiralty has decided to extend the membership of the R.N.V.(S)R. to officers granted temporary commissions during their period of National Service. Hitherto, membership of this Special Reserve, which largely consists of men who held temporary commissions in the Royal Navy during the war as members of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R., has not been open to any officer whose full service has been since the 1939-45 War.

MERCHANT NAVY

DEFENCE COURSES

The Merchant Navy defence courses have been revised in the light of increased knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons and other warlike techniques. Originally instituted in 1938, the courses, after a brief cessation, were revived in 1951 at centres in London, Newcastle, Liverpool, Glasgow, Cardiff, Southampton, and Hull. The object is to inform masters, officers, and men of the Merchant Navy of the measures that would be taken in time of war for their protection by the Royal Navy and of the steps which they can take themselves. The atomic, biological, and chemical defence and fire-fighting sessions have been extended to a total of twelve hours' duration.

ROYAL MARINES

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.—The following were announced on 23rd March :—

Major-General C. R. Hardy, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., R.M., to be promoted Lieutenant-General and to be Commandant General, Royal Marines, in succession to General Sir John C. Westall, K.C.B., C.B.E., R.M., the appointment to take effect about mid-August, 1955.

Colonel F. C. Horton, O.B.E., R.M., to be promoted Major-General on 8th May, 1955, and appointed Chief of Staff to Commandant General, Royal Marines, in succession to Major-General C. R. Hardy in May, 1955.

LECTURE TOUR IN SWITZERLAND.—At the request of the Swiss General Staff, Major General J. L. Moulton, D.S.O., O.B.E., carried out a tour of Swiss Army establishments in February during which he lectured to the Swiss Officers' Society on "Training and Employment of Commandos."

EXERCISE "SEA TROUT".—Exercise "Sea Trout," an amphibious exercise involving the landing and re-embarkation of 42 Commando on the South Devon coast near Brixham, took place between 1st and 3rd March. The exercise was designed to practice the mounting and execution of a medium scale raid. Forces taking part included H.M. Ships *Undaunted*, *Tyrian*, and L.C.T. 4037, Naval and R.A.F. aircraft, and elements of 16 Independent Parachute Brigade.

SNOW TRAINING.—The Norwegian mountains, the peaks of the Cairngorms in the Scottish Highlands, and Canadian Arctic territories formed the background for this year's snow warfare training. In Scotland, the training programme began in the last week of January and continued until March. Other officers and men who had already carried out the Cairngorms training visited Norway, and with the co-operation of the Army there carried out advanced training, including tactical exercises and cross-country ski-ing. Individual officers went to Canada and Norway.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

CANADA

SUBMARINES FROM ROYAL NAVY

To provide submarines for anti-submarine training in the Royal Canadian Navy, as arranged last year between the Admiralty and the Canadian Naval Board, a new submarine squadron of the Royal Navy has been formed. Known as the 6th Submarine Squadron, it will consist of the *Astute*, *Ambush*, and *Alderney*. The *Astute* sailed for Canada from Portsmouth on 26th March and the other two are expected to sail in mid-May and mid-July respectively. The Squadron will be commanded by Commander W. T. J. Fox, R.N., and will be based at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

AUSTRALIA**FRIGATE EXERCISES**

H.M.A.S. *Queenborough* was expected to arrive in the United Kingdom during April to carry out exercises with the Home Fleet and to remain for some months. The *Queenborough*, built on the Tyne in 1942, was lent to Australia in 1945 and permanently transferred to the R.A.N. in 1950. She was converted to a fast anti-submarine frigate in Australia in 1954.

NEW ZEALAND**CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF**

Captain (Commodore 2nd Class) J. E. H. McBeath, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., has been lent to the Royal New Zealand Navy as Chief of Naval Staff, New Zealand Navy Board, in succession to Commodore Sir Charles E. Madden, Bart., serving in the rank of Acting Rear-Admiral, the appointment to take effect in May, 1955.

INDIA

CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF.—Vice-Admiral S. H. Carlill, C.B., D.S.O., is to be lent to the Indian Navy as Chief of Naval Staff, Indian Navy, in succession to Admiral Sir C. T. Mark Pizey, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in July, 1955.

FLAG OFFICER (FLOTILLAS).—Captain Sir St. John R. J. Tyrwhitt, Bart., D.S.O., D.S.C., has been lent to the Indian Navy as Flag Officer (Flotillas), in succession to Rear-Admiral F. A. Ballance, C.B., D.S.O., serving in the rank of Acting Rear-Admiral, from April, 1955.

CEYLON**CAPTAIN OF THE NAVY**

Captain P. M. B. Chavasse, D.S.C., has been appointed for loan service to the Royal Ceylon Navy as Captain of the Navy and will serve in this appointment in the rank of Commodore, 2nd Class.

FOREIGN**ARGENTINA****ANTARCTIC BASE**

Admiral Ramon Brunet, Argentine Commander of Naval Operations, announced at a Press conference in Buenos Aires on 17th January that Argentina, thanks to her new ice breaker, the *General San Martin*, recently built in Germany, was now establishing a new Antarctic base in the Weddell Sea, only 800 miles from the South Pole. It would be the world's southernmost scientific station, situated at 78° South, 39° West. The new base is being named after one of Argentina's national heroes, General Belgrano.

CHILE**ANTARCTIC BASE**

It was announced in Santiago on 20th February that the Chilean Minister of Defence, Senor Tobias Barros, who was visiting the "southern region of Chile to reaffirm Chilean sovereignty," had arrived two days earlier in Pendulum Bay, Deception Island, and officially inaugurated a new base, which he named "Presidente Carlos Ibañez," after the Chilean President.

FRANCE**SURVIVAL AT SEA TEST**

Ten volunteers from the French Navy, led by a lieutenant-commander and including a medical officer and a representative of the Naval High Command, were cast adrift on a rubber raft in the Brest estuary on 22nd March, for a six-day test of the theories advanced

by Dr. Alain Bombard. In 1952, Dr. Bombard spent 65 days crossing the Atlantic by raft in an endeavour to prove that shipwrecked mariners could survive on a diet of raw fish and plankton, and could consume far larger quantities of sea water than had hitherto been thought possible.

PERU

NEW TANKER

The Peruvian Ambassador was present at Southampton on 15th February when the tanker *Sechura*, built in the Woolston yard of John I. Thornycroft and Company, was handed over to the Peruvian Navy.

SPAIN

SQUADRON AT BARCELONA

The heavy cruiser *Canarias*, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Abarzuza, Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Fleet, and several Spanish destroyers spent six days at Barcelona in February coinciding with a visit of the United States aircraft carrier *Randolph* and other units of the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet.

TURKEY

PRESIDENT'S CRUISE

H.M.S. *Flamingo* and the Indian Naval ship *Tir* fired 21-gun salutes when the President of Turkey, His Excellency Celâl Bayar, left Bahrein on 15th February in the Turkish training ship *Savarona* for Karachi, escorted by the Turkish destroyers *Gaziantep* and *Demirhisar*.

UNITED STATES

ATOMIC SUBMARINE.—The submarine *Nautilus*, the first ship to be propelled by atomic power, began her sea trials from Groton, Connecticut, on 17th January, and after 50 hours of surface trials made her first dive successfully on 20th January. On 20th March, the *Nautilus* left Groton for a demonstration cruise with 14 members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and several senior naval officers on board.

NEW CONSTRUCTION.—The House Armed Services Committee on 9th March approved plans to build 24 new warships, including a fifth super-aircraft carrier of the "Forrestal" class and three more atomic powered submarines.

GUIDED MISSILES.—According to the Washington Correspondent of *The Times*, Mr. Thomas, Secretary of the Navy, spoke in New York on 16th February of new techniques by which American naval forces are complementing their fixed land bases by a new concept of mobile sea bases—carriers, jet seaplanes, and guided missile ships. They would be able to change locations at speeds up to 40 miles an hour to any area of the world's oceans and seas where their presence was required, and they gave the American reprisal system the flexibility and dispersal it must have when sudden attack might overwhelm land bases. Three types of guided missiles were now operational in the Navy, the projectile called the Sparrow (air-to-air); the Terrier (surface-to-air); and the Regulus (surface-to-surface).

ARMY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

The Duke of Edinburgh visited the Guards Depot at Caterham on 1st March and presented leeks to the Welsh Guards.

The Duke of Gloucester, as Colonel-in-Chief, inspected the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, at Barnard Castle on 7th February.

The Duke of Gloucester left England by air on 21st March on a tour of visits in the British Army of the Rhine, which included the 2nd Battalion, Scots Guards, and units of the Royal Army Service Corps of which Regiment and Corps he is Colonel and Colonel-in-Chief respectively. His Royal Highness returned to England by air on 24th March.

The Princess Royal visited the Guards Depot, Caterham, on 17th March and presented shamrock to the Irish Guards.

The Princess Royal left England by air on 31st March on a tour of visits in the British Army of the Rhine, which included units of the Royal Corps of Signals and the Women's Royal Army Corps of which she is Colonel-in-Chief and Controller Commandant respectively. Her Royal Highness returned to England by air on 6th April.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments :—

TO BE AIDES-DE-CAMP TO HER MAJESTY.—Brigadier R. W. Jelf, C.B.E., late R.A. (29th September, 1954), vice Major-General B. P. Hughes, C.B.E., promoted; Brigadier L. de M. Thuillier, O.B.E., late Royal Signals (8th January, 1955), vice Brigadier C. A. H. Chadwick, C.B.E., retired; Brigadier R. E. H. Hudson, D.S.O., late R.A. (7th February, 1955), vice Brigadier C. I. V. Jones, C.B.E., retired; Brigadier R. N. M. Jones, C.B.E., late Infantry (18th February, 1955), vice Brigadier R. H. Maxwell, C.B., retired.

TO BE HONORARY PHYSICIAN TO HER MAJESTY.—Major-General F. J. O'Meara, M.D., F.R.C.P.I. (1st January, 1955), vice Brigadier R. J. Rosie, C.B.E., M.B., retired.

TO BE HONORARY SURGEON TO HER MAJESTY.—Colonel C. M. Marsden, M.B., F.R.C.S.(Edin.) (8th January, 1955), vice Major-General J. C. Collins, C.B., C.B.E., retired.

TO BE COLONELS COMMANDANT.—Of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Major-General B. C. H. Kimmins, C.B., C.B.E. (17th April, 1955), vice Lieut.-General Sir Edmond C. A. Schreiber, K.C.B., D.S.O., tenure expired; of the Corps of Royal Engineers, General Sir Nevil C. D. Brownjohn, K.C.B., C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C. (31st January, 1955), vice Major-General (Honorary Lieut.-General) Sir Philip Neame, V.C., K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., tenure expired.

APPOINTMENTS

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY.—Brigadier F. W. S. Gordon-Hall, C.B.E., appointed Director-General of Fighting Vehicles, with the temporary rank of Major-General (June, 1955).

WAR OFFICE.—Major-General G. C. Humphreys, C.B., C.B.E., to a special appointment (28th July, 1954).

Brigadier (temporary Major-General) N. P. H. Tapp, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Director of Military Training (18th April, 1955).

Major-General W. P. Oliver, C.B., O.B.E., appointed Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (May, 1955).

Brigadier W. S. Cole, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Deputy Quarter-Master-General, with the temporary rank of Major-General (May, 1955).

Major-General H. R. B. Foote, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., appointed Director, Royal Armoured Corps (August, 1955).

General Sir Gerald W. R. Templer, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff (November, 1955).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Brigadier R. A. Bramwell-Davis, D.S.O., appointed Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Southern Command, with the temporary rank of Major-General (22nd March, 1955).

Major-General R. P. Harding, C.B., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., East Anglian District (May, 1955).

Major-General B. C. H. Kimmins, C.B., C.B.E., appointed G.O.C., Northern Ireland District (July, 1955).

GERMANY.—Major-General R. C. Cottrell-Hill, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., appointed G.O.C. (British Sector), British Troops, Berlin (May, 1955).

NORTHERN EUROPE.—Major-General R. H. Bower, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff to the C-in-C., Allied Forces Northern Europe (May, 1955).

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—Major-General J. N. R. Moore, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division (July, 1955).

PROMOTIONS

Field-Marshal.—General to be Field-Marshal:—H.R.H. The Duke of Gloucester, Earl of Ulster, K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O. (31st March, 1955).

Lieut.-General.—

Major-General to be temporary Lieut.-General:—H. Murray, C.B., D.S.O. (28th February, 1955).

Major-Generals.—Temporary Major-Generals, Brigadiers, or Colonels to be Major-Generals:—G. D. G. Heyman, C.B., C.B.E. (6th January, 1955); K. C. Cooper, D.S.O., O.B.E. (12th January, 1955); R. C. M. King, D.S.O., O.B.E. (18th January, 1955); E. S. Lindsay, C.B.E., D.S.O. (29th January, 1955); D. J. Muir, O.B.E. (5th March, 1955).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals:—A. H. Musson (28th February, 1955); R. A. Bramwell-Davis (22nd March, 1955); J. D'A. Anderson, C.B.E., D.S.O. (4th April, 1955); G. O. Crawford, C.B.E., A.D.C. (12th April, 1955).

RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired:—Major-General L.I. Wansbrough-Jones, C.B., C.B.E. (18th January, 1955); Major-General G. S. Hatton, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. (29th January, 1955); Lieut.-General Sir Colin M. Barber, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (28th March, 1955); Major-General P. Le M. S. Stonhouse-Gostling, C.B.E. (28th March, 1955); Lieut.-General Sir Euan A. B. Miller, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (29th March, 1955).

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1955-56

The Army Estimates for 1955-56, excluding the receipts arising from mutual defence assistance from the United States (£10,000,000), amounted to a gross expenditure of £542,750,100 (£628,500,100 in 1954-55), reduced by appropriations in aid to the net figure of £484,000,100 (£561,000,100 in 1954-55).

The gross estimates for the main items of expenditure, with net estimates given in parentheses, were as follows:—Army pay, etc., £135,840,000 (£119,620,000); Reserve, Territorial, and Auxiliary Forces, £16,430,000 (£16,240,000); Civilian pay, etc., £69,300,000 (£67,720,000); Movements, £32,120,000 (£30,810,000); Supplies, £63,610,000 (£49,470,000); Production and Research, £155,250,000 (£129,000,000); Works, £40,520,000 (£33,820,000); Miscellaneous effective services, £10,000,000 (£7,880,000); Non-effective charges, £19,680,000 (£19,440,000).

Points made in the White Paper included the following :—

Manpower.—Regular Army recruiting in 1954, though showing a small drop on 1953, has not been unsatisfactory. The number of men who enlisted from civil life on a 22 year engagement during 1954 was 18,425, and the number of prolongations of engagement to 12 years in 1954 was almost double that in 1953. It is too early yet to assess the result of the new 3-22 year type of engagement, but of those who have so far decided to prolong their service for more than 3 years, 67 per cent. have extended to 12 years rather than to six years.

The National Service element of the Regular Army has decreased during 1954 owing to the run-out of the exceptionally large intake of 1952-53. National Service men provided about 25 per cent. of the corporals and 50 per cent. of the lance-corporals, and in some highly skilled trades the proportion of National Service men was over 70 per cent.

The Army Emergency Reserve is still much below its target, and volunteers for this important reserve are badly needed.

In the Territorial Army, although the first cycle of National Service is coming to an end, the strength has continued to rise because earlier intakes which are now leaving were smaller than those which are being received today. As a result, the strength of the Territorial Army at the end of December, 1954, was 17,719 officers and 288,489 other ranks, including the women's services.

The Home Guard has continued to make steady progress in 1954, and its strength at the end of the year was : enrolled, 37,000 ; reserve roll, 39,000 ; total, 76,000, an increase of 14,000 over the previous year.

Training.—In all types of modern warfare, there is an urgent need to simplify weapons, to reduce the number and variety of vehicles, and to simplify and speed up methods of supply. These problems have been studied throughout the past Winter, and experimental organizations have been drawn up and will be tried this year. The object of all these changes will be to increase mobility both on and off the battlefield and at the same time to add to effective fighting power.

Weapons.—The new tank, the Conqueror, is now beginning to be issued to the Army. Improvements have been made to the Centurion tank.

The introduction of the L70 light anti-aircraft gun with its associated radar will give the Army a much more powerful weapon to deal with low-flying aircraft.

Five thousand FN self-loading rifles are being tried by the troops in all overseas theatres, and as soon as final details resulting from troop trials are settled, production will be pressed on as rapidly as possible.

A new sub-machine gun as a general purpose personal weapon and as the complement to the FN rifle is being brought into the Service.

Transport.—Experiments are being studied with helicopters, but progress will be slow as quantity production of a heavy load vertical lift aircraft, helicopter or otherwise, is still some way off.

The most difficult problem will probably arise in the field of supply. The development of transport to overcome the problems of supply and maintenance under conditions of nuclear warfare has so far lagged behind the development of weapons. Cheap cross-country load carrying vehicles based on civil production, aided by vertical lift and short take-off aircraft capable of lifting heavy loads, appear to offer the best solution.

ARMY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE

This three-day conference and exercise took place in mid-March at Headquarters, Eastern Command, Hounslow. The aim of the exercise was to examine in both a hot and cold war setting the organization of infantry and armoured divisions, and the

principal object was to stimulate a discussion on the Army's equipment, organization, and functional problems in special relation to the scientific developments which have taken place in the last few years.

DISBANDMENT OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS

It was announced by the War Office on 5th April that the following anti-aircraft units are to be disbanded :—2 (HAA) H.A.C. and 625 LAA, 451 HAA, 499(M) HAA, 609(M) HAA, 484(M) HAA, 607(M) HAA, 489 HAA, 455(M) AA, 516(M) LAA, 535 LAA, 583(M) HAA, 523 LAA, 558(M) HAA, and 652 HAA Regiments.

REGULAR ARMY RECRUITING

The Regular Army recruiting statistics for March show that the total number of enlistments from civil life during the month were 2,772 men and 205 boys compared with 2,639 and 158 in January and 2,708 and 442 in February. The figures for re-enlistments were 6 from Short Service (January, 6; February, 9) and 449 from National Service (January, 358; February, 366).

ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, SANDHURST

The War Office announced on 25th January that courses at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, are being altered to provide greater continuity between school and military training. As a result, candidates will go straight to Sandhurst when they join the Army. In the past, direct entrants have been required to carry out 10 weeks other-rank training at training units before going on to Sandhurst.

Under the new arrangements, they will go direct to the Academy on entering the Army in January or September and complete their basic military training as other ranks in the first 13 weeks of the course there. Entrants who have already served in the ranks will spend this initial period principally on academic study. Officer Cadet status will be granted at the beginning of the second term at Sandhurst.

To accommodate the additional 13 weeks, the length of the whole course has been raised from 18 months to 23 months. This period is made up of three 13-week terms a year corresponding with school terms, and 21 weeks leave. An additional advantage of the new system is the fact that cadets will receive all their training at Sandhurst.

REVIVAL OF OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS TITLE

The War Office announced on 26th January that the University Training Corps is to revert to its pre-war title of Officers Training Corps. The change reflects a return of the Corps to its original role as an officer producing organization. The first O.T.C. was established for this purpose in 1908, and up to the 1939-45 War was responsible for the preparation of many thousands of young men for commissioned service in the Army. During the war the O.T.C. became a part of the Home Guard as the Senior Training Corps with compulsory service. In 1948, with the return of voluntary enlistment, the Corps was re-designated the University Training Corps, T.A., and it became part of the Territorial Army. In addition to the training of potential officers, and in order to make use of academic qualifications for the technical arms of the Service, sub-units were formed. They included R.A.C., R.A., R.E., Signals, R.E.M.E., and the R.A.M.C. Later, W.R.A.C. sub-units were formed.

In its new organization, a limited number of specialist sub-units will be retained, but the whole emphasis of training will be on leadership and preparation for Regular, National Service, and Territorial Army commissions. The Corps will remain an integral part of the Territorial Army.

As a result of the Corps' new responsibilities the training syllabus will now include basic officer training comparable to that given at the Officer Cadet Schools. A new Certificate B Examination will be instituted in line with the required standards. A cadet

the lists of executive captains and commanders into two lists, to be known as the "Post List" and the "General List." Only the officers placed on the Post List will be eligible for seagoing command. Those on the General List will be eligible for appointments in command of shore establishments and for staff and administrative duties. All future promotions of executive officers from commander to captain and from lieutenant-commander to commander will be made to one list or the other. In addition, existing executive captains promoted to that rank on 30th June, 1951, and later, and existing executive commanders promoted to that rank on 30th June, 1950, and later, will now be divided into the two lists referred to. There will be no similar division of the Flag List, but it will automatically become divided in course of time as officers of the seniorities which are being split are promoted to Rear-Admiral and onwards.

The second change concerns the non-executive officer branches. The following changes have been approved to take effect from 7th March, 1955 :—

Firstly, the wearing of coloured distinctive lace by all non-executive officers, except medical and dental and wardmasters, will be discontinued. This consequently affects the uniform of officers of the Engineering, Electrical, Supply and Secretariat, and Instructor Branches.

Secondly, the use of the suffixes (E), (L) and (S) will also cease, except for Branch List officers (formerly known as warrant officers and commissioned officers from warrant rank) of all ranks including those who have reached the rank of lieutenant and above. Officers of the Instructor Branch will, however, retain the prefix "Instructor" before their rank.

PERSONNEL

LAST SPECIAL ENTRY CADETS.—At the end of the Easter term on 29th March, the last of the 18-year-old Special Entry cadets left the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. This method of entry has provided some 50 per cent. of the Regular officers of the Royal Navy since 1913. The last group of Special Entry cadets numbered 51, including seven from the Royal Pakistan Navy and five from the Indian Navy.

PRIZES.—Official prizes presented annually to officers of the Royal Navy under training have been awarded for 1954 as follows :—

Neuman Memorial Prize to Sub-Lieutenant D. Wright, R.N., H.M.S. *Ark Royal*. It is awarded to the engineer officer obtaining the highest aggregate marks on qualifying for the rank of Lieutenant at the R.N. Engineering College, Manadon.

Rear-Admiral Simpson Memorial Prize to Lieutenant M. J. Neeves, R.N., H.M.S. *Glasgow*. It is awarded to the officer gaining the best results of the three terms of the Marine Engineering Specialist Course passing out each year from Manadon.

Charles Dargaville Ballard Prize to Sub-Lieutenant J. B. Young, R.N., H.M.S. *Diana*. It is awarded to the best all-round Acting Sub-Lieutenant of the Supply and Secretariat Branch promoted from the lower deck on qualifying for confirmation in rank at the conclusion of his training courses.

SINGAPORE MEMORIAL.—A silver high altar cross and two candlesticks which will form a Memorial in St. Andrew's Cathedral, Singapore, to Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, K.C.B., and the 764 officers and men who lost their lives in the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* on 10th December, 1941, were exhibited for two weeks from 21st March at the offices of the Commissioner for Malaya in the United Kingdom at Malaya House.

ENGINEERING AND ELECTRICAL TITLES.—The Queen has approved new titles for ratings in the Engineering and Electrical Branches, with effect from 17th March. The changes eliminate the term 'Stoker' in the former and 'Mate' in the latter. Stoker becomes Engineering Mechanic 2nd class, and Stoker Mechanic becomes Engineering Mechanic 1st class. Electrician's Mate is altered to Electrical Mechanic, and Radio Electrician's Mate to Radio Electrical Mechanic.

SUBMARINE ESCAPE TRAINING.—One thousand trainees have passed through the course in free ascent from submarines in the 100-foot escape tower at H.M.S. *Dolphin*, the submarine base at Gosport. Thus more than a quarter of the men in the Submarine Branch have received their initiation into the theory and practice of the latest methods of escape from a submarine lying on the bottom in circumstances permitting escape.

MATERIEL

H.M.S. ARK ROYAL.—The new aircraft carrier *Ark Royal* was accepted from her builders, Messrs. Cammell Laird and Co., Limited, Birkenhead, on 25th February. The ship is 808 ft. 3 in. in length (720 ft. between perpendiculars) and has an extreme breadth on the waterline of 112 ft. 9 in. She displaces 36,800 tons. Her peace-time complement is 110 officers and 1,522 ratings. When her frontline aircraft are embarked there will be an addition of approximately 100 officers and between 450 and 500 ratings. Captain D. R. F. Cambell, R.N., is in command. A ship's bell of silver, weighing nearly two hundredweight and 19 inches in diameter, which was purchased by the canteen committee of the former *Ark Royal*, sunk in November, 1941, was presented to the new ship at Portsmouth on 26th March.

LAUNCHES.—The anti-submarine frigate *Murray* was launched at the shipyard of Messrs. Alex Stephen and Sons, Limited, Govan, Glasgow, on 25th February. The anti-submarine frigate *Scarborough* was launched at the shipyard of Vickers-Armstrongs, Limited, Walker-on-Tyne, on 4th April. H.H. Princess Marie Louise has consented to launch the anti-aircraft frigate *Leopard* from Portsmouth Dockyard on 23rd May. The submarine *Excalibur* was launched on 25th February at the Barrow-in-Furness yard of Vickers-Armstrongs, Limited. The *Excalibur* is a sister ship to the *Explorer*, launched at the same yard last year and now undergoing trials. In addition to their Diesel-electric machinery, both ships are fitted with turbine machinery for which the energy is supplied by burning Diesel fuel in decomposed hydrogen peroxide.

IMPROVED EVAPORATORS.—Members of the R.N. Scientific Service have found a way of saving £500,000 a year in distilling fresh water from sea water by using a new compound introduced into the evaporators. This compound prevents scaling and the formation of foam. It has increased the operating life of an evaporator fivefold, and increased efficiency by about 30 per cent. With it fresh water can be made from salt water at a cost of 12s. a ton, against 18s. a ton before the present method of treatment, and the saving in fuel oil burned in the boilers to heat the evaporators is 34 tons of oil for every thousand tons of water made.

FLEET AIR ARM

H.M.S. BULWARK.—The first deck landing on H.M.S. *Bulwark* was made on 7th February in an Avenger aircraft flown by Lieutenant-Commander J. W. Nance, U.S.N., of Raleigh, North Carolina, who is on exchange service with the Royal Navy. The *Bulwark*, completed last year, in March took over the duties of trials and training carrier in succession to the *Illustrious*.

NEW LANDING AID.—As a further contribution to the safe landing of aircraft on carrier decks, a new sound device for indicating airspeed has been developed for the Admiralty by the R.A.F. Institute of Aviation Medicine and the Ministry of Supply's Royal Aircraft Establishment, both at Farnborough. Known as Audio, it works on the principle of an electric organ and gives assurance as to correct speed, or warning of incorrect speed, in the pilot's earphones as a background to the voice reception for which the earphones are primarily intended.

HELICOPTER SCOOP NET.—New apparatus to improve the means of rescue by helicopter has been developed by the Search and Rescue Unit at the R.N. Air Station, Ford, Sussex, in the form of a scoop net. The device was used for the first time in an actual helicopter rescue in the English Channel on 18th March, when the pilot of a

Firefly aircraft which had crashed during a training flight was recovered from the sea only three minutes after he had force-landed.

HELICOPTER SERVICE.—Helicopters from naval air stations in the United Kingdom took part in rescue and relief work in snowbound areas in the North of Scotland in mid-January. Food was dropped in isolated areas and medical cases were evacuated to hospitals.

A naval helicopter was used for the first time to pass a line from ship to ship for salvage purposes on 29th January. A Dragonfly of No. 705 Squadron from Gosport with about 1,000 yards of one-inch hemp as a messenger line was able to establish connection between the tug *Sir Bevois* and the freighter *Kingsbridge*, grounded south of the Isle of Wight. A few days later a Whirlwind helicopter similarly passed a line from a tug to H.M.S. *Montrose* when the latter broke adrift while being towed to Portsmouth in a gale.

D.H.110 ORDERS.—The Ministry of Supply have placed an order for de Havilland D.H.110 all-weather interceptor aircraft for service in the Fleet Air Arm. The aircraft is a two-seater supersonic jet fighter of the swept-wing type and is powered by Rolls-Royce Avon engines. Although primarily a high-altitude interceptor, it can be employed as a ground attack and naval strike aircraft. Besides its 30-mm. guns, it is designed to carry air-launched guided weapons.

TROPHY AWARDS.—The Boyd Trophy, highest annual award for the Fleet Air Arm, has been allocated to the Naval Test Squadron at the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment, Boscombe Down, for its direct contribution to the improvement of naval aircraft and the testing of new and undeveloped types. The trophy was presented by Admiral Sir Denis Boyd at a ceremony at the R.N. Air Station, Lee-on-Solent, on 17th March.

The de Havilland Trophy for the fastest flight of 1954 has been awarded to Lieutenant J. R. S. Overbury, R.N., of the Naval Test Squadron, Boscombe Down. He flew a naval Sea Hawk aircraft from London to Amsterdam on 29th July last in 23 minutes 19 seconds, an average speed of 571.5 miles an hour.

GLIDING ACHIEVEMENT.—A climb in a sailplane to 30,500 ft. above sea level was made by Commander Nicholas Goodhart, R.N., over the Sierra Nevada Mountains at Bishop, California, on 9th January. Although this is the greatest height yet reached by a British sailplane pilot, it cannot be recognized as a national gliding record as it does not exceed by five per cent. the height of just over 30,000 ft. reached by Mr. Philip A. Wills in New Zealand on 29th December.

ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE

AIR RESERVE TO CONVERT TO JETS.—In his Navy Estimates speech on 3rd March, the First Lord referred to the conversion of the R.N.V.R. fighter squadrons to jets, which is planned to start this year. It is expected that the R.N.V.R. Divisions will be re-equipped with Sea Hawks, Gannets, and Seamews within the next two years or so. At the same time, it will be necessary to reduce the establishment of these costly aircraft by about one-fifth. Broadly, the new plan envisages the reduction of the fighter content of the Air Reserve and an increase in the proportion of anti-submarine to fighter roles. The readjustments are being made for reasons of economy.

NATIONAL SERVICE OFFICERS.—The Admiralty has decided to extend the membership of the R.N.V.(S)R. to officers granted temporary commissions during their period of National Service. Hitherto, membership of this Special Reserve, which largely consists of men who held temporary commissions in the Royal Navy during the war as members of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R., has not been open to any officer whose full service has been since the 1939-45 War.

MERCHANT NAVY

DEFENCE COURSES

The Merchant Navy defence courses have been revised in the light of increased knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons and other warlike techniques. Originally instituted in 1938, the courses, after a brief cessation, were revived in 1951 at centres in London, Newcastle, Liverpool, Glasgow, Cardiff, Southampton, and Hull. The object is to inform masters, officers, and men of the Merchant Navy of the measures that would be taken in time of war for their protection by the Royal Navy and of the steps which they can take themselves. The atomic, biological, and chemical defence and fire-fighting sessions have been extended to a total of twelve hours' duration.

ROYAL MARINES

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS.—The following were announced on 23rd March :—

Major-General C. R. Hardy, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., R.M., to be promoted Lieutenant-General and to be Commandant General, Royal Marines, in succession to General Sir John C. Westall, K.C.B., C.B.E., R.M., the appointment to take effect about mid-August, 1955.

Colonel F. C. Horton, O.B.E., R.M., to be promoted Major-General on 8th May, 1955, and appointed Chief of Staff to Commandant General, Royal Marines, in succession to Major-General C. R. Hardy in May, 1955.

LECTURE TOUR IN SWITZERLAND.—At the request of the Swiss General Staff, Major General J. L. Moulton, D.S.O., O.B.E., carried out a tour of Swiss Army establishments in February during which he lectured to the Swiss Officers' Society on "Training and Employment of Commandos."

EXERCISE "SEA TROUT".—Exercise "Sea Trout," an amphibious exercise involving the landing and re-embarkation of 42 Commando on the South Devon coast near Brixham, took place between 1st and 3rd March. The exercise was designed to practice the mounting and execution of a medium scale raid. Forces taking part included H.M. Ships *Undaunted*, *Tyrian*, and L.C.T. 4037, Naval and R.A.F. aircraft, and elements of 16 Independent Parachute Brigade.

SNOW TRAINING.—The Norwegian mountains, the peaks of the Cairngorms in the Scottish Highlands, and Canadian Arctic territories formed the background for this year's snow warfare training. In Scotland, the training programme began in the last week of January and continued until March. Other officers and men who had already carried out the Cairngorms training visited Norway, and with the co-operation of the Army there carried out advanced training, including tactical exercises and cross-country ski-ing. Individual officers went to Canada and Norway.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

CANADA

SUBMARINES FROM ROYAL NAVY

To provide submarines for anti-submarine training in the Royal Canadian Navy, as arranged last year between the Admiralty and the Canadian Naval Board, a new submarine squadron of the Royal Navy has been formed. Known as the 6th Submarine Squadron, it will consist of the *Astute*, *Ambush*, and *Alderney*. The *Astute* sailed for Canada from Portsmouth on 26th March and the other two are expected to sail in mid-May and mid-July respectively. The Squadron will be commanded by Commander W. T. J. Fox, R.N., and will be based at Halifax, Nova Scotia.

AUSTRALIA**FRIGATE EXERCISES**

H.M.A.S. *Queenborough* was expected to arrive in the United Kingdom during April to carry out exercises with the Home Fleet and to remain for some months. The *Queenborough*, built on the Tyne in 1942, was lent to Australia in 1945 and permanently transferred to the R.A.N. in 1950. She was converted to a fast anti-submarine frigate in Australia in 1954.

NEW ZEALAND**CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF**

Captain (Commodore 2nd Class) J. E. H. McBeath, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., has been lent to the Royal New Zealand Navy as Chief of Naval Staff, New Zealand Navy Board, in succession to Commodore Sir Charles E. Madden, Bart., serving in the rank of Acting Rear-Admiral, the appointment to take effect in May, 1955.

INDIA

CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF.—Vice-Admiral S. H. Carlill, C.B., D.S.O., is to be lent to the Indian Navy as Chief of Naval Staff, Indian Navy, in succession to Admiral Sir C. T. Mark Pizey, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., the appointment to take effect in July, 1955.

FLAG OFFICER (FLOTILLAS).—Captain Sir St. John R. J. Tyrwhitt, Bart., D.S.O., D.S.C., has been lent to the Indian Navy as Flag Officer (Flotillas), in succession to Rear-Admiral F. A. Ballance, C.B., D.S.O., serving in the rank of Acting Rear-Admiral, from April, 1955.

CEYLON**CAPTAIN OF THE NAVY**

Captain P. M. B. Chavasse, D.S.C., has been appointed for loan service to the Royal Ceylon Navy as Captain of the Navy and will serve in this appointment in the rank of Commodore, 2nd Class.

FOREIGN**ARGENTINA****ANTARCTIC BASE**

Admiral Ramon Brunet, Argentine Commander of Naval Operations, announced at a Press conference in Buenos Aires on 17th January that Argentina, thanks to her new ice breaker, the *General San Martin*, recently built in Germany, was now establishing a new Antarctic base in the Weddell Sea, only 800 miles from the South Pole. It would be the world's southernmost scientific station, situated at 78° South, 39° West. The new base is being named after one of Argentina's national heroes, General Belgrano.

CHILE**ANTARCTIC BASE**

It was announced in Santiago on 20th February that the Chilean Minister of Defence, Senor Tobias Barros, who was visiting the "southern region of Chile to reaffirm Chilean sovereignty," had arrived two days earlier in Pendulum Bay, Deception Island, and officially inaugurated a new base, which he named "Presidente Carlos Ibañez," after the Chilean President.

FRANCE**SURVIVAL AT SEA TEST**

Ten volunteers from the French Navy, led by a lieutenant-commander and including a medical officer and a representative of the Naval High Command, were cast adrift on a rubber raft in the Brest estuary on 22nd March, for a six-day test of the theories advanced

by Dr. Alain Bombard. In 1952, Dr. Bombard spent 65 days crossing the Atlantic by raft in an endeavour to prove that shipwrecked mariners could survive on a diet of raw fish and plankton, and could consume far larger quantities of sea water than had hitherto been thought possible.

PERU

NEW TANKER

The Peruvian Ambassador was present at Southampton on 15th February when the tanker *Sechura*, built in the Woolston yard of John I. Thornycroft and Company, was handed over to the Peruvian Navy.

SPAIN

SQUADRON AT BARCELONA

The heavy cruiser *Canarias*, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Abarzuza, Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Fleet, and several Spanish destroyers spent six days at Barcelona in February coinciding with a visit of the United States aircraft carrier *Randolph* and other units of the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet.

TURKEY

PRESIDENT'S CRUISE

H.M.S. *Flamingo* and the Indian Naval ship *Tir* fired 21-gun salutes when the President of Turkey, His Excellency Celâl Bayar, left Bahrein on 15th February in the Turkish training ship *Savarona* for Karachi, escorted by the Turkish destroyers *Gaziantep* and *Demirhisar*.

UNITED STATES

ATOMIC SUBMARINE.—The submarine *Nautilus*, the first ship to be propelled by atomic power, began her sea trials from Groton, Connecticut, on 17th January, and after 50 hours of surface trials made her first dive successfully on 20th January. On 20th March, the *Nautilus* left Groton for a demonstration cruise with 14 members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and several senior naval officers on board.

NEW CONSTRUCTION.—The House Armed Services Committee on 9th March approved plans to build 24 new warships, including a fifth super-aircraft carrier of the "Forrestal" class and three more atomic powered submarines.

GUIDED MISSILES.—According to the Washington Correspondent of *The Times*, Mr. Thomas, Secretary of the Navy, spoke in New York on 16th February of new techniques by which American naval forces are complementing their fixed land bases by a new concept of mobile sea bases—carriers, jet seaplanes, and guided missile ships. They would be able to change locations at speeds up to 40 miles an hour to any area of the world's oceans and seas where their presence was required, and they gave the American reprisal system the flexibility and dispersal it must have when sudden attack might overwhelm land bases. Three types of guided missiles were now operational in the Navy, the projectile called the Sparrow (air-to-air); the Terrier (surface-to-air); and the Regulus (surface-to-surface).

ARMY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

The Duke of Edinburgh visited the Guards Depot at Caterham on 1st March and presented leeks to the Welsh Guards.

The Duke of Gloucester, as Colonel-in-Chief, inspected the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, at Barnard Castle on 7th February.

The Duke of Gloucester left England by air on 21st March on a tour of visits in the British Army of the Rhine, which included the 2nd Battalion, Scots Guards, and units of the Royal Army Service Corps of which Regiment and Corps he is Colonel and Colonel-in-Chief respectively. His Royal Highness returned to England by air on 24th March.

The Princess Royal visited the Guards Depot, Caterham, on 17th March and presented shamrock to the Irish Guards.

The Princess Royal left England by air on 31st March on a tour of visits in the British Army of the Rhine, which included units of the Royal Corps of Signals and the Women's Royal Army Corps of which she is Colonel-in-Chief and Controller Commandant respectively. Her Royal Highness returned to England by air on 6th April.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments:—

TO BE AIDES-DE-CAMP TO HER MAJESTY.—Brigadier R. W. Jelf, C.B.E., late R.A. (29th September, 1954), vice Major-General B. P. Hughes, C.B.E., promoted; Brigadier L. de M. Thuillier, O.B.E., late Royal Signals (8th January, 1955), vice Brigadier C. A. H. Chadwick, C.B.E., retired; Brigadier R. E. H. Hudson, D.S.O., late R.A. (7th February, 1955), vice Brigadier C. I. V. Jones, C.B.E., retired; Brigadier R. N. M. Jones, C.B.E., late Infantry (18th February, 1955), vice Brigadier R. H. Maxwell, C.B., retired.

TO BE HONORARY PHYSICIAN TO HER MAJESTY.—Major-General F. J. O'Meara, M.D., F.R.C.P.I. (1st January, 1955), vice Brigadier R. J. Rosie, C.B.E., M.B., retired.

TO BE HONORARY SURGEON TO HER MAJESTY.—Colonel C. M. Marsden, M.B., F.R.C.S.(Edin.) (8th January, 1955), vice Major-General J. C. Collins, C.B., C.B.E., retired.

TO BE COLONELS COMMANDANT.—Of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Major-General B. C. H. Kimmins, C.B., C.B.E. (17th April, 1955), vice Lieut.-General Sir Edmond C. A. Schreiber, K.C.B., D.S.O., tenure expired; of the Corps of Royal Engineers, General Sir Nevil C. D. Brownjohn, K.C.B., C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C. (31st January, 1955), vice Major-General (Honorary Lieut.-General) Sir Philip Neame, V.C., K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., tenure expired.

APPOINTMENTS

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY.—Brigadier F. W. S. Gordon-Hall, C.B.E., appointed Director-General of Fighting Vehicles, with the temporary rank of Major-General (June, 1955).

WAR OFFICE.—Major-General G. C. Humphreys, C.B., C.B.E., to a special appointment (28th July, 1954).

Brigadier (temporary Major-General) N. P. H. Tapp, C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Director of Military Training (18th April, 1955).

Major-General W. P. Oliver, C.B., O.B.E., appointed Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, with the temporary rank of Lieut.-General (May, 1955).

Brigadier W. S. Cole, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Deputy Quarter-Master-General, with the temporary rank of Major-General (May, 1955).

Major-General H. R. B. Foote, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., appointed Director, Royal Armoured Corps (August, 1955).

General Sir Gerald W. R. Templer, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff (November, 1955).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Brigadier R. A. Bramwell-Davis, D.S.O., appointed Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Southern Command, with the temporary rank of Major-General (22nd March, 1955).

Major-General R. P. Harding, C.B., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., East Anglian District (May, 1955).

Major-General B. C. H. Kimmins, C.B., C.B.E., appointed G.O.C., Northern Ireland District (July, 1955).

GERMANY.—Major-General R. C. Cottrell-Hill, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., appointed G.O.C. (British Sector), British Troops, Berlin (May, 1955).

NORTHERN EUROPE.—Major-General R. H. Bower, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Chief of Staff to the C.-in-C., Allied Forces Northern Europe (May, 1955).

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—Major-General J. N. R. Moore, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division (July, 1955).

PROMOTIONS

Field-Marshal.—General to be Field-Marshal:—H.R.H. The Duke of Gloucester, Earl of Ulster, K.G., K.T., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O. (31st March, 1955).

Lieut.-General.—

Major-General to be temporary Lieut.-General:—H. Murray, C.B., D.S.O. (28th February, 1955).

Major-Generals.—Temporary Major-Generals, Brigadiers, or Colonels to be Major-Generals:—G. D. G. Heyman, C.B., C.B.E. (6th January, 1955); K. C. Cooper, D.S.O., O.B.E. (12th January, 1955); R. C. M. King, D.S.O., O.B.E. (18th January, 1955); E. S. Lindsay, C.B.E., D.S.O. (29th January, 1955); D. J. Muir, O.B.E. (5th March, 1955).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals:—A. H. Musson (28th February, 1955); R. A. Bramwell-Davis (22nd March, 1955); J. D'A. Anderson, C.B.E., D.S.O. (4th April, 1955); G. O. Crawford, C.B.E., A.D.C. (12th April, 1955).

RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired:—Major-General L. Wansbrough-Jones, C.B., C.B.E. (18th January, 1955); Major-General G. S. Hatton, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. (29th January, 1955); Lieut.-General Sir Colin M. Barber, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (28th March, 1955); Major-General P. Le M. S. Stonhouse-Gostling, C.B.E. (28th March, 1955); Lieut.-General Sir Euan A. B. Miller, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (29th March, 1955).

ARMY ESTIMATES, 1955-56

The Army Estimates for 1955-56, excluding the receipts arising from mutual defence assistance from the United States (£10,000,000), amounted to a gross expenditure of £542,750,100 (£628,500,100 in 1954-55), reduced by appropriations in aid to the net figure of £484,000,100 (£561,000,100 in 1954-55).

The gross estimates for the main items of expenditure, with net estimates given in parentheses, were as follows:—Army pay, etc., £135,840,000 (£119,620,000); Reserve, Territorial, and Auxiliary Forces, £16,430,000 (£16,240,000); Civilian pay, etc., £69,300,000 (£67,720,000); Movements, £32,120,000 (£30,810,000); Supplies, £63,610,000 (£49,470,000); Production and Research, £155,250,000 (£129,000,000); Works, £40,520,000 (£33,820,000); Miscellaneous effective services, £10,000,000 (£7,880,000); Non-effective charges, £19,680,000 (£19,440,000).

Points made in the White Paper included the following :—

Manpower.—Regular Army recruiting in 1954, though showing a small drop on 1953, has not been unsatisfactory. The number of men who enlisted from civil life on a 22 year engagement during 1954 was 18,425, and the number of prolongations of engagement to 12 years in 1954 was almost double that in 1953. It is too early yet to assess the result of the new 3-22 year type of engagement, but of those who have so far decided to prolong their service for more than 3 years, 67 per cent. have extended to 12 years rather than to six years.

The National Service element of the Regular Army has decreased during 1954 owing to the run-out of the exceptionally large intake of 1952-53. National Service men provided about 25 per cent. of the corporals and 50 per cent. of the lance-corporals, and in some highly skilled trades the proportion of National Service men was over 70 per cent.

The Army Emergency Reserve is still much below its target, and volunteers for this important reserve are badly needed.

In the Territorial Army, although the first cycle of National Service is coming to an end, the strength has continued to rise because earlier intakes which are now leaving were smaller than those which are being received today. As a result, the strength of the Territorial Army at the end of December, 1954, was 17,719 officers and 288,489 other ranks, including the women's services.

The Home Guard has continued to make steady progress in 1954, and its strength at the end of the year was : enrolled, 37,000 ; reserve roll, 39,000 ; total, 76,000, an increase of 14,000 over the previous year.

Training.—In all types of modern warfare, there is an urgent need to simplify weapons, to reduce the number and variety of vehicles, and to simplify and speed up methods of supply. These problems have been studied throughout the past Winter, and experimental organizations have been drawn up and will be tried this year. The object of all these changes will be to increase mobility both on and off the battlefield and at the same time to add to effective fighting power.

Weapons.—The new tank, the Conqueror, is now beginning to be issued to the Army. Improvements have been made to the Centurion tank.

The introduction of the L70 light anti-aircraft gun with its associated radar will give the Army a much more powerful weapon to deal with low-flying aircraft.

Five thousand FN self-loading rifles are being tried by the troops in all overseas theatres, and as soon as final details resulting from troop trials are settled, production will be pressed on as rapidly as possible.

A new sub-machine gun as a general purpose personal weapon and as the complement to the FN rifle is being brought into the Service.

Transport.—Experiments are being studied with helicopters, but progress will be slow as quantity production of a heavy load vertical lift aircraft, helicopter or otherwise, is still some way off.

The most difficult problem will probably arise in the field of supply. The development of transport to overcome the problems of supply and maintenance under conditions of nuclear warfare has so far lagged behind the development of weapons. Cheap cross-country load carrying vehicles based on civil production, aided by vertical lift and short take-off aircraft capable of lifting heavy loads, appear to offer the best solution.

ARMY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE

This three-day conference and exercise took place in mid-March at Headquarters, Eastern Command, Hounslow. The aim of the exercise was to examine in both a hot and cold war setting the organization of infantry and armoured divisions, and the

principal object was to stimulate a discussion on the Army's equipment, organization, and functional problems in special relation to the scientific developments which have taken place in the last few years.

DISBANDMENT OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS

It was announced by the War Office on 5th April that the following anti-aircraft units are to be disbanded:—2 (HAA) H.A.C. and 625 LAA, 451 HAA, 499(M) HAA, 609(M) HAA, 484(M) HAA, 607(M) HAA, 489 HAA, 455(M) AA, 516(M) LAA, 535 LAA, 583(M) HAA, 523 LAA, 558(M) HAA, and 652 HAA Regiments.

REGULAR ARMY RECRUITING

The Regular Army recruiting statistics for March show that the total number of enlistments from civil life during the month were 2,772 men and 205 boys compared with 2,639 and 158 in January and 2,708 and 442 in February. The figures for re-enlistments were 6 from Short Service (January, 6; February, 9) and 449 from National Service (January, 358; February, 366).

ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, SANDHURST

The War Office announced on 25th January that courses at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, are being altered to provide greater continuity between school and military training. As a result, candidates will go straight to Sandhurst when they join the Army. In the past, direct entrants have been required to carry out 10 weeks other-rank training at training units before going on to Sandhurst.

Under the new arrangements, they will go direct to the Academy on entering the Army in January or September and complete their basic military training as other ranks in the first 13 weeks of the course there. Entrants who have already served in the ranks will spend this initial period principally on academic study. Officer Cadet status will be granted at the beginning of the second term at Sandhurst.

To accommodate the additional 13 weeks, the length of the whole course has been raised from 18 months to 23 months. This period is made up of three 13-week terms a year corresponding with school terms, and 21 weeks leave. An additional advantage of the new system is the fact that cadets will receive all their training at Sandhurst.

REVIVAL OF OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS TITLE

The War Office announced on 26th January that the University Training Corps is to revert to its pre-war title of Officers Training Corps. The change reflects a return of the Corps to its original role as an officer producing organization. The first O.T.C. was established for this purpose in 1908, and up to the 1939-45 War was responsible for the preparation of many thousands of young men for commissioned service in the Army. During the war the O.T.C. became a part of the Home Guard as the Senior Training Corps with compulsory service. In 1948, with the return of voluntary enlistment, the Corps was re-designated the University Training Corps, T.A., and it became part of the Territorial Army. In addition to the training of potential officers, and in order to make use of academic qualifications for the technical arms of the Service, sub-units were formed. They included R.A.C., R.A., R.E., Signals, R.E.M.E., and the R.A.M.C. Later, W.R.A.C. sub-units were formed.

In its new organization, a limited number of specialist sub-units will be retained, but the whole emphasis of training will be on leadership and preparation for Regular, National Service, and Territorial Army commissions. The Corps will remain an integral part of the Territorial Army.

As a result of the Corps' new responsibilities the training syllabus will now include basic officer training comparable to that given at the Officer Cadet Schools. A new Certificate B Examination will be instituted in line with the required standards. A cadet

with this certificate who passes the War Office Selection Board when he is called up for National Service will be exempted from the first six weeks of his Officer Cadet School course. If his deferment is for longer than the normal three years university course, he may carry out the 10 weeks advanced training at an officer cadet school and, if successful, may be granted a T.A. commission which will be converted to a National Service commission on call-up. Out of camp training for those undergraduates who have completed full-time National Service will continue to be governed by existing regulations.

MISCELLANEOUS

TOUR OF THE C.I.G.S.—Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, left England by air on 19th February to attend the Bangkok Conference. After the conference he visited Malaya and Korea. He returned to England on 13th March.

GRENADIER GUARDS TERCENTENARY.—The Grenadier Guards will celebrate their tercentenary next year. H.M. The Queen has graciously given permission for an exhibition depicting the history of the Regiment to be held in St. James's Palace in June, 1956.

MEDAL AWARD FOR SERVICE IN KENYA.—It was announced in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister on 8th February that H.M. The Queen had approved the award of the African General Service Medal to members of the Services, to the police and prison services, and to officers of the civil administration for operations against the Mau Mau in specified areas in Kenya. The terms of the award are contained in a White Paper (Cmd. 9378), price 3d.

ROYAL SIGNALS INSTITUTION.—This Institution "to foster professional and technical interests of the Royal Corps of Signals," which has been formed recently under the patronage of H.R.H. The Princess Royal, Colonel-in-Chief of the Corps, has established its headquarters at 88, Eccleston Square, London, S.W.1.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

CANADA

APPOINTMENTS.—Major-General A. Bruce-Mathews, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., has been appointed Chairman of the Canadian Army Battle Honours Committee for the 1939-45 War.

Brigadier H. W. Love, O.B.E., C.D., has been appointed Commander, Saskatchewan Area.

Colonel H. L. Meuser, O.B.E., C.D., has been appointed Commander, North-West Highway System and promoted to the rank of Brigadier.

Colonel E. C. Mayhew, C.D., has been appointed Chief of Staff and Assistant Military Attaché, Canadian Army Staff, Washington.

Colonel D. A. G. Waldock, C.D., has been appointed Director of Armament Development.

Colonel C. R. Boehm, M.B.E., C.D., has been appointed to the command of the Canadian Armament Design and Experimental Establishment at Valcartier.

TRAINING AT CAMP GAGETOWN.—More than 10,000 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, most of them from units of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, will concentrate for six weeks of intensive training at Camp Gagetown this Summer. They will begin to arrive about mid-June and all units will be in camp by the first week in July. The training will culminate in the Canadian Army's first peace-time divisional exercise "Rising Star," which will take place from 7th-14th August and has been designed to train the 1st Canadian Infantry Division in its operational role. Headquarters 3rd and 4th Canadian Infantry Brigades, one armoured regiment, two artillery regiments, eight infantry battalions, and other divisional troops will take part.

2ND CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE FOR GERMANY.—It was announced on 16th March that the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade has been selected to relieve the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade in Germany. The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade will have completed its two-year tour in October/November.

INSTRUCTORS TRAIN IN ENGLAND.—Twenty-one senior warrant and non-commissioned officers of the Canadian Army have arrived in England for special training. They will spend three months overseas, about six weeks at the Guards' Depot and the remainder of the time attached for training to British units in the United Kingdom and in Europe. Canada has sent approximately 80 drill instructors to England for training since 1952, and a further 20 will be despatched in August.

ROYAL CANADIAN ARTILLERY BAND.—The Royal Canadian Artillery Band sailed early in February for a tour of duty with Canadian Army units in Europe, relieving the band of the Royal Canadian Engineers, which returned to Canada.

NEW ANTI-TANK WEAPON.—A new anti-tank weapon with superior qualities of accuracy and penetration has been produced in Canada, and it is the first complete weapon, with ammunition and fire control system, that has been designed, developed, and manufactured in that country. The "Heller," as it is called, is a combination recoilless rifle and rocket launcher, and is primarily an infantry weapon. It is easily carried by a soldier, can be fired from the shoulder while standing, sitting, or kneeling, and no fire gloves or protective mask are necessary.

MILITARY EQUIPMENT SENT TO EUROPE.—Shipments sent to the armies of N.A.T.O. countries in Europe between February and April, 1955, included ammunition, mortars, hand grenades, artillery equipment, electronic equipment, and spare parts for army lorries.

AUSTRALIA

CHANGES IN ARMY TRAINING.—To meet requirements imposed by the possible use of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, the Australian Army has revised its system of training, with provisions for the introduction of new methods and modern weapons in all sections.

The modifications to present teachings in tactics and operational procedures considered necessary to cope with the new conditions have been drawn up and are being issued in a training pamphlet by Army Headquarters. The new doctrine is to be adopted immediately, and will be adjusted from time to time as demanded by developments in new types of warfare.

During 1955, 23 army schools of instruction are to be held, and it is estimated that more than 10,000 students will attend for instruction. In addition, command training activities are to be increased.

Simultaneously with the efforts directed to prepare for atomic warfare, additional facilities are being provided for training in tropical and jungle operations at the Jungle Training Centre at Canungra, and two C.M.F. commando units are being raised for training in guerilla warfare; one in Sydney, and the other in Melbourne.

NEW SERVICE RIFLE ADOPTED.—One of the first announcements from Army Headquarters this year was that the new FN .30 rifle, which had been adopted by N.A.T.O., would replace the Lee Enfield .303 rifle as standard equipment in the Australian Army.

NEW ZEALAND

NEW CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF

It was announced on 28th January that Brigadier C. E. Weir, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., would succeed Major-General W. G. Gentry, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., who is retiring, as Chief of the New Zealand General Staff.

INDIA**NEW ARMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF**

It was announced on 27th January that Lieut.-General S. M. Shrinagesh had been appointed Chief of Army Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, with the rank of General, in succession to General Rajendrasinhji, who is retiring.

FOREIGN**FRANCE****NEW COMMANDANT IN BERLIN**

Brigadier-General Gèze took over the appointment of French Commandant in West Berlin on 1st January, 1955, in succession to General Pierre Manceaux-Demiau, who had been appointed to take up duties elsewhere.

PORTUGAL**NEW CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF**

It was announced in the Press on 9th March that General Botelho Moniz had been appointed Chief of the General Staff.

RUSSIA**NEW MARSHALS**

On 11th March, it was announced by Moscow radio that eight new marshals of the Army had been created. The new marshals are General Chuikov, Colonel-General Gretchko, General Biryuzov, Colonel-General Moskalenko, General Bagramyan, General Yerenenko, Colonel-General Yarentsev, and Colonel-General Kazakov.

SWITZERLAND**PURCHASE OF CENTURION TANKS**

A grant of 220 million francs (£18,330,000) asked for by the Swiss Federal Government for the purpose of purchasing 100 Centurion tanks was approved by the First Chamber on 23rd March after previous approval by the Second Chamber. The contract with Vickers-Armstrong, Limited, was signed in Berne on 31st March.

UNITED STATES**NEW ARMY COMMANDERS**

Lieut.-General Anthony C. McAuliffe assumed command of the U.S. Army in Europe on 1st February in succession to General William M. Hoge.

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer has been appointed Commander of the Eighth Army in succession to General Maxwell D. Taylor, who has been appointed U.S. and U.N. C.-in-C. in the Far East.

NOTICE**GEORGE KNIGHT CLOWES MEMORIAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION**

The subject for the 1956 competition is as follows:—

"What are your views on the form of the land campaign of the future and how should the British Army be organized to meet the conditions of future war—bearing in mind its possible varying commitments."

Prizes. First prize, £35; second prize, £15.

Closing date. 8th January, 1956.

This competition is sponsored by *The Army Quarterly*, c/o W. Clowes and Sons Ltd., Little New Street, London, E.C.4. General conditions, which are the same as for the 1955 competition, are contained in A.C.I. 479/54 or can be obtained from the Editor of *The Army Quarterly*.

AIR NOTES GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

The Duchess of Gloucester, Air Chief Commandant of the Women's Royal Air Force, paid a visit in March to Headquarters, No. 19 Group, Mount Batten, R.A.F. Station, St. Eval, and the R.A.F. Medical Rehabilitation Centre at Collaton Cross. Her Royal Highness flew to St. Eval in a Viking of The Queen's Flight, and later proceeded to Mount Batten in a helicopter of The Queen's Flight.

HONOURS AND AWARDS

The following award was published in the Second Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 18th March, in recognition of gallant and distinguished service in Kenya :—

C.B.—Group Captain D. J. Eayrs, C.B.E., D.F.C.

APPOINTMENTS

AIR MINISTRY.—Air Commodore K. J. McIntyre, C.B.E., appointed Director of Policy (Air Staff) (1st February, 1955).

Air Vice-Marshal A. Earle, C.B.E., appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) (1st March, 1955).

Air Vice-Marshal A. F. Hutton, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., appointed Director-General of Engineering (March, 1955).

Mr. Handel Davies appointed Scientific Adviser to the Air Ministry (1st March, 1955).

COASTAL COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal C. E. Chilton, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Senior Air Staff Officer (1st March, 1955).

Air Vice-Marshal P. D. Cracroft, C.B., A.F.C., appointed A.O.C., No. 18 Group, and Senior Air Officer, Scotland (1st April, 1955).

TECHNICAL TRAINING COMMAND.—Air Vice-Marshal J. G. Franks, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Senior Air Staff Officer (March, 1955).

Air Commodore G. B. Beardsworth, C.B., appointed Air Officer Commanding, No. 24 Group, with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (March, 1955).

MAINTENANCE COMMAND.—Air Commodore F. G. S. Mitchell, C.B.E., appointed A.O.C. in charge of Administration (March, 1955).

Air Vice-Marshal R. G. Hart, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., appointed A.O.C., No. 41 Group (1st April, 1955).

SECOND TACTICAL AIR FORCE.—Air Commodore D. G. Morris, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., appointed Senior Air Staff Officer with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (1st February, 1955).

PROMOTIONS

Air Marshal to be Air Chief Marshal.—Sir Donald Hardman, K.C.B., O.B.E., D.F.C. (1st April, 1955).

Air Commodores to be acting Air Vice-Marshals.—W. H. Kyle, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.D.C. (14th January, 1955); D. G. Morris, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C. (24th January, 1955); F. G. S. Mitchell, C.B.E. (1st February, 1955); W. C. Sheen, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. (23rd March, 1955).

RETIREMENTS

The following officers have been placed on the retired list :—Air Vice-Marshal G. A. Ballantyne, C.B.E., D.F.C., D.S.R.C.S., E.D.S.R.C.S. (Edin.), Q.H.D.S. (1st January, 1955); Air Vice-Marshal H. W. Heslop, C.B., O.B.E., A.F.R.Ae.S. (6th February, 1955);

Air Vice-Marshal E. D. D. Dickson, C.B., C.B.E., M.D., Ch.B., F.R.C.S.(Edin.), D.L.O., Q.H.S. (28th February, 1955); Air Vice-Marshal H. G. White, C.B., C.B.E., M.I.Mech.E. (1st March, 1955).

AIR ESTIMATES

The net expenditure provided for the Royal Air Force for 1955-56 amounts to £513,900,000 compared with £491,640,000 for 1954-55. It provides for a maximum of 272,000 officers, airmen, and airwomen, compared with 288,000 for the previous year.

In introducing the Air Estimates in the Commons, the Under-Secretary of State for Air, the Hon. George Ward, made the following main points:—

(i) The first task of the R.A.F. was to build up a deterrent in the shape of the V-bomber force and its weapons. Our stockpile was steadily increasing and the Valiants were now coming into Bomber Command. The Vulcans and Victors which had already flown in development flights promised considerable improvement over the Valiant. It would be possible to refuel a large proportion of the V-bombers in flight.

(ii) The essence of the new bomber force lay in its flexibility and in its power to strike quickly at targets far away and with the assistance of Transport Command to move from base to base at short notice.

(iii) The re-equipment of the day fighter squadrons with Hunters was well advanced. The Hunter could hit about nine times as hard as its predecessors. It was a much better aircraft than the MIG-15 and MIG-17.

(iv) At the same time the Meteors and Vampires of the R.Aux.A.F. would be highly effective against the possibility of airborne attack or diversionary raids by paratroopers.

(v) The Javelin would be capable of carrying air-to-air guided weapons.

(vi) The expansion of Fighter Command had now been completed.

OPERATIONS

HASTINGS AIRCRAFT FOR MALAYAN OPERATIONS.—The Royal Air Force has begun to use four-engined Hastings transport aircraft for supply dropping in Malaya, where operations against the Communist terrorists continue almost day and night. They are being used in addition to two-engined Valettas and smaller aircraft.

The Hastings, which belong to No. 53 Squadron, were recently transferred from their base at Lyneham, Wilts., for a short period of attachment to the Far East Transport Wing at R.A.F., Changi.

CANBERRAS IN MALAYA.—Four Canberra B.6s of No. 101 Squadron, Bomber Command, have spent three months undergoing operational trials with the Far East Air Force. The Canberra B.6 is more powerful and has a greater range than the B.2 version, which it is superseding in some of the bomber squadrons. No. 101 Squadron, which was the first to receive the original B.2 Canberras towards the end of 1951, was also the first unit to get the B.6.

HORNET SQUADRON COMPLETES ITS 5,000TH MALAYAN SORTIE.—No. 33 Squadron, based at R.A.F., Butterworth, Malaya, has now completed 5,000 operational sorties against the Communist terrorists.

ORGANIZATION

BOMBER BASES IN MALAYA.—£1,500,000 is to be spent this year on converting three Malayan civil airfields to military use, thus bringing the number of fields fit for jet bombers to five. Two of the airfields, Alor Star and Gong Kedar, are a few minutes flying time from Thailand. The third, Kuantah, is less than an hour from Indo-China. The runway at Alor Star, capital of Kedah state, was built by the Japanese. Gong Kedah was started by the British and finished by the Japanese during the occupation.

NIGHT INTERDICTORS FOR 2ND T.A.F.—The introduction of the new night-interdictor version of the Canberra jet bomber for R.A.F. squadron service with the 2nd Tactical Air Force, Germany, later this year, will mean a considerable increase in the striking power of the Command in night operations.

In general terms, the new night-interdictor squadrons will perform by night similar work to that undertaken by the single-seat ground-attack squadrons during the day. Interdictor operations include the hampering of enemy movements—by attacks on road and rail transport, bridges, and so on—and attacks on airfields and troop concentrations. Night operations of this type call for an aircraft with greater endurance and equipped with more navigational aids than are possessed by the single-seat Venom ground-attack aircraft. The Canberra meets the requirements well.

MATERIEL

BRITISH GUIDED MISSILES ORDERED.—Production orders have now been placed for air-to-air guided missiles of British design, Mr. G. Ward, Under-Secretary of State for Air, said in reply to questions in the House of Commons on 2nd February. He could not give details of the missiles programme, however, nor could he say when they were expected in service. Development had been proceeding as rapidly as possible, and had been going very well.

JAVELIN DEVELOPMENT.—A new all-weather fighter is being developed from the Gloster Javelin, it was officially disclosed on 2nd March. No details of the developments were given. The Javelin is a delta-wing, long-range fighter and was first flown in November, 1951.

DOMINIONS AND COLONIES

CANADA

FIRST NIKE FIRING TESTS AT FORT CHURCHILL

Canadian Army gun crews recently completed the first Nike Arctic firing tests at Fort Churchill. The tests initiate a series of exercises designed to try out Canada's defences against trans-Polar attack.

AUSTRALIA

APPOINTMENT TO AIR MINISTRY.—Air Commodore I. D. McLachlan, C.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.A.F., has been appointed Director of Flying Training at the Air Ministry, London.

R.A.A.F. ORGANIZATION.—With the return of No. 78 Fighter Wing from Malta early in the New Year, the entire R.A.A.F. permanent fighter component is on Australian soil for the first time since the end of the War. No. 78 Fighter Wing, which left the Vampires of its Nos. 75 and 76 Squadrons in Malta, is completed by No. 77 Squadron. This squadron recently returned from Korea after a distinguished war record and will continue to fly its Meteors at William Town. One of No. 78 Wing's Malta squadrons will convert there to Meteors, while the other will be the first unit to receive the Avon-Sabre. A Sabre conversion flight has also been set up at that Station, and the first Commonwealth-built Avon-Sabre was recently delivered there from Laverton, Victoria. This was the first of a number of Avon-Sabres which will be flown intensively for six months by the flight. Eventually all three fighter squadrons of the Regular R.A.A.F. will be re-equipped with these aircraft.

FIRST WINJEEL DELIVERED.—The first Commonwealth Winjeel trainer was delivered recently to the R.A.A.F. An initial order for 60 has been placed, but it is expected to be increased to 200 very soon. Average cost is said to be about £A20,000 (against £A10,000 for the Wirraway); the rate of climb is given as 2,000 ft./min. and top speed is 184 m.p.h.

NEW ZEALAND

N.Z. VENOMS FOR MALAYA.—The New Zealand fighter squadron which is going to Malaya will be equipped with the latest Venom jet aircraft by about the middle of next year, according to an Air Force spokesman in Wellington. The squadron, which is at present using Vampire jets, was transferred from Cyprus to Malaya in April.

TRANSPORT SQUADRON.—No. 40, the original transport unit of the R.N.Z.A.F. in the 1939-45 War, has been reformed. It is now equipped with Hastings aircraft.

SOUTH AFRICA**S.A.A.F.**

It has been officially announced in Cape Town that the S.A.A.F. is to have air support units for co-operation with armoured forces; that a five-year plan for the construction of an extensive radar network has been prepared and will cost about £5,500,000; that helicopters will replace launches for all rescue work; and that modern four-engined aircraft will take over "almost completely" the work of troop transport.

PAKISTAN**NEW C.-in-C., R.P.A.F.**

Air Vice-Marshal A. W. B. McDonald, C.B., A.F.C., has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Pakistan Air Force (May, 1955).

FOREIGN**BELGIUM****HIGH ACCIDENT RATE**

The great concern felt in Belgium about the very high accident rate in the Belgian Air Force has resulted in the Minister of Defence convening a special committee of senior officers of the B.A.F. to examine the situation. It was reported that during the years 1953 and 1954 there were 345 accidents, 63 per cent. of which were attributable to pilot error, and a total of 55 Belgian pilots were killed. In terms of money these accidents were given as representing a loss of about £4,000,000.

FINLAND**FINNISH VAMPIRE TRAINERS**

Finland, whose Air Force already operates de Havilland Vampire jet fighters, has now placed an order for Vampire trainer aircraft.

FRANCE

FRENCH AIR FORCE PLANS.—During 1954, the French Air Force received the last of a series production of 350 Dassault Ouragan fighters (MD 450), which were put into service mainly as replacements for the Mistral, a French version of the British Vampire. The F.A.F. also received an unspecified number of F-84Gs under the M.D.A.P. agreement with the U.S., which are replacing existing F-84s. Also the F.A.F. took delivery of the first 15 of a series of 150 Dassault Mystère 2C fighters, and received a squadron of Meteor night fighters from Great Britain. These combat aircraft, together with 50 Nord 2501 transports constitute the overall deliveries to the French Air Force last year, apart from training planes. Scheduled for delivery in 1955 and 1956 are the remaining 135 Mystère 2Cs, and a total of about 400 of the Dassault Mystère 4 group—4As equipped with a Hispano-Suiza Verdon engine of 7,700 lb. thrust, 4Bs powered by a French-built version of the Rolls-Royce Avon developing 9,900 lb. thrust with after-burner, and 4Ns which will be night fighter versions. Also to be provided in the immediate future are 70 Vautours (SO.4050), being built in three versions—all-weather fighter, ground support,

and light bomber—all powered with S.N.E.C.M.A. Atar 101 engines of 6,600 lb. thrust each. Substantial follow-on orders are expected for the Vautour.

METEORS LAUNCH GUIDED MISSILES.—It was reported that the French Air Force has been experimenting over the Sahara Desert with a rocket which guides itself on to the target by an electronic 'magic eye.' Nearly 15 ft. long, and weighing about 90 lb., the rocket can be shot from an aircraft at 1,242 m.p.h., and can strike a moving target more than three miles away. Gloster Meteor jet planes have been used to launch the rocket at parachute targets over the Sahara.

NEW BOMBER.—The third prototype of the Vautour, the bomber version, flew for the first time in December, 1954.

GERMANY

EAST GERMAN AIR FORCE

The Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs gives in a pamphlet published on 30th January the estimate of size and some details of the organization of fighting forces in Eastern Germany up to October last year. The air force, which bears the camouflage designation of Aero Club, has between 7,000 and 18,000 men, all of whom are based in East Saxony. They, like the ground forces, are getting better equipment now than they had a year ago, but they have received none of the latest Soviet aircraft. What they have would be of no operational value and would be useful only for training purposes. Unconfirmed reports have it that German pilots are receiving instruction in flying Russian jet fighters, but at Soviet air bases and not with the Aero Club.

ISRAEL

MYSTERES ORDERED

Fifteen Marcel Dassault Mystère II jet fighters have been ordered by the Government of Israel. In the absence of further information it is presumed that these are powered, as are Mystère IICs for the French Air Force, with S.N.E.C.M.A. Atar 101s.

JAPAN

U.S. DELIVERIES TO JAPAN

The first consignment of 59 aircraft under the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme was received by the Japanese Defence Force at Tachikawa airfield on 20th January. It was made up of 35 T-6 (Harvard) trainers, 16 C-46 Commando transports, and eight Lockheed T-33 jet trainers. All the aircraft bore the insignia of the Rising Sun. The Japanese Defence Board is said to be expecting delivery of about 400 aircraft in all, including 70 North American Sabres.

KOREA

SOUTH KOREAN JET PILOTS

The R.O.K.A.F. can now claim to have jet pilots for the first time in its history. The first ten South Koreans ever to pilot jet aircraft completed their training course in mid-February. Their training had been undertaken by the 5th United States Air Force based at Osan, using Lockheed T-33s for the purpose. According to their American instructors, the pupils had done extremely well and had shown both enthusiasm and skill. The course, which lasted 60 days, included 13 hours of transition, 11 hours formation, 20 hours instrument, and 12 hours on tactics training. The ten pilots, two lieut.-colonels and eight majors, had considerable previous experience on Mustangs, each one having flown a minimum of 100 combat missions. This graduation brings South Korea a step closer to the wing of F-86 Sabre jets it is scheduled to receive under the U.S. military aid programme.

NETHERLANDS

NEW BADGES OF RANK

New badges of rank were introduced into the Royal Netherlands Air Force on 1st January, 1955. Prior to that date, R.N.A.F. personnel wore the same badges of rank as the Dutch Army, but the new ones are identical to those in use in the R.A.F. and are to be worn in the same manner. Army rank titles will be retained and R.N.A.F. officers will in future wear rank badges identical to their equivalent rank in the R.A.F.

RUSSIA

SOVIET AIR FORCE PROMOTIONS

On 11th March, Moscow Radio broadcast a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, announcing the promotions of three of the senior officers of the Soviet Air Force. They include Air Marshal Zhigarev, C.-in-C. of the S.A.F., who becomes the equivalent of an Air Chief Marshal; and S. I. Rudenko and V. A. Sudets, who from Colonel-Generals of Aviation become Air Marshals.

TURKEY

ORDER FOR TRAINING AIRCRAFT.—A Press report of 23rd February stated that "the trainer aircraft M.K.E. Model 4 Ugur manufactured entirely in Turkey has proved to have excellent manoeuvrability. The Turkish Air Force has ordered a large number of these trainers from the M.K.E."

GIFT OF TRAINERS TO JORDAN.—Three of these Mark IV Ugurs, in fact modified Magister aircraft, were given as a gift to Jordan. The handing over ceremony took place on 1st March at Etimesgut, Ankara, airfield, attended by the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Cs.-in-C. of the Air Force and the Navy, the U.S. Ambassador, and others.

CANADIAN AID: AIRCRAFT AND PILOT TRAINING.—The Press of 4th February reported that Canadian aid to the T.A.F. would be increased. The number of T.A.F. pilots training in Canada would be trebled, from 25 to 75.

The Canadian Ambassador, interviewed in Istanbul, was reported as follows: "Canadian military aid to Turkey will amount to \$100,000,000. . . . To date, 41 Sabre jets have arrived in this country. . . ."

HERON AIRCRAFT FOR STATE AIRWAYS.—Recently the first two Herons for the Turkish State Airways arrived in Istanbul. Within two days one landed with undercarriage up and it is understood that new propellers are now awaited from the United Kingdom.

UNITED STATES

U.S. DEFENCE EXPENDITURE.—The Defence Department expects to spend for aircraft a total of \$7,557,045,000 this year and an additional \$7,549,628,000 in fiscal 1956, a report issued by Mr. W. J. McNeil, Assistant Defence Secretary (Comptroller) reveals. The Defence Department anticipates an unexpended balance for aircraft of \$15,327,219,000 on 30th June, 1956.

EXPANSION OF U.S.A.F.—It is reported that although the Air Force is constantly re-evaluating its goal of 137 wings by mid-1957, it has not changed its plans. The Air Force expansion programme is said to be running some four wings ahead of schedule and by mid-1956 will provide 131 wings.

ASSAULT BY HELICOPTER.—Atomic tests which took place in Nevada recently were designed to test the efficacy of helicopter landings after atomic assault. The Defence Department has said that the highlight of "Operation Teapot" was an assault by helicopter-borne Marines on an enemy position presumed to have been atom-bombed.

NEW TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT.—The first production version of the Lockheed C-130A Hercules has been completed. The first American transport aircraft designed to use turbo-prop engines, it is classed as a medium combat transport. Tactical Air Command will receive the first production models.

MODIFICATION OF THE B-47.—Under a new conversion programme, many of the older models of the B-47 (chiefly the B-47B) are being modified to the standard of the B-47E. The first B-47 Stratojet to complete this modernization programme has been delivered to the U.S.A.F.

DELIVERY OF THE B-52.—The U.S.A.F. has announced that deliveries of the B-52 Stratofortress to operational units will begin late this Spring. The 93rd Bomber Wing, stationed in California, will be the first unit to be equipped with this eight-jet, swept-wing bomber. The U.S.A.F. plan to convert all their 11 B-36 wings to B-52s.

EXTENSION OF U.S. RADAR SCREEN.—It is reported that radar-equipped Constellations now form part of the early warning network along the Atlantic seaboard and extend the land-based radar screen far out to sea.

ATOMIC AIR-AIR MISSILE.—The United States Air Force opened the age of atomic air defence on 6th April by exploding an anti-aircraft air-to-air missile six miles in the sky. There was a heavy nuclear blast powerful enough to knock down a dozen enemy bombers. It was a 'baby' blast, as atomic explosions go. But its force travelled 75 miles through the sky into Las Vegas and shook the plate-glass windows in the Atomic Energy Commission office. The compact missile, secret as to details, but probably encased in a six-foot-long skin, was launched from a B-36 four-jet bomber 30,000 feet above the Nevada proving range. It sped, apparently under rocket power and electronic guidance from the 'mother' aircraft, toward a pattern of smoke trails laid down by six F-86 Sabre jets two minutes before scheduled blast time.

ULTRALIGHT HELICOPTER FOR U.S. ARMY.—The Bell Aircraft Corp., Buffalo, N.Y., has won the Army competition for development of a utility helicopter, the Department of Defence announced on 15th February. To be developed at Bell's Helicopter Division at Fort Worth, Texas, the rotorcraft has been designated by the manufacturer as the Model 212. Bell's design was selected for further development from among proposals submitted by eight manufacturers. The winning proposal calls for a lightweight, closed cabin, single rotor helicopter. It will have an 800-lb. payload, cruising speed of 100 knots, hovering ceiling of 6,000 ft., and a 1,500 feet-per-minute rate of climb. The Army will use this rotorcraft for front-line evacuation of wounded, general utility missions, and as an instrument trainer.

U.S.A.F. WING GETS CANBERRAS.—The 461st Light Bombardment Wing in Utah, will soon be equipped with the new Martin B-57 Night Intruder twin jet bomber. The light bombers will replace the Douglas B-26 Invaders which the 461st Wing, a unit of the Ninth Air Force, has been using since 1953. Powered by two Wright J-65 engines, which can develop over 7,200 lb. thrust each, the B-57 has the performance characteristics of a fighter type aircraft, making it particularly suitable for light bombardment operations.

FIVE MORE U.S. TANKER SQUADRONS.—The U.S.A.F. emphasis on global mobility will be demonstrated in 1956 by the addition of five air refuelling squadrons. Augmenting previously announced plans to add ten combat wings in 1956 for a total of 131, the Air Force has just disclosed that the expansion programme also provides for 88 additional radar sites and centres and three airborne early warning squadrons. The Air Force intends also to add nine more troop carrier assault squadrons during the next fiscal year—this build-up to be accomplished by the addition of only 5,000 men.

FAST FLYING.—On 9th March, for the first time, planes flew across the American continent from Los Angeles to New York in less than four hours. The feat was reported by three Republic F-86F Thunderstreaks, which all broke the 4 hours 6 minutes 16 seconds record. The best time for Los Angeles to New York was 3 hours 46 minutes 33 seconds.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL

The Decisive Battles of the Western World and their Influence on History.

Volume II. From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo.

By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (Eyre & Spottiswoode.) 35s.

This second volume is arranged like the first,¹ the decisive battles which changed the structure of Europe being linked by 'chronicles.' During the period covered, the British Empire emerged and was slowly but surely strengthened. The author shows how sea power contributed to this development and, further, that our greatest failure was mainly due to temporary loss of command of the Atlantic Ocean when France came to the aid of the revolting American colonists. The long struggle with revolutionary France is well narrated and the final victories of Trafalgar and Waterloo are described in detail. The peace treaty following Waterloo restored the balance of power in Europe—our political aim—and there was no general war for a century. "Out of sea power, steam power, money power, and the prestige with which Waterloo had crowned England, emerged the *Pax Britannica*, which was destined to survive as long as British sea power and British credit retained their dominance."

The eclipse of Sweden and the rise of Russia, following the defeat of that remarkable young soldier, Charles XII, at Poltava, 1709, is of considerable interest. His opponent, Peter the Great, ruler of a barbaric people, "married brutality to European efficiency . . . out of their union emerged Russia, not only as an empire but as a pseudo-Western Power." The Russia of Peter became a "factory and a camp," ruled by terror.

The author outlines in masterly fashion the methods and characteristics of the men whose victories are recorded. Among these are six of the 'Great Captains.' First, Gustavus Adolphus, victor of Breitenfeld and Lützen, a strategist who made far reaching innovations in tactics and organization; he was the "first great field gunner." Second, Marlborough, "one of the greatest military geniuses his country has known," broke the existing convention of avoiding battle. Third, Frederick the Great, audacious, a master of manoeuvre and undefeatable in spirit, saved Prussia from extinction and left memories which have dominated German history. Fourth, Napoleon the pre-eminent strategist and supreme egoist who initiated the new era of war. Finally, Nelson and Wellington whose forte was their mastery of tactics. The Elizabethan sailors who defeated the Armada, as well as Clive and Wolfe have their place, too.

In addition to the general theme, the development of weapons and their effect on tactics and organization are traced. The importance of administration, particularly of supply and transport, is not overlooked.

This is a book packed with information and vigorous commentary. It provides the means of studying the influence of decisive battles on history and of gaining an insight into the conduct of war by soldiers, sailors, and statesmen. It is a work of outstanding value to those whose duty, inclination, or pleasure it is to know as much as possible about war. The volume is well produced and provided with 32 sketch maps and diagrams in the text. Footnotes relating to sources are included; there is also a comprehensive index.

Prisoners of War. By Wynne Mason. (Oxford University Press.) 42s.

This volume forms part of the Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45. During the war 9,140 New Zealanders (including the author) fell into enemy hands. Of these 8,348 were prisoners of war and the remainder civilian internees. Approximately 718 prisoners of war succeeded in escaping after capture. This book aims to record an accurate, objective, and impartial account of captivity as it affected New Zealanders. From a mass of evidence derived from individuals and official documents,

¹ Reviewed in the August, 1954, JOURNAL.

New Zealand, British, International Red Cross, enemy, etc., it builds up a factual account of the conditions, treatment, and daily life in the various permanent and transit camps through which New Zealanders passed, and their experiences whilst in transit in enemy hands by road, rail, and water. Accounts of escapes are confined to those which ended in success, and these are not recorded in greater detail than is necessary to show the method employed and the result to the escaper and his less fortunate comrades. Since it was the custom of Germans, Italians, and Japanese to concentrate Commonwealth prisoners of war in the same camps, much of this volume is applicable to British, Australian, Canadian, and South African prisoners of war.

Moreover, from the official angle all questions of policy as regards prisoners of war were handled by the Imperial Prisoners of War Committee in London, representing the British and Dominion Governments. Executive action rested with the various Ministries in London, notably the War Office, the Foreign Office, and the Home Office, which were responsible for all dealings with the Protecting Powers and the International Red Cross, from whom official reports on conditions in prisoner of war and internment camps were obtained and through whose good offices representations were made to enemy governments. The book is, therefore, of far wider appeal than the title suggests.

Since the war a large number of accounts of their experiences have been published by prisoners of war, many of them quite excellent and all of them informative, so that the general reader will find familiar ground in many of the camps described in this volume. However, being an official account, he will find in these pages a possibly more objective outlook than is to be found in some individual accounts. The author is at pains to be scrupulously fair to the detaining Powers and to give credit where credit is due to camp commandants and their staffs in their treatment of and attitude towards those under their charge.

Of particular interest are those passages dealing with the official representations which passed between Whitehall and the German and Italian Governments on such subjects as the "shackling" reprisal instituted by the Germans after the raids on Dieppe and Sark, the repatriation of invalids and protected personnel, questions concerning officers' messing charges in Italy, etc.; also the ill-fated 'stay put' instructions issued by the War Office to senior officers and camp leaders which resulted in some 50,000 out of 70,000 Commonwealth prisoners of war in Italy falling into German hands at the time of the Italian armistice.

The majority of New Zealanders captured fell into the hands of Germans and Italians, but a small number of airmen, sailors, merchant seamen, and civilians suffered incarceration by the Japanese. The experiences of these are recounted in some detail, however small and isolated the numbers concerned.

This book is a tribute to those New Zealanders who, in the face of adversity, frustration, and hardship, maintained discipline, soldierly spirit, and pride of race, and never gave up the struggle. It is also a tribute to their comrades of the British Commonwealth. These are no idle words, for even the enemy were forced to pay them tribute, as captured official documents bear witness.

The author has included an excellent selection of photographs, sketches, and maps.

NAVAL

The Sea Heritage. A Study of Maritime Warfare. By Admiral Sir Frederic C. Dreyer, G.B.E., K.C.B. (Museum Press.) 30s.

The autobiography of any great sailor, and especially one with so dynamic a personality as Admiral Dreyer, is certain to produce much of interest. It is enough only to mention that the author was flag captain to Admiral Jellicoe in the *Iron Duke* during the Jutland battle to realize that his book is obviously one of absorbing interest and value.

Dreyer made his name as an expert gunnery officer at a time when naval gunnery was in the hands of those two outstanding exponents of the naval gun, John Fisher and Percy Scott. It was no fluke that H.M.S. *Exmouth*, in which Dreyer served as a young gunnery officer, led the entire Home Fleet in the annual gunnery tests for the three years he served in her. No problem of gunnery was too large or too small for him, and he became widely recognized throughout the Navy as the man in whose hands naval gunnery reached its highest pitch of efficiency and power. It marked him, even at that early age, as one of the great brains of the Navy, and the fire-control table which he invented was officially named after him.

But it is his close association with Jellicoe, before, during, and after the 1914-18 War, that will inevitably provide the greatest interest in this book. As the years pass, and more of the official records become available for detailed study, it is becoming apparent that in Jellicoe the Navy possessed a brilliant strategist and a master tactician. His stature is growing visibly in history. Admiral Dreyer's chapters on his associations with Jellicoe, and especially the three chapters which deal with Jutland and its aftermath, bear out vividly the growing realization of Jellicoe's supreme handling of the immense fleet he commanded on those two fateful days. They are written with first-hand knowledge and a mastery of detail that make clear the course of the battle, and an analysis of the action itself, pointing out the mistakes made and the lessons to be learned from them, is particularly lucid.

Admiral Dreyer's remarks on the post-1914-18 War period are of equal interest to the reader, and it is remarkable how accurate they are in the light of experience gained in 1939-45. In these chapters we can see evidence of a penetrative brain dealing with the problems of naval responsibilities in a world of wishful thinking, befuddled by the cries of disarmament. These chapters are most interesting and informative, and add considerably to our knowledge of the times.

This is, indeed, a notable book, full of information of the greatest interest on naval affairs. If one criticism can be made, it is that the diagrams illustrating the course of the battle of Jutland could well have been larger, for the scale of reduction from the originals is such that it is difficult to read all the names of the ships concerned. There is also a certain amount of repetition in a few places, which could usefully be deleted in a second edition. These are, however, small points of criticism in comparison with the absorbing interest of the book itself. Admiral Dreyer is indeed to be thanked and congratulated on a masterly piece of work.

Admiralty Manual of Seamanship, Vol. III (1951). (H.M. Stationery Office.) 12s. 6d.

Mr. Wackford Squeers of Dotheboys Hall was a firm believer in practical application. Similarly, the only sure way by which the art of seamanship can be acquired is to practise it at sea. Books alone are no substitute, though they can point the way.

After the final abolition of sail in the Royal Navy, which took place shortly after the turn of the century, the earlier privately-printed books on seamanship were largely rendered obsolete, and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty then began to issue their own Manual of Seamanship. The first edition of the Admiralty Manual of Seamanship appeared in 1908, and since that date there have been several revised editions. Each edition comprised two separate volumes. Volume I was intended as a text-book for naval cadets and seaman boys in training ships or establishments. Volume II contained information of a more advanced nature, to meet the requirements of junior officers, senior ratings, and of men desiring to qualify for advancement.

The experiences gained in the 1939-45 War showed the need for a complete revision of the Admiralty Manual of Seamanship, in order to bring it up to date. The present edition, dated 1951, now comprises three volumes. Volume III, which is the subject of this review, was issued in 1954: it provides information on the more advanced aspect of seamanship, and is intended as a book of reference for seamen of experience.

No seaman, however experienced, whether he belongs to the Royal Navy, the Merchant Navy, or is a yachtsman, should take the line that he knew all this before. Some of the predicaments dealt with are fortunately not of everyday occurrence, and in the stress of emergency some item may well be overlooked. A quiet study of these possible situations and how best to compete with them will serve to keep the salient points in mind, for when an emergency does arise there will seldom be time to refer to the 'drill book.'

In a manual of such a comprehensive nature as this it is obviously impossible to include every possible combination of circumstances in which the seaman may find himself placed. In the chapter on towing at sea mention might have been made of the advisability on proceeding to sea, and especially in war-time, of disconnecting the centre-line capstan from the capstan engine. If the capstan engine compartment is rendered inaccessible due to flooding, it will not then be possible to free the capstan spindle, and the centre-line capstan will not be available as a hand capstan; the cable holders, also, will be out of action except for veering on the brakes. This happened in the *Lion*, when it came to take her in tow after the Dogger Bank action in 1915.

Another item, which will no doubt be included in the next edition, is the very recent introduction of new methods of manual artificial respiration in the treatment of the apparently drowned. They do not entirely supersede the old familiar 'prone-pressure' method, but will produce more efficient results whenever it is possible to apply them. The author, however, cannot be reproached for this omission as the new methods were not promulgated until after the book had gone to press.

The illustrations, diagrams, and index are adequate. The authors—for more than one person must have had a hand in the compilation—are to be congratulated on the manner in which the several subjects are presented.

This book can be thoroughly recommended to all who follow the sea. To employ the phraseology of the Contract and Purchase Department, the price is fair and reasonable; and that is really an understatement.

The Sea Wolves. The story of the German U-boats at war. By Wolfgang Frank. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson.) 21s.

This book is an abridged translation of the German *Die Wölfe und der Admiral* (Stalling-Verlag, Oldenburg), which gives the overall story of the U-boat war as seen from the German angle. The author was a public relations officer on the staff of Admiral Dönitz, Flag Officer U-boats, and was thus in a position to obtain firsthand reports of the experiences of U-boat officers and men as soon as they returned from a patrol; he also occasionally went to sea in a U-boat in order to improve his knowledge of the conditions which obtained during a war-time patrol. He did not, however, have access to the German naval archives after the war, and so was not always able to check his facts in the light of subsequent knowledge. The translation here is by Lieutenant-Commander R. O. B. Long, R.N.V.R.

The narrative of the U-boat war is divided into three parts—The Growth of the Offensive (1939–41); The Years of Achievement (1941–43); The Struggle for Survival (1943–1945). Part 1 opens with a brief historical survey, and Part 3 ends with the Nuremberg Trials. The four appendices have been provided by Commander M. G. Saunders, R.N.

Accounts of interviews between Dönitz and Hitler, Raeder and Göring are inserted in the appropriate places in the narrative, which give the reader an insight into the various changes in German naval policy during the ebb and flow of the war at sea.

Some of the details in the descriptive narrative of the earlier attacks by U-boats are not quite correct, and the number of sinkings claimed cannot always be substantiated. The general picture, however, is reasonably accurate. These overclaims by U-boat

captains were often made in good faith, for when several U-boats were simultaneously attacking a convoy at night and in dirty weather, it was quite easy to make a mistake in the total number of ships sunk. These discrepancies have been corrected in the footnotes, which also give further details of the incidents referred to in the text.

A few minor errors have crept in—merchant ships' names incorrectly spelt and described as tankers when, in fact, they were not. Some of the British footnotes, also, might have been better worded. On page 26, for example, since the *Courageous* was sunk 300 miles to the south-west of Ireland and the *Ark Royal* was attacked 200 miles west of Cape Wrath, they can scarcely be said to have been operating in the *same waters*; moreover, the U-boat which attacked the *Ark Royal* was U39, not U36. U39 was sunk by the carrier's escort and was the first U-boat to be sunk by British forces.

In Appendix IV, it is not made clear that the number of merchant ships sunk (Curve 1) is the total, irrespective of how they were being sailed; the number sunk whilst in convoy formed only a small percentage of the total sunk by U-boats. Curve IV gives no indication that, at the beginning of 1943, there were only six V.L.R. aircraft available for the central belt in mid-Atlantic, which was beyond the range of the normal A/S aircraft.

A foreword by Admiral Sir George Creasy succinctly sums up the achievements by both sides. As he points out, the late struggle was but one phase in the development of submarine warfare, and that further developments may be expected in the future.

Good illustrations have been provided; some are from the German edition and others by courtesy of the Imperial War Museum. The index meets all requirements. The book can be recommended to all who wish to study the U-boat war from the German point of view.

ARMY

Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954. By George F. G. Stanley. (The Macmillan Co. of Canada.) 32s. 6d.

Professor Stanley is head of the department of history, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston. In this volume of under 400 pages he has set himself the formidable task of providing for the general reader a short history of the Canadian Army over a span of three and a half centuries. His pen traces the organization, development, and history of Canada's soldiers from the struggles of the early French settlers against the Iroquois Indians up to the Canadian participation in the Korean War. The result, as might be expected, is not a detailed study of the various military actions which have played so large a part in shaping Canadian history, but rather a challenge to other historians to take up the torch and lighten the path of Canadian military history, which, as the author points out "has been the Cinderella of Canadian historical studies."

To the average reader in Great Britain, whose knowledge of Canadian military history is probably confined to Wolfe's capture of Quebec and Canadian participation in the two World Wars, this book will serve as an appetiser to stimulate his desire for further information of the various campaigns outlined by the author. Most of them will have a special appeal to students of British military history, since they involve British Regular units firstly as opponents to and then, after 1760, as comrades in arms with the militia forces of Canada.

From the end of the XVIIth Century up to the beginning of the present Century the defence of Canada affords an excellent example of the influence of naval power on land strategy. So long as Canada possessed the means to take advantage of the system of water highways provided by the east-west network of rivers and lakes extending from the Rocky Mountains to the St. Lawrence, she could move men and munitions quickly and easily to any threatened area. It was her naval superiority which enabled Britain to seize Canada from the French, and later to defend her from the revolting thirteen American colonies, and finally from the United States.

It may come as a shock to some in these days of N.A.T.O. to read that the Otter Committee, appointed in 1919 to consider the re-organization of Canada's armed forces, based its plan of 11 infantry and four cavalry divisions, into which the militia was organized in 1920, on the premise that this represented "the all-out mobilization of Canada's resources to resist an American invasion pending the arrival of reinforcements from Great Britain and other parts of the British Empire". As the author puts it "the experience of past history could not easily be put aside."

Today, Canada, with a population of little over 13 million people has emerged as a nation whose influence in world affairs has brought her to the fore front in the councils of the United Nations and N.A.T.O. In this volume the military history of an unmilitary people is unfolded. It is the story of the farmer, mechanic, labourer, fisherman, doctor, lawyer, and teacher, who time and time again have taken up arms to defend their country, and who in the present Century have travelled far afield to fight alongside their Allies in the cause of freedom. It is the story of a people who, brought up in the tradition of compulsory service, have in the past hundred years turned more and more to the principle of voluntary military service backed by a small permanent cadre. (In the 1939-45 War, out of nearly 750,000 Canadians who saw service some 630,000 were volunteers). It is the story of an unmilitary people who nevertheless when the need arose have displayed the highest military virtues.

The author has included sketch maps illustrating the various campaigns, and a bibliography.

Take These Men. By Cyril Joly. (Constable.) 15s.

Take These Men (for your example) is a story of armoured warfare in North Africa, 1940-43, told by a professional soldier who served there as a regimental officer until just before El Alamein when he became a brigade-major. The author's object is to record the "actions and reactions" of the men who fought, how they lived—and died. As he points out, there are many accounts of these operations but they deal with them from a formation level. The story, told in the first person, concerns the services of one unnamed unit, presumably of the Royal Tank Regiment. According to the Preface, the characters are fictitious though the main incidents are factual and the minor events and background are based on "fact, knowledge, and experience."

The narrative is clear, vivid, and well arranged in six parts. The first two cover the period from the early skirmishes up to the destruction of the Italian Army. The story opens with the 'narrator's' arrival, his initiation to the desert and continues with his reactions as a troop leader up to the final victory at Beda Fomm. The next part is a record of adversity in which the impact of the Germans on our forces, weakened by detachments sent to Greece, is well related. In Part IV the 'narrator,' now a squadron commander, describes his experiences during the offensive leading to the relief of Tobruk and after. Rommel's counter-offensive in May, 1942, the difficult retreat, the stand on the El Alamein position, and the victory of Alam Halfa are narrated in Part V as seen from squadron level. The final part brings the story up to the junction with the First Army and the final triumph at Tunis. It is all very well told, with good descriptions of action, terrain, climate, and daily life in the desert.

An extremely interesting book which rings true and is free from sickly introspection. There are no formal comments, though opinions as to tactics and equipment are expressed in the form of conversations from which the reader can discern the lessons for himself. The author has succeeded in depicting the 'atmosphere of war' as it affects regimental officers and men, especially the reactions of the 'narrator' and his subordinates in the varying situations in which they found themselves. He makes a point of the steady influence of discipline and a sense of duty in combating fear, fatigue, boredom, and the minor accidents of war. This is a book which all officers may read with profit; those who have not seen war will find in it a picture of active service which will serve as a good introduction to the study of military history.

Life in Our Hands. By Pamela Bright. (MacGibbon and Kee.) 12s. 6d.

Miss Bright is a nursing sister, and in her book she describes something of her experiences in a casualty clearing station attached to 21st Army Group. She went ashore in Normandy on 14th June, 1944, eight days after the first landings, and she finished up beyond Hamburg. After the Armistice, she went to Berlin.

The above is a bald statement of Miss Bright's travels in the wake of the soldiers; it is, in fact, no more than the framework of a very moving and beautifully written little book. This is a side of the war of which little has been written, and one, moreover, that lends itself admirably to the kind of treatment which the author has given it. Here are humour and sadness hand in hand, a little wonder, a little unbelief, perhaps, in the things that war can do to a man, all allied to a deep understanding of the needs of a badly wounded man.

The book is quite short, but at the end the reader is left wanting more of it, which is an admirable way for a book to end. Miss Bright has so happy a gift of description in her pen that she can make the whole scene alive, and so happy a philosophy that she can bring to even the common things of life a fresh and lively vitality. A charming little book, very well worth while the reading.

The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, 1920-1950. By Lieut.-Colonel H. D. Chaplin. (Michael Joseph.) 25s.

The Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment raised 10 battalions during the 1939-45 War, six of which served overseas. The list of the theatres of war in which they served—France, 1939-40; Malta, 1939-43; Egypt and Iraq, 1942-43; North-West Africa, 1942-43; Sicily, 1943; Italy, 1943-45; Leros, 1943; and Burma, 1943-45—gives some indication of the strenuous fighting in which they took part.

The book opens with the period between the wars, and shows graphically the effect of the financial stringency of 1923-32 on the Regiment, limiting its normal development and hampering it in all its work. It shows, too, the effect of the end of disarmament in 1933 and the gradual build-up, both in arms and men, during the six years of crisis which followed Hitler's assumption of power in Germany.

It is, however, the war-time history of the Regiment which will naturally be read with most interest, for the record is an inspiring one. The extreme gallantry of the Queen's Own Brigade in the two fine rearguard actions at Oudenarde and the Forêt de Nieppe during the withdrawal to Dunkirk are epics in the story of British military prowess, though they are matched in this book by the Regiment's fine record of gallantry in Italy and Burma, in both of which campaigns battalions of the Royal West Kents played a leading part. Among the honours and awards won by the Regiment in the war is a Victoria Cross, most gallantly won by a lance-corporal at Kohima.

Colonel Chaplin has an inspiring story to tell, and he has succeeded in his task to admiration. Written in a style that flows naturally from event to event, he has set the activities of the various battalions against the appropriate background, so that the story assumes its natural place and perspective against the campaigns as a whole. As a result, the interest in this particular history extends beyond the immediate bounds of the Regiment concerned, and can well be read with profit by a much wider circle.

The book is very well illustrated with photographs and admirably served by 27 excellent maps, with two additional maps as endpapers. A Roll of Honour is printed in the front of the book and appendices give the Honours and Awards, lists of officers in campaigns, units of the Home Guard with their C.O.'s, a roll of Colonels and Commanding Officers during the whole period under review, and an escape story of an officer from Calais in 1940. Finally, beyond the limiting date of the title, a sixth appendix gives a brief account of the 1st Battalion's experiences in Malaya in 1951. There is an adequate index to the book.

War Journal of the Fifth (Kenya) Battalion, The King's African Rifles. By W. D. Draffan and T. C. C. Lewin.

This well-written and interesting little book deals with the activities during the 1939-45 War of one battalion of The King's African Rifles. They fought first in East Africa against the Italians in Kenya, Italian Somaliland, and Abyssinia; in Madagascar against the Vichy French; and in Burma against the Japanese.

It is an inspiring little story, written partly in a light-hearted vein, partly with real feeling for the dramatic story of the Battalion's war service. It is interesting, too, in the fact that little has as yet appeared in print of the East African campaign, and this story virtually breaks new ground. The difficulties of terrain, transport, and supplies in all the three campaigns in which the 5th Battalion served are well brought out, and the way they were overcome makes excellent reading.

Three pull-out maps at the end of the book illustrate the account adequately, and help the reader to appreciate the really fine organization of the Battalion to overcome long distances and tenuous lines of communication. The joint authors are to be congratulated on producing so readable and interesting an account of a single battalion's efforts in the war.

AIR

Air War Against Germany and Italy, 1939-1943. By John Herington. (Australian War Memorial, Canberra.) 25s.

This is the first volume to be published in Series 3 of the Official History of Australia in the War of 1939-45. This series, which is to consist of four volumes, is devoted to the air aspect of all operations. Two are to deal with the fighting against Japan and Germany and Italy, whilst the other two are concerned with the Royal Australian Air Force and air power over Europe. Though the contents of the latter two are not yet known it would seem a pity that they have not been published first, since that now under review inevitably refers to matters with which they will also have to deal.

During the war the Australian Air Board tended to segregate the units of the R.A.A.F. with a view to eventually establishing a strong national air force of its own. At the same time a very large number of Australians were trained under the Empire Air Training scheme and absorbed into the Royal Air Force. So by the end of 1943, and in the theatres with which we are concerned, there was no higher Australian formation than the squadron and even at times these were not wholly composed of Australians. No truly Australian air component had as yet emerged.

This volume, therefore, could have been no easy one to design or write, for the author was faced with the problem of linking the rather unsatisfying story of the R.A.A.F. squadrons with the larger picture of Australia's contribution to the air war as a whole. This has led him to describe each campaign on a chronological basis and to turn from the events in Britain in 1940 to those in the Middle East in 1941 and then back to Britain, and so on. This with the mass of detail included tends to make the basic story obscure, and since the actions of more than five hundred and fifty Australians are recorded the book must primarily appeal to all those Australians who served in any capacity in any of the air operations dealt with.

With the United Kingdom Official Histories as yet unpublished, neither the high level aspect of the air operations nor the details of those carried out on the ground, or at sea, seem at times to be accurate and the over condensation of the aims of the various commanders gives a wrong impression of what was in fact intended, even if the gallantry of the individuals and of the aircrews makes heartening reading. Of all these tales surely that relating to Pilot Officer Middleton, from New South Wales, must be an epic of its kind for sheer cold courage and devotion to duty, and few V.C.'s could have been more hardly won.

The volume is very well produced with many fine illustrations, but its seven hundred and thirty pages make it too heavy to hold and read conveniently, and though such maps as are included are well drawn they are insufficient to cover the scope of the story.

ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

(* Books for Reference in the Library Only)

GENERAL

- THE ATOM. By Sir George Thomson. Foolscape 8vo. 204 pages. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1955.) 6s.
- BRITAIN AND THE TIDE OF WORLD AFFAIRS. By Oliver S. Franks. Foolscape 8vo. 71 pages. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1955.) 5s.
- BRITAIN'S ATOMIC FACTORIES. The Story of Atomic Energy Production in Britain. By K. E. B. Jay, B.Sc., A.Inst.P. Demy 8vo. 99 pages. (H.M.S.O. 1954.) 5s.
- BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES. The Distribution of Power within the Conservative and Labour Parties. By R. T. McKenzie. Medium 8vo. 623 pages. (Heinemann, 1955.) 30s.
- CALLED UP. The Personal Experiences of Sixteen National Service men, told by Themselves. Edited by Peter Chambers and Amy Landreth. Demy 8vo. 271 pages. (Wingate, 1955.) 10s. 6d.
- THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR. By Raymond Aron. Medium 8vo. 379 pages. (Derek Verschoye, 1955.) 25s.
- CLOAK WITHOUT DAGGER. By Sir Percy Sillitoe, K.B.E. Demy 8vo. 206 pages. (Cassell, 1955.) 15s.
- ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R. By J. Stalin. Demy 8vo. 103 pages. (Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952.) 6d.
- EGYPT'S DESTINY. By General Mohammed Neguib. Demy 8vo. 288 pages. (Gollancz, 1955.) 18s.
- *FACTS AND HOW TO FIND THEM. By W. A. Bagley. Demy 8vo. 135 pages. (Pitman's, 1937.) 8s. 6d.
- FLIGHT FROM DAKAR. By Eiliv Odde Hauge and Vera Hartmann. Demy 8vo. 200 pages. (Allen and Unwin, 1955.) 15s.
- FRONTIER TO SPACE. By Eric Burgess. Demy 8vo. 174 pages. (Chapman and Hall, 1955.) 21s.
- THE HYDROGEN BOMB. The Men, The Menace, The Mechanism. By James R. Shepley and Clay Blair, Jr. Demy 8vo. 215 pages. (Jarrolds, 1955.) 12s. 6d.
- THE INNOCENT ON EVEREST. By Ralph Izzard. Demy 8vo. 255 pages. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1955.) 16s.
- LAWRENCE OF ARABIA. A Biographical Enquiry. By Richard Aldington. Demy 8vo. 447 pages. (Collins, 1955.) 25s.
- LIFE IN OUR HANDS. By Pamela Bright. Demy 8vo. 208 pages. (MacGibbon and Kee, 1955.) 12s. 6d. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL).
- LITTLE CYCLONE. By Airey Neave. Demy 8vo. 189 pages. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1954.) 12s. 6d.
- LORD OF ARABIA. By H. C. Armstrong. Medium 8vo. 306 pages. (Barker, 1934.) 12s. 6d.
- MARXISM PAST AND PRESENT. By R. N. Carew Hunt. Medium 8vo. 180 pages. (Geoffrey Bles, 1954.) 12s. 6d.
- THE MEMOIRS OF CATHERINE THE GREAT. Edited by Dominique Maroger. Medium 8vo. 400 pages. (Hamish Hamilton, 1955.) 25s.
- N.A.T.O. The First Five Years. By Lord Ismay. Demy 8vo. 280 pages. (H.M.S.O., 1955.) 9s. 6d.

- THE NATURE OF POWER. Civilization and Foreign Policy. By J. Louis Halle. Demy 8vo. 239 pages. (Hart-Davis, 1955.) 18s.
- NO BANNERS. The Story of Alfred and Henry Newton. By Jack Thomas. Medium 8vo. 346 pages. (W. H. Allen, 1955.) 18s.
- OF SINS AND WINTER. By Maurice Rowdon. Demy 8vo. 181 pages. (Chatto and Windus, 1955.) 11s. 6d.
- *PEOPLE, PLACES, THINGS. Three Reference Volumes. Edited by Geoffrey Grigson and Charles Harvard Gibbs-Smith. Royal 4to. 470/464/466 pages. (The Grosvenor Press, 1954.) 42s. each.
- THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA. By W. W. Rostow and others. Medium 8vo. 379 pages. (Chapman and Hall, 1954.) 40s.
- QATABAN AND SHEBA. Exploring Ancient Kingdoms on the Biblical Spice Routes of Arabia. By Wendell Phillips. Demy 8vo. 333 pages. (Gollancz, 1955.) 21s.
- THE USE OF HISTORY. By A. L. Rowse. Demy 8vo. 247 pages. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1946.) 7s. 6d.
- SA'UDI ARABIA. By H. St. John Philby. Demy 8vo. 393 pages. (Benn, 1955.) 30s.
- SOVIET SPY RING. By E. H. Cookridge. Demy 8vo. 263 pages. (Frederick Muller, 1955.) 15s.
- A SPACE FOR DELIGHT. Letters from the late Rear-Admiral Cosmo Graham. By Rear-Admiral Cosmo Graham. Demy 8vo. 191 pages. (H. F. and G. Witherby, Ltd., 1954.) 18s.
- STILL DIGGING. Interleaves from an Antiquary's Notebook. By Sir Mortimer Wheeler. Demy 8vo. 235 pages. (Michael Joseph, 1955.) 15s.
- A STRANGER IN SPAIN. By H. V. Morton. Medium 8vo. 373 pages. (Methuen, 1955.) 18s.
- THE THIRD REICH. Compiled. Medium 8vo. 910 pages. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955.) 50s.
- TIBETAN MARCHES. By André Migot. Demy 8vo. 288 pages. (Rupert Hart-Davis, 1955.) 18s.
- WHERE BLEED THE MANY. By George Dunning, D.C.M. Medium 8vo. 254 pages. (Elek Books, 1955.) 16s.
- WHITE AFRICANS. By J. F. Lipscomb. Demy 8vo. 172 pages. (Faber, 1955.) 12s. 6d.

NAVAL

- THE SEA HERITAGE. A Study of Maritime Warfare. By Admiral Sir Frederic C. Dreyer. Medium 8vo. 472 pages. (Museum Press, 1955.) 30s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE SEA WOLVES. The Story of the German U-Boats at War. By Wolfgang Franks. Demy 8vo. 251 pages. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955.) 21s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE SECRET RAIDERS. By David Woodward. Demy 8vo. 232 pages. (William Kimber, 1955.) 15s.
- *THE SECOND CHINA WAR, 1856-1860. Edited by D. Bonner-Smith and E. W. R. Lumby. Medium 8vo. 413 pages. (Navy Records Society, 1955.)
- SICILY-SALERNO-ANZIO. Volume IX of the History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II. Edited by S. E. Morison. Medium 8vo. 413 pages. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1955.) 42s.

ARMY

- PRISONERS OF WAR. Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45. By W. Wynne Mason. Royal 8vo. 546 pages. (Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1954.) 42s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- *THE QUEEN'S OWN ROYAL WEST KENT REGIMENT, 1920-1950. By H. D. Chaplin. Medium 8vo. 510 pages. (Michael Joseph, 1955.) 25s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- CANADA'S SOLDIERS, 1604-1954. The Military History of an Unmilitary People. By George F. G. Stanley. Medium 8vo. 401 pages. (Macmillan 1954.) 36s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE CRECY WAR. A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360. By Alfred H. Burne. Medium 8vo. 366 pages. (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955.) 30s.
- THE DECISIVE BATTLES OF HISTORY. Volume II. From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. Medium 8vo. 561 pages. (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955.) 35s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- GOING TO THE WARS. A Journey in Various Directions. By John Verney. Demy 8vo. 255 pages. (Collins, 1955.) 12s. 6d.
- THE UNTOLD STORY OF DOUGLAS MACARTHUR. By Frazier Hunt. Medium 8vo. 533 pages. (Robert Hale, 1954.) 25s.
- THE SERGEANT-MAJOR. The Biography of R. S. M. Brittain. Demy 8vo. 191 pages. (Hartap, 1955.) 10s. 6d.
- TAKE THESE MEN. By Cyril Joly. Demy 8vo. 356 pages. (Constable, 1955.) 15s. Presented by the Publishers. (See Review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE WOOLWICH MESS. By Lieut.-Colonel Alfred H. Burne. Demy 8vo. 93 pages. (Gale and Polden, 1954.) 5s. 6d. Presented by the Publishers.

AIR

- DOWN IN THE DRINK. By Ralph Barker. Demy 8vo. 253 pages. (Chatto and Windus, 1955.) 12s. 6d.
- THE FIRST AND THE LAST. The German Fighter Force in World War Two. By Adolf Galland. Demy 8vo. 368 pages. (Methuen, 1955.) 18s.
- *THE JET AIRCRAFT OF THE WORLD. By William Green and Roy Cross. Royal 4to. 176 pages. (MacDonald, 1955.) 30s.
- THE MINT. A Day-Book of the R.A.F. Depot between August and December, 1922, with Later Notes by 352087 A/C Ross. By T. E. Lawrence. Medium 4to. 206 pages. (Jonathan Cape, 1955.) 17s. 6d.
- *THE OBSERVER'S BOOK OF AIRCRAFT. Compiled by William Green and Gerald Pollinger. F8vo. 287 pages. (Frederick Warne, 1955.) 5s.

FORTHCOMING PUBLICATIONS

It is proposed to purchase, among others, the following volumes which are being published within the next few months:—

THE CALL TO HONOUR. By General de Gaulle.

BISMARCK: THE MAN AND THE STATESMAN. By A. J. P. Taylor.

- MAN OF EVEREST (Tensing). By J. R. Ullman.
- WELLINGTON. By Sir Charles Petrie.
- SOVIET ARMY. By Liddell Hart.
- THE THIRD SERVICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE R.A.F. By Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert.
- EXPLAINING THE ATOM. By Selig Hecht.
- MAKE A SIGNAL. By Jack Broom.
- MACARTHUR, 1941-1951. By Major-General C. A. Willoughby.
- DIRECTION OF WAR. By Air Vice-Marshal Kingston McCloughry.
- MORALE IN WAR AND WORK. By Dr. T. T. Patterson.
- THE LONDON CAGE. By Colonel A. P. Scotland, O.B.E.
- ASSIGNMENT DANGER. By Noel Monks.
- SERVICE MOST SILENT. By J. F. Turner.
- THE DRAMA OF THE SCHARNHÖRST. By Fritz Otto Busch.
- THE GATES BURST OPEN. By Remy.
- COMMANDO CLIMBERS. By Captain M. Banks.
- ABODE OF SNOW. By Professor Kenneth Mason.

ONE HUNDRED-AND-TWENTY-FOURTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING

ON TUESDAY, 8TH MARCH, 1955, at 3 p.m.

GENERAL SIR RICHARD N. GALE, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., presiding

THE SECRETARY (LIEUT.-COLONEL P. S. M. WILKINSON) read the notice convening the meeting, which appeared in *The Times* of Tuesday, 15th February, 1955.

ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1954

The Council have the honour to present their Annual Report for the year 1954.

COUNCIL

VICE-PRESIDENTS

Field-Marshal The Lord Wilson of Libya, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.S.O., was re-elected for a further term as a Vice-President.

General The Lord Ismay, P.C., G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O., D.L., was elected a Vice-President in the vacancy caused by the resignation of General Sir Harry H. S. Knox, K.C.B., D.S.O.

ELECTED MEMBERS

Admiral Sir Henry Moore, G.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., was re-elected a Member of the Council.

The following elections were made to vacancies on the Council :—

Major-General G. W. Lathbury, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E., vice Major-General L. O. Lyne, C.B., D.S.O.

Admiral Sir Geoffrey Oliver, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., vice Rear-Admiral G. Barnard, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Leslie Hollinghurst, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.F.C., vice Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Newall, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.M.G., C.B.E., A.M., elected a Vice-President.

Lieut.-General Sir John Eldridge, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., vice Major-General G. P. Walsh, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Group Captain Sir Archibald Hope, Bart, O.B.E., D.F.C., R.Aux.A.F., vice Air Vice-Marshal W. M. Yool, C.B., C.B.E.

The following Members, having completed three years' service, retire :—

*Vice-Admiral Sir John A. S. Eccles, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.B.E.

*General Sir John C. Westall, K.C.B., C.B.E., R.M.

General Sir Ouvry L. Roberts, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.

*General Sir Richard N. Gale, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.

*General Sir George W. E. J. Erskine, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O.

*Brigadier Sir George S. Harvie-Watt, Bart., T.D., Q.C., D.L., M.P., A.D.C.

*Brigadier J. A. Longmore, C.B.E., T.D., D.L.

*Air Chief Marshal Sir James M. Robb, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.

* These Members offer themselves for re-election.

REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS

Lieut.-General Sir A. James H. Cassels, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., succeeded Lieut.-General Sir Colin B. Callander, K.B.E., C.B., M.C., as the War Office Representative on the Council.

EX OFFICIO MEMBERS

Admiral Sir William G. Andrewes, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich.

Captain R. A. Ewing, D.S.C., R.N., accepted the invitation of the Council to become an ex officio Member of the Council on taking up the appointment of Director of the Royal Naval Staff College.

MEMBERSHIP

The total number of members on the roll at the end of 1954 was 6,159 compared with 6,220 in 1953. During the year 242 members joined the Institution compared with 247 in 1953. The following shows the figures for the past seven years :—

Year	Joined		Total	Re- signed	Deceased		Struck off	Total
	Annual	Life			Annual	Life		
1954 ...	199	43	242	192	48	29	34	303
1953 ...	190	57	247	184	34	42	18	278
1952 ...	197	53	250	206	56	21	26	309
1951 ...	224	56	280	125	49	35	24	233
1950 ...	289	56	345	126	41	50	21	238
1949 ...	397	103	500	185	58	64	57	364
1948 ...	449	128	577	270	44	29	35	378

The details of members joining during the year 1954 are as follows :—

Regular Army	130
Royal Air Force	41
Royal Navy	26
Dominion Forces...	14
Territorial Army...	10
Indian Forces	7
Royal Marines	6
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve	2
Royal Auxiliary Air Force	2
Pakistan Forces	2
Royal Naval Reserve	1
Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve	1
							<hr/> 242 <hr/>

COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

At the end of 1954 there were 1,264 annual covenanted subscriptions compared with 1,434 in 1953; and 236 covenanted life subscriptions compared with 274 in 1953.

During 1954, 404 annual covenants out of a total number of 599 were renewed on expiry and 66 life covenants completed the seven-year period.

FINANCE

The excess of expenditure over income is £373 0s. 7d. compared with an excess of income over expenditure in 1953 of £180 10s. 5d.

Comparisons of the principal items of Receipts and Expenditure are shown below :—

RECEIPTS

	1954			1953		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Annual Subscriptions	5,746	5	0	5,824	14	6
Life Subscriptions (amount brought to credit)	2,098	0	0	2,098	8	0
Museum	3,703	6	0	4,012	2	6
Journal Sales	2,568	7	0	2,173	17	11
Journal Advertisements	624	7	4	565	17	1
Sales of Catalogues and Pamphlets ...	124	19	7	139	15	5

Life Subscriptions (brought to credit) represent £1 10s. 0d. from each Life Member whose payment has not yet been so expended. The balance is held in the Life Subscription Fund. £535 8s. 0d. has been transferred to this Fund on account of tax rebate on covenanted life subscriptions.

Museum. Although Museum receipts show a fall compared with those for Coronation Year, they are considerably above the post-war average after allowing for the increased charges made in 1951.

Journal Sales. The price of the Journal was raised in 1952 and a new system of accounting was later introduced. The receipts for 1954 are above the average.

Journal Advertisements. These constitute a record and for the first time exceed £600.

EXPENDITURE

	1954			1953		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Salaries and Allowances, Wages and National Insurance	9,836	11	9	9,856	7	0
Journal Printing	4,245	17	1	4,498	1	11
Library—Purchase of Books	384	9	3	341	17	4
Binding	92	6	6	93	17	6
Fuel	273	6	6	242	17	0
Lighting and Electric Fires	512	8	0	495	19	11
General Repairs and Maintenance ...	202	6	0	431	10	1
Other Printing and Stationery	226	15	9	241	17	0
Museum Expenses	127	8	6	21	11	11

Museum Expenses. This shows an increase on the previous year but it is well within the budget allotment. Expenditure covers several small permanent installations in the Museum.

JOURNAL

The standard and popularity of the JOURNAL has been well maintained and there has been an over average number of sales. This has been due, in the main, to the publication of the valuable lectures given at the Institution during the year and to the number of excellent articles contributed by officers and others. The thanks of the Institution are due to the lecturers and authors concerned.

Another pleasing item has been the steady increase of advertisements, from which additional income is derived. This side of JOURNAL affairs has been and is being carefully fostered and there is some reason to hope that a further improvement in income from this source will take place in the future.

The "Reviews of Books" section of the JOURNAL has continued to be popular with both authors and publishers, and an increase of advertisements from the latter has been noticeable.

The "Service Notes" section, which has been a special feature of the JOURNAL for many years, continues to draw favourable comment and is understood to be of considerable interest to many readers.

The willing assistance given by Service Departments, Commandants of Staff Colleges, and Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry Representatives on the Council in preparing the lecture programme, in facilitating approval for articles written by serving officers, and in advising the Editor in many matters, is gratefully acknowledged.

LIBRARY

A large number of members and research workers have used the Library during the year, while the number of books issued on loan—7,779 against 7,090 in 1953—was again a record. 484 new volumes were acquired compared with 369; 136 books were rebound.

MUSEUM

During 1954, there were 50,822 paid admissions to the Museum, made up of 31,798 adults and 19,024 children. Free admission was given to 3,902 members of the Services and to 1,815 cadets, scouts, and school parties, as well as to guests passing through the private entrances from the Institution. Although there was a decrease in admissions compared with Coronation Year, the number can be regarded as satisfactory for one of the few museums not maintained at public expense.

The constant difficulty in providing a comprehensive display within the very limited space available has been alleviated by the very helpful co-operation of the Director of the Imperial War Museum, who has accepted a number of exhibits relating to the two World Wars. The policy of helping Service museums with exhibits has continued, but the surplus of pictures and silver has been absorbed and it is regretted that further requests from Messes cannot at present be met.

The Navy side of the Crypt has been reorganized, with the models of modern warships by Mr. Norman Ough as the central feature. Plano-convex magnifiers have been fitted to 13 of the 15 dioramas in order to show the craftsmanship of the modelling and painting of individual figures.

Valuable additions to the Museum have been received from members and private donors, to whom the thanks of the Council have been conveyed. Among the acquisitions during the year were the Ice Axe used by Brigadier Sir John Hunt during the ascent of Mount Everest, and presented by him; the original Orrery constructed by John Rowley of London in 1716, and deposited by Admiral of the Fleet The Earl of Cork and Orrery; and a set of models of the Queen's Beasts set up in the annexe to Westminster Abbey for the Coronation. Acknowledgment is made to the Technical Department of Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., for preparing a special preservative for these models and to Captain C. C. P. Lawson for painting the shields.

The provision of suitable cases for new exhibits is an expensive item. Attendant Freeman, a retired master cabinet-maker, has accomplished this at a minimum cost and our appreciation of his highly skilful work is recorded.

A card index and catalogue of Naval Swords and Dirks in the Museum has been compiled by Captain H. T. A. Bosanquet, C.V.O., R.N., and placed in the Library for reference. The Institution is indebted to Captain Bosanquet for his generosity in presenting this valuable work to add to the already considerable records previously compiled and given by him.

On 5th January, the B.B.C. made a record of the "Advance" being sounded on the Balacava bugle by Attendant Coulson for use in the Overseas Service. In June, the Secretary made a recording for a broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Company, and in September he made a further broadcast for the Canadian Broadcasting Company. Both of these included information about the history and organization of the Institution as well as the Banqueting House and Museum, and the production in each case was under the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Liaison with the Publicity Department, London Transport, has continued and they have been most co-operative by including information about the Museum in station posters and their publication *Visitors to London*.

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION BALANCE SHEET, 31ST DECEMBER, 1954

[illegible]

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

We have audited the above Balance Sheet dated 31st December, 1954, and have obtained all the information and explanations we have required. In our opinion such Balance Sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the Institution's affairs according to the best of our information and the explanations given to us and as shown by the books of the Institution.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, BISHOPS-GATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
21st January, 1955.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

CHESNEY MEMORIAL MEDAL FUND

31ST DECEMBER, 1954

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1953 :—				BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1954 :—			
Balance at Bankers	63	1	7	Balance at Bankers	71	9	7
Investment at Market Price	256	4	0	Investment at Market Price :—			
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS				£280 3% Savings Bonds 1950-70	268	16	0
APPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1953							
					340	5	7
					£340	5	7

We have audited the above Statement of the Chesney Memorial Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1964, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDREMAN'S HOUSE,
BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
21st January, 1955.

TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE FUND

31ST DECEMBER, 1954

BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1953 :—		£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Balance at Bankers	224	5	6
Investments at Market Prices... ..	1,809	5	5
	<hr/>		
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS	2,033	10	11
APPROPRIATION OF INVESTMENTS since 31st December, 1953	64	3	6
	60	3	5
	<hr/>		
			£2,157 17 10

PRIZE ESSAYS	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
	52 10 0
<hr/>		
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1954 :—		
Balance at Bankers	235	19 0
Investments at Market Prices :—		
£1,922 10s. 6d. British Transport	1,682	3 10
£1,000 0s. 0d. War Stock	87	5 0
£100 0s. 0d. 3% Defence Bonds	100	0 0
	<hr/>	
		2,105 7 10
	<hr/>	
		£2,157 17 10

We have audited the above Statement of the Trench Gascoigne Prize Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1954, and certify, the same to be correct.

A. BARTON MAYHEW & CO.
Chartered Accountants.
Auditors.

ALDEMAN, 11, BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
21st January, 1955.

BRACKENBURY MEMORIAL FUND

31st DECEMBER, 1954

	£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1953 :—			
Balance at Bankers	35	17	7
Investment at Market Price	356	16	8
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS			
APPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT			
31st December, 1953	411	17	2
EXPENDITURE ON BOOKS, Etc.			
ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION			
Administration Fee—1954	1	1	0
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1954 :—			
Balance at Bankers	44	9	10
Investment at Market Price :—			
£421 l. 0s. 3½d. War Stock	367	7	4
£417 19 7			

We have audited the above Statement of the Brackenbury Memorial Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1954, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDENHAM'S HOUSE,
BARTON, MARYLEVEY CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

21st January, 1955

ENBOROUGH, LONDON, E.C.2.

EARDLEY-WILMOT MEDAL FUND

31ST DECEMBER, 1954

[illegible]

We have audited the above Statement of the Eardley-Wilnot Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1954, and certify the same to be correct.

A. DERMAN'S ACCOUNTANTS,
BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.
Chartered Accountants,
21st January, 1955.

CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

THE CHAIRMAN : In the absence of the Chairman of the Council, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Power, who is abroad, it is my duty to present this Address. Before leaving, the Chairman asked that a personal expression of his own should be included in the Chairman's Address and I cannot do better than read what he has asked me to say to you.

" In recording my appreciation of the support I have had during my year as Chairman I would like to pay a special tribute to one of our senior Vice-Presidents, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward Ellington. Sir Edward, a past Chairman of the Council, has continued for many years to give his valuable services and advice to two Committees, the Finance and Museum. In addition, he has given his expert help whenever and wherever it has been desired. He has recently retired from the Chairmanship of the Museum Committee, but I am glad to say he remains with us on the Council and on the Finance Committee.

" With the approval of your Council I circulated a letter to all members of the Institution in the current issue of the JOURNAL asking them to help in adding to our membership. The number of members is holding up, but we must never relax our efforts to increase it and our constant endeavour is to retain the annual subscription at its present rate—which after all is only 1d. a day. You will, I am sure, agree that there is good value for this sum and not the least is the variety and importance of our lecture programme; the one for the season now ending includes addresses of outstanding and particular interest and I am glad to say that at least one of those distinguished lecturers will be talking to us again next season. In the published particulars of membership of the Institution we claim that our Lecture Theatre is the recognized forum where Service subjects of the highest authority are expounded, and nobody can deny the justification for that claim."

That concludes the statement by Sir Arthur Power. I have one special contribution to add to the remarks by the Admiral of the Fleet.

Every organization of our sort is glad to increase the number of its members, and the higher the membership, obviously the lower the average cost. But there is another source of income that I want to emphasize and to commend to you for your help if you do not already give it. A very considerable proportion of the Institution's income is derived from the tax rebate on subscriptions paid by members under a deed of covenant, and this is a main factor in keeping subscriptions at a comparatively low level for everybody. A deed operates for seven years both for annual and life instalment subscriptions. I think it is fair to say that the benefit is mutual, as the member who covenants cannot be called upon to pay any increase in subscription that the Institution may be compelled to authorize during the period of the covenant. Since the member has virtually nothing to lose and very much to gain, I hope that those members who do not at present covenant will give it their full consideration. The only condition imposed by the tax authorities is that the member pays the standard rate of income-tax of 9s. in the pound on some portion of his income. The Secretary will be glad to supply the necessary forms for signature.

The second point I should like to make is that a short time ago an organization known as the Army Museums Ogilby Trust was inaugurated. That Trust has two objects; the first is to assist regimental museums and civilian museums containing recognized military sections. This has also long been the policy of the Royal United

Service Institution. There are few, if any, regimental museums which do not benefit from this policy in a practical way, but the Trust will go further than we are able to do. The second object is the establishment of a National Army Museum. The need for this has long been apparent and it is hardly necessary for me to enlarge on it. Such an organization as a Trust demands money and its establishment was made possible by the generosity of Colonel R. G. L. Ogilby, Honorary Colonel of the London Scottish and a member of this Institution. I think you will agree that the present occasion is a fitting one for us to record our appreciation of this munificent and far-sighted action of Colonel Ogilby. (*Applause*).

That brings me to the next point which is the Annual Report for 1954 which is in your hands. Before putting the first resolution, which stands in my name, I will ask Brigadier Longmore, the Chairman of the Finance Committee, to comment if he so wishes on the financial section of the Report and to invite any questions which you might have at this meeting.

BRIGADIER J. A. LONGMORE: May I just say that it is extremely difficult to keep a balance unless the membership is increased, as the Chairman has mentioned in his remarks. Everything is done to be as economical as possible, and I should like to pay tribute to the staff who turn their hands to anything. They do not mind doing a bit of carpentering or repairing chairs, and it is their willingness and co-operation which goes a long way towards helping the financial side. But unless we do get more help we shall not be able to keep this place in the way it should be kept up.

If there are any questions, I shall be only too pleased to answer them. (*No questions were asked.*)

THE CHAIRMAN: If there are no questions on the finances perhaps we might turn to the next section of the Report. The Editor and Librarian are both here and they will be pleased to deal with any questions. (*No questions were asked.*)

The final section in the Report before you is the Museum Section, and the Secretary, who is also the Curator, is prepared to answer any questions you may wish to raise. (*No questions were asked.*)

There appear to be no questions so I shall now put the following resolution to the meeting:—

“That the Report and Accounts, as circulated, be taken as read and adopted.”

BRIGADIER J. A. LONGMORE: I second that.

The Resolution was carried unanimously.

BRIGADIER J. A. LONGMORE: I beg to propose:

“That Messrs. Barton, Mayhew & Company be re-elected Auditors for the ensuing year.”

COMMODORE R. HARRISON: I have pleasure in seconding that.

The Resolution was carried unanimously.

VACANCIES ON THE COUNCIL

THE CHAIRMAN: The following Officers have been nominated as candidates for the vacancies on the Council:—

ROYAL NAVY

Vice-Admiral Sir John Eccles, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.B.E.

ROYAL MARINES

General Sir John Westall, K.C.B., C.B.E., R.M.

REGULAR ARMY

General Sir George Erskine, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O.; General Sir Richard N. Gale, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.; General Sir Cameron Nicholson, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.

TERRITORIAL ARMY

Brigadier Sir George Harvie-Watt, Bart., T.D., Q.C., D.L., M.P., A.D.C.; Brigadier J. A. Longmore, C.B.E., T.D., D.L.

ROYAL AIR FORCE

Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.

There being no other nominations, under Bye-law 5, Chapter 3, these Officers were unanimously elected.

TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1954

The Secretary announced that there were twenty-four entries. On the recommendation of the Referees, the Council had awarded the Gold Medal of the Institution and the First Trench Gascoigne Prize of Thirty Guineas to Wing Commander P. de L. le Cheminant of the Royal Air Force.

The Chairman then presented the Prize.

The Secretary announced that the Second Prize of Twenty Guineas had been awarded to Colonel L. W. G. Hamilton and the Third Prize of Ten Guineas to Group Captain J. N. Tomes, R.A.F., neither of whom was able to be present.

CHESNEY GOLD MEDAL

THE CHAIRMAN: To me personally, and I feel certain to all of you present, it will probably be one of the happiest and most pleasant items which we have before us—the presentation of the Chesney Gold Medal.

The Chesney Gold Medal was instituted in 1899 as part of a memorial to a very distinguished Royal Engineer, General Sir George Chesney, and since that year it has been awarded on twenty occasions—I quote the original wording—"to the author of original literary work treating with naval or military science and literature which has a bearing on the welfare of the British Empire." It might interest you to know that the first to receive the Medal was Captain A. T. Mahan of the United States Navy, and the last, in 1950, was Sir Winston Churchill.

The award this year will, I feel quite certain, have your unqualified approval. The Council have unanimously decided to award the Medal to a writer whose works are well known to you all and which clearly fulfil the original conditions which I have read out.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to ask Sir Arthur Bryant to accept this Chesney Gold Medal. (*Applause.*)

SIR ARTHUR BRYANT: I am deeply touched and honoured that you should have thought me worthy of this great and historic award. In one of my capacities I am a keeper of cows, and on the day upon which I received your kind invitation to attend here and receive this beautiful medal, it happened that my desk was even more

crowded and confused than usual. I had a number of papers to send off to my octogenarian mother in the country about our cows, and by mistake the invitation found its way into the packet addressed to her. Two nights later, after I had been searching everywhere for the letter, she telephoned me. Now, we have a Jersey cow that has recently qualified for an 'Order of Merit.' There is only one normal award higher than that in the Jersey cow world, which is a Gold Medal—one far beyond our present capacity—and my mother, being a little short-sighted and, having read the letter which had been sent to her by mistake, said to me with great excitement over the telephone, "Darling, it is wonderful news about the cow getting the Gold Medal!" I was forced to explain that it was not the cow but only her son who had been given one!

Although it is not my milk-yield but merely my word-yield that has been thought worthy of this great award, there is no body of men on earth from whom I would sooner receive praise than those who are the trustees of the history of the three fighting Services. That history, as I see it, is the chronicle of all that is finest and noblest in our national tradition—not only of those with the highest standards of selflessness, comradeship, self-command, discipline, and courage, but with, what is much more important, a consistent record of living up to those standards. The historic role of our Navy, Army, and Air Force is summed up in Virgil's noble line, "to impose the way of peace, to spare the subject, and to wear down the proud." The record of that great work is enshrined in their corporate memories, strengthened by every act of courage and self-sacrifice performed by their members. To help preserve the immortality of noble deeds is part of the work of this great Institution—a work in which a mere pedlar of words can be humbly grateful for being allowed in some small measure to share.

I can only express my gratitude and pride that you should have thought me worthy of this great award, one which was conferred, among many other great men, upon one to whom, I feel, this Country has never given his full meed of praise—John Fortescue, the historian of the British Army. (*Applause.*)

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES ROBB: We have had a message from our retiring Chairman to say how sorry he is not to be present here this afternoon, and we have also heard that fine statement from him read out by General Gale. Throughout his term of office, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Power has taken an active interest in the Institution. I know something of the amount of work which he carried out in connection with the all-important lecture programme. I should like to assure him how much we have appreciated during this past year his personal interest, his wise advice, and his unfailing courtesy.

It is my privilege to propose with the same real sincerity which he displayed on this similar occasion last year:

"That the thanks of the Meeting be accorded to the retiring Chairman."

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JULIAN GASCOIGNE: I have very much pleasure in seconding that resolution.

The resolution was carried unanimously, with acclamation.

The Meeting then terminated.

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